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PART I

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION UNDER
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

1

INTRODUCTION

On January 15\ 1995, a new international economic organization came into being.
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), of which the tenth anniversary
recently passed, marks "a watershed moment for the institutions of world economic
relations reflected in the Bretton Wood system." 1 Through a decade of existence, the
WTO has grown into a "common institutional framework for the conduct of trade
relations," 2 serving to "develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system."3

Like many international economic organizations that emerged after World War II, the
WTO is a treaty-established inter-governmental institution.4 "Treaties are often an
awkward albeit necessary method of designing institutions needed in t<?day's
interdependent world."

The WTO was founded by the Marrakesh Agreement

Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter as the "WTO Agreement"),
treaty adopted by 124 nation states plus the European Community (EC) at Marrakesh,
Morocco on 15 April 1994. With a length of 25, 000 pages and enormous impacts,
the WTO Agreement has been the heaviest and most important treaty system ever
since the adoption of the United Nations Charter of 1945.5 Although its formal text
takes no more than 10 pages to address merely institutional issues, the WTO
Agreement has actually developed a legal complexity, first through its inclusion in the

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (hereinafter as the "Final Act''), the latter includes 28 more Ministerial
Decisions, Declarations and one Understanding related to the WTO Agreement, and
1

John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation or Cautious Small Step
Forward? THE WORLD ECONOMY 18 (1995).
2

3
4

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. II: 1.
/d. Preamble.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POUCY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS 32 (2d ed. 1997).
5

ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATTIWTO DISPUTE SEITLEMENT SYSTEM 45 (1997)_

2

also through its four elaborate annexes that contain additional 29 Agreements and
Understanding to regulate a variety of trade and trade-related areas.

6

This

comprehensive treaty package - usually called the "WTO agreements" (different from
the above "WTO Agreement") or "Uruguay Round agreements," or simply, the "WTO
treaty" or "1994 Uruguay Round treaty" - is at the core of an emerging body of
multilateral rules for trade, the latter nowadays is widely recognized as "the law of the
WTO" or "WTO law."

The law of the WTO has its roots in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of

1947 (hereinafter as the "GATT 1947" or "GATT'). Signed by 12 developed and 11
developing economies on October 30th, 1947, the GATT 1947 played a dual role for
over four decades as both a primer multilateral trade agreement and a de facto
principal institution for international trade. 7 Having been applied on a provisional
basis,8 the GATT treaty set forth a "liberal trade philosophy" that had imposed f~ur
primary legal obligations on the "contracting parties." These four "pillars" of the
GATT included:
(1) Unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) obligation;
(2) National treatment (NT) obligation;
(3) Binding tariffs obligation; and
(4) Elimination of import quotas obligation.9

Meantime, above primary obligations were subject to certain exceptions prescribed in
the GATT provisions, such as the balance-of-payment relief, safeguard measures, as
well as the measures concerning public health, safety or national security (Article XX

6

7

/d.

RAJ BHALA, WORlD TRADE LAW: TIIE GATI-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S.

LAW 1 (1999).
8

Amelia Porges, The Ma"akesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE

WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TilE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEwORK FOR TIIE 21ST CENTIJRY AND

U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 66 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
9
BHALA, Supra note 7, at 4.

3

and XXI).I 0 In early 1995, the birth of the WTO brought an end to the GATT
institution, while the GATT treaty obligations continued by incorporating the text of
the GATT 1947 into the "GATT 1994," as part of "Annex 1A" of the WTO
Agreement. II Thus, the GATT treaty became an integral part of the law of the WTO,
and the latter is therefore often referred to as the "GATTIWTO law."

The creation of the GATT as a de facto multilateral trade organization in late 1940s
somehow established the institutional framework for the law of the GATT/WTO.
Having filled the vacuum left by a still-born International Trade Organization (ITO),
the GATT operated as a principal multilateral trade institution by its CONTRACTING
PARTIES, which referred to the contracting parties of the GAIT using their power to
"act jointly."12 More significantly, the GATT developed a "reasonably sophisticated"
(if not perfect) dispute-settlement process through its five decades of institutional
practice. 13 Along with this achievement were eight multilateral trade negotiati~n
"rounds" accomplished under the GAIT auspices, and the latest one, so-called
"Uruguay Round," gave birth to the WTO. The then newly-born multilateral trading
organization bears an institutional continuity of the GAIT for it is required to "be
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and bodies established in the framework
of GATT 1947."I4 Despite the uncertainty with the binding nature of the wording "be
guided by," it has been clear that the GAIT practice imposed enormous implications
for the WTO institution as well as for the multilateral trading rules evolving thereafter.

Still, however, the birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO) marked a watershed
for the substantive expansion and institutional evolution of WTO law. On the one
hand, under comprehensive WTO agreements, a large part of treaty obligations serve
10

Id. at 5.

11

JACKSON, Supra

12

13
14

note 4, at 48-49.
Porges, Supra note 8, at 67.
JACKSON, Supra

note 4, at 3.

Marrakesh Agreement, Supra note 2, Art. XVI:I.

4

to address the new areas like trade in services, protection of intellectual property
rights and investment, which significantly expands the substance ofWTO law. On the
other hand, with the advent of the WTO, a "genuine" international institution had first
come out merely for trade issues, aiming to "facilitate the implementation,
administration and operation, and further objectives" of its comprehensive treaty
system. To this end, the WTO particularly affords "a stronger, more rule-oriented
dispute settlement process" based upon a single WTO legal instrument,

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(hereinafter as the "DSU"). Over a decade of practice in enforcing and interpreting
the "covered agreements," the WTO's DSU-based dispute settlement mechanism has
significantly enhanced the institutional dimension of WTO law as a "real law," 15
making WTO legal regime a dynamic legal system towards its maturity and integrity.

Completion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO did not end the
evolution of WTO law. Since 1995, the WTO has held six Ministerial Conferences,
with the forth in Doha, Qatar on November 2001 set the agenda for a new round of
trade negotiations ("Doha Round") on a range of subjects and other work concerning
agriculture, cotton, services, TRIPs, investment, etc. 16

Since then, the original

mandate of the Doha Conference for trade negotiations has been refined by work at
CancUn. in 2003, Geneva in 2004, and Hong Kong in 2005. 17 The ongoing Doha
Round is now taking the WTO system further in its directions, where negotiators
continue to pursue agreements in various other subjects, e.g., environmental
protection, telecommunications. This suggests an even increasing expansion of treaty
norms under the WTO auspices, as well as the accelerating advancement of the WTO

15

JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2d ed. 1980). According to Professor

Raz, the

law is observed to have three features as being "normative, institutional and coercive."
16

World Trade Organization, Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, implementation and

development, at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop e/dda e/dda e.htm.
17

/d. at http://www.wto.org/Englishltratop e/dda e/negotiations summary e.htm.
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dispute settlement mechanism, 18 both contributing significantly to the evolution of
WTOlaw.

The above review highlights the substantive and institutional dimension of the law of
the WTO in a historical context. To conceive of this emerging body of rules for
international trade, one should further explore its definition, sources and nature, as
elaborated in the remainder of this part (Part 1). The succeeding discussions begin
with the definition of the law of the WTO. According to Professor Hart, "definition is
primarily a matter of drawing lines or distinguishing between one kind of thing and
another, which language marks off by a separate word." The appropriate definition
entails the availability of "a form of words which can always be substitute for the
word defined." 19 To make it clear, "there should be a wider family of things or genus,
about the character of which we are clear, and within which the definition locates
what it defines."20 As for the definition of the law of the WTO, the best applicable
genus will be "public international law."

Accordingly, the first chapter (Chapter 1) of the present part examines the relationship
between the law of the WTO and public international law, and concludes that the law
of the WTO is part and parcel of public international law, or, more precisely, a
specialized area of public international law concerned with international trade. For
this reason, the sources and nature of WTO law must be examined within a greater
corpus of public international law, based on the general rules of the latter. Also, as
part and parcel of public international law, WTO law is never a self-contained, but
always an open, dynamic legal system evolving under public international law. Only
with these in mind will one be able to grasp a sound structure of the law of the WTO.

18

John H. Jackson, International Econoimic Law in Times That are Interesting, 3 No1 J. INT'L ECON. L.

3-14 (Mar. 2000).
19

H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 13 (2d ed. 1994).

20

/d. at 15.

6

The second chapter (Chapter 2) elaborates the sources of the law of the WTO by
referring to a commonly used "inventory" of the sources of international law that
covers treaties, customary law, general principles of law, as well as judicial decision
and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. The sources of WTO law
generally fit this inventory, with their hierarchical status distinguished accordingly.
The final chapter (Chapter 3) explores the nature of the law ofthe WTO, particularly
in the context of Hart's concept of a legal system. It then draws the distinction
between the "treaty obligations" and "secondary legal obligations" under the WTO
auspices.

7

CHAPTER 1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WTO LAW AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Public international law (sometimes known as the "law of nations") is a system of law
primarily concerned with the relations between states, though nowadays the subject
also extends to rights and duties pertaining to individuals, companies and international
organizations depending on the situation. 21 Notably, there is another distinct subject
related to that of public international law, called "private international law" (or the
"conflict of laws" in the Anglo-American legal tradition), which is concerned with
rights arising in private law and enforceable by individuals against each other. 22
According to many international law scholars, in this chapter and other related ones
through the present study, the term "public international law" is interchangeable with
its abbreviated tile "international law."

Much has been said and written about the interrelations between international law and
WTO law, especially the extent to which WTO law should be receptive to other rules
of international law. This chapter turns to examine the relationship between the two
systems particularly in terms of treaty norms and dispute settlement mechanism.

I.

The law of the GATT/WTO is Part and Parcel of Public International
Law

It has now been widely recognized that the law of the GATI/WTO is part and parcel

of public international law. From a historical perspective, institutional evolution from
the GATT (as a de facto multilateral trade organization) to the WTO appears
indispensable to the emergence ofGATIIWTO legal regime, and this process in-deed
reflects one significant feature of modem public international law in the post-World
21

JOHN O'BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2001).

22

/d. at 2.

8

War

n

era, highlighting the predominant role of international organizations in

. world 1aw." 23
"formmg

24

Back to 1940s when the World War ll came to an end, international organizations
began to play a significant role in extending the horizon of international law and
considerably modifying its nature.

25

These were certain variations of international

law, which largely expanded its landscape. Among them was the "Bretton Woods
System," originally consisting of three principal governmental economic institutions,
namely, the GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the
International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD) or World Bank, and
serving to

accomplish international

cooperation for

free

trade,

economic

reconstruction and financial security. In early 1995, when the WTO came into being
to replace the GATT, it was seen to fill up the "missing leg" of the "Bretton Wood
stoo1." 26

Being a comprehensive multilateral institutional framework, the "Bretton Woods
System" has operated to establish and enhance an "international economic law" which,
according to Professor John Jackson, "would embrace trade, investment, and services
when they are involved in transactions that cross national borders, and those subjects
that involve the establishment on national territory of economic activity of persons or
firms originating from outside the territory."27 International economic law appears to
be largely overlapped with (if not subject to) a broad concept of public international
law. Equally, within the "Bretton Woods System," the three constituent institutions
are seen closely linked to three respective specialized areas of internationallaw. 28 In
23

/d. at 736. Cite, G. Clark and LB Sohn.

24

/d. at 39.

25

/d. at 39-42.

26

JACKSON, supra note

27

/d. at25.

28

O'BRIEN, supra note 21, at 614. "As for other two institutions ... as the IMF was designed to secure

4, at 32.

the stability of exchange rate, the work of IMF is usually described as comprising the topic of
International Monetary Law. As the IBRD (or World Bank) was designed to promote reconstruction

9

terms of the GATT/WTO institution, given its objectives to promote free trade, the
work under the WTO/GATT auspices is normally deemed part of "international trade

1aw.

,29

Like international economic law, international trade law contains both public law and
private law dimensions, representing a much broader category of international norms
"concerned with the flow of goods and services across the border," regardless of its
relation with public or private rights. 30 Although it is not uncommon to treat
contemporary international trade law as being embodied in the GATT/WTO legal
regime, 31 the latter merely represents the public law dimension of international trade
law. The reasons are simple: subjects of public international law are primarily the
nation-states, despite some special occasions where individuals, companies or
international organizations may be involved therein.

The GATTIWTO system

simplifies this issue in the sense that the GATI/WTO legal rules only apply to the
governments of their Member States.

During the GATT era, the range of application of GATT treaty was limited to the
governments of the "contracting parties." The WTO treaty adopts this practice by
imposing legal obligations upon Member States. 32 So long as the nation states
contract with each other, which has been the case with GATT/WTO Memberships,
"they do so automatically and necessarily within the system of public international
law." 33 Thus, the law evolving from the WTO/GATI system is "no more than a
specialized branch of public international law" concerned with trade and trade-related
by facilitating capital investment, the activities of the World Bank Group are usually described as
falling within International Development Law."
29 /d..
30

!d. at 619. This is also true for international economic law and its other two divisions, namely,

International Monetary Law and International Development Law.
31

32

David Palmeter, The WTO as A Legal System, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 444 {2000).
JACKSON, supra note 4, at 53-54.

33

Joost Pauwelyn, The Role ofPublic International Law: How Far Can We Go? 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 3
(July 2001).
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a:ffairs."34 For the same reason, it might be inappropriate to treat the WTO/GATT
legal regime as the equivalent of international trade law, given the latter's "mixed"
legal nature in both private and public international law sense. Otherwise this may
somehow obscure the "pure" nature of the law of the WTO as a new variation of
public intemationallaw,35 although it is indisputable that the law of the WTO is at the
core of international trade law.

The above historical perspective indicates that the GATTIWTO law emerged from the
landscape of modem public international law, and has ever since grown into an
indispensable part of this landscape. Besides, there is an institutional perspective,
given that WTO law must be scrutinized in the context of international law. The
WTO is an international governmental organization, with a range of organs and
responsibilities plus an "international legal personality." Viewed as little different
from other international law institutions, the WTO falls into the ambit of
"international institutional law," 36 a major field of public international law.

It is

therefore una:ffordable to isolate the law evolving through the GATTIWTO system
from public international law.

Also, the "constitution" of the WTO (WTO Agreement) is a treaty, under which legal
obligations applicable to each Member State are treaty obligations.

On some

occasions, the term "WTO" does not directly refer to the institution itself, but to its
comprehensive treaty system. As contended by the WTO's Appellate Body in the
Japan Alcohol case, "[t]he WTO is a treaty - the international equivalent of a ...

contract. . . . The Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the

34

Donald M. McRae, The WTO in International Law: Traditional Continued or New Frontier? 3 Nol J.

INT'L ECON. L. 27, 28-29 (Mar. 2000). Also, Ff 8.
35

In reality, however, some scholarly texts imply that international trade law primarily refers to a set of

legal regimes developed under the GAIT/WTO system, called as the "rules" or "law" of the GAIT or
the WTO. Others even see international trade law as exchangeable with "WTO law" or the "GAIT
law."
36

McRae, supra note 34, at 28.
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benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise
their sovereignty according to the commitments they made in the WTO Agreement."37
Treaties are automatically born into the system of public international law, much the
same way as private contracts are automatically born into a system of domestic law,38
not to mention that treaties constitute the major primary source of public international
law. To the WTO treaty system, which is at the core of the WTO law, this is no
exception.

More importantly, WTO agreements themselves draw from public international law,
despite the fact that many negotiators of those treaties did not bear it in mind in their
drafting process.39 Under Article 3.2 of the DSU, the "covered agreements" of the
WTO are to be interpreted and applied "in accordance with the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law," which indeed indicates the drafters' intent
to view the WTO within the mainstream of public international law.

40

Also, it is

worth noting the WTO dispute settlement process, given its essential role as that of
many other international adjudicating bodies, the latter range from the traditional one
like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to new ones like the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 41 Despite some procedural differences in the
jurisdiction and operation of above adjudicating bodies, judicial nature of the task of a
WTO panel or the Appellate Body is basically the same as that of other international
tribunals. 42 This similarity makes the WTO dispute settlement mechanism a worthy
study in the field of international dispute settlement, another major subject of public
international law, not to mention the essential role of this mechanism in paving the
"institutional dimension" ofWTO law.

37

Appellate Body Report, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage, WT/DS8/ABIR 15 (Oct. 4, 1996).

38

Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 2.

39

/d.

40

McRae, supra note 36.
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/d. at31.
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/d. at31-32.
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Jn sum, in a historical, institutional, textual and substantive context, GATT/WTO law
has been incorporated into the corpus of international law, ever since it emerged from
the landscape of modem public international law. In this particular connection, the
law of the WTO can be treated as nothing more than the integral part of international
law. Further more, it is appropriate to take international law as the genus ofWTO law,
viewing the latter from an international law perspective. According to some scholars,

"[p]rinciples of international law, we are reminded by panels and the Appellate Body,
are valid for the WTO and form the basis of the relations between and among WTO
members.'.43 This observation suggests an approach of applying general concepts,
rules and principles of international law to WTO law, especially concerning its
fundamental dimensions, e.g., sources of law, legal nature, legal interpretation, as well
as its relationship with the internal legal system of each WTO Member.

The remainder of the present part (Part I) is devoted to an exercise as such, proving
that the GATT/WTO law is neither a "close" nor a "self-contained" legal regime. On
the contrary, it has been and will continue to be open to the broader landscape of
public international law.

Particularly, under certain prescribed conditions,

international law rules will serve to fill up the "gaps" left by the existing WTO treaty
system. In this sense, international law has enriched the law of the WID, and will
continue to achieve more in this regard.

II.

The Law of the WTO Represents Certain "New Frontiers" of Public
International Law

It is one thing to see the GATTIWTO law as part and parcel of public international
law, and quite another to assert that there is nothing special about this emerging body
oflegal norms in the realm ofpublic internationallaw. 44 The law ofthe GATTIWTO
43

Thomas Cottier & Krista N. Schefer, Good faith and the protection of legitimate expectations in the
WTO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN lNlERNATIONAL EcONOMIC LAW 48 (Marco Bronkers, eds., 2000).
44
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is more than a "continued tradition" of public internationallaw.45 It has created some
"new frontiers" for that classic subject in both a theoretical and practical context.46

Theoretically, public international law is essentially based upon the concept of
sovereignty of states, while the GA1TIWTO law is based on an economic theory
(principle of comparative advantage) underlying a liberal trade order.

Under a

sovereignty-based regime, states will, due to citizenship and nationality, protect the
interests of the "insiders" even at the expense of the "outsiders".

Under the

GATT/WTO legal regime, pursuit of "national interests" can be seen as
"protectionism" and at variance with the notion of the liberal trader order on which
the WTO is founded. 47 Since WTO law still exists within the framework of a
sovereignty-based system of international law, a tension between the claims to state
sovereignty and those to international disciplines of trade undertaken by the
GA1TIWTO law, will become the sources of numerous problems occurring in the
field of international trading system. 48

Despite the above inherent theoretical conflicts, by "thickening" the "rule of law"
nature, the GATTIWTO law has gradually overcome the "sovereignty obstacles" to its
underlying liberal trade philosophy. Rapid expansion of world trade as the result of
trade liberalization is regarded as a big contribution to the growing independence of
the world economy. Thus, private interests are increasingly affected by the forces
from abroad, inevitably calling for more citizen participations and political democracy
in the processes of international economic policy.49 For international trading system,
there has been an evolution from a "power-oriented" approach to a "rule-oriented
approach," 50 where the role of the sovereignty or "economic sovereignty" (analogue
45

McRae, supra note 34, at 27-28.

46

/d. at 29-30.

47

/d. at 29.

48

/d. at41.

49
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JACKSON, supra note 4, at 111.

/d. at 110-111.
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to the sovereignty in economic sphere) as the foundation of international law has
gradually decreased and faded.5 1

Meanwhile, upon the creation of the WTO, the GAITIWTO trading system has
developed towards the "rule of law," especially in the aspects of "rule
implementation" and dispute settlement. 52 Over the past decades, enhancement of
"international rule of law" in the WTO context has led to certain breakthroughs to the
"sovereign nature" of public international law. As a result, GAITIWTO law has
turned into some "new frontiers" of public international law.

In a practical context, evolution of the WTO dispute settlement has extended the

horizon of the "new frontiers" of public international law. Generally, "an active
process of dispute settlement, in which international law is argued, applied, and
refined, can make contributions to both procedural and substantive aspects of
international law." This is particularly true for the WTO dispute settlement process,
which first serves to resolve individual disputes in the application of the "covered
agreements" within the scope of the DSU, but also goes further. The WTO dispute
settlement process is "unique" for its judicial nature. Being obligatory to all WTO
Members, the process makes its results both final and binding upon the latter. In this
judicial decision-making process, applying WTO agreements is rather an active, lawcreating process, where the concepts and doctrines of international law may be refined
through authoritative interpretations of the WTO panels or the Appellate Body. 53

While the WTO is a treaty-established institution and a treaty-based legal regime, the
meanings of WTO treaty norms can only be clarified and articulated by the
adjudicating organ available to the WTO system. Through the efficient WTO dispute
settlement process, treaty law and judicial decision-making merge well. Rulings of
SIM

cRae, supra note 34, at 29-30.

52
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the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) play a more significant role than their
relegation traditionally prescribed as a "subsidiary source of international law" under
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ. Thus, development of public international
law within the WTO dispute settlement process maintains a much faster pace than has
occurred under other existing international legal institutions. 54

Accordingly, the law of the GATTIWTO does, and will continue to represent certain
"new frontiers" of public international law. With its "rule of law" feature increased,
WTO law significantly enhances the "international rule of law," the latter is deemed
as a "new frontier" of modem public international law for its achievement in
resuming a "natural law" tradition.

Apparently, efficient operation of the WTO

dispute settlement process accelerates the development of international dispute
settlement process in both procedural and substantive dimensions, and thus has
refined the concepts and doctrines of public international law as a whole. 55 • This
functioning is deemed to have expanded the "new frontiers" of public international
law.

As the GATTIWTO law evolves towards its maturity and integrity, public

international law will remain a dynamic rather than static legal system.

In a word, the relationship between the law of the WTO and public international law

is "two-folded," while the interaction between the two systems can be seen as a
continuing process of "cross-fertilization." 56 WTO law is part and parcel of public
international law on the one hand, and represents certain "new frontiers" of the latter
on the other. Without a position as such, one may feel difficult - if not impossible -

to obtain a sound perception ofWTO law.

54

/d. at40.
ss !d. at30.
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Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 26.
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CHAPTER 2 SOURCES OF THE LAW OF THE WTO

A simple question "what is the law of the WTO?" will invite numerous complex
issues. With its "genus" (public international law) available in previous discussions,
definition of WTO law still calls for some further explorations. While there is no
doubt that WTO law is part and parcel of international law, issues may go further as:
What does the WTO law look like? How to establish it and by what criteria? What
would be the outcome? All these issues are concerned with the "sources oflaw."

"Sources of law" are involved in "some accepted criteria by which 'laws' are
established" in a legal system. They either supply the substance of the rules of law
(as "material sources"), or give them the force and nature of law (as "formal
sources"). 57 Within a national legal system, sources of law can be easily _identified
when they are prescribed in a written constitution, or based on a distinct allocation of
power among legislative, judicial and executive branches of the government. 58 This
reflects the functioning ofthe "rules of recognition" within a legal system.

In terms of international law, identifying its sources appears uneasy, for international
law is regarded as a "primitive legal system" in the absence of a "permanent supreme
legislative body." 59 Thus, "rules of recognition" are formulated on the basis of a
widely recognized practice of the ICJ (a primer international dispute settlement
body). 60 This practice is codified in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, providing
that:
(1) The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
57

O'BRIEN, supra note 21, at 66.

58

/d. at 65.

59

/d. at 28.

60

/d. at 33.
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rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules oflaw."61

The above provision bas long been regarded as the "most convenient summary of the
sources of internationallaw."62 The rationale behind this approach is that "whatever
deemed as the law by the competent adjudicating body through its application would
be law," where the perspectives of the adjudicating body is at the center, just like
those of the ICJ in this case.

The results are an "inventory" of the sources of

international law, covering four categories as follows:
(1) Treaties;
(2) Customary law;
(3) General principles of law; and
(4) Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.

Among these four categories, the first two are "primary sources" of international law
without hierarchical difference, although "in the event of a direct conflict a treaty
provision (unless it violated a rule of jus cogens) would prevail over a customary
rule." The third category serves to "fill gaps in treaty and customary law" and can be
treated as the "subordinate source" of international law." 63

Nevertheless, it is

arguable that these three categories are "parallel" sources in that they all belong to the
"formal sources" from which international law derives its force and validity. 64
Namely, all these categories include the rules of international law that are "likely"
61

Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ reads that: ''The decision of the Court has no binding force except

between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
62
O'BRIEN, supra note 21, at 65-66.
63
/d. at 68.
64
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binding in nature and contain the force of general application.

As for the fourth category, it does not contain such binding force. Particularly, Article
38 (l){d) expressly denies the binding nature of ')udicial decisions" by referring to
Article 59 of the same Statute.

Also, Article 38(1)(d) regards both ')udicial

decisions" and "teaching of the most qualified publicists" as "subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law." Thus, these two sources of law are qualified as
evidentiary of the existing rules of international law and as such also constitute the
"material sources" from which only the matter (substance) of international law
derives, 65and appear to be the "subordinate source" of international law.

As part and parcel of international law, the law of the WTO may adopt the above
"inventory" for identifying its own sources of law. However, the WTO has in itself
been a "mini" but integrated legal system, as viewed from the perspective of Professor
Hart's doctrine of a legal system, and will in all respects be comparable to the legal
system represented by international law. Especially, the WTO legal system features a
highly efficient DSU-based dispute settlement process, where a single Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) is designed to "establish panels, make rulings and
recommendations and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations
under the covered agreements." In this context, the DSB turns out to be analogous to
the ICJ within the WTO legal system, while the DSU can be seem as an analogy of
the Status of the ICJ. Thus, the sources of WTO law deserve a better articulation than
by simply adopting the "inventory" designed for international law.

Following the rationale behind the approach proposed by Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the ICJ, an exercise to locate the sources of WTO law should start with the DSU,
WTO equivalent of the Statute of the ICJ that spells out the "rules of recognition." It
is observed that the DSU contains no explicit enumeration analogous to Article 38 (1)

65/d.
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ofthe statute of the ICJ. Alternatively, Article 3.2 and Article 7 of the DSU establish
some criteria for identifying the sources of WTO law. Under Article 3.2, part of the
purposes of the WTO 's dispute settlement process is to "clarify" the provisions of the
WTO Agreement "in accordance with customary rules of international law." Under
Article 7, the ''terms of reference" for panels serve to "examine, in the light of the
relevant provisions in the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute, the
matter referred to the DSB'' and to "address the relevant provisions in any covered
agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the disputes!'

66

Were Article 3.2 and Article 7 of the DSU viewed as the "WTO substitute" for Article
38{1) of the Statute of the ICJ, the sources of WTO law would be limited to the
"covered agreements" and "other agreements" invoked by the parties in the WTO's
dispute settlement process. 67 As these "agreements'' fall within the category of
"treaties," primary source of international law, from the outset, WTO law refers to the
comprehensive treaty system under the WTO auspices, with the above "covered
agreements" taking a lead.

Nevertheless, the sources ofWTO law are not limited to international treaties. As part
and parcel of public international law, WTO law shares the four categories of the
sources of international law as defined in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.
There are also increasing needs to extend jurisprudential basis of the WTO beyond· the
limits of the WTO treaty texts. 68 Therefore, the other three categories of international
law, namely, custom, general principles of international law, as well as judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, are "potential
sources" of WTO law. 69 All these four categories will be elaborated in the WTO
context in the ensuing sections.
66
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1.

Treaties

Under Article 38(l)(a) of the Statute of the ICJ, the first category of the sources of
international law is "international conventions," also categorically known as
"treaties." Under Article 2(1)(a) ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties,
a "treaty" is an "international agreement" concluded between states in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in one or more instruments or
whatever its particular designation. Here the term "instruments" may have other
names, such as, "protocols."70

Treaties impose legal obligations upon the parties (nation states) to these treaties.
Depending on the nature of these legal obligations, treaties can be categorized as the
"law-making treaties" and "treaty contracts." Law-making treaties "will purport to
lay down general rules, will be multilateral in character, and the observance of rules
will not dissolve other treaty obligations." In the absence of a legislative body under
international law, multilateral law-making treaties are usually employed to stipulate
common rules for future and continuing observance. In contrast, "treaty contracts"
are those treaties that resemble contracts, with their performance leading to
dissolution oflegal obligations concerned.71

Both law-making treaties and treaty contracts are "international conventions" within
the scope of Article 38(l)(a), where law-making treaties are "general" in nature and
treaty contracts are "particular." They both come within the category of "formal
sources of international law," imposing legal obligations upon the parties involved.72
However, it is important to distinguish one from the other, for legal obligations and
rights deriving respectively from these two legal sources appear different in character,
70
71

72
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and therefore bear different legal implications.

1.

1994 Uruguay Round Agreements

As a treaty-established international organization, the WTO is equipped with a

comprehensive treaty system, which is deemed to be the "fundamental source of law
of the WTO.'m Major body of this treaty system refers to "1994 Uruguay Round
agreements," the results of 1986-1994 Uruguay Round negotiations that were signed
at the Marrakesh Ministerial Conference in April 1994. As a terminological matter,
the "1994 Uruguay Round agreements" are often called "WTO agreements." They
comprise some 60 agreements and decisions totaling 550 pages. Since then, trade
negotiations under the WTO auspices have also produced some "post-1994
agreements," e.g., Information Technology Agreement, Services Protocols and
Accession Protocols.74

The Uruguay Round agreements constitute a comprehensive treaty package,
beginning with a "single copy" of treaty document called the Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Final Act).
Attached to the Final Act is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (or, the "WTO Agreement"), together with 28 Ministerial Decisions,
Declarations, and an Understanding related to this agreement. 75 The WTO Agreement
- usually called as the "WTO Charter" - is by itself a ten-page treaty text and
confined to institutional issues regarding the establishment of the WTO, including its
scope (Article II), functions (Article III), governing structure (Article IV), status
(Article VIII), decision-making (Article IX), amendment (Article X), accession

73

Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 66, at 398.
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(Article XII), etc.

76

More significantly, the WTO Agreement explicitly outlines four important annexes
which consist of a number of "agreements and associated legal instruments" on trade
and trade-related issues. Article ll of the WTO Agreement expressly clarifies the
legal nature of these annexed agreements and legal instruments. According to Article
ll:2, Annex 1, 2, and 3 - as collectively referred to as the "Multilateral Trade
Agreements" (MTA) - are "integral part" of the WTO Agreement and "binding on all
WTO members." Article ll:3 of the WTO refers to "Plurilateral Trade Agreements"
which is also the integral part of the WTO, but binding only on the members that
accept it. This unique arrangement allows certain "flexibility" for the treaty texts to
be added or subtracted upon the changing environment of international trade over
time, and "for the evolution of institutions necessary for implementation of the rules."
The structure of the four annexes is also significant in the sense that they serve
different purposes respectively and entail different legal consequences. 77

Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement contains three multilateral agreements, namely,
Annex 1A, 1B and 1C. They address respectively three substantial areas of trade:
trade in goods, trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights. "Annex 1A" contains General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GAIT
1994) and vast "schedule of tariff concessions." Tariff schedules for each of the
major trading country (the United States, Japan, and the European Union) constitute a
volume of printed tariff listings. The GAIT 1994 comprises the revised GAIT 1947,
some new understandings, and side agreements on 12 topics ranging from agriculture
to pre-shipment inspection. 78
76
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The "side agreements," with some of them originated from the Tokyo Round and revised in the

Uruguay Round, addressed respectively twelve topics as diverse as: agriculture, application of sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade (standards), trade-related

23

According to Article II:4 of the WTO, GATT 1994 is "legally distinct from" GAIT
1947. When GATT 1994 came into force upon the establishment of the WTO, GAIT
1947 as a separate legal instrument lost its force oflaw. By incorporating GAIT 1947
into its text, GAIT 1994 absorbs the treaty obligations of the former as a whole. 79
GATf 1994 contains numerous substantive rules to constrain the governments of
members from imposing or continuing a variety of measures that restrain or distort
international trade, so as to achieve the "liberal trade" goal and secure free market.
Among them three major substantive rules are worth noting: the MFN clause (Article

1), the National Treatment clause (Article III) and the ''binding tariff concessions"
clause (Article ll). Other substantive rules concern the "exceptions" to the above
three sets of legal obligations, such as the rules for national security, health and
morals, and safeguard.80

Annex 1B contains Uruguay Round General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and a series of"schedules of concessions." The GATS resulted from the negotiations
in the Uruguay Round on "services" - emerging area of trade that embraces more than
a hundred different service sectors, e.g., banking, insurance, tourism, communications,
legal, transport, etc). It is observed that trade in services takes a larger portion of
international and national markets. The GATS contains a body of multilateral rules to
"inhabit a growing tendency of the governments to limit competition in services with
restrictions and protectionist measures." Many of these rules are comparable to those
of the GAIT, including the analogies of the National Treatment clause, transparency
clause and the exceptions on safeguard, health, morals and national security. Other
substantive rules address the issues on subjects like competition and monopoly policy
investment measures, implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (dumping), implementation of
Article VII of the GATT 1994 (valuation), preshipment inspection, rules of origin, import licensing
procedures, subsidies and countervailing measures, and safeguards.
79
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(antitrust).

81

Annex 1C contains Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of

Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS}, designed to ensure the governments of members
to provide for certain "minimum level of protection" of a variety of intellectual
property rights, such as patents, copyrights, industrial designs, trademarks, and the
like. The TRIPS equally contains the analogies to the substantive rules of the GATT
on MFN treatment, National Treatment, transparency and various exceptions. Also,
the TRIPS comprises the obligations imposed on the governments of members to
provide civil and administrative procedures and remedies for the right-holders to
pursue. More remarkably, by incorporating the provisions of some major intellectual
property treaties (such as the Berne Convention on copyrights, Paris Convention on
patents, etc.}, the substantive rules of the TRIPS are largely enriched,

~aking

this

agreement an open and dynamic legal regime within the WTO. 82

Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement contains Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules

and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which comprises most
WTO rules for dispute settlement. The DSU establishes a unitary dispute settlement
mechanism for all the agreements listed in Annex 1, Annex 2 and Annex 4 of the
WTO Agreement (collectively as the "covered agreements"). Although the "covered
agreements" do not exhaust the treaty source of WTO law, they constitute the
essential part of the WTO treaty system available to the WTO dispute settlement
process.

Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement establishes a Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM) for reviewing and reporting the overall trade policies of each WTO member
on a periodic and regular basis. The TPRM is rather "administrative" than "legalistic"
in nature, for it does not focus on the WTO consistency, but on the general impact of
81
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the trade policies on the examined Members and their trading partners within the
WTO.s3

According to Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement, the above three annexes are integral
part of the WTO Agreement, collectively termed "Multilateral Trade Agreements"
(MTA). Both the WTO Agreement and its annexed MTA are "binding on all WTO
members," and therefore create substantive and procedural legal obligations, which
are multilateral in nature. As "formal sources" ofWTO law, WTO Agreement and the
annexed MTA agreements are multilateral law-making treaties, creating common
rules for future and continuing observance in various substantive areas of trade. In
this regard, the WTO has reinforced the "single package idea" of the negotiators of
the Uruguay Round, and overcome the "fragmented feature" of the GATT 1947
("GATT as a la carte"). 84 Particularly, the overall application range of the DSU
(Annex 2) towards all Members enables the WTO to establish and maintain a unitary
dispute settlement mechanism, so as to ensure the consistent application and integrity
of the "covered agreements," especially in terms of the above noted treaties.

Notably, the MTA is also a mixture of law-making treaties and treaty contracts, the
latter mainly refer to vast "schedule of tariff concession" attached to GATT 1994 in
Annex 1A, as well as comprehensive "schedules of concession" attached to the GATS
in Annex 1B. These schedules represent specific arrangements between a specific
WTO Member vis-a-vis others as a whole, creating time-framed, specific legal
obligations to be dissolved upon their performance. They appear to fall within the
category of treaty contracts, and constitute another more formal source of WTO law.

Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement originally contained four "Plurilateral agreements"
that address four respective subjects: trade in government procurement, trade in civil
aircraft, bovine meat and dairy products.
83

/d. at 220.

84
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meat and that on dairy products were terminated in 1997. Since then, Annex 4 has
remained Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA). 85 According to Article 11:3 of the WTO Agreement, these two
treaties form an integral part of the WTO Agreement specifically "for those members
that have accepted them" and only "binding on those members." Although this
"optional" nature is at odd with the "single package" philosophy of the MTA,
''Plurilateral agreements" are still the law-making treaties in that they contain rules of
general application towards the parties concerned, which impose various legal
obligations upon these parties, either in a substantive or a procedural sense. With
their mandatory nature limited to a "plurilateral" status, Annex 4 leaves some
important flexibility for the WTO to evolve and address new subjects emerging in the
future. 86

2.

Post-1994 Agreements, Protocols and Schedules of Commitments

Upon the completion of the Uruguay Round and since the birth of the WTO, the WTO
treaty system has continued to expand through six rounds of trade negotiations held
successively in Singapore, Geneva, Seattle, Doha, Cancun and Hong Kong. 87 These
rounds have resulted in the conclusion of certain "post-1994" treaties in the form of
"agreements," "protocols" and "schedules of commitments."88

In the area of trade in goods, noteworthy is the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in

Information

Technology Products

(hereinafter as

"Information Technology

Agreement'' or the "ITA"). 89 Concluded at the Singapore Ministerial Conference by
as World Trade
86

Organization, supra note 74.

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKFS, supra note 76, at 220.
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World Trade Organization, supra note 16, at
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Interestingly, a "ministerial decision" of the WTO may be termed an "agreement," and thus bring

this legal source into the category of''treaties." This may give rise to a question with regard to the
legal status of the "Doha Declaration," which remains a controversial at present.
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29 (including 15 EC Member States) WTO Members in December 1996, the ITA did
not enter into force until July 1st, 1997, when a stipulated "90 percent trade coverage
criteria" were met based on total shares of the participants of this agreement in world
trade in information technology products. 90

Serving as "solely a tariff cutting

mechanism," the ITA features vast schedule of tariff cutting for various IT products
with various fixed implementation periods. Therefore, based on its legal nature, the
ITA is a treaty contract rather than a law-making treaty. As for its binding force, the
ITA creates specific and time-frame obligations upon each participating Member. On
the MFN basis, the benefits of these obligations will accrue to all other WTO
Members. 91 Adding the ITA to the WTO treaty system has increased the formal
sources ofWTO law.

Similar development has taken place in the area of trade in services.

After the

Uruguay Round, four protocols were concluded and attached to the GATS, with two
covering financial services and the other two addressing movement of natural persons
and basic telecommunications.

They are referred to as the "Post-1994 GATS

Protocols." 92 Attached by vast "schedule of commitments," these protocols are a

mixture of law-making treaty and treaty contract. They are incorporated into the
WTO's treaty system and serve as formal sources ofWTO law.

More significantly, there have been a large number of "accession protocols" for the
Members acceding to the WTO (so-called "acceding Members) after January 15\ 1995.
Titled as "Post-1994 Accession Protocols," these agreements form an integral part of
the WTO Agreement for the acceding Member concerned.

They contain various

terms of accession which break down binding legal obligations upon the acceding
ember concerned, and these benefits accrue to all other existing Members on the MFN

90
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basis.

Depending on the particular case, the accession protocol may attach the

"schedule of commitments" for an acceding Member.

93

Thus, from an overall

perspective, "Post-1994 Accession Protocols" have become a mixture of law-making
treaty as well as treaty contract. Among these accession protocols is the Accession
Protocol on China, a most comprehensive package of this kind.

In addition, since the establishment of the WTO, "schedule of commitments" has been

on the increase as envisaged by existing WTO Members. These schedules contain the
commitments of individual Members concerned, which allow specific foreign
products or service-providers access to their domestic market. 94 Appearing as "pure"
treaty contracts, they are an integral part of the WTO Agreement for the Members
concerned, and therefore also constitute the formal source ofWTO law. -

3.

Other International Agreements

Besides the treaty system under the WTO auspices (at the core of which are the
"covered agreements"), other international agreements that exist outside the WTO
auspice may also be incorporated into the WTO treaty system, and become another
source of WTO law. 95 Treaties of this kind should fall in either of the following
categories:
1. These international agreements are explicitly referred to in the "covered
agreements" of the WTO. Typical cases include several major intellectual
property conventions referred to by the TRIPS, and the "customary rules of
interpretation of public international law" as noted in Article 3.2 of the DSU,
which actually codifies Article 31 and 32 of Vienna Convention on Law of
Treaties.

2. Parties to the said international agreements are also those to a dispute in the
93
94

95

World Trade Organization, supra note 74.
Id.
Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 66, at 409.
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WTO dispute settlement process, where these agreements are bound to largely
affect the rights and obligations of the WTO members under the "covered
agreements" of the WT0.

96

Therefore, "other international agreements" in themselves may not amount to WTO
law without condition, and will only be deemed as the treaty source of WTO law on
the limited occasions mentioned above. Even in these two categories, it will be the
"covered agreements" of the WTO that play the major role, while relevant
international agreements will serve only as a supplement. This indicates that among
the treaties sources of the WTO law, the "covered agreements" will always take the
central position.

D.

International Custom

"Custom" basically refers to the evolving and observed rules of conduct by which
''the practice has become general."97 International custom, often interchangeable with
"customary international law," is defined as the "rules of national behavior that can be
ascertained from the practice of nations when such practice reveals that nations are
acting under a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris)."98 This definition is affirmed in
Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Status, where international custom is regarded "as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."

Although international custom counts as one of the two "primary" sources of
international law, it is considered to have played a minor role in regulating current
international economic relations. 99 This is particularly true for the treaty-based legal
regime like the GATTIWTO law, evident in the most-favored-nation clause (MFN) of

96

/d. at 412 (July 1998).
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the GAITIWTO treaty, which denies either a custom or any codification of it. The
only portion of custom, which is expressly incotporated into the WTO legal regime,
lies in Article 3.2 of the DSU specifying that the putpose of the dispute settlement is
to clarify the provisions of the WTO agreements "in accordance with customary rules
ofintetpretation of public international law." Even this portion has been integrated in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and thus applied
in practice more as treaty norms. Other likely examples may be found in certain
WTO dispute settlement proceedings, such as the "precautionary principle" noted in
the BeefHormone case. But the nature of this principle as international custom seems
"plausible" in the eyes of the Appellate Body of the WTO, since the latter felt "less
than clear" whether it has been widely accepted as such. 100

In addition, recalling the wording of Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement, the
provision refers to "customary practices" of the GAIT 1947 by which the WTO is
obligated to be guided. A question has been raised whether the phrase "customary
practices" falls within the category of customary international law. Few parties to the
GAIT 1947 offered a positive answer in this regard. Nor has any WTO member done
so ever since. 101

ill.

General Principles of Law

Under public international law, general principles of law serve to "fill gaps in treaty
and customary law" and become some "subordinate source" of international law. 102
Given their function, however, general principles of law would have the same general
binding force as that of treaties and customary law, and should be capable of being
incotporated into any concrete source of law.

100
101
102
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" This proposition equally applies to WTO law, where general principles of law should
be treated as effective supplements to the source of WTO law, and incorporated into

the latter in both textual and practical sense.

Textually speaking, some general

principles of law have been incorporated into the text of WTO agreements. A typical
example concerns Article 22.4 and 22.6 of the DSU.

According to these two

provisions, the level of suspension of concessions should be proportional to the level
of the nullifications and impairment, which actually reflects the principle of
. 1'tty. 103
proportiona

For practical purpose, especially in the context of WTO dispute settlement process,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have relied on some general principles of law to
support their "legal reasoning," on occasion and even in controversial cases.
Examples in this context include:
1. the principle that an exception to a general rule should be interpreted narrowly,
which has been applied by the GATT panels in several instances before the
Appellate Body finally rejected it;
2. the equitable principle of estoppel, invoked by the WTO panel in a proceeding
involving the U.S. subsidies and countervailing measures affecting imports of
softwood lumber from Canada;
3. the interpretative principle concerned with the avoidance of the readings that
would result in reducing the whole clauses or paragraphs of a text to
"redundancy or inutility," which has been recognized several times by the
WTO's Appellate Body. 104

Still, there are now a few WTO treaty provisions that have recourse to general
principles of law, although they are only occasionally or even controversially quoted
or invoked in the WTO dispute settlement process. Thus, general principles of law
have been an essential component but merely a supplemental source of WTO law.
103

Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 66, at 408.

104
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With a rapid expansion of Members' practice in the WTO dispute settlement process,
it is expected that the chances for these principles to be adopted and applied within
the WTO system will increase steadily.

rv.

Reports of "Prior" Panels and the Appellate Body as Judicial Decisions

Within the primitive legal system represented by contemporary international law,
decisions of an adjudicating body like the ICJ are treated as "subsidiary means for
determination of rules oflaw" under Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute ofthe ICJ. These
judicial decisions fall within the category of the "subordinate sources" of international
law, since under Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ, their binding force are confined
to the parties of the particular disputes at issue. In no event will they obtain a "stare
decisis" status. Neither will they amount to any binding "precedent" as they a:e in a
full-fledged national legal system. 105 None the less, being binding as between the
parties to the dispute, and with respect to the subject matter in dispute, the principle of
"res judicata" clearly applies.

Thus, within international law system, judicial decisions contain not a controlling but
a "persuasive" force upon subsequent disputes and tribunals. 106 They are "material
sources" that merely generate the substantive matter of international law. Absent the
binding nature and the force of general application (which derive from a "formal
source" like treaties, international custom or general principles of law, etc.), these
judicial decisions may not serve as a rule of international law for general application.
However, as res judicata, they constitute a source of law as between the parties in
respect of the decided case.

This is also the case with the GATTIWTO law, the latter is part and parcel of
international law.
105
106

Ever since the GATT era, the GATTIWTO legal system has

The doctrine of "stare decisis" is even inapplicable under many mature (domestic) legal systems.
Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 66, at 401.
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developed a dispute settlement mechanism that, back to its origin in the GATT, was
already seen to be "sophisticated enough" and "work better than the World Court."
The GATT dispute settlement process was established under Article XXIII of GATT
1947, where the CONTRACTING PARTIES explained their position before a "panel
of experts" with authority to take up each particular dispute after the mid 1950s and
functioning as an adjudicating organ to investigate, recommend action, give a ruling
on the matter, and authorize suspension of concessions. 107 Until the end of 1994, over
500 disputes had been processed by the GATT panels, with 196 panel reports

.
d 108
ISSUe •

With the advent of the WTO, an integrated, more rule-based dispute settlement
mechanism came into being under the DSU.

It is designed for all parts of the

GATTIWTO system, including the post-GAIT subjects like services and intellectual
property, as well as the post-WTO subjects like information technology, environment,
etc. It furnishes "a right to appellate review" as unique to any other international
tribunals. It has been deemed as "the most developed dispute settlement system in
any existing treaty regime." 109

Within the WTO dispute settlement process, the single Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) serves as the adjudicating body to make rulings and recommendations,
maintain surveillance of their implementation and authorize suspension of concession
and other obligations under the covered agreements.

110

To make rulings and

recommendations, the DSB has the authority to establish panels, and adopt the reports
of panels and those of the Appellate Body (a standing organ to take up the appellate
review of panel reports). Unless it is adopted by the DSB, a WTO panel or Appellate
107
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34

Body report will not have any binding force upon the parties to the dispute. However,
under the DSU formulation, the adoption of these reports is almost, if not absolutely,
111
. and uncond"ti"
automatic
1 ona1.

It is then clear that in the context of GAITIWTO law, "judicial decisions" refer
exclusively to adopted reports of the GAIT and the WTO panels, as well as those of
the WTO's Appellate body. To identify the sources of WTO law, one should pay
attention to the "prior'' reports, as contrasted with the "current'' ones, with the
necessity to draw a distinction between the two. A report is deemed to be "prior" in
the sense of its being a decided case law in the previous dispute, which may be of
relevance to subsequent cases and panels. In this regard, the status of that report is
relevant to the parties of all subsequent disputes, with regard to its so-called "force of
general application." A report is deemed to be "current'' on the other hand, in the
sense of its limited binding force merely upon the parties to the particular dispute
concerned, without creating a binding precedent. In this connection, every report
imposes specific, "instant" legal obligations upon the parties to the disputes.

The "stare decisis" status of prior GAIT panel reports remained vague in terms of any
express reference in the GAIT/WTO treaties. The only likely relevant provision is
Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement, mandating the WTO to ''be guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING

111

RAJ BHALA & KEviN KENNEDY, WORlD TRADE LAW: TilE GATI-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL

ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S.

LAw 38-39 (1999). "In a remarkable volte-face from the GATI practice

that permitted a losing party to block the adoption of a panel report, a WTO panel or Appellate Body
report is adopted automatically unless the DSB disapproves the report by consensus. The DSU
guarantees the winning Member the fruits of its victory, even if all other WTO Members object to the
report. If a panel report is not appeared, the report will be adopted at a DSB meeting within 60 days
after circulation of the panel report to the members. If a DSB meeting is not scheduled within this 60day period, a special DSB meeting will be held for this purpose. An appellate Body report must be
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the dispute Members unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days after its circulation to WTO
members."
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pARTIES to GATT 1947 and bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947."112
However, the wording "be guided by" implies the existence of guidance as distinct
from the mandatory nature of the said "decisions, procedures and customary
practices" (to serve as binding precedents). The provision also fails to further specify
whether the adopted GATT panel reports fall within the category of such "decisions."

In the absence of any indication in the GATT/WTO treaty law, one may have recourse
to the results of the WTO dispute settlement process. This approach is proposed in

Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage case, where the Appellate Body asserted that
"[adopted reports] are often considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate
expectations among WTO members, and, therefore, should be taken into account
where they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with
respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute. " 113 The
Appellate Body then viewed the adopted GAIT panel reports within the meaning of
Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ, and concluded that the both led "to the same
effect." 114 Accordingly, it is clear that the "prior'' adopted GATT panel reports share
the status of ·~udicial decisions" within the meaning of Article 3 8( 1)(d) of the Statute
of the ICJ, and thus amount to "subordinate source" of the law of the WTO.

As for "prior" adopted reports of the WTO panels and Appellate Body, their "stare

decisis" status is expressly denied in Article 3.2 of the DSU, the latter provides that:
"recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements." In this context, "recommendations
and rulings" actually refer to adopted reports of the WTO panels and Appellate Body
under the formulation of the DSU.
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force. Nor are they capable of creating legal obligations and rights until and unless being adopted by
the DSB to become the "recommendations and rulings of the DSB."
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control the decisions of panels in subsequent cases. Nor do they have the same force
of general application as that of the WTO treaty. Obviously, these reports equally fall

within the category of the "judicial decisions" specified in Article 38(1)(d) of the
Statute of the ICJ, and serve as "subordinate source" of the WTO law.

Although previously adopted reports of the GATTIWTO panels and the Appellate
Body are nothing more than "non-binding precedents," their "persuasive power" is
apparent. In practice, these reports are often taken into account (or, "followed") by
panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent dispute settlement proceedings, unless
the latter may distinguish them from the instant cases, or may find them in error. The
"persuasive value" of prior reports obviously rests on the reasoning they contain.
However, behind this approach is a legal tradition of ''treating like cases alike," which
has been accounted as "an important source of legitimacy for any adjudicator." This
tradition reflects valuable attributes - continuity, consistency and efficiency - in any
legal system. 116 The WTO legal system is no exception, as it is part of public
international law.

Commentaries in the practice enhance the value of the

')urisprudence" or case law of any international adjudicating body.

It is worth drawing a distinction between the adopted reports of the WTO panels and
those of the Appellate Report in terms of their persuasive power. The "persuasive
value" of prior adopted WTO penal reports lies not only in their reasoning, but also in
their factual findings, though the latter is rare. As for the "authoritativeness" of the
adopted Appellate Body reports, subsequent WTO panels generally follow them in
much the same way that a lower court follows the decisions of a high court. The
Appellate Body in subsequent proceedings, comparatively, is often "more prone than
panels to follow its own prior decisions." In contrast with the ad hoc operation of the
WTO panels, the Appellate Body is a standing tribunal. Members of the Appellate
Body are more likely to be confronting their own collective decisions or those of their
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colleagues when they confront prior decisions especially on points of law. "1bis
relationship seems likely to lead to a stronger attachment to the reasoning and results
• •

of those declSlons.

,117

Even the Appellate Body is more likely to follow its prior decisions than to depart
from them, the opposite may happen. Where the members of the WTO disagree with
the adopted Appellate Body reports, the only way left for them to "fix the problem"
would be to change the text of the covered agreement in question. However, there is
no practical way to achieve such a "law-amending" process, making the adopted
Appellate Body reports "final" rulings on the subject.

This may inspire greater

willingness on the part of the Appellate Body - being substantially a court of last
resort- to "reexamine" its prior decisions rather than to simply ignore them. 118

The next question to consider is whether an un-adopted panel reports constitutes a
''judicial decision" in the sense of Article 38 (1) (d). In fact, an answer to this
question may be less than meaningful. Given the adopted reports of prior panels and
the Appellate Body contain only "persuasive power," the difference between the unadopted reports and adopted ones lies in the level of such power. True, the unadapted reports, as observed by the Appellate Body in Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic

Beverage case, "have no legal status in either the GATT or the WTO system since
they have not been endorsed through decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
GAlT or the WTO members." However, the Appellate Body meanwhile agreed that
they could somehow provide for certain "useful guidance" to the panels of subsequent
dispute settlement proceedings. 119 In this particular connection, it seems difficult to
measure the gap between a level to which a report may "persuade" the subsequent
WTO tribunals and that to which a report may "guide" them. Thus, un-adopted panel
reports might also serve to a much lesser degree as a "sources" of the WTO law. The
117
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WTO Tribunal and the Appellate Body should not lose sight of their previous or prior
un-adopted reports, since the reasons for their non-adoption or rejection may reveal
the parts that deserve the attention of the WTO Tribunal or the Appellate Body which
summarily dismissed them.

Regardless of their limited role in directly forming part of any source of the WTO law,
prior reports of the panels and the Appellate Body have made great contributions to
this emerging legal regime. A commentary is correct in observing that "[o]ther than
the textS of the WTO Agreements themselves, no source of law is as important in
WTO dispute settlement as the reported decisions of prior dispute settlement panels.
These include ... reports of the Appellate Body." 120

This recalls the common

awareness pointed out by Professor John Jackson, that the WTO treaty "has many
gaps and ambiguities," and "a key question facing the DS system is whether it is
appropriate and feasible to pass to it the responsibilities of correcting these gaps and
ambiguities."

As Professor Jackson further articulated, "[I]n many of these cases it would demand
that the panels and appellate body undertake tasks that would appear to be law making
rather than law applying, arguably more appropriate for a legislature that does not
exist, or negotiations that substitute for legislation. Yet the WTO rules ... impose a
number of constraints on the exercise of power. In such cases the temptation will be
stronger to overburden the DS process, despite treaty clauses also aimed at
constraining the authority of that process." Thus, it is highly expected that the reports
of panels and the Appellate Body will play an increasingly vital role in enriching the
sources of the law of the WTO.

V.

120

Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists

/d. at 400.

39

Other than judicial decisions, the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists"
are specified in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ as the other "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law." They therefore equally fall within the
category of "subordinate sources" of international law. 121 Being "subsidiary" in
nature, the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists constitute part of
"material source" which provides only the substantive matter of international law,
without touching its force or validity. 122 The way in which this category may work on
the sources of international law involves increasing occasions where it may be taken
as reference by international adjudicating bodies in particular dispute settlement
proceedings. This is also the case with the law of the WTO.

During the GAIT era, the teachings and writings of highly qualified publicists were
rarely referred to by the panels. The reluctance of the panels was attributed to the
GATf's diplomatic heritage. Writings of legal scholars were less appealing to the
diplomats than to lawyers, while the GAIT dispute settlement process was more a
diplomatic system of "conciliation" than a legal proceeding. In addition, the relative
absence of legal scholars among the panelists inevitably accounts for the relative
insignificance of the level of scholarship in their rulings. 123

Within the WTO dispute settlement process, panels and the Appellate Body are more
willing to refer to the teachings of highly qualified publicists to justify their
positions. 124 This is evident in some adopted reports of panels and the Appellate
Body in which certain most distinguished legal scholars have been cited. Take two
remarkable examples.

In the panel report on Argentina - Measures Affecting

Foodware, Texitles, Apparels and Other Items, the teachings of John H. Jackson,

Keith Hightet and Mojtaba Kazazi were cited. In the Appellate Body report on India

121
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_Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, the
teachings ofE.-U Petersmann, I. Brownile, and F. Roessler were mentioned. 125

This development is largely attributed to the "thickening legality" of the WTO system,
by which not only do panels - advised by lawyers - increasingly deal with complex
issues of law (such as standing, adequacy of notice and admissibility of evidence), the
Appellate Body also brings a legal perspective to the process, given its standard of
review confined to the issues of law and legal interpretation of panel reports. 126 As a
result, the WTO dispute settlement process becomes more "legal and adjudicative" in
nature, and the law plays an increasingly important part in this connection. With this
trend, it is likely that there will be more occasions for panels and the Appellate Body
to refer to the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists in future WTO dispute
settlement proceedings.
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CHAPTER3

NATURE OF THE LAW OF THE WTO

The law of the WTO has emerged from the landscape of modem international law
since World War II, and has ever since grown into an integral part as a "new frontier"
ofpublic international law. The nature ofWTO law, which is inextricably linked with
the nature of international law, has also been moulded in the same historical context.

The nature of international law is one of the most discussed questions by international
legal scholars. 127 After World War II, two schools of theories contributed significantly
to the transformation of the nature of modem international law. On the one hand, the
revival of "natural law" traditions, with emphasis on human rights, peaceful
resolution of disputes and avoidance of armed conflicts, the rule of law, etc., imposed
"minimum standards of state conducts" not only in contemporary treaties follQwing
the United Nations Charter (1945), but also on international adjudication such as the
trial of war criminals by the Nuremberg tribunal. 128 Consequently, the nature of
modem international law, especially in its substance, has extensively demonstrated the
traces of natural law thinking.

The law of the WTO is no exception. Natural law theories are identifiable in the
WTO treaty system. The first preamble of the WTO Agreement itself specifies the
objectives of the agreement as "raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, ...
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development, seeking ... to protect and preserve the environment ... at
different levels of economic development." The second preamble then addresses the
needs "for positive efforts designed to ensure developing countries, and especially the
least developed among them ... " All these provisions are based upon or deriving from
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"natural rights" or human rights developed under natural law theory.

Equally

remarkable, through the establishment and maintenance of a highly effective WTO
dispute settlement process, the law of the WTO has achieved the "thickening" of its
legality and advanced "international rule of law." 129 Not only bas the DSU provided
for a set of "due process-oriented" procedures, the quasi-judicial practice of the
WTO's DSB also bares fruits.

On the other band, positivism remams a significant role in identifying (if not

"defining") the nature of modem international law, although "extreme positivism"
(which places no restriction on state sovereignty) is generally responsible for the
outbreak of World War II. Positivist theories can be traced back to the 18th century
when positivism "dominated the subject" by according "with the rationalist and
optimistic spirits of the enlightenment."

In the 19th century, positivism "was

congenial to the practitioners of Realpolitik such as Cavour and Bismarck who sought
to avoid any restraints on state conduct." Obviously, the positivist theory in its very
substance is conflicted with natural law thinking, as the latter emphasizes "minimum
international standards" towards the sovereign states. However, positivist theories are
still significant in the sense that their emphasis on "pure" rules lays a ''theoretical"
foundation for the nature of law (and also international law) to be analyzed and
elucidated through a concrete conceptual frame. 130

In general, the term "positivism" represents two parallel concepts: "(1) the Austinese
theory that laws are commands; (2) the view that a clear distinction should be drawn
between law as it "is" and law as it "ought'' to be." 131 Criteria have been developed
upon both these concepts to clarify the nature of "law" and that of "international law,"
first by Austin, 132 then Kelsen, 133 and later by Hart, whose theory on a "legal system"
129
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bas been subject to considerable debates and comments. This chapter conducts a
similar exercise in the context of WTO law, namely, an examination of the nature of
the law of the WTO from the positivist perspective.

1.

The WTO as A Legal System

A positivist position - as proposed by Kelsen - holds that "it is impossible to grasp
the nature of law if we limited our attention to the single isolated rule." This position
was enhanced by Hart in his book The Concept ofLaw, stressing the significance of a
"legal system" in defining the precise nature of a law existing therein. Later, Joseph
Raz further asserted that "a theory of legal system is a perquisite of any adequate
definition of a 'law' ..." 134 All these indicate that the precise nature oflaw can only be
reached through a study of the legal system to which this law belongs to.

lbis proposition applies to the law of the WTO. As a result, two issues are essential
to an examination of the nature of WTO law.

First, what are the criteria for

identifying a legal system? Second, does the WTO (especially, its treaty system)
amount to a legal system? What if the answer is positive? Both issues are discussed
below.

1.

Hart's Theory of A Legal System

In the view of Profess Hart, an integrated concept of a "law" can be described as a
"union" of two different types of rules: primary rules and secondary rules. They both
are essential to the existence of a "modem legal system." As Hart pointed out, "most
of the features of law which have proved most perplexing and have both provoked
and eluded the search for definition can best be rendered clear, if these two types of
rules and the interplay between them are understood." The "explanatory power" of
133
134
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such union "in elucidating the concepts that constitute the framework of legal
thought" makes a study of these two types of rules a desirable start of assessing the
natureo fl aw.

135

All legal systems, regardless of their primitive or sophisticated nature, contain
primary rules that are simply "a collection of separate standards resembling rules of
etiquette" and subject to abidance. 136 In other words, primary rules function to
"regulate behavior"137 and the purpose is to "impose duties." 138 Although some of
them may be in the form of order backed by the force, primary rules do not alone
amount to a "legal system," without the procedure available for their interpretation,
enforcement and modification. 139

Secondary rules are those supplemented to the primary rules, serving to "specify the
ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced,
eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined." According
to Hart, to add these secondary rules to primary rules is "enough to convert the latter

into what is indisputably a legal system." 140 The maturity and advancement of a legal
system largely depends on the development of its secondary rules. Municipal legal
systems are often deemed as "mature" and "advanced" for its highly developed
secondary rules. International legal system is often deemed as "primitive" "because
its institutional limitations have prevented the development of a system of secondary
rules." 141

Under Professor Hart's speculations, secondary rules are categorized into three groups:

135

HART, supra note 19, at 79-81.

136

RAz, supra note 15, at 2-3.
O'BRIEN, supra note 21, at 48.

137
138

!d. at 33.

139

HART, supra note 19, at 91-93.
!d. at 94.
141
Palmeter, supra note 31, at 445.

140

45

rules of recognition, rules of adjudication and rules of change. Rules of recognition
represent a secondary rule that is "accepted and used for the identification of primary
rules of obligations." 142 In this context, Hart introduced an "insider vs. outsider''
viewpoint. From the view of those who accept a particular legal system ("insiders"),
the validity of the rules of recognition is "presupposed" as a matter of fact, when these
rules serve to determine the validity of other rules within that legal system. 143 From
the view of a non-member of a legal system ("outsider"), it may observe the rules
followed by the members and ascertain the rule of recognition by such observation. 144

In a modem municipal legal system like the United States, the constitution may serve
as the rule of recognition therein. In a primitive legal system where the constitution is
not available, the rule of recognition may be established by referring to the widely
recognized practice of an available dispute settlement organ (court) in identifying
"what is to count as law." 145 This is particularly true for international law re~e,
where Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (its premier
adjudicating body) has served as the rule of recognition to specify the sources of
international law.

Rules of adjudication represent a secondary rule that empowers authoritative
determination of possible breach or violation of primary rules, and addresses remedy
and sanctions. 146 A lack of rules of adjudication would constitute a serious "defect'' in
any legal system.

Accordingly, they are usually the first secondary rule to be

supplemented to a system of primitive rules. 147

Rules of change represent a secondary rule that empowers "deliberate" changes of
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primary rules. An alternative process would be a prolonged evolution of custom.

148

In a modem municipal legal system, the legislatures, the executive or even individuals
may be entitled to the alteration of the obligations comprised in the primary rules.

149

In a primitive legal system like public international law, alteration appears to be
problematic.

With regard to the relations among these three groups of secondary rules, where the
rules of adjudication exist, there must be the rules of recognition available, for those
who are empowered to determine the breach or violation of a primary rule "cannot
avoid employing a rule of recognition" to determine the validity of that primary
rule. 150 Similarly, the rules of recognition are inextricably linked with the rules of
change. After all, a law after its alteration "entitled by the rules of the system" would
need recognition within that system in any event. 151

It is worth noting that Hart's theory of legal system pays a particular attention to

international law. As mentioned above, Hart views international law as a ''primitive
legal system" in terms of its lack of the supreme legislature, or compulsory
jurisdiction of the adjudicating body, as well as "a centrally organized system of
sanction." All these actually imply a deficiency of advanced, developed secondary
rules. Despite these identified shortcomings of international law, Hart still deemed
international law as a "law," which just resembles a primitive law more than a law in
a municipal legal system.

Conversely, Hart also observes that international law

resembles municipal law more in its "function and content" (concerned with primary
rules), than its "form" (concerned with secondary rules). In this sense, "no other
social rules are so close to municipal law than those of intemationallaw." 152
148
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2.

The WTO as A Legal System

A positivist approach based upon Hart's theory of a legal system, has a great
significance in examining the nature of the law of the WTO. First, although his
position regarding international law as a "primitive legal system has been subject to
criticism, Hart has correctly predicted that international law, given its "evolving and
different nature," may "evolve in a manner analogous to a developed system of
municipallaw." 153 The law of the WTO is part and parcel of international law, but
also represents the "new frontier'' of international law in many respects that seem to
have achieved certain "features" of a municipal legal system (as elucidated below).
Hart's positivist approach in its fundamentals appears to keep pace with this trend.

Secondly, given that positivism stresses "free will" of sovereign states, through the
history of international law after 1945, positivist approach has been adopted
especially by "newly independent states" to "stress the role of treaties and diminish
the position of customary international law." 154 Treaty norms are obviously the
"rules" within the prevailing scope of a positivist approach. It is expected that a
special treaty regime may be more easily conceived if a positivist approach is adopted
in this regard. The WTO is a treaty-established institution, while the law of the WTO
at first sight refers to a comprehensive treaty system (WTO agreements).

It is

appropriate to adopt a positive approach in examining the nature of WTO law, with
particular focus on the WTO's treaty system.

As elucidated in previous section, treaty system under the WTO auspices constitutes
the most primary source of the WTO law. It is plain to see all legal analysis begin
there. 155 The examination of the nature of WTO law is no exception. The WTO's
In
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treaty package consists of a series of "agreements" and the associated legal
instruments, among which the "covered agreements" as specified by the DSU including the WTO Agreement and its Annex 1, 2 and 4 - takes a led. Along with
them is an increasing body of "post-1994 agreements, protocols and schedules of
commitments" that emerged and has been incorporated into the treaty package since
the inception of the WTO in early 1995. By now, most discussions and comments
concerning the law of the WTO have focused on the "covered agreements" of the

DSU, with little mentioning about the "post-1994" treaty outcome. 156 The current
exercise holds the same position as the above. A closer look is thus taken at the
covered agreements from the perspective of Hart's positivist criteria for a legal system.

A.

The WTO's Primary Rules

In the context of Hart's view of a legal system as "a fusion" of primary and secondary

rules," 157 a treaty may meet his criteria in many respects. In general, "treaty regimes
are essentially regimes of primary rules." 158 This is particularly true for the "lawmaking treaties" that serve to produce "common rules for future and continuing
observance." On most occasions, a treaty itself serves as the "ultimate rules of
recognition" from an "internal perspective" of the parties to this treaty. 159 Treaties are
also commonly seen to comprise rules of adjudication and rules of change. All these
features are shared by the WTO treaty regime, and especially duplicated in the
covered agreements of the DSU.

Like many treaty regimes, the WTO is never dearth of primary rules. Most of the
156
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WTO's primary rules lie in Annex 1 and Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement. As
discussed in the previous section, Annex 1 refers to three multilateral agreements,
namely, GATT, GATS and TRIPS. They set out numerous substantive rules for a
variety of areas concerning trade in goods, trade in services and trade-related
intellectual property rights. Being multilateral in nature, these three agreements are
binding upon all WTO members.

Annex 4 consists of two plurilateral trade

agreements, both containing a large number of substantive rules. Being "plurilateral"
in nature, both agreements are binding only upon the parties to them. Thus, both
Annex 1 and Annex 4 are mandatory in nature, with the "scope of mandate" differing
from each other. Given their concrete substance and obligatory nature, substantive
rules arising from Annex 1 and Annex 4 come within the definition of Hart's primary
rules as noted earlier. As a matter of fact, it has been recognized that the WTO
represents one of the most comprehensive collections of primary obligations under
public intemationallaw. 160

B.

The WTO's Secondary Rules

Meanwhile, the WTO features a significant proliferation of secondary rules, which, as
first mentioned by Celso Lafer, largely contributed to the "thickening of legality" of
theWT0. 161

(a)

Rules of recognition

From the perspective of a Member (insider) of the WTO, the WTO Agreement usually regarded as the "Charter'' or "Constitution" of the WTO - serves as the body
of the basic rules of recognition. This is also the case with many treaties that are
constituent instruments. The members of the WTO "presuppose" - as a matter of fact
- that this constituent agreement of the WTO is applicable to them, "providing a
160
161
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reason for their own behavior" and "providing justification for their expectations
. the b ehavtor
. o f o ther members. " 162
concemmg

One more reason for the WTO Agreement to be viewed as the WTO's rules of
recognition is linked to the role of the WTO - as a institution - to undertake the
"implementation, administration and operation" of the primary rules in the MTA and
Plurilateral Agreements (Article ill: 1 of the WTO Agreement).

Since the WTO is

expressly defined as an institution to support the operation of the primary rules therein,
provisions of the WTO Agreement concerning institutional issues, including, inter
alia, the establishment of the WTO, its scope, functions, structure, as well as

accession, acceptance, and entry into force, fall within the category of the "ultimate"
rules of recognition within the WTO. 163 Especially, Article II (2) of the WTO
Agreement provides that the agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annex 1, 2 and 3 (collectively as the "Multilateral Trade Agreements," or" MTAs")
are "integral parts of the WTO Agreement" and "binding on all members." By
recognizing the scope and binding force of the MTAs, Article II (2) actually functions
as a rule of recognition to "identify" primary rules. For these reasons, the WTO
members and adjudicators may "determine authoritatively which of the primary rules
contained in the MTA are relevant to their purposes." 164

(b)

Rules of adjudication

Most of WTO's rules of adjudication are contained in the DSU, which is seen as a
continuity of the pattern beginning from the GATf era to supply the same kind of
rules to the trading system's sets of primary rules. Provisions of the DSU include
some that codify and expand upon the "diplomatic tradition of the GATT'' by
requiring pre-panel consultation, and providing for good offices, mediation and
162
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conciliation. 165 They also include others that set out comprehensive procedures for
the establishment and operation of panels (as the tribunal of the first instance) and the
Appellate Body (as the tribunal at the appellate level).

166

More remarkably,

provisions of the DSU make a unified dispute settlement mechanism possible as
featured by a single Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to process any dispute brought
under any of the WTO agreements (covered agreements). If, as observed by others,
the DSU does establish the "most developed dispute settlement system in any existing
treaty regime," it would not be difficult to find- within the WTO- the most advanced
rules of adjudication in the same context. 167

Nevertheless, however, certain provisions of the DSU, such as those concerning the
"sanctions" or "remedies" for WTO violation or inconsistency, illustrate the "defects"
ofthe WTO regime in comparison to a modem municipal legal system. As the major
sanction available in the WTO, the prevailing party may "suspend the application to
the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements," which is equivalent to the trade damage suffered by the prevailing
party. 168 By contrast, "compensations" are only available in the case where the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is not feasible. 169

Notably, within the WTO treaty system, the DSU is not the only source of rules of
adjudication. Some other covered agreements - such as six "side agreements" on
trade in goods, GATS and TRPS - also provide for a few rules of adjudication on
procedural matters, which in effect substitute for their counterparts in the DSU in a
limited way. Typical examples of those provisions are Article 4 of the SCM, Article
165
166
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and which has no other WTO responsibilities, the Appellate Body of the WTO has achieved the
separation of"judicial power" from "policy-making power" within the WTO institutional structure.
This enhances the feature of the "rule oflaw" of the WTO.
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14 of the TBT, and Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement.

(c)

170

Rules of change

Article IX and X of the WTO Agreement - dealing with the subject of "decisionmaking" and "amendment" respectively, comprise most of the WTO's rules of change.

It bas been observed that within the WTO, decision-making, amendment or other
changes in primary rules mainly depend on the procedures of "consensus" or "vote by
members." According to Article

iX (1) of the WTO Agreement, "consensus" in the

WTO context refers to a situation under which " ... no member, present at the meeting
when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision." In the absence
of consensus, the decision shall be decided by vote "with each member having a
single vote." Specific "pass rate" of the votes varies upon different situations.

171

However, Article X (2) provides that for certain primary rules, their amendment may
only take effect upon consensus.

These include Article IX and X of the WTO

Agreement (Decision-making and Amendment, respectively), Article II of GATT
1994 (tariff binding), as well as three articles provides the MFN obligation
respectively in GATT 1994 (Article 1), GATS (Article ll(1 )) and TRIPS (Article 4). 172

With regard to other cases where the change of primary rules may occur on the
ground of Article IX and X of the WTO Agreement, they are listed as follows: For
Article IX, Paragraph 2 on the "interpretation" of the WTO Agreement and the MTAs
to be adopted by a three-fourths majority, and Paragraph 3 on the "waiver" of WTO
obligations to be decided by three-fourths majority as well. For Article X, Paragraph
1 concerns the submission of a proposed amendment to be decided either by
consensus or by two-thirds majority of the Members; Paragraph 3 relates to the
170
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effectiveness of an amendment decided by three-fourths majority; and Paragraph 4
sets out the "general amending authority," requiring any amendment "of a nature that
would not alter the rights and obligations of the Members" to "take effect for all
members upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members."

173

In addition, Paragraph 5

applies to the amendment to the GATS, Paragraph 8 to the DSU and the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM), and Paragraph 9 and 10 cover exclu,sively the
Plurilateral Agreements.

174

Besides Article IX and X of the WTO Agreement, there are other provisions or those
of other covered agreements serving as rules of change as well, such like Article XII
(2) to govern the accession of new members, Article 71.2 of the TRIPS, and Article
XXIV (9) of the Agreement on Government Procurement. 175

ll.

The Law of the WTO as A Real "Law"

The nature of WTO law is examined in the context of Profess Hart's theory of the
interplay of primary rules and secondary rules within a legal system, and the results
indicate that the WTO law represents a legal system less "primitive" than
international law, but equally less "sophisticated" than municipal law. To take a more
''blunt'' look at the nature of WTO law, one may go further with a question whether,
and to what extent, the law of the WTO is really law.

Such perspective reflects

Joseph Raz's observation of law, where the law is viewed as having three "most
general and important features" of being "normative, institutionalized and
coercive." 176 All these features are somehow shared by the law of the WTO.

According to Professor Raz, the law is normative "in that it serves, and is meant to
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serve a guide for human behavior." 177 The WTO law fits this criterion in terms of
abundant primary rules contained in its comprehensive treaty system. Those primary
rules - of their very functioning described in previous section - are in any respect the
"norms" to guide the behaviors of the WTO Members in trade and trade-related areas.

Professor Raz also proposes that the law is institutionalized "in that its application and
modification are to a large extent performed and regulated by institutions." 178 The
institutional feature of the WTO law depends on the availability of an institution
(WTO) established by it. According to Article III: 1 of the WTO Agreement, the
functioning of the WTO covers "implementation, administration and operation" of the
WTO treaties, the latter is the primary source ofWTO law. Accordingly, thanks to the
WTO, the institutional feature ofWTO law has been significantly enhanced.

Raz further observes that the law is coercive "in that obedience to it, and its
application, is internally guaranteed, ultimately, by the use of force." 179 The WTO
law is somehow deemed as "coercive" for its highly effective dispute settlement
mechanism comparable to any of its kind in other treaty regimes. In the WTO dispute
settlement process, rulings of the single Dispute Settlement Body (the DSB, which is
the WTO's adjudicating body) are actually binding upon the parties to the specific
disputes, and their implementation is backed by certain "sanctions." However, such
sanctions are relatively "weak," as they are limited between the "suspensions" of
concessions or obligations, and the "compensation" equivalent to trade damage. With
these sanctions, it is doubtful that specific rights and obligations of the WTO can be
"internally guaranteed" to live up with Professor Raz's criteria of coerciveness. In
this context, the nature ofWTO law as real law is more or less imperfect.

The above generalization of the "lawness" of WTO law shows the extent to which the
mid.
178 /d.
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WTO law may amount to "real" law remains as "shallow" as that of international law.
As elucidated previously, being part and parcel of international law, WTO law
inevitably shares some "deficiencies" of the latter. However, representing some "new
:frontiers" of international law, WTO law has achieved much as noted above. This
places WTO law somewhere between a primitive system of law as international law
(as it is) and a modem legal system as much as any municipal law. In other words,
WTO law is more advanced than international law, but still has been on the way
towards a modem system of state law. If, according to Professor Hart, none of the
"shortcomings" of international law may prevent it from properly claiming to be
"law," there is no reason why the law of the WTO may not amount to real law, much
less to say that it lacks the various ''virtues" of contemporary international law.

ill.

Nature of Legal Obligations under the Law of the WTO

The nature ofthe law ofthe WTO is examined above in the light of its "lawness," of
being normative, institutional and coercive. Specifically, the normative and coercive
features of WTO law are embodied in various legal obligations, just in the same way
as "real" law.

Professor Hart's idea of an "obligation" has two dimensions: (1) the existence of
certain rules; (2) the application of such "general" rules to a particular person by
calling attention to the fact that his case falls under these rules. 180 Obviously, the first
dimension implies the "normative feature" of law, while the second dimension merely
indicates the "coerciveness" of law in terms of its "application" process. 181 The
binding nature of an obligation is reinforced by Raz's further summarization of three
"characteristics" of an obligation as follows: (1) insistence on a general demand for
conformity and importance or seriousness of social standards; (2) necessity for the
lBO
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maintenance of social life or some highly prized feature of it; (3) involvement of
•

•

sacrifice or renunciation.

182

Accordingly, an "obligation" in its plain meaning can be seen as both normative and
coercive. And legal obligations, in terms of legal rules (not other social rules), will
contain the nature of those rules (law) in anyway. Consequently, a sound conception
of the nature of law entails proper and in-depth appreciation of the nature of its legal
obligations in light of its substance and_binding force. This is certainly the case with
the law of the WTO.

Legal obligations generally refer to "legal norms" that are "obligatory" or ''binding"
in nature (or, directly as "norms of obligation."). Such norms (obligations) derive
from formal sources of law, given that the latter serves to determine the validity and
force (binding nature) of law. 183 As long as these sources can be identified,

l~gal

obligations deriving from them - in the form of legal norms or prescriptions - will be
"presupposed." 184 Where legal obligations themselves can be identified in one or
more of formal sources, their binding nature will be presumed.

Accordingly, in

examining the nature of a legal obligation, a two-prong approach may be adopted as
follows: (1) Identifying the formal sources concerned; (2) Presupposing the existence
of related legal obligations and clarifying the substance and binding nature of these
obligations. This approach is therein adopted in an examination of the nature ofWTO
treaty obligations.

In public international law, treaties, custom or general principles of law are formal
sources to set out "international obligations" incumbent upon nation states.18S Since
WTO law is part and parcel of public international law, legal obligations deriving
182 u.~
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therefore automatically fall within the above category. However, the WTO legal
obligations have their unique features. Given that treaties serve as the most primary
formal source of WTO law, most legal obligations under the WTO are "treaty
obligations." In contrast, another primary formal source, custom, plays a minor role

in formulating norms of WTO law, thus there are few "customary obligations"
identifiable within the WTO. Besides, the WTO regime introduces a category of
"secondary legal obligations" based on the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.

1.

Treaty Obligations under the WTO

Owing to the fact that the WTO treaty system dominates primary formal sources of
WTO law, most WTO legal obligations are "treaty obligations." As discussed
previously, the WTO maintains a comprehensive treaty system ranging from
multilateral trade agreements (MfAs) to bilateral schedules of concessions. Given
various substances and binding force of these treaties, legal obligations deriving
therefore vary in their nature. The rest of this chapter will elaborate this point.

In general, the binding force of a WTO-administrated treaty is governed by rules of
the law of treaties, which are generalized by O'Brien as: "[a] state that consents to
abide by a treaty is bound by the terms of the treaty in its relation with other parties to
the treaty. As is sometime said, the treaty governs the relations of the parties inter se.
As a general principle, the state party to a treaty will not be affected in its relation
with a non-party. However, this principle has to be qualified because a treaty may be
held to have codified or consolidated rules of customary internationallaw." 186 It is
contended that WTO treaties can hardly become "customary international law." 187
186

187
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Thus, the binding force of a WTO treaty may only extend to its parties (WTO
Members), and legal obligations under this treaty will find its binding force within the
saDle legal circles. In this context, the binding character of treaty obligations is a
specific outcome of the applicability and validity of that treaty.

As for the substance of the WTO treaty obligations, it depends on the contents of the

specific WTO treaty norms in question. Usually, legal obligations take the form of
obligatory legal norms. 188 This goes back to earlier discussions on a "WTO legal
system" as represented by a fusion of primary and secondary rules contained in the
WTO treaty.

They both are treaty-based rules, and capable of creating legal

obligations, the nature of the treaty obligations varies with the different substance of
those respective rules.

Accordingly, the substance of WTO treaty obligations is

related to a specific norm rather than a specific treaty.

As noted earlier, most primary rules of the WTO contained in the Annex 1 and Annex

4 of the WTO Agreement, cover a comprehensive issues on trade and trade-related
areas like trade in goods, trade in services, trade-related intellectual property rights
and investment, etc. More primary rules are being formulated upon the extension of
WTO legal regime to some new areas, such as the information technology. Major
secondary rules of the WTO can be found in the WTO Agreement and the DSU. All
these comprehensive rules, with their very substance, entail numerous legal
obligations upon WTO Members.

The remainder of this section focuses on the

binding nature of WTO treaty obligations, with necessary reference to their particular
substance.

Since the binding nature of these obligations is treaty-based, they need to be examined
in the context of the binding force of the specific WTO treaty. The WTO treaty
system - in its varying binding nature - can be divided into three types of instruments:
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multilateral

agreements,

plurilateral

agreements

and

bilateral

agreements/arrangements. Accordingly, legal obligations arising from these three
types of instruments are correspondingly termed "multilateral treaty obligations,"
''plurilateral treaty obligations" and "bilateral treaty obligations." The nature of the
WTO treaty obligations will be examined below according to these types of
instruments.

A.

Multilateral Treaty Obligations

The first type of the WTO's treaty package refers to a set of multilateral agreements
consisting of the WTO Agreement and its first three annexes (collectively as
"Multilateral Trade Agreements" or MTAS). Their binding force is expressly defined
in Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement as towards "all members" of the WTO. Besides,
Article XII:2 of the WTO Agreement requires the WTO Members to anchor their
accession on the acceptation of the above agreements as a whole, rather than picking
and choosing one or more among them.

All these actually reinforce a "single

package" idea envisioned at Punta Pel Este during the Uruguay Round, and
consequently led to the "multilateral nature" of these agreements. 189 Accordingly,
legal obligations deriving from these multilateral agreements are categorized as
"multilateral treaty obligations," legally binding upon all WTO Members.

The substance of these multilateral treaty obligations varies upon the respective
multilateral agreements with which they are associated.

Annex 1 of the WTO

Agreement has been viewed as containing most of the WTO's primary rules
governing various substantive areas of trade. Thus, most legal obligations deriving
therefore are substantive in nature and serve to guide the conduct of Member States in

189
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of the WTO Agreement.
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trade and trade-related areas. The WTO Agreement and its basic contents serve as
major "rules of recognition" (secondary rules) within the WTO legal system, of which
roost legal obligations are institutional and procedural in nature, supporting the
functioning of the WTO's primary rules.

Interestingly enough, the agreement still contains three primary rules to generate
substantive obligations "on a member," as provided respectively in Article Vll:4 (to
promptly pay dues), Article VIII (to accord functional privileges and immunities to
the WTO, its officials and the representatives of the Members), and Article XVI:4 (to
ensure endure conformity of national legislation with the WTO agreements). 190 It is
notable that Article XVI:4 is regarded as the "conformity clause," 191 which paves the
way for the WTO Members to implement the WTO law in their internal legal system.
This topic comes within the scope of this study and is elaborated in the ensuing
sections.

B.

Plurilateral Treaty Obligations

The second type of the WTO's treaty package refers to two existing "plurilateral trade
agreements" contained in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement: Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft and Agreement on Government Procurement. According to Article 11:3

of the WTO Agreement, both these agreements are binding only upon those WTO
Members "who accept them," and "do not create either rights or obligations for the
Members that have not accepted them." Given that the accession to both agreements
is "optional," 192 legal obligations arising from these agreements - categorized as
"plurilateral treaty obligations" - do not affect the WTO Members as a whole, but
only those who accept them. For the parties to both these agreements, the plurilateral
190
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"MTA."

61

treaty obligations are legally binding, but just incumbent upon one vis-a-vis another
among themselves.

Discussions so far have touched two categories ofWTO treaty obligations. They both
share some features in fact.

Mostly, multilateral agreements and plurilateral

agreements under the WTO are both "law-making" treaties.

Legal obligations

deriving therefore will then fall within the category of "rule obligations" (rules of
conduct), binding upon WTO Members as a whole or upon the identifiable "insiders."
These obligations are more "regulatory" in nature for general application, imposing

r,

"minimum standards" for WTO Members, irrespective of their actual or potential
trade impact in (bilateral) relations with the latter. In this context, they are regarded
more as "statutes" with general application, than bundles of bilateral "contracts."

C.

,.

Bilateral Treaty Obligations

,

'!

The third type of the WTO's treaty package refers to the "treaty contracts" addressed
in the previous section on the sources of WTO law, referring to numerous bilateral
schedules of commitments and various country-specific "agreements" or protocols
concluded between and after the Uruguay Rounds in late 1994. Specifically, they
include the schedules annexed to the GATT 1994 and the GATS, as well as those post1994 tariff-cutting schedules on new areas like information technology products.
They also include protocols on the accession of new members and those on finance
services, telecommunications, etc. Given that these treaty contracts reflect bilateral,
state-to-state relations, legal obligations arising the.refore are categorized as "bilateral
treaty obligations." In terms of the substance, these obligations are also termed
"market access obligations" incumbent upon each "specific" member of the WTO.
This means the WTO market access obligations are "country-specific." Each WTO
member has its own market access obligations vis-a-vis all other WTO members
respectively on the basis of the MFN treatment, aimed at liberalizing its trade in
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specific goods and services to benefit all Members respectively.

D.

193

Comparison and Analysis

Despite the difference among the above three categories, WTO treaty obligations are
''bilateral" in nature from an overall perspective. This is largely attributable to the
object (trade), origin (reciprocal arrangements) and objective (trade liberalization) of
the WTO treaty system, and also reflects any eventual breach and enforcement of the
treaty obligations. It is readily visible that "many trade treaties and agreements on
investment (even if multilateral)" fall into the category of "multilateral treaty
obligations of a bilateral nature." This is exactly the case with the WTO treaty system,
for it has been observed "both GATT and the WTO treaty remain treaties establishing
bilateral jural relationships between WTO Members." 194

There is hardly any doubt that "market access obligations" under the treaty contracts
of the WTO are bilateral in nature.

As for the "normative or rule obligations"

deriving from the WTO multilateral and plurilateral agreements, their broad scope of
application towards all or any identified group of the WTO Members does not obscure
their bilateral nature. After all, most GATTIWTO treaty obligations were originally
negotiated on a state-to-state, bilateral level, and ended up as bilateral and mutual
reduction in trade restrictions.

The latter was subsequently multilateralized and

applied to all other WTO members, based on the MFN principle. 195 Thus, by their
very substance, the normative obligations of the WTO are capable of being
"individualized" and "differentiated." Though they are "uniform" in the sense of
putting forth the same set of "codes of conduct" binding on the WTO members as a
whole or as a "plurilateral" group, 196 they can be seen as compilation of bilateral
193
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obligations, or as the "duplication" of these bilateral obligations towards each single
Member. Thus, despite the "heterogeneity" of the WTO treaty obligations, 197 they are
all in fact "binding" in nature.

For all these, it is worth noting that the WTO nonnative obligations and market access
obligations "differ in their design." This distinction has a great significance in the
way in which each type of obligations may be modified or changed. In light of WTO
rules of normative obligations, their modification or change seems very difficult, in
the sense that the amendment of any provisions of the WTO agreements, as well as
the waiver of any obligation "imposed on a Member'' by the WTO Agreement or any
of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, would be subject to "elaborate and stringent
procedures" provided in Article IX and Article X of the WTO Agreement. As a result,
WTO normative obligations "are intended to be stable and unsusceptible to constant
revision." 198

By way of contrast, the WTO market access obligations "may be modified, withdrawn
or re-negotiated either periodically or under certain specified circumstances at any
time, on the basis of reciprocity," in accordance with the relevant provisions of its
associated WTO agreements. Accordingly, market access obligations are "designed to
allow flexibility for frequent change." 199

2.

Secondary Legal Obligations under the WTO

Although treaty obligations have dominated the category of "WTO legal obligations,"
they do not exhaust this category. Given their complexity, WTO treaty obligations
will inevitably encounter interpretative problems. Also, the binding nature of these

pauwelyn, supra note 187, at 918-919.
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treaty obligations calls for compliance or redresses of any violation. 200

Both

situations have led to the crucial role of the WTO dispute settlement process, since it
serves to "preserve the rights and obligations of Members" under WTO agreements,
and to "clarify the existing provisions of these agreements." 201

In this context,

Professor Petersmann introduces the "secondary legal obligations" under the WTO
legal system, which comes within the category of WTO legal obligations as well,
although their binding force is arguably less extensive than WTO treaty obligations.

According to Professor Petersmann, "[u]nder both general international law and WTO
law, violations of international legal obligations trigger 'secondary legal obligations'
ofbringing the illegal act into conformity with intemationallaw."202 The observation
implies that such WTO obligations may only occur in a "violation case" in the WTO
settlement. 203 Considering the role of the WTO dispute settlement process in the
application (interpretation) and "enforcement" (implementation) of specific WTO
treaty obligations, the above "secondary legal obligations" should emerge from the
results of this process, namely, reports of WTO panels and the Appellate Body as
adopted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This recalls a commentary of
the International Law Commission, to the effect that: "[i]t will be a matter for the
interpretation and application of the primary rule [in casu, the WTO provision setting
out the obligation] to determine into which of the categories an obligation comes. "204
In this context, the "secondary legal obligations" of WTO are subordinate to the
pertinent WTO treaty obligations they propose to apply and enforce.
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As noted above, legal obligations deriving from the "formal sources" are capable of
giving the force and validity of law.

As the source of WTO's secondary legal

obligations, the results ofWTO dispute settlement process (WTO decisions or rulings)
have to be binding in nature so as to "presuppose" such legal obligations. Basically,
the legal nature of the WTO decisions is similar to that of the ICJ decisions, which, as
emphasized in Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ, have "no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case. " 205 However, neither the
DSU nor any other WTO agreement contains such "ICJ-type" clause. Instead, as
submitted by John Jackson, "a good number of clauses" of the DSU can be considered
for this purpose, since the "ovemll gist of these clauses, in the light of the practice of
the GATT, and perhaps supplemented by the prepamtory work of the negotiators"
would "strongly suggest" that the recommendations or rulings of the DSB are binding
upon the parties to the particular cases, and therefore impose the secondary legal
obligation of ''bringing the illegal act into conformity" with the WTO treaty
obligations which have been related?06

The results of the WTO dispute settlement process refer to the reports ofWTO panels
and the Appellate Body (AB) as adopted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), namely, WTO decisions or rulings. The contents of these reports are specified
in Article 19.1 of the DSU, which provides that "[w]here a panel or the Appellate
Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall
recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement" From a perspective of Petersmann 's definition of the "secondary legal
obligations," this clause not only specifies the substance of such obligations in the
WTO context as "bringing illegal act into conformity with international law," but also
confirms WTO decisions or rulings as their legal source.
205

Under Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ, ''The decision of the Court has no binding force except

between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Similarly, Article 94 of the UN Charter
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Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party."
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As noted above, unless and until adopted by the DSB, the reports of WTO panels and
the Appellate Bodies will never be transformed into binding decisions or rulings of
the WTO.

Under the DSU, the process of this "adoption" is "virtually automatic"

with "no blocking."207 Moreover, once a panel or Appellate Body report is adopted,
it will be unlikely to be altered or modified, for neither the DSU nor any other WTO
agreement provides for any procedure for an alteration or revocation as such.
leads to a "once binding, always binding" situation.

This

In this sense, a WTO decision

seemingly creates a more coercive legal obligation than WTO treaty obligations in
general terms.

r•

The binding force of WTO decisions or rulings is also strongly supported in Article
21 .1 of the DSU, which provides that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members." The provision explicitly addresses the implementation of
WTO treaty obligations, implying that the secondary legal obligations of WTO are not
only directed at WTO decisions or rulings, but also extend to their implementation
within the WTO legal system. In this context, some other provisions of the DSU
further establish "an implementing procedure," which not only affirms the binding
nature of WTO decisions, but also introduced a separate type of secondary legal
obligation, so-called "obligation to perform."

Such obligations involve possible

"compensation" or "retaliation" serving as "only a fallback" in the alternative.Z08

In short, the "secondary legal obligations" of the WTO represent one particular

207

Under the DSU, to block the "adoption" of the reports ofWTO panela and the Appellate Body

reports requires the "consensus" of all WTO Members. Since this "concensus" is very difficult (if not
impossible) to reach, such "adoption" is deemed to be automatic and inevitable.
208
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category of international law obligations. Deriving from WTO decisions or rulings,
they are incumbent upon the parties to the particular "violation cases" in the WTO
dispute settlement process, aimed at bringing the challenged internal law or practice
of WTO members into conformity with specific WTO treaty obligations. Compared
with WTO treaty obligations, the secondary legal obligations of the WTO have a
limited scope of application, binding only on the parties (WTO members) to the
particular WTO disputes. However, such binding force should never be ignored. As
noted above, a typical legal obligation should be both "normative" and "coercive" in
nature. As for the secondary legal obligations of the WTO, they may not be so
''normative," but undoubtedly are "coercive." Although they are "secondary" legal
obligations to their "primary" counterparts under the WTO treaties, they still come
within a broad category ofWTO legal obligations.
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INTRODUCTION

In the preceding part (Part 1), the law of the WTO is examined in the context of its

historical evolution, sources of law and legal nature. As concluded, WTO law is not
only part and parcel of public international law, but also represents some magnificent
"new frontiers" of this landscape. The present part (Part II) takes a look at the
relationship between WTO law and the internal law of WTO Members, particularly
focusing on the status of WTO Law under the domestic legal system or internal legal
order of these Members. This subject is significant in the sense of an "increasing
recognition" that "understanding an international legal system necessitates

r

understanding the relationship of national legal and political systems to that
international system." 209

It is also essential to exploring the issue of "WTO

implementation" which, as the key subject of the present study), cannot be fully
displayed and perceived without referring to "enforcement mechanisms" at both
international and internal levels.

As state practice indicates, implementation of international law is more often
accomplished by domestic judiciaries, if empowered to do so under the national
constitutional arrangements or within the "intent'' of the national legislature, than by
international tribunals. This seems not to be the case with regard to the law of the
WTO. On the one hand, most WTO Members simply deny the "direct effect'' of
WTO law in domestic/internal law, leaving a free hand for national courts to be
restrictive in this regard. On the other hand, national constitutional and legal systems
of WTO Members are diverse, especially with regard to the relationship between
WTO law and municipal law. When these internal legal settings remain unclear or
silent on this issue, there will be room for ')udicial policy-making," for national
courts to play an active or even constructive role in this regard. Accordingly, most of
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the present part will be devoted to an examination of the role of national courts in
domestic/internal implementation ofWTO law.

It is necessary at the onset to take a "preliminary" overview of the membership of the
WTO.

When the WTO formally came into being on January 15\

1995, the

organization had 129 Members, including 128 states and the European Communities
(EC} as the signatories of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements.

They are the

"original WTO Members." 210 The past decades had witnessed a rapid increase in
WTO Membership. According to the WTO Secretariat, until February 16th, 2005,
when Cambodia obtained its "access ticket" as the latest comer, WTO Members
reached 148, including the 19 post-1995 comers as the "acceding Members." Since
then, Saudi Arabia has been admitted as the latest Member, leaving 30 states (as the
"observers" of the WTO) working on their accession to the WT0. 211 Thus, one may

I

'

still expect some "160 nations or independent customs territories" to be the members
of the WTO, as some scholars forecast eight years earlier.2 12
=·a

The WTO membership is open to both a sovereign state and a "customs territory
having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies." This flexibility is explicitly
provided in Article XII of the WTO Agreement, and has explained why the WTO has
comprised an increasing number of regional governments. The European Community
(EC) is the only "original Member" joining as "a single customs union" with a single
external trade policy and tari:ff. 213 Several "acceding Members" take a similar status,
e.g., Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

Unlike these three regional governments,

whose accession has somewhat reflected the nuance of the WTO's admission policy
in avoiding political sensitivity, the EC is a model of regional integration by virtue of
210
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its highly developed political, economic and legal system.

The EC is the official title of the European Union (EU) in WTO vocabulary. It has
been a member of the WTO in its own right since 1 January 1995. As "a single
customs union with a single trade policy and tariff," the EU now has 25 Member
States that are equally WTO Members in their own rights. While Member States of
the EU coordinate their position in Brussels and Geneva, the European Commission
alone speaks for the EU at almost all WTO meetings. As a result, in most issues,
WTO materials would refer to the EU, or "more legally-correct EC." It is "for legal

r II

reasons" that the EU has been officially regarded as the EC in WTO parlance. Since

i
•

this study is all about WTO-related legal issues, this author will follow the above
standard usage, adopting the title of the "EC" wherever the EU is addressed in a legal
context. Together with the United States (U.S.), the EC has played a predominant role
within the WTO. 214

As WTO Members consist of both national and regional governments, the law of an
individual WTO Member is either "national law'' or "regional law." For the purpose
of present study, both categories are referred to as "internal law" or "domestic law."
In the context of dispute settlement and enforcement of WTO law, internal law of
WTO Members should be deemed as comprising domestic constitution, legislation,
judicial decision as well as other related legal acts of a particular legal system therein.
Given the predominant position of the United States and the EU in the WTO, both the
U.S. legal system and the EC legal order are most frequently cited for a study of the
relationship between WTO law and internal law of WTO Members, as evident in the
current part.

To a great degree, the relationship between WTO law and the internal law of WTO
Members duplicates the one between international law and municipal law. As noted

214
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earlier, WTO law is part and parcel of international law. Presumably, effects of the
interactions between international law and municipal law will extend to WTO law, but
merely in regard to its relation with the internal law of WTO Members, not with that
of the non-Members (e.g., "observers" of the WTO). This can be explained in the
context of Hart's theory on a legal system, particularly his proposition concerning
"insiders" and "outsiders" of a legal system. 215

According to Hart, the "insiders" of a legal system are those who accept this system,
view it from "an internal perspective," and take it as the one that applies to them. In

r

contrast, the "outsiders" of this legal system would view it "externally," taking it as
"merely an explanation of why" the "insiders" would behave as such. Because Hart
views international law as a "primitive" legal system, "insiders" of international law
will be those who are subject to this system.2 16 They are mainly sovereign states, and
can exceptionally be private individuals and international organizations. Both groups
are the "subjects" of international law. International law is the law of nation states,
while municipal law is the internal law of an individual nation state. The relationship
...

between international law and municipal law is mainly one between a "primitive"

•.

t

legal system, referring to international law, and a municipal legal system of its
"insiders." In terms of treaty law (a primary source of international law), such a
relationship turns out to be the one between this treaty law and the domestic law of
the parties to this treaty, and these ''parties" are the "insiders" of it.

As discussed earlier, the law of the WTO represents an integral legal system as well.
An acceding Member of the WTO is by all means an "insider" of the WTO legal

system, with its accession conditioned on the "terms to be agreed" by it with other
WTO Members. These terms not only incorporate the requirements of the existing
WTO treaties (WTO agreements) accepted by this acceding Member, but also include
a specific "final accession package" (consisting of the Working Party Report and
215
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schedules of market access commitments) reached by both sides. 217 Through its
accession to the WTO, the acceding Member views the law of the WTO - from an
internal perspective- as binding upon itself. By contrast, non-Members of the WTO
are the "outsiders" of WTO legal system, and "may observe the rules members
follow." Since WTO law is part and parcel of international law, the relationship
between international law and the law of its "insiders" (municipal law) is presumably
applicable to the law of the WTO and the internal law of its Members ("insiders").
Since WTO agreements are at the core of WTO law, the relationship between WTO
law and the internal law of WTO members is mainly the one between this
comprehensive treaty system and the internal law ofthe "signatories" ofthese treaties;
the latter refer to WTO Members.

This part (Part II) examines the relationship between WTO law and the internal law of
WTO Members. As stated above, the exercise begins with the relationship between
international law and municipal law, as summarized in Chapter 1. Based on an
observation of the ''theoretical dichotomy" between monist and dualist, Chapter 1 will
introduce a "pragmatic approach" by which the above subject is interpreted as a
possible "conflict of obligations" between the system of international law and that of
municipal law, with the two operating separately. This approach will then apply to the
relationship between international treaties and municipal law, especially focusing on
the status of treaties in the municipal sphere, where the roles of municipal
constitutional arrangements, legislatures and courts are significant.

Chapter 2 explores the relationship between WTO law and the internal law of WTO
Members, which is the major subject of the present part.

From a "pragmatic"

perspective, this chapter will be devoted to a two-way exercise, reviewing the status
of the internal law of WTO members within the WTO legal system from an
international perspective, and the vice versa from a municipal perspective. The first
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part of this exercise will elucidate WTO requirements for the domestic law of WTO
Members, as well as the effect of domestic law in the WTO dispute settlement process.
The second part of the exercise will assess the status of WTO law in the domestic law
of WTO Members, which appears to be more comprehensive. It will first generalize
the main issues, and then briefly cover most academic discussions on these issues.
The remainder of the exercise will turn to the "domestic effect of WTO law,"
particularly concerning the WTO treaty obligations and the "secondary legal
obligations" deriving from the rulings of the WTO tribunal (e.g., reports of WTO
panels and the Appellate Body as adopted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body).

rThe next part (Part ill) will continue with the issue on the domestic effect of WTO
law, but the focus of discussions will shift to the practical dimension, which involves
the "domestic implementation" of WTO law by WTO Members. Specifically, Part III
will present an empirical study of American and European experiences.

These

experiences are essential, for "domestic WTO implementation" cannot afford oversimplification, given diverse state practice in this regard. Considering the leading
position of the U.S. and the EC within the WTO, as well as their active roles in
domestic WTO implementation, the WTO practices of the U.S. and the EC not only
represent the trends in this regard, but also provide their fellow Members with some
useful reference and guidance therein.

Thus, the U.S and the EC experiences -

significant and comprehensive as they may be - deserve a separate part as presented
later.
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CHAPTERl

THE RELATIONSHlP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW

The relationship between international law and municipal law is one of the most
important topics in public international law. "Municipal law" means the domestic law
of an individual sovereign state that generally comprises both "primary and secondary
legislation" as well as the principles "to be deduced from the judicial decisions of the
superior appellate courts." As a matter of language, municipal law may also be
referred to as "internal law," "national law," or "state law." 218 All these terms are
exchangeable in the present context

Over the centuries, the relation of international law with municipal law has been
extensively addressed through numerous writings. The importance of this subject is
well recognized based upon a common viewpoint that one cannot conceive of an
international legal system without understanding the relationship of national legal and
political systems to that international system.219 John O'Brien, from a perspective of
modem international law, views this relation as comprised of "three central issues" as
follows:
(i)

The status of rules of municipal law before international tribunals;

(ii)

The circumstances where a rule of public international law will be
applied by a municipal court;

(iii)

The consequences upon a conflict of a rule of municipal law with that
ofpublic intemationallaw.220

Among the above three issues, the first two underline a theoretical discussion on the
relationship between international law and municipal law, either as "part of a single
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legal order" (monism) or as a combination of "two distinct systems of law"
(dualism).221 Notably, these two issues have in themselves superseded the theoretical
controversy and embarked on a pragmatic endeavor by bringing the question to both
international and national processes of dispute settlement. The third issue assumes a
conflict between international law and municipal law, which, existing in either of the
circumstances referred to by the first two issues, addresses the "appropriateness" of
the primacy of either of the above system of law over the other.222

Accordingly, O'Brien has suggested a two-tier, pragmatic approach for scrutinizing
the relationship between international law and municipal law. By this approach, the
issue is brought into the landscape of the international and domestic enforcement of
international law. For the purpose of such an exercise, the present chapter begins with
a theoretical dichotomy of dualism and monism, given the "certain,

thou~

not

decisive influence" of these two schools of thoughts "on writers dealing with
substantive issues and also on courts."223 The chapter then provides some pragmatic
insights on the relationship between international law and municipal law, especially
focusing on the relation of the obligations of states with municipal law based upon the
theories of"co-ordination."

l.

A Theoretical Dichotomy of Dualism and Monism

Historically, there are two theoretical doctrines that have sought to illuminate the
relationship between municipal law and international law, namely, monism and
dualism. Both doctrines assume that international law and municipal law - each as a
legal system - operate simultaneously within a common field, leading inevitably to a
question as to which system will prevail.224
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Monism represents the older of the two doctrines. The monist doctrine holds that
both legal systems are "part of a single legal structure," and "concerned with the same
subject matter." In case of a conflict between the two, the rules of international law
should prevail. The earlier monist jurists established their propositions upon natural
law principles and deemed the law of nations as "higher" than municipal law.

225

Later,

Hersch Lauterpacht from the United Kingdom introduced the "supremacy of
international law" even within the municipal sphere. Kelsen, on the contrary, did not
support the supremacy of international law over municipal law, but proposed a "basic
norm" as follows: "[t]he states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved."
He then asserts that "[i]t is the basic norm of the international legal order which is the
ultimate reason of validity of the national legal orders."

226

Specifically,

international law regulated the relations between states, while municipal law
concerned the relationship between the state and its citizens.227 Thus, neither legal
system had the power to create or alter the rules of the other. For the same reason,
when municipal law provides that international law applies in whole or in part within
the jurisdiction, it merely represents an exercise of the authority of municipal law to
"adopt'' or "transform" the rules of international law. In this context, where a conflict
arises between international law and municipal law, a municipal court would apply
municipallaw.228

The dualist doctrine is closely associated with the positivist approach to international
law, with the latter traced back to the beginning of the 18th century. The doctrine
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The dualist doctrine views international law and municipal law as "two separate
systems" in the sense that they regulate different subject matter.
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increased its importance and attraction in the 19th century Europe when the will of the
state was placed at the center of politics and diplomacy to deny any "higher authority"
over it. By contrast, a British "pragmatic tradition" emphasized little in theoretical
debate in this regard. Most celebrated dualist exponents, e.g., Triepel, Strupp, and
Anzilotti, have a civil law background.

229

Anzilotti developed a doctrine featured by

the distinction between international law and municipal law, noting "each system was
founded on a fundamental principle or norm." According to Anzilotti, for municipal
law, the principle was that state legislation was to be obeyed; for international law, the
principle was that agreements between states were to be respected, namely, pacta sunt
servanda. Later, Anzilotti confirmed his favor of dualism in the case of the Electronic
Company ofSofia and Bulgaria, recognizing that "the systems deal with two different

subject matters, that is, each has its own sphere of application. "230

In addition, there is a monist-naturalist theory "resembling Kelsen's provision of a

universal basic norm." This theory submits a "third legal order" that international and
municipal legal orders are subordinate to. Usually postulated in terms of natural law
or of a general principle of law, this third legal order is superior to international and
municipal legal orders, capable of determining both of the latter.231

ll.

A Pragmatic Approach Based upon the Theories of "Co-ordination"

A dichotomy of monism and dualism has long been criticized as "unreal" - for "both
theories conflict with the way in which international law and national organs and
courts behavior."232 As also observed, entangling such a theoretical controversy may
obscure the nature of the relationship between municipal law and internationallaw.233
Arguably, the monist approach is not practically workable alone, given the ambiguity
229
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in and inapplicability of international law on many occasions.

More significant

arguments have been put forward against both theories, especially challenging their
"common field of operation." It then concludes with a pragmatic approach in this
course, holding that international law and municipal law are operating "on a different
sphere," without any conflict arising between each other. 234

According to this pragmatic approach, although the two systems do not come into
conflict "as systems" since they work in different spheres, there may be a conflict of
obligations in the form of "an inability of the state on the domestic plane to act in a

manner required by international law."

The conflict usually appears to be an

incompatibility of national law with international law, but the legal consequences of
this circumstance "will not be the invalidity of the internal law, but the responsibility
of the state on the international plane. "235 Accordingly, international law can be seen
as "a system of co-ordination," where no substantial conflict will arise, and the
attention "should be directed to the actual practice of the courts."236 This pragmatic
approach appears to concentrate on the operation of "enforcement mechanisms" for
the given rules of international law on both international and domestic plane.

Developed by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the approach was later advanced by Rousseau,
who characterized international law as a "law of co-ordination" that "does not provide
for automatic abrogation of internal rules in conflict with obligations on the
international plane."

Since 1945, there has been an increasing "preference for

practice over theory" advocated by Fitzmaurice, Rousseau, and their followers, which
consistently stresses the practice of municipal courts. 237 This goes back to Jonh
O'Brien's "three central issues" in the earlier discussion, which reflect a similar
approach of focusing on judicial processes at both the international and municipal
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levels.

Professor O'Brien's perspective falls within the scope of modem international law, the
latter gives predominance to the actual practice rather than theoretic debates. Based
upon the "co-ordination" theories, the above noted pragmatic approach falls within
this landscape as well. Aiming to "create sensible working relationship" between
international law and municipal law, insisting on "the maintenance of an
accommodation between the two systems," rather than "the attainment of a formal
'harmony' or the 'supremacy' of intemationallaw,"238 the approach comes closer to
reality than any theoretical formula. In accordance with this approach, O'Brien's
"three central issues" tum out to be more appropriate than the dichotomy of monism
and dualism would be, especially in examining the relationship between international
law and municipal law.

The remainder of this chapter will address Professor O'Brien's three central issues.
Before addressing these, it is necessary to have a "preliminary review" of the inherent
relations among these issues, so as to follow the logic and order of the pragmatic
approach for the succeeding articulation. From the outset, either of the first two
issues reflects one-way thinking towards, respectively, the status the rules of
municipal law in the international sphere, or the status of international law in the
municipal sphere. The third issue represents a single topic that can be incorporated
into either of the first two.

Since the pragmatic approach holds that either

international law or municipal law is "supreme in its own field, and neither has a
hegemony over the other,"239 most study will be divided by these two issues, with
each part turning on the international or municipal plane, but equally addressing the
third issue.

ill.

The Relation between International Law Obligations and Domestic law
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Discussions so far have submitted a pragmatic approach based upon the "coordination" theories, which propound a conflict of "obligations" - rather than any
other form of confrontation - between international law and municipal law. In this
regard, the relationship between the two systems can be interpreted as that "between
the obligations of the states under international law and those under municipal law."
As a practical matter, the conflict of municipal law with international law is

essentially a conflict with international law obligations.

Accordingly, how to specify these international legal obligations becomes crucial. As
noted earlier, legal obligations of the states derive from formal sources of the law of
nation states (international law). Basically, international law contains two primary
forms: customary international law and treaty law. This distinction complicates the
status of international legal obligations, especially in the municipal sphere. 240
However, given the leading role of treaty law in shaping contemporary international
law, and given the major subject of the present study concerning WTO agreements the most comprehensive body of treaty law in international law landscape - the
following discussions will concentrate on "treaty obligations." Based on O'Brien's
three central issues, below is a two-tier examination of the relationship between
international law and municipal law, from a perspective of either system of law.

1.

In International Sphere

Viewing the relation of international law (obligations of states) with municipal law
from an international law perspective, John O'Brien examines the "status of rules of
municipal law before international tribunals" (see, his first central issue). Due to this
pragmatic approach, the issue is brought to the international dispute settlement
process, where the governments of states are the major subject of international law,

240

TIEYA WANG, GUO JI FA YIN LUN (INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW) 197-198 (1998).

82

1 l

with little chance for private individuals being involved?

41

In the international sphere, it has been clear that municipal law should adhere to

international law obligations. First, the binding nature of international law obligations
leads to a general duty for the states to bring their municipal law into conformity with
these legal obligations under internationallaw.

242

More significantly, there is a well-

established governing law in this regard, 243 notably, the fundamental general principle
of pacta sunt servanda that is codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the

Law ofTreaties. 244 Article 27 further elaborates the governing law, providing that no
state can plead provisions of its own law or deficiencies in that law in justifying their
disobedience and disrespect for international obligations, and the otherwise triggers
state responsibility vis-a-vis impaired parties (states).245 The two provisions address
O'Brien's third central issue of "primacy." Consequently, on the international .plane,

in case of a clash between a national legal rule and an international legal norm, the
latter will prevail, with the clash possibly generating the state responsibility.
•.

':

In the international dispute settlement process, tribunals have consistently adhered to

the above governing law, notably the long-standing jurisprudence of the ICJ and its
predecessor (PICJ). In Greco-Bulgarian Communities, the tribunal held that "it is a
I

general principle of international law that in the relations between the Powers who are
contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over
those of treaties." 246 Generally, international tribunals examine the conformity of
municipal law with international law obligations on each specific occasion. They
241
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basically treat these occasions as "facts" and "evidence of conduct attributed to the
state concerned which creates international responsibility. " 247 They pay attention to
the "acts of the legislature and other sources of internal rules and decision-making"
that "are not to be regarded as acts of some third party for which the state is not
responsible," since otherwise "would facilitate evasion of obligations." In this regard,
a "specific occasion" is not limited to a "municipal law" narrowly defined as national
legislation, but extends to the constitution, judicial decisions and other related legal
acts of this municipal legal system. This proposition has been affirmed by numerous
decisions of international tribunals. 248

r•
Therefore, in a general sense, the failure to bring municipal law into conformity with
international law obligations does not in itself constitute "a direct breach of
international law," so long as this failure does not constitute a "fact." Such a preach
will arise only "where the state concerned fails to observe its obligations on a specific
occasion." 249

This does not apply to a circumstance in which some national

legislation (e.g., "mandatory legislation") may in itself constitute a breach of a treaty
obligation and then "a tribunal might be required to make a declaration to that
effect" 250 Interestingly, the opposite situation may have a similar consequence.
Where a treaty norm inconsistent with municipal constitutional rules becomes invalid
in the municipal sphere, such domestic invalidity does not in itself preclude the
validity of this treaty norm under internationallaw.251 This in turn recalls the premise
of John O'Brien's perspective, that international law and municipal law are separate
systems, operating in different spheres.
247
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2.

In the Municipal Sphere

A.

General Issues and Their Significance

Viewing the relation of international law obligations with municipal law from a
municipal law perspective, John O'Brien suggests taking into account the
"circumstances where a rule of public international law will be applied by a municipal
court," as covered by his second central issue. Due to this pragmatic approach, the
issue is brought into domestic judicial proceedings for the enforcement of
international law. 252 Questions may arise as to the role of municipal courts in
enforcing international legal obligations, as well as to the extent to which private
individuals may rely on these international obligations to challenge municipal law and
practice before these courts. These questions, along with other relevant ones, are all
about the "domestic legal effect" of international law obligations.

The issue,

especially in terms of treaty law and treaty obligations, has been well articulated by
Professor John Jackson. According to Professor Jackson, "domestic legal effect" of
treaty law involves "at least three sub-questions" as follows:
(1)

The availability of the "direct effect" or "direct applicability" of a given
treaty (or any part of it), which entitles "at least some" domestic litigants
to "rely on" its provisions, and bind domestic courts to accept these
provisions as applicable law;

(2)

The availability of the "standing" of "a particular party" on domestic
plane, based on any provision of the given treaty;

(3)

The "hierarchy of norms" with regard to a conflict between the given
treaty and a "prior or subsequent" domestic statue or constitutional
provision. 253
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'Jbe above articulation appears to be an annotation to John O'Brien's second and third
central issues.

Sub-questions (1) and (2) particularly elaborate O'Brien's second

central issue, presenting some scenarios and specific terms for succeeding discussions.
From the perspectives of O'Brien and Jackson, in the municipal sphere, the
relationship between international law and municipal law is largely a matter of the
treatment of international law obligations before municipal courts.

'Ibis, however, does not suggest that only municipal courts are involved in the issue.
To enforce (or, specifically, to "apply") international law obligations, the municipal
court has to "ascertain" the existence and "internal effect" of these international
obligations in the municipal sphere, 254 and make sure the court by itself has the
competence to do so. 255

International law provides little guidance for these

purposes. 256 Instead, clues often lie in the domestic legal system, particularly the
municipal constitutional arrangements, or, the "intent" of national legislature. 257
Accordingly, the domestic legal effect of international obligations is in the instance a
constitutional and/or legislative issue. This recalls Jackson's sub-question (1) and (3),
mainly referring to the sources and hierarchy of domestic law, separation of power,
etc.

In terms of international treaties, other factors matter as well, although not explicitly
or implicitly covered by Jackson and O'Brien's concept of "domestic legal effect."
These factors belong to the broader landscape of legal/constitutional issues
inventoried by Jackson. 258 Among these issues, some are prerequisites for obtaining
254
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implement the treaty obligations; (6) direct applicability of the treaty in domestic law; (7)
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the "domestic legal effect" of treaties, such as the validity of treaties in domestic
sphere, usually addressed by the national constitution; 259 or the power to implement
the treaties in domestic sphere, concerning the role of municipal courts and other
domestic institutions (e.g., legislature). Some others, although parallel to the issue of
"domestic legal effect," still reflect certain bearings of the latter, such as the treaty
making process, which, from the outset, concerns the national "constitutional
procedure" (especially, "democratic participation" and separation of power), and also
involves the enactment ofnationallegislation. 260

Due to the above observation, the status of international law obligations (treaties) in
domestic law is collectively shaped by various entities of a municipal legal system,
e.g., constitutional system, legislature, courts, and even administrative bodies.
Questions then may arise as to who has the authority to determine the relations among
these entities, especially in regard to the domestic effect of international law
obligations; and, to what extent a competent entity may determine such matters.
These

are

all

about

the

role

of

above

municipal

entities

in

the

enforcement/implementation of international obligations. In the municipal sphere, the
health of the relations of municipal law with international law depends largely on the
maintenance of a "proper" relationship among the above actors. 261 This will be
discussed later.

The treaties in themselves matter as well. As observed by Jackson, whether a treaty is
entitled to direct application or subject to an act of transformation depends greatly on

invocability in municipal law (contrasted with direct applicability); (8) a hierarchy of norms in
domestic law when treaty norms conflict with norms of that law; and (9) the power to administer the
treaty, which includes a series of issues, such as the procedure for formal "ratification;" the power to
interpret the treaty for domestic application and as a matter of international law; the power to
represent the country in institutional procedures relating to the treaty; the power to "vote" in such
procedures; the power to amend the treaty; and the power to terminate the treaty. 258
259
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"the relative degree to which constitutional drafters trust international institutions and
treaty-making processes compared with national institutions and legislative
process."262 The quality of treaties entails enormous implications for their status in
domestic law. Treaties can be imperfect, given their possible vagueness, ambiguities,
and rigidity. A nation state is more likely to grant direct application to a treaty that is
precise, specific in nature, and/or adaptable to the changing situation than
otherwise.263 The matter of"justiciability" is for succeeding discussions.

The above issues and questions display the complexity of the relationship between
international law and municipal law in the municipal sphere. In the international
sphere, international law obligations simply bind the states, and the latter are obliged
to give effect to their international legal obligations. Nevertheless, how a state makes
and applies international law obligations is mainly a matter of domestic discretions.
Notwithstanding its general international duty, the state is responsible for assuring its
constitution and laws enable its government can carry out its international obligations;
how the state may achieve such results is not of concern to international law as a
whole. Nor does international law contain any general rule to govern this particular
issue.

In effect, a state may carry out its international obligations "by particular means," e.g.,

national legislation, executive measures, or judicial decisions. Given the absence of a
well-settled rule of international law vis-a-vis the diverse state practices, the
relationship between international legal obligations and municipal law remains
controversial and unresolved as a matter of domestic law, with the issue largely
complicated by the internal structure and arrangements of particular state systems.
Consequently, for the questions addressed by O'Brien's and Jackson, answers to them
will vary from country to country.
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Meanwhile, the issue has more practical significance. International law, especially in
terms of its enforcement and implementation, cannot replace the municipal law of
states, but indeed depends on the actions of governments of states and their legal
systems. As survey of state practice indicates, disputes remain limited when raised
and settled on the international plane, while municipal courts have played an
increasingly significant role in the enforcement of international law. In some areas of
public international law, "nearly all the relevant case law derives from the municipal

..264
courts.

Take, for instance, the treaties involving private law (especially private commercial

. r" IIIIi

·"'

transactions), e.g., Warsaw Convention on the contracts by international air carriers,
or, IMF's Article of Agreement on the enforceability of contracts involving an
exchange of currencies. Traditionally, a treaty of this kind calls for

enforcem~nt

by

domestic courts. Even though this treaty is not "self-enforcing" in nature, or remains
ambiguous in its nature, the municipal court may still be granted the competence to
apply or interpret it. Hence, the effectiveness of international law obligations has
considerable practical impacts on their implementation in the municipal sphere,
especially with regard to the practice of the municipal court.

r
B.

l

Some Basic Concepts

Discussions so far have called for attention to the enforcement mechanism for
international law obligations, especially concerning the role of the national judiciary.
Equal attention should also be paid to the process of giving domestic legal effect to
international obligations, where national constitutional systems, legislatures, and even
administrative bodies may play significant roles as well. As a matter of terminology,
this process can be variously described as "adoption," "incorporation," "reception,"
"transformation"

264

and

"implementation,"

depending

on

different

scholarly
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preferences. 265 There are also some other concepts for describing the effects of this
process, e.g., "direct application" (direct applicability) or ''direct effect'' of
international law obligations, or, specific treaty obligations that are "self-executing"
in nature. For the succeeding discussions, these terms and concepts are defined and
clarified as follows.

According to John O'Brien, the doctrine of incorporation holds that the rules of
international law will "automatically" become part of municipal law "without any
express act of adoption." It presumes that "adoption will operate unless there is some
clear statute or precedent to indicate otherwise." In this context, a treaty signed and
ratified by a state would become binding upon the citizens of this state "without any
legislation being passed." As for the doctrine of transformation, O'Brien submits an
opposite case, where the rules of international law do not become part of municipal
law "unless and until there has been an express act of adoption." This means the
given rule of international law must be "transformed" into domestic law. In this
regard, a treaty concluded by a state would not be given domestic effect in municipal
courts of this state "unless domestic legislation had been enacted to 'transform' it into
municipal law. "266

Professor O'Brien's proposition is consistent with that of his compatriot Ian Brownlie;
the latter acknowledged a trend of British judicial practice to "displace the doctrine of
incorporation by that of transformation." 267

Although these two doctrines are

distinguishable in giving domestic effect to international law, their significance and
application under different jurisdictions may still cause confusion. In analyzing the
status of treaties in domestic legal systems, American scholar John Jackson asserts
there is no uniform definition of an "act oftransformation," nor is there any definition
for terms such as "incorporation," "adoption," "reception," since they seemingly
265
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"compete

WI"th"

or " may . . . b e sub sume d

WI"thin"

each other. 268 Th"IS ech oes the

position of the late Chinese scholar, Wang Tieya. According to Professor Wang, terms
like :'incorporation" and "transformation" are only distinguishable in terms of their
plain meanings. This distinction is not legally significant and may not lead to any
legal effect.

Professor Wang particularly referred to the phrase "incorporation,"

regarding it as a common description of any case where the rule of international law is
integrated into municipal law, regardless of the necessity to take an "express act" of
such integration.

269

This author holds a variant perspective. First, absent a uniform definition, the term
"transformation" generally implies an "express act of adoption" or, an "act of
transformation" in its plain meaning. Such an act, as O'Brien suggests, mainly refers
to the enactment of domestic legislation for implementation of international law.
Even Jackson regards an act of transformation as a "government action" of a
particular state to "incorporate" treaty norms into its domestic law, which may take
various forms like a statute, a regulation of an administrative body, or even a decision
of a court or tribunal in the municipal sphere, depending on the actual practice of the
given state.270 As evident in state practice, in most cases, an act of transformation
falls with the province of municipal legislature, ending up in the enactment of
domestic legislation. Thus, it is not unreasonable to regard the term "transformation"
as what it ordinarily means. The succeeding discussions will adhere to this definition.

Secondly, Although Professor O'Brien's doctrine of "incorporation" explicitly refers
to a situation where international law obligations automatically become part of
domestic law without the aid to an act of transformation, 271 the term "incorporation,"
in effect, has multiple usage and meanings in a general sense. In its plain meaning,
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the word "incorporation" describes nothing more than a general process of giving
domestic legal effect to international law, including the process of "transformation" as
well.

Apparently, O'Brien's doctrine of "incorporation" can be misleading and

confusing.

To understand what amounts to O'Brien's "incorporation" doctrine, one may consider
the concept of "direct application" (or "direct applicability") introduced by Jackson in
terms of treaties. According to Jackson, "direct application" generally means the
courts or other competent government bodies in a municipal system will deem the
treaty language as a source of law subject to this system, much the same way as they
treat the constitutions, statutes, or certain other legal instruments of domestic law.
This treaty language will then become "a required source for the court to examine so
as to determine the legal rules applicable to particular cases."272 Hence, the c~ncept
of "direct application" ("direct applicability") allows for a treaty provision
automatically to become part of the sources of domestic law, without resorting to an
act of transformation, and turns out to be comparable to O'Brien's doctrine of
"incorporation." The succeeding discussions will adhere to this position. Wherever
the term "incorporation" is noted, it refers to a general process of incorporating
international law obligations into domestic law. As for O'Brien's "incorporation,"
this author adopts the concept of "direct application," "direct applicability" or,
alternatively, "direct effect" as noted below.

The concept of "direct effect'' is more commonly used in the European context.
Developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the concept represents a principle
of the internal EC legal order to grant individuals rights deriving from internal EC
legal acts. 273 Since originally applied to the "constituent EC treaties," the doctrine of
direct effect bas "extended to cover certain types of international agreements." From
272
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the predominant European viewpoint, "direct effect'' concerns "the ability of
international treaty obligations to generate legal rights, within the internal legal
system of the

Community,

which

individuals

can enforce

against their

government."274 Unlike Jackson's definition of "direct application" (directing at the
applicability of international law rules by the courts as domestic source of law), the
leading European perspective emphasizes the capability of international legal rules to
"confer rights on individuals," implying the availability of judicial review.
purposes of

th~

For

succeeding discussions, the term "direct application," "direct

applicability" and "direct effect'' are exchangeable.

Finally, although Jackson might go to extremes in mixing the phrase "transformation"
with "incorporation" and the like, he has properly introduced the term
"implementation" for the purpose of international treaties.

From

I
I

o

Ja~kson's

perspective, the process of "implementation" covers both "transformation" and "direct
application." An act of transformation may achieve "partial or full implementation,"
while the direct application of a treaty might be one form of "implementation" of
certain types of treaties.275 In this sense, "implementation" can be regarded as the
alternative of the "incorporation" in the latter's plain meaning. The present study
embraces Jackson's idea of "implementation" as a matter of domestic law. In the
succeeding discussions, wherever this term appears, it will mean "domestic
implementation" as Jackson proposed herein.

C.
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Discussions so far have clarified a couple of terminological issues concerning the
relation of international law with municipal law in municipal sphere, especially
addressing the domestic legal effect of international law obligations. At this stage, it
seems appropriate to take a look at the subject of the whole study: "domestic
implementation" of WTO law.

This subject, based on the above theoretical and

conceptual articulation, suggests the necessity of narrowing the scope of the present
study, limiting it to international treaties and their legal status on the municipal plane.
This merits some explanation below.

First, as discussed and confirmed in Part I, the law of the WTO is mainly treaty law.
Thus, the remainder of the present study will concentrate on international treaties,
especially in terms of the existing WTO treaty system (WTO agreements). The issues
on customary international law will be omitted.

Second, based on Jackson's concept of"treaty implementation," the present study will
focus on a process of giving domestic legal effect to WTO law (especially, WTO
treaty law), as well as various to the results of this process. Addressing the role of
several municipal authorities (e.g., constitutional system, legislature, courts) in this
process, the study will examine the treatment of WTO law by these respective
domestic authorities, and analyze the policy and legal rationale behind their operation
in this particular context.

Finally, since the subject of the present study remains "controversial and unresolved
as a matter of domestic law," the study will explore the diverse practice of WTO
Members.

Particularly, a case study will be conducted of U.S and European

experiences, so as to reach some policy recommendations for the People's Republic of
China, a new Member of the WTO.

For all these considerations, although the reminder of this chapter will not go beyond
the general question on the relationship between international law obligations and
94

municipal law in the municipal sphere, its focus will shift to pragmatic aspects of that
issue, which concerns the roles of respective municipal authorities in the
implementation of treaties.

IY.

Role of Municipal Authorities in Domestic Implementation of Treaties

As discussed earlier, the status of treaties in domestic law is shaped collectively by
various entities of a municipal legal system, including the national constitutional
system, legislature, courts, as well as administrative bodies.

The health of the

relationship between treaty obligations and domestic law depends greatly upon the
maintenance of the "proper'' relations among these domestic actors. 276

1.

Status ofTreaties in Municipal Constitutional Arrangements.

Generally, constitutional arrangements of a particular state serve to "determine
whether a particular rule constitutes a rule of municipal law of this state."277 The
domestic effect of international law, or, its status of "being part of municipal law" is
equally determined by these national constitutional arrangements?78 Thus, municipal
constitutional systems may serve as the starting point of any discussion on the
domestic status ofinternationallaw,279 as followed in the succeeding discussions.

A survey of state practice indicates, most states make some reference to the status of
international law within the term of their written constitution. 280 Notwithstanding the
diversity of such references, 0 'brien generalizes three aspects of their contents: (i) the
executive branch shall respect certain fundamental rights "internally"; (ii) the
executive branch shall conduct itself "externally" in accordance with international law;
276
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(iii) the constitution may make separate provision in respect to treaty provisions and
rules of customary internationallaw.Z81 Issues (i) and (ii) suggest a general preference
of the states to assert the primacy of municipal law over international law on the
municipal plane, and therefore confirms the predominant role of municipal
administrative bodies in foreign affairs. Issue (iii), on the other hand, distinguishes
treaties from customary international law by virtue of their status under the national
constitutional system.

According to L. Hankin, "the status of treaties in the domestic law of any country is a
constitutional, not an international, question." 282

Thus, municipal constitutional

arrangements may cover a number of issues with respect to the domestic status of
treaty law. They may expressly specify the "domestic legal effect" of treaties, either
granting the "direct effect" or instead, requiring an act of"transformation." They may
clarify the "hierarchical status" of treaties in domestic law, in case of a conflict
between the two. Moreover, they may address the prerequisite or pertinent issues
essential to the status of treaties in domestic law, which, as noted earlier, include the
validity of treaties under domestic law, the power to implement treaties in domestic
sphere, and the treaty-making process, etc.

All these issues are covered by an

"inventory" submitted by Professor Jackson. Below these issues are summarized in
the context of their inherent linkage to municipal constitutional arrangements.

A.

Validity of Treaties in Domestic Law

This issue is crucial, for a treaty will never be considered domestically effective
unless and until its domestic validity is established. The issue often falls within the
province of the national constitutional system, but not always. Exceptions include the
practice of the U.S. As state practice indicates, it is not uncommon that a treaty
provision will be invalidated by a national constitutional rule for its inconsistency
281
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with the latter. This situation suggests that the national constitution may serve as the
"basis" for domestic validity of treaties.

It may raise a broader issue on the

"hierarchical status" of treaties. Notably, domestic invalidity of a treaty generally
does not exclude its validity under intemationallaw.283

B.

Power to Implement Treaties in Domestic Sphere

Only domestically valid treaty obligations are capable of being implemented
domestically. Where such domestic validity is established, the issue will concern the
allocation of the power to implement these treaty obligations among various national
government bodies, as well as the "capability" of these constitutional institutions to
do so through the "direct application" or an act of"transformation." These apparently
reach the traditional province of the municipal constitution (especially, separation of
powers}, and are often covered by municipal constitutional arrangements.Z 84

C.

Choice between Direct Application of Treaties and An Act
of Transformation under the Domestic Legal System

This is the key issue on the status of treaties in domestic law, for such status basically
appears to be a matter of "direct application" or "transformation" of treaty law.
Municipal constitutional systems often make this choice, so as to determine the
domestic legal effect oftreaties. 285 As some scholarly observations suggest, wherever
a national constitution is silent on the necessity to defer to an act of "transformation,"
the "direct application" will be presumed. 286 In terms of treaties, however, many
states present an opposite case, where municipal constitutional arrangements
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explicitly call for a process of transformation, with very few exceptions available (e.g.,
"self-executing treaties" of the U.S.).

In contrast, constitutional recognition of the "direct application" appears rare. Even if

the "direct application" is constitutionally permissible, it is usually conditioned on a
requirement for the consistency of treaties with the national constitution itself. This is
merely part of the "significant qualifications and conditions" attached therein. Others
include the requirement for the application of lex posterior (the "later-in-time"
prevails) to a "statute-like" treaty law, 287 or, the "publication" prerequisite for
domestic recognition of a treaty law with direct application. 288

Finally, the role of municipal constitutional arrangements is not unlimited in
determining the status of treaties in domestic law. Where constitutional drafters are
explicit about their deference to an act of transformation, they will likely decline to
further instruct the operation of this process, and rather leave it to the municipal
legislature. Besides, not all national constitutions explicitly address the domestic
legal effect of treaties.

The status of many treaties in domestic law is either

unintended or unclear within municipal constitutional arrangements, leaving room for
other municipal authorities (e.g., legislature or judiciary) to play a role.

D.

"Hierarchical Status" of Treaties in Domestic Law

This issue concerns whether a treaty provision will prevail over a rule of domestic law

in case of a conflict between the two. As a survey of state practice indicates, the issue
is "more often deemed to tum on a constitutional rule" 289 and to be governed by
national constitutional system. A predominant "constitutional principle" embraced by
the majority of states is: "international law must give way to national legislation,"
287
288
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which is particularly true for treaties. 290

This principle reflects a "dualist-like"

position in general, but does not suggest a simple and absolute conclusion.

In the domestic sphere, clashes between the rules of treaties and domestic law tum
into "a fairly elaborate matrix" due to their equal complexity. 291 The present study
does not intend to scrutinize each of these clashes, but two of them are worth noting
for their frequent appearance in municipal constitutional arrangements: one is the
clash between a treaty norm and a national constitutional provision, the other is that

I

between a treaty norm and a national legislative enactment. In terms of the first clash,

I

it is observed "with one or two exceptions, constitutions generally are deemed
superior to treaties." As for the second one, the situation has been complicated not
only by the complexity of national legislation, the latter is either "prior" or
"subsequent" to the treaty norm concerned, but also by the diverse state practice that
enhances such complexity. Certain municipal constitutions assert that "the later in
time prevails," as in the U.S.

Others, on the contrary, insist on the primacy of

international treaties over domestic statutes (even including later-enacted ones)?92 As
a survey of state practice indicates, where a treaty law is in conflict with domestic law,
the national constitutional system has more often given weight to domestic law than
otherwise.
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As the above observations suggest, a question on the "hierarchical status" of a treaty

may arise only when there is a clash between this treaty and domestic law in domestic
sphere, while some scholars even regard such a clash as rare. Professor Jackson is the
biggest proponent of this position, submitting that the questions of the "hierarchy of
norms" arise only when "a directly applicable and invocable treaty norm is
unavoidably inconsistent with other norms in the national legal system. " 293 This
submission has two important bearings: first, international treaties may enter into a
conflict with domestic law only when they are valid, directly applicable, and
"invocable" on the domestic plane; second, this conflict serves as the prerequisite for
reaching the issue of the "hierarchy of norms."

To this author, Jackson's proposition risks a problem of oversimplification. First, the
domestic validity of treaties may depend on their "hierarchical status" in domestic law.
This is particularly the case with many national constitution rules capable of trumping
any inconsistent treaty obligations. In such a situation, it will be crucial to clarify the
"hierarchical status" of the treaty norms concerned, as to their domestic validity,
leading to a possible "conflict'' between domestically invalid treaty provision and the
pertinent rules of domestic law.

Second, based on the "co-ordination" theories, the earlier discussed "pragmatic
approach" proposes "a conflict of obligations" that is always possible between
municipal law and international law, regardless of the domestic legal effect of the
latter. 294 In practice, such a conflict turns out to be common and substantial, leading
to great potential for an action being brought before a domestic court against domestic
legislation, on the ground of treaty obligations (even they have no "direct effect''
under the domestic constitutional or legislative system). In this instance, the presiding
court does not have to address the "hierarchical status" of the treaty obligations
293
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concerned, for the latter's lack of direct effect has presumed the primacy of domestic
law over them.

Thus, the issue of the "hierarchy of norms" does not imply an

exclusive case of directly applicable treaty norms. This issue should be elaborated in
a general sense?95 Notably, where the direct effect of a treaty law is excluded, the
primacy of domestic law will be presumed over this treaty provision, making it
unnecessary to reach the issue of "hierarchy of norms."

E.

Domestic Treaty-making Process

This issue concerns the allocation of the "treaty-making powers" among national
government institutions, including the power to negotiate or sign a treaty, and to
accept this treaty as binding international legal obligations. In this context, the issue
is a procedural matter, and, from the outset, involves domestic constitutional
procedures. In the domestic sphere, "treaty making" is distinguishable from "treaty
implementation."

Nevertheless, the making of a treaty may entail enormous

implications for its domestic legal effect. As Jackson observes, where the domestic
constitutional treaty-making process does not require any "democratic participation"
(e.g., parliamentary approval), the case will be rare that the adopted treaty is granted
domestic effect without the subsequent act of the Parliament. This parliamentary act
will then serve to fill the blank left by the prior treaty-making process in "democratic
participation,"296 obviously amounting to an act of"transformation." In addition, the
domestic constitutional treaty-making process may provide an aid to identifying the
"hierarchical status" of a treaty in domestic law, if domestic legislation has been silent
on the issue. Here, one may refer to a competent government institution (usually, a
national legislature) in making this treaty, deeming the effect of this treaty comparable
to that of domestic legislation enacted by that institution.

Since municipal constitutional arrangements cover these complex issues, they play an
29
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essential role in determining the domestic status of treaties. Nevertheless, such a role
is not unlimited.

As noted earlier, even though a national constitutional system

explicitly defers to an act of transformation, it may decline to further put forward a
formula for the operation of this process, and would rather leave the matter to
competent government institutions (e.g., legislature, courts and administrative bodies).
Besid~s,

while "the practice of state reflects the characteristics of the individual

constitution,"297 national constitutions vary from state to state in treating the status of
treaties in the domestic sphere. Not all national constitutions address the domestic
effect of all treaties. In many treaties, the issue is unmentioned or unclear in the
national constitution, leaving room for national government institutions to play a role.
This is true even for a highly developed national legal system, such as Switzerland
and the Netherlands. The situation calls for an active role of national authorities "in
different directions" for the above purpose. 298

2.

Transformation of Treaties by Municipal Legislature

In previous discussions, the domestic status of treaties is mainly manifested by the

formalities of their domestic implementation, namely, the "direct application" or
"transformation" of these treaties. A choice between these two formalities is often
covered by municipal constitutional arrangements, which, however does not imply
this is "always" the case. More often, especially in absence of explicit constitutional
references, such a choice is made by the national legislature on a case-by-case basis.
Constitutional or legislative deference to an act of transformation will lead to the
primacy of domestic law over treaties, and thus clarify the "hierarchical status" of the
latter within Jackson's interpretation of this concept.

According to some scholars, "to rule against direct application would enable national
officials to implement the treaty by means of an act of transformation," the latter is
297
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"much more likely to be found and utilized by the domestic legal institutions." 299
This is particularly true for national constitutional practice, which contains an
overwhelming deference to the "transformation" of treaties. Nevertheless, as Jackson
submits, an act of transformation may have various forms, such as a domestic statute,
administrative regulation, or even a judicial decision, so long as they are capable of
incorporating treaty obligations into domestic law. 300

In practice, an act of

transformation mainly refers to the enactment of domestic legislation for treaty
implementation, giving predominance to the role of municipal legislatures. lbis has
been the case with the "enabling Act of Parliament'' of the U.K. and the
"implementing legislation" of the U.S., both spelling out the roles of the British
Parliament and the U.S. Congress.

301

As Jackson concluded, the doctrine of

transformation "recognizes the responsibility of the executive branch to negotiate
treaties and the monopoly power of the legislature to change the law."

302

Basically, a municipal legislature conducts an act of transformation in two dimensions:
policy and technical dimensions.

The policy dimension bears the legislature's

motives and political considerations for such a choice, which can be interpreted from
both international and domestic perspectives.

From an international perspective, the national legislature may desire to assert their
interpretation of a treaty, especially when the treaty concerned appears to be
ambiguous or, under its terms, "the policy choices are left open (explicitly or
implicitly)." lbis "legislative interpretation" of treaties may further be adopted by an
authoritative entity (which can be the legislature itself, or more often, national courts
of law) to impose an interpretation for domestic law. All these legal interpretations
will constitute the "state practice" to "influence the later international interpretation of
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this treaty norm." Besides, the legislature may favor an act of transformation with the
intent to delay the application of a treaty obligation or "preserve the option" to
"breach" that obligation. 303 This becomes an issue of "treaty compliance," relating to
that of "treaty implementation" as discussed later.

From a domestic perspective, the national legislature may intend to use an act of
transformation to enhance its political power "vis-a-vis other governmental entities."
Within the province of the legislature, an act of transformation will be the
implementing legislation for the treaty law concerned, triggering the "allocation" of
national authority to make certain decisions, or to take certain actions for the treaty
implementation purpose. At this stage, the treaty-implementing power is allocated
among several municipal government institutions, including not only the legislature
itself, but also the courts of law and the administrative agencies, while the act of
transformation turns out to be "part of a purely internal power struggle" within the
state. 304 Given its predominant (if not exclusive) law-making authority, the national
legislature will always have the final say on this power allocation. As national courts
and administrative agencies must adhere to its intent, the role of the national
legislature in treaty implementation becomes insurmountably significant.

In the technical dimension, the national legislature may tailor the act of
transformation in various ways.

It may reword the treaty to ''match domestic

circumstances," as in the case of many multilateral treaties, given that their official
language may be incompatible with the (legal) language of the implementing nation
state, or, same as in the latter but with differences in "certain nuances of usage." The
legislature may directly enact a treaty provision by setting it out as a schedule to the
enacted domestic legislation, or, by enacting a domestic legislation that uses all or part
of the language of this treaty. It may also enact a separate act or statute that employs
its own substantive provisions to give effect to a treaty, but the text of the treaty will
303
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not be directly enacted. In this regard, the treaty concerned can be referred to in the
long or short titles of the enacting legislation, or in its preamble or annexed schedule.
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Another approach may be adopted by the legislature where the treaty language is
deemed as ambiguous, and the direct application of it would lead to a violation of
"constitutional standard of due process." In this circumstance, the legislature may
wish to elaborate on the treaty provisions to "clarify some ambiguities (for use by
domestic courts and other applications)." 305 In the aggregate, the legislature may
"paraphrase," "clarify," "refer to," "confirm" or "elaborate" the treaty language.
These comprehensive tasks may impose a great challenge for the legislature to
develop compatible legislative techniques.

After all, even though the above

eventualities may occur in the context of "a good faith effort fully to apply the treaty
norms," they may also arouse the legislature's temptation to "depart from the precise
wording of the treaty" and therefore "to 'transform' a norm that does not accord with
the treaty norm itself."306

Where the domestic status of treaties entails an act of transformation, the municipal
legislature will play a determinant, insurmountably significant role compared to those
of other national government authorities. As state practice indicates an overwhelming
deference to an act of "transformation," it is expected that the role of the municipal
legislature in treaty implementation will remain highly significant, as a practical
matter.

3.

Application of Treaties by Municipal Courts

From the outset, the domestic status of a treaty regime is a matter of constitutional or
legislative choice between the "direct application" and "transformation" of this treaty
regime in the domestic sphere. Where the role of a national constitutional system or
305
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legislature has been satisfied in this context, the treaty concerned is capable of being
applied domestically. This, however, merely reaches the halfway point of the whole
process of treaty implementation. From a pragmatic perspective, treaty implement is
more about the task of applying a treaty (or part of it), mainly by domestic courts of
law.

Friedl Weiss views the "application of law" as comprised of three steps in the context
of dispute adjudication:
(1)

Determining the applicable law and ascertaining the rules of the legal
system which are to be applied on the basis of given materials;

(2)

Interpreting the rules so chosen or ascertained, which is determining their
meaning as they were framed and with respect to their intended scope;

(3)

Applying to the case in hand the rules so found and interpreted. 307

.

As noted earlier, several municipal government authorities may undertake to interpret
or apply treaties within their constitutional authority.

Typically, by an act of

transformation, a national legislature may incorporate its interpretations of treaties
into domestic legislation. These "legislative interpretations" appear to be general
rules or policies for the treaty norms concerned, without being directed at any
particular case (dispute).

Therefore, they do not fall within Professor Weiss's

meaning of"legal application." As for national administrative bodies, they may argue
towards the "allocation of power, or policies to apply in relation to the treaty." They
may also decide within their discretion to act "as if the treaty were, or were not,
directly applied" for purposes of a particular case (dispute). 308 However, subject to a
judicial review by national courts, administrative decisions in this regard will not
contain any decisive, authoritative interpretations of the treaty.
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Today, judicial review has been one of the fundamentals of a modem legal system that
is based upon the rule of law, with the courts of law playing an exclusive role in
performing this legal function.

Under such a system, administrative bodies'

interpretations of treaties are always subject to those of the courts, and therefore do
not govern the outcome of any typical legal interpretation. On the contrary, where the
issue of the domestic legal effect of treaties arises in judicial review, the reviewing
court will have the final say on it.309

For the purpose of treaty application/interpretation, national courts generally follow
Professor Weiss's three-prong approach. For the first prong, the court will first "make
a choice of law depending on the nature of the subject matter." Where the treaty
norms are appropriate for use, the courts will "ascertain" their existence and ''their
effect within the municipal sphere."310

To this end, the courts will adhere to any

available constitutional arrangements or legislative policies or laws concerning the
issue. This task can be easy or tough, depending on the extent to which these rules or
policies may address the issue, explicitly or implicitly. Where they are ambiguous or
silent on the issue, the court may find itself in a difficult position seeking the guidance
to maintain "proper relations" with the legislative and the executive branches.

This may become a constitutional problem, regarding the "separation of powers" in
the context of foreign relations, to which the resolutions developed by the courts vary
from state to state, ranging from "judicial activism" to ''judicial restraint." In any
event, the court will have to undertake a ''judicial policy-making" process often
criticized and doubted. 311 The first prong usually leads to the "direct application" of a
treaty (or part of it), or, otherwise, the application of domestic legislation for the
purpose of those treaty norms. With this completed, the court will continue with the
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second and third prongs.

Accordingly, municipal courts serve as both the "applying authority" of treaties and
the "destination" for this applying process. Although from the outset, the domestic
status of treaties falls within the province of the national constitutional system and the
legislature; as a practical matter, the issue is more related to domestic enforcement
mechanisms, which, in a general sense, refer to domestic judicial proceeding featuring
the exclusive role of national courts.

A.

Municipal Courts' Position towards Domestic Legal Effect
of Treaties

Application of treaties by municipal courts calls for the latter's appropriate pos.ition
towards the domestic legal effect of treaties.

In this regard, some municipal

constitutional systems and legislatures have developed certain rules and policies.
Wherever they are available, the courts must adhere to them, and thus become the
"operator" of these constitutional and/or legislative rules and policies.

A question then arises as to how to locate these rules or policies. As a survey of state
practice indicates, the national constitution system and the legislature address the
domestic effect of treaties variously. There will never be a "simple and firm" rule or
policy for the "direct application" of all treaties; even the most monist countries like
the Netherlands would not do so. 312 On the contrary, some national constitutions do
simply deny the direct application of all treaties.

More often, the domestic

constitution limits this effect to "certain category of treaties" (e.g., "self-executing
treaties" of the U.S.}, 313 granting the direct application to some treaties, while
explicitly requiring an act of transformation for others. The domestic legislature, on
the other hand, may take the same position by adhering to an act of transformation. In
312
313
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these situations, it would be easy to fmd constitutional or legislative rules or policies
for domestic status or effect of treaties.

On other occasions, states will take an "intermediate" position, granting direct
application to certain part of a treaty, or, otherwise, imposing certain criteria or
conditions upon the treaty provisions concerned, so as to restrict such direct effect to a
certain degree. 314 Where this provision-specific approach is adopted to define the
domestic status of treaties, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the national
constitution or legislation to incorporate any simple and firm rule or policy for the
issue. Consequently, the courts will likely face the ambiguous, fragmental intent of
the constitution or the legislature, not to mention the latter's possible silence on the
issue.

In the above situation, the courts will have to shoulder the burden of clarifying this
issue by "articulating interpretive strategies and conducting default rules."315 Absent
explicit constitutional or legislative guidance, the courts often have to resort to other
legal sources for alternative criteria. According to U.S. practice, such alternative
criteria can be the intent of the treaty makers. Or, the treaty concerned may in itself
serve as a convenient source for this purpose, since "direct and precise [treaty]
language enters into the evaluation of this intent." In this regard, the pertinent treaty
language needs to be suitable enough for the expression of the "unilateral intent'' of
the treaty-making officials or institutions of the applying state. 316

Treaties differ in expressing the "intent" concerning their domestic legal effect. Some
treaties "expressly disavow direct enforcement." 317 In this context, a treaty clause
indicating the necessity to take domestic implementing action may "presumably"
314
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secure the "unilateral intent" of the applying state to deny the direct application, and
therefore qualify a matter of domestic law binding upon the applying state.

318

This

presumption assumes that the denial of the "direct application" is always in the
interest of the applying party to the treaty, so that international exclusion of such
direct effect will be deemed to reflect the unilateral intent of the applying state, and
thereby control its domestic sphere.

I"

I
Other treaties "expressly call for domestic judicial enforcement."

They mostly

involve "private commercial transactions where the parties typically are strangers to
each other not likely to engage in repeat play.''319 These treaties may express such
intent "by their own terms, or through implementing domestic laws:mo However,
whether such intent lives up to the above "unilateral intent" criteria remain unsettled.
A treaty incorporating an international obligation of direct applicability does. not in
itself make this obligation a matter of domestic law to the applying state, for this
treaty cannot exclude the possibility of the adverse "domestic intent" of the applying
state. 321 This recalls an earlier-discussed circumstance, where the "inability" of a
state to give direct effect to a treaty (especially under municipal national
constitutional arrangements) does not prevent this state from expressly obligating
itself to apply this treaty in the international sphere. 322 Notwithstanding this settled
international commitment, the applying state will still be prevented from granting
direct application to this treaty, since the national constitution or legislative law and
policies have so provided.

Thus, the "unilateral intent" criteria are not entirely reliable. They merely apply to the
intent to deny direct application, and merely result in a "presumption" for such an
effect on the domestic plane.

Reasonable these criteria may be, they are also
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restrictive. As noted above, this approach has widely been adopted by the U.S. courts.
Even so, it remains arguable in the U.S., that "where the matter is not predetermined,"
the issue "is the one of domestic constitutional, or legislative policy, and law, and
need not involve (as a matter of domestic law) the intent of other parties to the treaty."

In this context, although the commentary does not refer to the unilateral intent of the
applying state, based upon the above discussion, such intent is not necessarily relevant,
either.

As for the "international intent" to grant direct application, national courts may face
the question of honoring the principle of pacta sunt servanda, so as to avoid state
responsibilities. The courts may adhere to such intent only within their competence
relative

to

s

other

national

governmental

institutions,

under

national

constitutional/legal settings. This will still be a matter of domestic law, particularly
concerning the "separation of powers" and the propriety of the relations among the
courts and other domestic governmental institutions. 323 In this sense, the courts'
position towards the domestic status of treaties is, at any rate, a matter of domestic
law, subject to the explicit or implicit intent of the national constitution or legislature
in the same regard.

In sum, municipal courts' position regarding the domestic legal effect of treaties
varies.

The courts may adhere to direct application, or defer to an act of

transformation. They may also develop other judicial policies or techniques to handle
the matter, leading to complex arguments in this regard. On the one hand, even
though a treaty is directly applicable, the courts may still find a way to avoid this
effect, e.g., adopting the concept of "invocability'' and "justiciability."324 On many
occasions, the courts will tend to do so to avoid the embarrassment of determining its
government's breach of treaty obligations. 325 On the other hand, where an act of
323
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u-Wsformation is required, the courts must apply domestic implementing legislation
for the treaty concerned, other than that treaty itself.

The issue then turns to a

domestic matter of legal interpretation. Even so, since treaties maintain an important
bearing on the interpretation of domestic law, the courts will inevitably interpret the
treaty itself.326 These circumstances will be discussed below.

B.

The Concept oflnvocability and Justiciability

In terms of the application of treaties by municipal courts, the term "invocability" is
regarded as the equivalent of"standing." As Jackson submits, "even though the treaty
is directly applicable in the domestic legal system, in a specific case a determination
may need to be made as to who is entitled to invoke or rely on the treaty norm." Such
a "special case" refers to either the "vertical application" of the treaty, or the
"horizontal application" of it.

In the former circumstance, the treaty is directly

applied in the disputes between different units or levels of government, or between the
government and private individuals. In the latter circumstance, the treaty is directly
applied between the private citizens or enterprises. "Invocablity" refers to standings
of the above particular parties in either circumstance, based on a "direct applicable"
treaty at issue. 327

The terms "justiciablity" refers to the "quality" of a rule (e.g., a treaty norm) to be
"understood and applied by courts within their competence." The concept is deemed
to "center, explicitly or implicitly, around the precision (Bestimmtheit) of the rule
concerned" for clarifying the obligations and rights deriving therein. "Justiciability"
of a treaty is mainly determined by its intent, context, and purpose, and may also be
measured in the context of certain broad principles, such as the human rights
guarantee.

In the latter case, those principles are deemed to come within the

326
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competence of the courts "in determining individual rights and obligations. "

328

As a technical matter, "justiciability" may serve as the criterion for both "direct
applicability" and "invocability" of treaties. According to the judicial practice of the
states, treaty obligations with insufficient precision (e.g., negotiating programmes)which are deemed to lack jusiticiability - will be excluded from direct application by
municipal courts. 329 It is also observed that "invocability" of a treaty depends on its
justiciability as well. As the concept of '1usticiability" appears so essential to the both,
national courts and governments are often confused with the question of "direct
applicability" (direct application) and that of "invocability. " 330

In fact, the above two legal concepts are distinguishable from each other. "Direct
application" is primarily a matter of the intent of one or more parties (states) _to the
treaty concerned, especially in terms of the unilateral intent of treaty makers of the
applying state. "Invocability" is a matter to be determined by municipal courts on a
case-by-case basis.

For that purpose, beside the '1usticiability" of the treaty

concerned, the courts will take into account other factors as well, such as the
categories of persons entitled to standing (e.g., "citizen," "adult male") or, "political
question." 331 In this sense, "invocability" is mostly a matter of domestic procedural
law (for standing). Consequently, these two concepts arise from separate dimensions
of a national legal system: "direct applicability" concerns the national treaty-making
process, while invocability concerns national judicial proceedings. As they remain in
different dimensions, the direct application of a treaty does not necessarily lead to its
invocability.

Such a difference may also result in a "vacuum" between the two dimensions for
328
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municipal courts to fill in the process of treaty application. In this context, the courts
may decide within their competence whether the treaty law concerned can "transit"
from a "directly applicable" status to an invocable matter. In some nation states, the
court often adopts a two-prong approach, excluding the application of directly
applicable treaty provisions based upon the criteria of "invocability" or
"justiciability." Specifically, the court will first recognize that the treaty concluded as
directly applicable is part of the domestic jurisprudence.

Then, based upon the

concept of invocability, the court will determine which party is entitled to invoke or
rely on the treaty concerned; or, based upon the precision and other attributes of the
language of this treaty Gusticiability), the court will determine only portions of this
treaty should be entitled to direct application and the remainder of it should not. 332 By
this approach, municipal courts may successfully exclude the domestic effect of
treaties without irritating their "legitimate" status of direct application.

Behind the above approach is a nuanced judicial policy, based upon the courts'
concern that the "direct application" will likely result in an embarrassing court
decision that their municipal government is "acting in violation of the treaty." Such a
consequence may "undercut the effectiveness" of that government, "if it should
participate in an international proceeding where it is charged with breach of the treaty
obligation."333 Accordingly, many national courts have tended to avoid touching the
above decisions, and a convenient approach for this purpose will be to "avoid
applying the treaty norm in particular cases," as evident in the adoption of the
"invocability" and "justiciability" criteria. 334

C.

Municipal Courts' Interpretations of Treaties

Application of law requires its interpretation. So does the application of international
332/d.
333
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treaties. As noted above, municipal courts are the "applying institution" of treaties in
the domestic sphere. However, their interpretations of treaties are conditioned by the
treaty's domestic legal effect Where a treaty is directly applicable and becomes part
of domestic jurisprudence, the domestic court may, subject to the criteria of
invocability and justiciability, apply (interpret) this treaty in the same way it does with
domestic law.

Where an act of transformation is required, a domestic municipal

legislature generally takes on this task, incorporating its own interpretations of the
treaty into domestic implementing legislation.

As mentioned earlier, "legislative interpretations" do not amount to typical "legal

interpretations," since they take the form of domestic legislation. 335 To the courts,
they may not directly apply a treaty subject to the act of transformation. Neither can
they develop the same interpretations of this treaty, as those of a directly applicable
one. This, however, does not mean that the courts may not interpret this treaty at all.
Even though a treaty may not be directly applicable, it still may have a significant
"bearing on interpretation of municipal law." Such "municipal law" can either be the
particular implementing legislation for this treaty, or be any other domestic law
relevant to this treaty. To interpret such domestic legislation, the courts may still have
to interpret the pertinent treaty norms as well.

336

Thus, in terms of treaty interpretation, domestic courts either interpret the directly
applicable treaty norms (e.g., "self-executing" model in the U.S.), or interpret any
domestic rule of law, which is related to a treaty norm subject to an act of
transformation (e.g., "non self-executing" model in the U.S).

In the latter

circumstance, there might be a necessity for the courts to interpret pertinent treaty
norms. Both circumstances are discussed below.

335
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(1)

Interpretation of Directly Applicable Treaties

According to the judicial practice of many states, where the national court has decided
_ "as a preliminary issue" - that a treaty norm is "applicable to a case before it," this
treaty norm "is applicable as though it is a rule of the law of the forum," and, the court
will use the same techniques of legal interpretation as it would for domestic rules of
law. 337 Obviously, such a process of "treaty interpretation" is conditioned by the
direct applicability and invocability of the treaty norm concerned. In England, once
the court ascertains that there are no bars within the domestic legal system to applying
a treaty, the court will "take judicial notice" of this treaty, accepting it as the rule of
domestic law without requiring a "formal proof' of its existence. 338 In the U.S., the
self-executing treaties obtain the "statute-like" status, and therefore is applied and
interpreted by the court just as the court would apply and interpret domestic

s~tute

law.339

One concern may arise in this context about the potential of "diverging interpretation
of rules" by the courts of different states supporting the direct application of the same
treaty provision. 340 The courts of different states may have different interpretations of
a directly applicable treaty norm. This inconsistency of interpretation may lead to
chaos in domestic treaty implementation, and jeopardize the effectiveness of treaties
in the domestic sphere. In addition, the inconsistency of interpretation may also occur
between a national court and an international tribunal. While a national court may

lI
I·
I

hold - within its competence - its interpretation of a directly applicable treaty norm, it
is arguable that the parallel interpretations by an existing international body should be
definitive in domestic law as well. 341 Here, a preliminary question arises: whether the
direct effect of a treaty law necessarily extends to an international interpretation of
337
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this treaty law. 342 In other words, whether domestic law, which comprises directly
applicable treaty norms, should incorporate the interpretations of these treaty norms
by a competent international body, making them equally binding upon domestic
institutions (like the courts)? This falls within a broad scope of the stare decisis status
of international judicial decisions.

A blunter question may arise where an international interpretation of the treaty norm
clashes with a domestic one. In practice, this may happen regardless of the domestic
effect of the treaty norm concerned. As noted earlier, even where a treaty is not
directly applicable, the national court may still have the competence to interpret it for
the purpose of applying the pertinent domestic law. This may raise a question of the
"hierarchical status" of the interpretations by an international tribunal compared to
those by the national court. Here, the key to the issue is a matter of the res judicata
force of such international interpretation in the domestic sphere, reflecting the attitude
of national policy makers towards the relative merit of national judges, as compared
to that of international judges. As a practical matter, there is "at least a suspicion or
hint" that the domestic legal institutions will "strain" to apply their interpretation
through one technique or another. 343

As a technical matter, the methods of

interpretation as employed by British, American, and Commonwealth courts are
normally "similar to a great way to those of international tribunals and international
law." 344

(2)

Interpretation of Domestic Law in Light of Treaties

The fact that the interpretation of the rules of domestic law may entail the necessity to
refer to a treaty obligation suggests a tight linkage between two types of legal
obligations arising therefore. On many occasions, the applied domestic law is the
342
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"implementing legislation" for this treaty, serving as the act of transformation of the
latter. In applying this domestic implementing legislation, the national court will do
so just like it "would interpret other legislation or domestic legal acts."345 At the same
time, the court will recognize any possible necessity to refer to the treaty itself. In this
context, since this interpretation of the treaty serves the purpose of interpreting the
pertinent domestic law, it may not bear the same legal consequence as those of
directly applicable treaties.

In many states, municipal courts have developed certain common rules for the
interpretation of domestic law in light of treaties and other international law
obligations. In the United Kingdom, there has been a well-established rule of
construction providing that "where domestic legislation is passed to give effect to an
international convention, there is a 'presumption' that Parliament intended to fulfill its
international obligations." Here, the key for the courts to interpret this domestic
legislation is to locate the above intent of Parliament.

As English courts have

consistently recognized, the text of a treaty may be used as "an aid to interpretation"
for the purpose of interpreting the Enabling Act of Parliament. Originally, the courts
imposed controversial conditions in various individual cases. Later, they reached a
common policy, that the text of a treaty may be used as an aid to interpretation in any
case where the interpreted domestic law "does not in terms incorporate the treaty nor
refer to it," or, where there is an "absence of ambiguity in the legislative text when
taken in isolation." With regard to a necessity to make a reference to the text of a
treaty, it remains unsettled whether "the method chosen to give legislative effect of
the treaty" should determine this issue. 346

The above British practice reveals in part a predominant judicial rule of construction
for today, which is the doctrine of "consistent interpretation." According to this
doctrine, where a national rule of law "allows for different interpretations," the rule
345
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''has to be construed in accordance with international obligations."

In terms of

treaties, the doctrine requires that the construed national law has to be "broadly
framed" and have "no fundamental conflict" with the treaty obligations concerned. 347
This seems not to be a problem with a domestic law intended to implement the given
treaty obligations, for the intent of this implementing legislation is fundamentally
consistent with that of the treaty obligations concerned, and the legislation itself
would be deemed to be "broadly framed" and open to multiple interpretations. As a

I

I·

result, the treaty obligations concerned should qualify as "a proper aid to
interpretation" and serve to reveal any latent ambiguity in the given national law.

348

In reviewing the state practice, the doctrine of consistent interpretation bas been
widely embraced by many countries, and turned into a long-standing judicial policy of
their courts. In the United States, this practice can be traced back to the case of the

Charming Besty in the early history of the Supreme Court. In this landmark case,
Chief Justice Mashall held that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other construction is possible."349 In Switzerland, the
Swiss Supreme Court established in its 1968 decision Frigero v. EVED that national
law has to be applied and construed in accordance with international obligations,
whenever there are doubts as to the proper meaning of the domestic statutory
language. 350

D.

Res Judicata and the "Interplay" between Municipal
Judicial Proceeding and International Dispute Settlement
Process

As mentioned earlier, from a pragmatic perspective, the relationship between treaty
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law and domestic law should be examined in the context of international enforcement
mechanisms. Since treaties are implemented at both domestic and international level,
there is always a potential for a treaty being applied simultaneously by a national
court and an existing international tribunal, leading to the interplay between domestic
judicial proceeding and international dispute settlement process. This concerns the
concept of res judicata.

The term "res judicata" refers to a general rule of law, providing that "a matter once
judicially decided is finally decided." 351 At international level, the res judicata force
of the result of international dispute settlement may extend, at least, to the parties of a
particular dispute.

In this context, the international decision will create some

"secondary legal obligations" of international law.

In principle, "without the co-operation of the internal legal system," decisions of
international tribunals (which contain the interpretations by these tribunals) are not
binding upon national courts. Such "internal co-operation" can be the approaches for
giving domestic effect to international legal obligations, specifically, by "direct
application" or an act of "transformation."

Thus, a question remains unsettled:

whether the res judicata force of an international decision may shift to the domestic
sphere, so that the "secondary" international law obligations deriving therein will
equally bind national courts. As a matter of fact, at the international level, even the
establishment of the res judicata force for an international decision can be
questionable, not to mention its possible legal effect in the domestic sphere. Some
highly developed international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), may secure the res judicata force of their determinations on a limited basis.
Nevertheless, even an ICJ decision "does not of itself create a res judicata" for its

351

BRYAN A.

GARNER, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (8th ed. 2004). The term refers to a rule that "a

final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action

,.
I

involving the same claim, demand or cause of action."

120

. 1 count erparts .352
nattona

Of course, the above situation does not imply that a national court - within its
competence - "could not, or should not, recognize the validity of the judgment of an
international tribunal of manifest competence and authority, at least for certain
purposes." At least, decisions of international tribunals "may provide evidence of the
legally permitted extent of jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty of the particular
states involved."353 Moreover, they may, as they often do, serve as a "persuasive
source" for national courts to apply and interpret international law (including treaties).

As for the decisions of municipal courts, in general, their application of res judicata
does not shift to an international jurisdiction. The reason is simple. Although the
subject matter "may be substantially the same" within both jurisdictions, and the
applied treaty obligations may be the same as well, the parties involved in each
jurisdiction will not be, and issues "will have a very different aspect" accordingly.
One exception to this general practice involves the principle of "exhausting local
remedies." Where it is established that "adequate remedies have been obtained" in
the municipal sphere, the force of res judicata from this jurisdiction will extend to the
other one (international jurisdiction).

354

Notably, this consequence may also lead to a violation of international law and "cause
the international responsibility of the state of forum." Moreover, the effect of res
judicata of national judicial decisions may extend to international jurisdiction upon

the agreement among the states concerned. In this context, an international tribunal
may, in accordance with its constituent instrument (usually referring to an agreement
between two or more states), "accept certain categories of national judicial decisions
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CHAPTER 2

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WTO LAW AND THE

I,

INTERNAL LAW OF WTO MEMBERS

1.

The Nature of the Relationship between WTO Law and Internal Law of
WTOMembers

It is well established that the law of the WTO is part and parcel of international law.
Thus, it is not surprising that the relationship between WTO law and the internal law
of WTO members falls within the broad matrix of the relationship between
international law and municipal law. This proposition is particularly supported by
Professor Hart's concept of a legal system, which draws a distinction between the
"insiders" and "outsiders" of a legal system.

According to the "pragmatic approach" noted earlier, the relationship between
international law and municipal law turns out to be a "conflict of obligations"
between these two separately operating systems, which refers especially to "an
inability of the state on the domestic plane to act in the manner required by
international law," and "the consequence of this will not be the invalidity of the
internal law but the responsibility of the state on the international plane."356 In terms
of treaties, such a conflict involves the issue of treaty compliance. 357 From this
pragmatic perspective, the relationship between WTO law and the internal law of
WTO Members turns into a conflict between WTO legal obligations and the rules of
the internal law of WTO members, which particularly involves the ''WTO
compliance" issue, concerning the compliance of domestic law of WTO members
with WTO legal obligations.

From an international law perspective, there are generally two categories of
356

BROWNLIE, supra note 222, at 34.
m Jackson, Status, supra note 209, at 311 .

123

I

international legal obligations under the law of the WTO: one is the treaty obligations
under the WTO agreements (as "WTO treaty obligations"), the other is the "secondary
legal obligations" deriving from the rulings of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) (as "DSB decisions"). "WTO compliance" concerns a possible conflict of
internal law ofWTO members with either ofthese categories. Differing in the source
and legal nature, these two types of WTO legal obligations are distinguishable from
each other, which are also reflected in their respective relations with the domestic law
ofWTO Members.

Acknowledging the different domestic effectiveness of these two types of WTO
obligations, some scholars have proposed an intermediate position of granting "direct
effect'' to the DSB decisions, under which the WTO treaty norms would be "stated
and clarified" with "no flexibility," and "left to the discretion of the contracting
parties."358 However, the evidence of state practice supports an opposite position. In
some very limited situations, domestic institutions (e.g., legislatures and courts) may
grant direct effect to certain WTO treaty provisions. However, in no event have they
granted such effect to the results of the WTO dispute settlement process. This will be
elaborated in the succeeding discussions.

Certainly, the domestic legal effect of WTO law (in the context of above two
categories of WTO obligations) reflects only part of the relationship between WTO
law and the internal law of WTO members. To take an overall look at this core
subject, one may tum to John O'Brien's "three central issues" for describing the
relationship between international law and municipal law, 359 a "broad matrix" of the
above core subject. Viewed from O'Brien's perspective, the relationship between
WTO law and internal law of WTO members may correspondingly contain three
central issues as follows:

358
359
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(i)

Status of internal law of WTO members within the WTO legal system
(especially, the treatment of such internal law in the WTO dispute
settlement process);

(ii)

Status of WTO legal obligations in the internal law of WTO members
(especially, the circumstances in which WTO legal obligations are
implemented by domestic institutions, such as domestic courts);

(iii)

Consequences of a conflict of WTO legal obligations with internal law
ofWTO members.

The above observation equally suggests a two-tier, pragmatic approach for assessing
the relationship between WTO law and the domestic law of WTO members,
according to which the succeeding discussions are divided into two parts, addressing,
respectively, issue (i) and (ii), with each equally specifying issue (iii).

ll.

Status of Internal Law of WTO Members within the WTO Legal System

1.

Pacta sunt servanda in the Context of WTO Law

On the international plane, the relationship between international law and municipal
law is settled by the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda. This customary
rule is codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
providing that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." 360 Article 27 of the same Convention confirms the
supremacy of a treaty over the internal law of its parties, providing that "a party may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty," 361 otherwise it will trigger state responsibility vis-a-vis the impaired parties to
this treaty. As a result, parties to a treaty have "a general duty" to bring their internal
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law "in conformity with" their treaty obligations, 362 as often explicitly referred to in
this treaty.

As part and parcel of international law, WTO law takes the major form of treaty law,
which basically refers to a comprehensive treaty package under the WTO auspice,
titled ''WTO agreements," "Uruguay Round Agreements" or, simply "WTO treaties."
Thus, WTO law falls within the governing scope of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties. As parties to the WTO treaties, WTO Members are subject to a
similar "general duty" noted above, which is incorporated in Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement. Under this provision, "[E]ach Member shall ensure the conformity
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided
in the annexed Agreements." Incorporating the principle of pacta sunt servanda into
WTO legal regime, this provision reinforces the supremacy ofWTO law over internal
law of WTO members in international sphere. As a result, WTO legal obligations
(especially, WTO treaty obligations) prevail over national or regional law of WTO
Members in any event.

Unlike numerous WTO substantive legal rules that address various trade and traderelated subjects, Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement particularly targets the
domestic legal systems of WTO Members. Because of this feature, it is among some
other WTO treaty provisions that particularly impose the criteria for Members'
domestic implementation of WTO law.

Under these "implementing provisions,"

Members are supposed to afford a favorable internal legal system for their WTO
implementation, which manifests the "rule of law" feature of the WTO, as originally
advocated by its founders.

According to Aticle XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, the "inconformity" of domestic
law of a WTO Member with WTO legal obligations may constitute a breach of WTO

362
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law, and trigger the state responsibility vis-a-vis the impaired WTO Members.
However, the establishment of such a breach is not unconditional. As noted earlier, a
failure to bring domestic law into conformity with international law "is not in itself a
direct breach of international law," for "domestic invalidity does not itself preclude
the validity of a treaty under internationallaw."363 A breach will arise "only where the
state concerned fails to observe its obligations on a specific occasion."364 In terms of
WTO law, such a "specific occasion" concerns the "internal law" of a particular WTO
Member, in regarded to its constitution (state practice indicates a rare case in this
regard), legislation (it "could of itself constitute a breach of treaty provision" in
limited situations),365 judicial decisions or other related legal acts.

Furthermore, this specific occasiOn usually entails a particular dispute, where
enforcement/resumption of the breached WTO obligations calls for specific
performance by the convicted WTO Member. The WTO dispute settlement process
has made such specific performance possible by offering certain reparations for the
WTO violations, which, however, contain certain disadvantages at the same time.
Under Article 21:1 of the DSU, "WTO-inconsistent measures and practices under
national law have to be brought into compliance with WTO obligations within a
reasonable period of time." In this regard, a major "specific performance" would be
to remove these contested measures or practices.

However, the DSU-based

enforcement mechanism fails to fix a grace period for the above purpose, and also
makes the available reparation limited to the withdrawal of concessions and
temporary compensation. 366

These disadvantages have constituted a significant

obstacle to the enforcement ofWTO law at international level.

Another limitation to the international enforcement of WTO legal obligations
363
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concerns the constitutional structure of a WTO Member, which can be either a unitary
or a federal nation-state. Under international law, the acts of a national legislature, or,
other sources of internal rules and decision making "are not to be regarded as the acts
of some third party for which the state is not responsible," otherwise this "would
facilitate evasion of obligations." 367 As an exception to this tradition, WTO law
enables WTO Members "to enforce obligations internally only to the extent that they
dispose of the necessary constitutional powers."368 This suggests that a Member may
exclude itself from the liabilities of its subordinate authorities' violations of WTO
legal obligations, so long as the domestic constitution of this Member provides for
such a leeway. 369 This leaves room for reexamining "if a proper balance of basic
obligations to perform between unitary and federal state members of the WTO is to be
maintained," as this "balance" is so acknowledgeable for its significance to the
international enforcement of WTO law. On the other hand, this WTO mandate does
reinforce the general duty ofWTO Members to implement WTO legal obligations "in
matters falling within the jurisdiction of the central government. " 370

2.

WTO Treaty Requirements for Internal Law of WTO Members

A.

Issue of "Domestic Implementation" as Specified in WTO
Agreements

The WTO treaty law has given particular attention to the domestic law of WTO
Members. Within the WTO treaty system, quite a few provisions mandate WTO
Members "to make available judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals and
independent review procedures at the domestic level." They are part of the abovementioned implementation provisions, including:
367
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- GATT 1994 (Article X of the GATT)~
- WTO Antidumping Agreement (Article

13)~

- WTO Agreement on Preshipment Inspection {Article 4);
- WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (Article 23)~
- General Agreement on Trade in Services (Article VI), the TRIPS Agreement
(e.g. Article 41-50, 59); and
-Agreement on Government Procurement (Article XX:). 371

These provisions impose similar (if not identical) criteria for the internal dispute
settlement and enforcement mechanisms of WTO Members. A few of them are even
more "aggressive" by calling for the direct effect ofWTO treaty norms. According to
these provisions, the objective of domestic courts or other dispute settlement bodies
should be to examine the "alleged breaches of the Agreement" (Article XX:2 of the
Agreement on Government Procurement), and "whether the parties to the dispute
have complied with the provision of this Agreement" (Article 4:f of the PSI
Agreement). At odds with most of the other "modest" implementation provisions, the
domestic legal effect of these "aggressive" provisions is unsettled in both academic
and practical circles. Nevertheless, all implementation obligations of the WTO entail
"a clear determination to increase the effectiveness of WTO law by linking it to
domestic dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms." 372 This, according to
some scholars, has reflected the significant "rule of law" feature of the WTO legal
system, as proposed by the WTO founders.

The issue of domestic implementation can be traced back to the Uruguay Round
negotiations. In January 1990, Switzerland proposed in the "Negotiation Group on
Dispute Settlement" to "further strengthen the domestic implementation and judicial
enforcement of international trade rules." That proposal called for reaching this goal
371
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"by implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements in domestic laws on the basis of
individual rights and obligations, thereby improving private access to domestic courts
and private rights in domestic policy-making process."

Specifically, "domestic

foreign trade law should not be less precise than the corresponding international
GA1TIWTO rules," regardless of the domestic effect of these international
373
.
obligatlons.

Subsequently, when the Uruguay Round Agreements concluded in 1994, they
followed that Swiss proposal in a very limited way. Only those provisions "requiring
private access to domestic courts and prescribing precise substantive and procedural
standards for domestic trade policy-making processes" have been incorporated into

I

~'

the WTO agreements, turning out to be the existing "implementation provisions"

I

under the WTO. On the other hand, "much remains to be done so as to further

,~~

strengthen the multi-level protection of individual rights, and the 'grass-root
enforcement' of liberal trade rules, in domestic court proceedings. ••

374

notwithstanding their binding nature in an international legal

Moreover,
sense, the

"implementing provisions" still maintain much flexibility by giving WTO Members

C?

~

~~~i

un

various options for the domestic mechanism for the WTO implementation. In fact,
I

there has not yet been any WTO treaty provision that explicitly mandates WTO

~

Members to implement WTO obligations in a particular way, 375 even though some of
them have indicated such a tendency (e.g., the above-noted "aggressive"
implementation provisions). In this sense, WTO law has restrained itself from over
interfering with the internal law ofWTO Members.

This position is in line with the general practice of international law, where how a
state will make and apply international law is a matter to be determined upon its own,

373

/d. at 119.

374

/d.

375

/d. at 72.
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as the issue remains "controversial and unresolved as a matter of domestic law."376

r.

'·

Under international law, the WTO's "implementation provisions" are definitely
binding upon its Members, and the "inconformity" of the internal law of a Member

with any of these requirements may trigger the state responsibility of this Member
vis-a-vis its impaired counterparts within the WTO. Take the provisions on "the
obligations of publication, transparency and reasonably application" for example.
They "are as instrumental in making the (factual) assessment of national or regional
law [ofWTO Members] as is the substantive rule at stake."

B.

Role of Domestic Courts as Defmed in WTO Agreements

WTO agreements set forth a series of requirements for internal dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms of WTO members, as contained in certain "implementation
provisions" noted above. Interestingly, none of these provisions provides for the
exclusive role of domestic courts in this regard. Instead, they simply refer to "judicial,
arbitral or administrative tribunals and independent review procedures at the domestic
level," leaving to WTO Members a great deal of discretion for their choice. One
scholar therefore asserts that none of these WTO requirements "address[es] the
specific role of national courts and the functioning of judicial review with respect to
the rights of the individual. " 377

Nevertheless, the availability of a variety of means for option can never imply a
denial of any of them, especially in regard to those deemed to be the best choices.
First, these implementation provisions do explicitly note the ''judicial . . . tribunals"
which, within their plain meanings, mean nothing more than the courts of law. The
provisions just place the courts in a "candidate seat" with other available domestic
adjudicating bodies, for the options of WTO Members within their own discretion.
376

Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, at 91.

377
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This flexibility reflects the capacity of the WTO legal regime to address the diverse

'·

political and legal development of individual WTO Members.

Second, these implementation provisions do not and should not prevent domestic
courts from playing a significant role in the implementation of WTO law.

It is

particularly true from the perspective of the international rule of law, which
emphasizes the essential role of national judiciary in the implementation of
international law. As American scholar Mattias Kumm observes:
National courts in cooperation with litigants would assume the role of policing
national political branches.

In liberal constitutional democracies, government

I

~~!

institutions and bureaucracies exhibit, at least as a general matter, the habit of

Cc.JI

conforming their behavior to legal requirements as interpreted by national courts.

~r:!l:

Therefore, the enforcement of international law by national courts is likely to ipcrease

Fl'

the probability of state compliance with international law. . .. Whatever the reasons

111/3

~·
111311

for widespread state compliance with international law, however, problems of

l

lsJ w

noncompliance sufficiently widespread for national judicial actors to have a
potentially significant role in the enforcement of international law. 378

Apparently, Professor Kumm based his observation on his belief in "liberal
constitutional democracies" and the "rule of law" - both concepts open to various
meanings in enforcing international law, depending on the particular political and
legal systems involved. Today, as the "rule of law" has now been embraced by any
state or region claiming to possess a "modem" legal system, states have developed
certain common standards for this favorable regime, no matter how it is presented in
various countries and regions, or at national and international levels. 379
378
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"independent judiciary" has been one of these widely recognized common standards.
WTO Members are no exception to this. As a result, it is not surprising to see the
increasingly essential role of national or regional courts in domestic implementation
ofWTO law, especially with a sophisticated legal system like that of the U.S. or the
EC. In this regard, there is no doubt that national courts should undertake to enforce
WTO law "even when there is no specific authorization from the legislative or
executive branches to do so."

Finally, as noted above, a few of these "implementation provisions" indicate a trend to
have WTO law directly applicable to domestic judicial proceedings. It is true that this
has now been rare, given that an act of "transformation" is still the leading formality
of domestic WTO implementation, featuring the prevailing role of the national
legislature. As matter of evidence, however, the courts ofWTO Members do c?nstrue
national trade law to conform to WTO law "under certain circumstances." 380 The
following discussions not only confirm this fact, but also see it as an increasing trend
in the practice ofWTO Members.

:l~
~Po
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~t

JJ

"JiO

3.

Status of Internal Law of WTO Members in WTO Dispute
Settlement

p

Basically, in examining the conformity of municipal law with international law
obligations, international tribunals will treat municipal law as "facts" and "evidence
of conduct attributed to the state concerned which creates international
responsibility."381 In this regard, the municipal law should be understood in a broad
context as comprised of the constitution, legislation, judicial decisions and other
related legal acts of a specific state. It is also arguable that "when it is appropriate to
apply rules of municipal law, an international tribunal will apply them as such,"
suggesting the deference to domestic law as applied by domestic authorities.
380

Hilf, supra note 377.

381

BROWNLIE, supra note 222, at 39.
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The WTO's adjudicating body is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), consisting of ad

hoc trial organ called "panels" as well as a standing appellate organ named the
"Appellate Body." Once adopted by the DSB, the report of a WTO panel or of the
Appellate Body will become a binding ruling or decision of the WT0. 382 Thus, a
WTO ruling is also referred to as a "DSB ruling" or, a "DSB decision." So far, the
WTO dispute settlement process has been regarded as one of the most developed
international dispute settlement mechanisms, especially featured by its appellate-level
trial under a standing organ (the Appellate Body).

It is observed that in the

international sphere, the legal status of WTO law would be manifested better at the
"trial level" than at the "appellate level" of the WTO dispute settlement process.

At the trial level, WTO panels take on a primary task of construing WTO legal
obligations and deciding whether "the results produced on the basis of national or
regional law" are consistent with the relevant WTO obligations.

They (or the

Appellate Body, if an Appellate complaint is available) have the final say as to the
interpretation of WTO rules, since "there is no one to whom deference could be
given."

In examining the "compatibility" of the alleged internal law of WTO

members with WTO obligations, the panel bases its jurisdiction on Article XXIII of
the GATT and on the DSU, determining "whether the application and interpretation of
a national or regional measure, as set out by a national or regional authority,
adequately responds to legitimate expectations created by the international rule."
Particularly, the panel may focus on the extent to which such domestic legal acts have
achieved "a result compatible with international obligations in a sufficiently clear,
predictable and impartial manner."383 The question then arises as to what "standard of
review" the panel should apply under such a situation.

'l
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I
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This goes back to the beginning of this section, where international tribunals, in a
sinrilar situation, basically treat municipal law as the facts or evidence of state
conduct in violation of international law rules, but the tribunals may also defer to
municipal law as so construed and applied in the domestic sphere. Following this
customary practice, WTO panels essentially recognize domestic law - as so applied
by respective authorities of WTO Members - as matters of fact with certain deference,
without performing a de novo review. However, since the panels are called upon to
declare whether domestic law of WTO members and the way they are applied are
compatible with the pertinent WTO treaty provisions, they are seemingly facing
increasing chances to rigorously examine the internal law of WTO members, mainly
based upon the "good faith" protection, "rather than standards of review which are
limited to patent unreasonableness or arbitrary and capricious interpretation of
national or regionallaw."384

Moreover, a potential for WTO panels to adopt the above "more nuanced approach"
appears to be strengthened by the above-noted implementation provisions of the WTO.
Regarding those on publication, transparency and reasonably application of internal
law and related measures ofWTO members (e.g. Article X of the GATT, Article 62 of
the TRIPS, Article VI of the GATS, collectively as the "transparency issue"), they
impose upon the panels the criteria for assessing the status of internal law in WTO law.
As a practical matter, these provisions are "as instrumental in making the (factual)
assessment of national or regional law as is the substantive rule at stake. " 385

ill.

Status of WTO Law in the Internal Law of WTO Members

1.

General Issues

In the previous chapter (Chapter 1 of Part II), the status of treaties in domestic law is
384
385

Id. at 86-87.
Id. at87.
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elaborated mainly based upon Professor Jackson's observations. As probably the

I

roost comprehensive treaty law in the world, the law of the WTO definitely deserves a

i

case study in this regard. Before embarking on such an exercise, it will be helpful to

I

review some major issues addressed in that chapter concerning domestic status of
international treaties.

Basically, the question as to the status of a treaty in domestic law concerns the
"domestic legal effect" and "hierarchical status" of this treaty under the domestic
legal system. A treaty (or part of it) may obtain "domestic effect" through the "direct
application" of it by domestic courts, or by "an act of transformation," mainly
conducted by a domestic legislature. How to choose between the two formalities is
generally a matter of domestic law, for which international law rules do not provide
much guidance. That choice is often indicated in the domestic constitution, or in
domestic legislation. In the latter case, the intent of treaty makers of the applying
state will be expressed, while the domestic treaty-making process of this state may
have significant implications for making such a choice. The "hierarchical status" of a
treaty is closely linked to its domestic legal effect. Where treaty law is directly
applicable, its "hierarchical status" in domestic law can be specified by the
constitution, legislation, or even judicial decisions of a particular state. Where the
direct effect is clearly rejected or excluded, it is presumed that domestic law prevails
over the treaty law concerned.

From a pragmatic perspective, it is more appropriate to examine the domestic effect of
a treaty (or part of it) in the context of domestic enforcement mechanisms, especially
in regard to judicial proceedings and the role of the courts. Wherever the direct
application is established, the courts will still have to secure the "invocability"
(standing) and justiciability of the treaty concerned before they apply this treaty.
Where an act of transformation is required, the courts generally take on a task of
applying domestic implementing legislation for the treaty concerned, but may still
refer to the treaty itself for the above purpose. Consequently, the status of treaties in
136
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domestic law is collectively shaped by the national constitution, legislature and courts.
Given the diversity of state practice in this regard, the status of treaties in domestic
law has been complicated by the internal structure and arrangement of the particular
state. However, national courts may play a pragmatic and essential role in this course.

On the other hand, the quality and characteristics of treaties entail significant
implications for the domestic legal effect of these treaties. A state is more likely to
grant direct application to a treaty that is precise, specific in nature, and/or adaptable
to the changing situation than to the otherwise situations. 386

Whether a treaty

provision is entitled to direct application or subject to an act of transformation will
depend greatly on "the relative degree to which constitutional drafters trust
international institutions and treaty-making processes compared with national
institutions and legislative process."387

The WTO treaties have inherited the above complexity of treaties. Taking Professor
Jackson's viewpoint, the status of WTO Agreements in the domestic law of WTO
members can be seen as comprising two questions: (1) Whether WTO treaty
provisions are directly applicable or subject to an act of transformation, for purposes
of obtaining domestic legal effect, and (2) In case of a conflict between WTO treaty
obligations and the internal law of WTO members "in a domestic context and with
domestic law," which will prevail? As noted earlier, question (1) appears to be more
essential to clarifying the status of WTO law in domestic law, since the denial of
direct effect will almost secure a c1ear answer to question (2). Most of the succeeding
discussions will concentrate on question (1 ), with question (2) being addressed
wherever necessary.

Answers to the above two questions can be hardly found in the WTO treaties, for
none of these treaty provisions explicitly mandates WTO Members to "fully
386
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387
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incorporate WTO law into their domestic laws and make precise and unconditional
WTO rules directly applicable by domestic courts and citizens." 388 As mentioned
earlier, even those "implementing obligations" do not explicitly require this direct
effect. The WTO treaties leave room for Members to choose between the formality of
"incorporating WTO law directly into the domestic legal system" (direct application)
and that of "adjusting its domestic law to the international WTO obligations" (act of
transfonnation). 389 Over the past decade, this position has not been modified in WTO
negotiations and the rule-making process, 390 and is, in effect, increasingly affirmed in
the WTO dispute settlement process.

Specifically, the US-Section 301-310 panel

report explicitly refers to the "indirect effect" of WTO law, holding "it would be
entirely wrong to consider the position of individuals is of no relevance to the
GA1TIWTO legal matrix."391 According to this panel:
Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a result of the
acceptance of various disciplines under the GA1T/WTO depends on the activity of
individual economic operators in the national and global market places. The purpose
of many of these disciplines, in deed one of primary objectives of the GA1T/WTO a
whole, is to produce certain market conditions which would allow this individual
activity to flourish .
. . . Providing security and predictability of the multilateral trading system is another
central object and purpose of the system ...
. . . The security and predictability in question are of the "multilateral trading
system." The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of State but
also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of security and
predictability affects mostly these individual operators.
Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It is through
improved conditions for these private operators that Member benefit from WTO
388

Petersmann eds., supra note 371, at 120.

389

/d. at 72.
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Based on the above reasoning, the panel concludes that "[I]t may, thus, be convenient
in the GATT/WTO legal order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the

I

I

principle of indirect effect." Thus, as some European authors observe, "it is very hard
to see any form of consensus emerging within the WTO membership with respect to
the relationship between WTO law and municipallaw."393

Meanwhile, answers to the above two questions vary from Member to Member within
the WTO, given their diversity of economic development, political structure, as well
as of constitutional and legal systems.

Nevertheless, Members do share some

similarities in their practice, not only in terms of their "policy considerations" for
domestic effect of WTO law, but also of their approaches for WTO implementation.
As the issue remains generally "controversial and unresolved" in the domestic

sphere,394 enormous academic interest has been directed into this field, leading to an
expanding jurisprudence for the subject. All these will be elaborated below.

2.

Rethinking the Concept of "Direct Effect"

Discussions so far have revealed that the most essential concept for the status of
treaties in domestic law is "direct application" or its alternatives, "direct applicability"
and "direct effect." The term "direct effect" appears to be more commonly used in the
European context. Given the predominant role of the EC in the WTO, the concept of
"direct effect" merits some further elaboration before a discussion on domestic legal
effect ofWTO law.

I

II

The doctrine of "direct effect" originated from the case law of the European Court of
392

/d.

393
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394
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Justice (ECJ), 395 and thus is inherently linked to the role of internal courts and the
operation of domestic judicial review. 396 According to some European scholars, a
treaty has "direct effect" in the sense that "a private person in a state may base a claim

in, and be granted relief from, the domestic courts of that state against another private
person or the state on the basis of the state's obligations under this treaty." Such
claims can be made "without a transformation of the relevant treaty obligation by
domestic rule-makers." More significantly, the claims may equally be made "against
implementing legislation on grounds that such legislation is incompatible with
international law." 397 These submissions imply that the concept of direct effect
contains an element of"invocability," as elaborated in the following observations:
Direct effect brings about the empowerment of three actors: the administration,
private sectors, and the courts. The administration is empowered to act without
specific internal legislation, directly reply upon treaty provisions, provided that the
legislator or the government decides to act this way. Private actors directly derive
rights and assume obligations under a self-executing treaty. Importantly, they may
use such rights and obligations to challenge domestic law. Bit foremost, the position
of courts i~ reinforced vis-a-vis government and national or regional legislators to the
extent that the courts may overrule national or regional rules inconsistent with treaty
obligations based upon supremacy of international law. Direct effect, in other words,
has a fundamental impact on constitutional power relations among domestic actors,
private and public. 398

Apparently, the above observations not only reveal a complex constitutional and legal

i
1.
I

I
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context behind the direct effect, but also spell out the necessity for a "judicial review."
In this sense, the "invocability" of treaties basically entails the availability of a

judicial review.

Notably, Professor Jackson has sought to separate "direct

application" from "invocability," since each concept involves different policy
considerations. 399 This position has been supported by EC judicial practice. As a
European practitioner observes, "[t]he ECJ ... established a link between the
possibility of invoking an international agreement for reviewing the legality of a
Community act and the fact that this agreement may be relied upon by individuals
before national courts. As a consequence of this link, the ECJ was not prepared to
review the validity of such an act unless the agreement was capable of conferring
rights on individuals." Obviously, the European courts treat the two concepts as
separate regimes, although recognizing a close linkage between them.

This is particularly true for the EC case law concerning the status of WTO law in the
EC legal order. As that European practitioner further observes, the well-established
ECJ case law provides that "the direct effect of the WTO Agreements serves as a precondition for using these as a ground for judicial review in a direct action before of
ECJ and CFI [Court of the First Instance]." 400 Nevertheless, notwithstanding such
divergent definitions, the concept of direct effect has been widely adopted to describe
the domestic legal effect of WTO law, both for academic discussions and for actual
practice.

To this author, neither "direct effect" nor "invocability" can be simplified and
generalized, given the categorization of WTO legal obligations as well as diverse
practice of WTO Members. The issue needs to be examined from both scholarly and
practical perspectives, and elaborated on a case-by-case basis. For the purpose of the
succeeding discussions, the meaning of "direct effect" will extend to "invocability,"
399
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unless the distinction is specifically noted between the two concepts.

3.

Academic Discussions on Domestic Legal Effect of WTO
Agreements
I

i
For simplicity, the present section focuses on domestic legal effect of WTO treaty
obligations.

Since the GATT era, an extensive literature has contributed to this

subject, with a major focus on two contradictory schools of thought towards the
"direct effect" of WTO agreements: against direct effect, Jan Tumlir and Emst-illrich

Petters~nn, and for this doctrine, John Jackson.401 For issues raised in this context,
there is usually a presumption of "an explicit conflict between the provisions of WTO
Agreements and internal law of the WTO members." 402 Also, these academic
discussions have significantly penetrated the practice of WTO Members, and in tum
mirrored their practice. Although WTO Members may differ in choosing for or
against direct effect of WTO treaties, behind their choice are some common
considerations in political economy and legal dimensions. These considerations have
the roots in the above-noted long-standing academic discussions; the latter appears to
be crucial to assessing the diverse practice of WTO Members in this regard, and will
be first elaborated as follows.

A.

Advocates of the Direct Effect of WTO Agreements

In the political economy dimension, arguments for direct effect of trade treaties

(including WTO Agreements) are mainly developed by two European scholars, Jan
Turmil and Emst-mrich Petersmann. Viewing the right to trade as a fundamental
human right, they both set forth the idea of "constitutionalizing" international trade
principles to fight against "inherently protectionist tendencies in domestic law
system." Considering the integrity of a state's sovereignty, Turmil "suggests granting
401
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402
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·individuals the right to invoke trade treaty provisions in front of their domestic
courts," so as to allow for their standing to challenge national protectionist policies
and practice on such grounds.

This, as he believes, would "help to correct the

asymmetries in the political process." Petersmann suggests similar "constitutional
restraints" on domestic protectionist behaviors. Relying on the political theory of
public choice, he submitted that the GATT/WTO rules must be available to
individuals to ensure the governmental compliance with the GATT/WTO obligations,
especially those concerning non-discrimination and market access. 403

Among the U.S. scholars embracing the direct effect of trade treaty rules, Frederick
Abbot bases his proposition on "regional integration mechanisms."

From his

viewpoint, direct effect would encourage not only the implementation of market
regulations, but also more importantly, "a 'deeper', or social and political, integration
in addition to economic integration." Although Abbot does not explicitly refer to
WTO Agreements, his proposition would equally apply to WTO treaty rules, should
the latter be deemed "as a large regional integration mechanism. " 404

Some other authors base their beliefs in direct effect of international trade law on
"quasi-economic arguments," notably the idea of"compliance capital" concerning the
"benefits deriving from reliability and protection of legitimate expectation."
Interestingly, in smaller and medium-size trading nations heavily relying on the "rule
of law" in international law relations, advocating direct effect of GATT treaty has
long been a scholarly tradition, which has naturally extended to the WTO agreements
since the advent of the WTO. 405 Notably, some Swiss scholars submit that the "direct
democracy" of Switzerland considerably enlarges the basis for direct effect, and
"renders" the nation "a well-suited candidate to take the lead unilaterally in this

403
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matter under WTO law.'t406

In legal dimension, arguments for the direct effect of WTO agreements particularly

target the judicial practice of the EC and other WTO Members that have refused to
directly apply GATTIWTO rules. In supporting the political economic arguments of
Tumlir and Petersmann, Jacques Bourgois pleads for availability of judicial review to
individuals on the grounds of GATT/WTO law. Meinhard Hilf contests the position
of European courts that views WTO Agreements as "too flexible to apply," and insists
that since the 'justiciability" of GATTIWTO provisions is nothing different from
those of the Treaty of Rome, GATTIWTO rules should apply as directly applicable as
the latter under the EC legal order.

With regard to the courts' concerns for the

authoritative interpretation of WTO rules, Hilf insists the safeguard or procedures for
this purpose "cannot rule out direct effect. '.407

B.

Critics of Direct Effect of WTO Agreements

In the political economy dimension, American scholar John Jackson has developed

probably the most comprehensive arguments against direct effect of treaties
(including WTO Agreements). 408 In analyzing the "policy reasons" for denying direct
effect, Jackson particularly introduces some "functional arguments," among which is

406

!d., at 97. These arguments cover the following key points: (1) direct effect is an important element

of checks and balances in direct democracy which tends to be open to protectionist arguments; (2) the
absence of global foreign policy responsibilities renders direct effect more feasible than elsewhere; (3)
WTO rules which have passed the test of direct democracy enjoy the same democratic legitimacy as
national statutes.
407
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(1) self-execution narrowly defined; (2) standing of individuals before domestic courts; and, (3)
hierarchy of norms. Deeming these dimensions to be equally important, Jackson neither vigorously nor
universally supports or denies the "self-execution narrowly defined." However, he does view the idea
of granting standing and allowing for an international treaty law to be superior to federal legislation
(leaving the constitution alone) as dangerous to the idea of the democracy and democratic
representation of individuals.
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an observation that "some constitutions provide for very little democratic participation
in the treaty-making process," so that granting direct effect to treaties subject to this
process may risk a threat to domestic democracy and cause "constitutional structural
problems." Given legitimate desires of national legislatures to adopt treaty language
to domestic legislation, as well as those of governmental institutions to use an act of

transformation for the "purely internal power struggle," granting direct effect will
frustrate all these efforts, leading to a refusal to join the treaty in the end. As Jackson
concludes, direct effect "may or may not be the optimal policy for implementing trade
treaties," given the diverse practice of WTO members in this regard. However, he
suggests that each member should take into account constitutional factors like the
treaty-making process, national constitutional arrangements, characteristics of
national legal system, as well as the policies a particular government intends to
promote.409

Some European scholars join Jackson by adding one more argument related to the
"reciprocity" concern, acknowledging that "direct effect" is not available in most
members of the WTO, especially the U.S. According to Jan Peter Kuijper, a WTO
member not recognizing direct effect would "place itself in such favorable position
that it becomes fundamentally unfair to its trading partners [that recognize such
effect]." Thus, "when discussing interpretation and application of the treaty," it may
"arrive with free hand at table, contrary to their counterparts from countries with
direct effect, whose hands are tied by the interpretation of their courts." 410 Piet
Eeckhout further points out in his commentary on the ECJ's decision on Portugal v.
Council, that "[r]eciprocity is indeed the cornerstone, but ultimately it is not
reciprocity as such which leads the Court to deny WTO law direct effect. Rather, it is
the impact of direct effect on the EU's political institutions." As he concludes, the
issue involves "the clear constitutional dimension" of Portugal case, and "goes
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beyond the issue of reciprocity in international trade relations.'.4 11 Accordingly, the
argument of reciprocity is regarded as the one of"Realpolitik.'.4 12

In the legal dimension, both American and European scholars have noticed the
potentials lying in direct effect for diverging interpretation of WTO agreements by
different adjudicators at national, regional, and international levels. John Jackson and
S. P. Crowley observe this occurring in the context of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement. Wolfgang Benedek expresses a particular concern about the errors in the
interpretation of the Tokyo Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
by the Austrian Supreme Court. Piet Eeckhout expressed a similar concern when
referring to "judicial policy" in the context of the EC and its member states, warning
that "multiple national courts interpreting WTO agreements independently may
reduce the effectiveness of the WTO rules and its dispute settlement procedures."
However, the issue "is not unique to international law," to which a resolution usually
lies in "appeal mechanisms.'' Thus, it is expected that a "WTO-inconsistency" in
above sense will be overcome as a procedural matter, so as to secure the "uniform
interpretation ofWTO law.'.4 13

Besides, inspired by the judicial practice of certain WTO Members, scholars from the
U.S. and Europe have developed other legal arguments against direct effect. As John
Jackson observes, direct effect does not necessarily ensure domestic implementation
of WTO obligations. Even a treaty norm automatically has direct effect, internal
courts may still avoid applying it on certain grounds, such as factual findings,
justiciability, etc. 414 In this context, the courts' practice has called upon considerable
scholarly attentions and debates. Notably, with regard to European courts' denial of
direct effect of WTO rules for their "flexibility," some European scholars explicitly
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contest this position, asserting that "most of them are sufficiently precise to be
n41S

construe dby courts .

C.

Consistent Interpretation: Possible Coordination between
WTO Legal Obligations and Internal law of WTO
Members

The above scholarly pros and cons of the direct effect of WTO Agreements share a
presumption that WTO treaty obligations are in fundamental conflict with the internal
law of WTO Members. This provides for a simple choice of "black or white," which
appears to be convenient for domestic policy makers to make a decision. However,
this fundamental conflict does not always exist in reality. Instead, the internal law of
WTO Members often turns out to be ambiguous and flexible in interpretation, leaving
the potential for their coordinating with WTO legal rules. This is particularly the case
with domestic implementing legislation for WTO treaties (e.g., the URAA in the U.S.),
where the intent of the domestic legislature is usually presumed to comply with WTO
legal obligations. Given their justiciability as noted above, WTO treaty provisions
often are more precise and detailed than their analogies in the internal law of WTO
members. 416 This also raises the possibility for the internal law of WTO members
being applied and interpreted in accordance with WTO treaty obligations. All these
situations are covered by the doctrine of"consistent interpretation."

As the principle of "consistent interpretation" requires, where a domestic rule of law
allows for different interpretations, it has to be construed in accordance with
international obligations, so as to adhere to both international and municipal law as
much as possible.

The biggest proponent of this doctrine in the context of

GATTIWTO law is Ernst-illrich Petersmann, who urges the courts of the EC and the
member states to develop the "GAIT-conform" legal interpretations. Some recent
415
416

/d. at 92.
/d.
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European observations indicate the important assistance this doctrine may offer to
WTO members, in honoring the principle of pacta sunt servanda "without treading on
417

the more sensitive ground of direct effect."

Many WTO members have incorporated the principle of "consistent interpretation"
into their judicial jurisprudence, especially the U.S. and the EC. The case law of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) recognizes the application of "consistent
interpretation" to international agreements concluded by the Community, based upon
their "primacy ... over provisions of secondary Community legislation."

This

position was early established in Mar/easing, and subsequently affirmed in
Commission v. Germany.

In the latter case, the Court rules that Community

legislation ought to be construed in a manner consistent with the specific GATT
obligations under the International Dairy Arrangements. In Werner and Leifer, the
Court particularly applied the doctrine in the context of Article XI of the GATT. 418 In
the U.S., the principle of consistent interpretation was originally introduced by a
Supreme Court decision in Charming Betsy, where Chief Justice Marshall held, "an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
construction is possible." 419 Over the past decade, the Charming Betsy canon of
statutory interpretation has played a significant role in the U.S. domestic
implementation ofWTO legal obligations.

Compared with their European counterparts, the U.S. courts more frequently
encounter the issue related to this doctrine, by coping with the applicability of the
Charming Betsy doctrine with regard to GATT/WTO law. Although European courts
have been restrained from coping with the issue, European scholars are not without
foresight and sagacity in this regard. On one hand, they acknowledged the virtues of
this doctrine in enforcing WTO obligations without irritating the existing internal
417
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~..
legal order ofWTO members. On the other hand, they notice the problems in the lack
of public awareness among domestic legal circles (especially the courts) towards
WTO law. As they point out, "the doctrine of consistent interpretation is bound to
remain largely irrelevant, despite Charming Betsy, Commission v. Germany, ... until
basic knowledge of and sensitization to WTO rules has taken place in the legal
community at large.'.420

4.

Status ofWTO Agreements in Internal Law ofWTO Members

The status of WTO agreements in domestic law concerns their domestic legal effect
and hierarchical status under the domestic legal system of WTO members.

As

indicated in previous discussions, the issue is a matter of domestic law. Previous
discussions have highlighted two competing positions towards the domestic effect of
WTO treaties, as supported by a number of competing considerations on both policy
(political economy) and legal dimension. In practice, many WTO members have
taken a position of excluding the direct effect of WTO agreements, and therefore
secured the primacy of their domestic law over WTO treaty obligations in any event.
The U.S. and the EC are two notable examples, given their predominant position
within the WTO. To support their consistent adherence to this position, the European
courts repeatedly cite the fact that the EU's "major trading partners" (e.g., the U.S.)
do not recognize direct effect of WTO agreements.

Switzerland is one of a few

Members friendly to the "direct effect" of WTO rules, but in a cautious manner by
treating the issue on a provision-by-provision basis.421

It should be noted that the attitude of a WTO member state towards the direct effect of
WTO law is not necessarily linked to its traditional practice in treating international
treaties. No doubt, the minority of sates that have a monist tradition (like Switzerland)
will be more flexible in supporting the direct effect of WTO law than those without.
42
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For the majority of states, they cannot be simply categorized as "dualist states," given
their usually complicated, diverging or even contradictory practice in this regard.
Among them quite a few states do have a tradition that recognizes the direct effect of
treaties (e.g., self-executing mode in the U.S.}, but they would rather avoid granting
this privilege to the WTO, and depart from their long-standing practice.

This is

largely attributed to the enormous impact WTO law may impose upon domestic trade
and economic relations.

From an overall perspective, the dominant position of WTO members has been to
reject the direct effect of wro agreements. This is mainly the outcome of policy
considerations of political economy, rather than a legal consideration of the
justicability of WTO treaties. 422 It has been widely recognized - at least within the
academic circle -

that WTO treaties generally have no problem in their

"justiciability." Most WTO treaty provisions are "sufficiently precise to be construed
by the courts" and "do not show structural differences to comparable norms in
national or regional law." Further, through the WTO dispute settlement process,
"principles, rules and exceptions" deriving from WTO treaty system will be applied
and legally construed by panels and the Appellate Body, and thus become "more
precise" for domestic courts to apply and rely on in many occasions.423 According to
some legal scholars, WTO treaty provisions have been "justiciable" enough to support
the legality and the "rule of law" of the WTO legal system. In this sense, as a legal
technical matter, WTO agreements should merit the direct effect.

However, as most WTO members are reluctant to grant direct effect to WTO treaty
obligations, the reality suggests some other reasons beyond the above legal
considerations. The major reason is related to the "fundamental impacts" of direct
effect on "constitutional power relations among domestic actors, private and public."
As mentioned before, direct effect is deemed to empower the administrative bodies,
422

/d. at 92-93.

423
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courts and private individuals of a domestic system, and therefore will likely affect
the existing internal constitutional and legal settings. In terms of WTO treaties, such
concerns will be more severe, given the complexity and comprehensiveness of this
treaty system, as well as its enormous implications for external trade and economic
relations of individual WTO members.

In the U.S., these concerns were fully

addressed in far-reaching, heated debate over the "sovereignty" issue during the
enactment of the URAA in 1994. In the EC, similar concerns are mostly expressed by
European courts on the ground of "reciprocity." 424 Accordingly, in the U.S., the
European Communities and elsewhere, WTO agreements would appear be "politically
unacceptable" even it can be "legally acceptable.'.425 This situation will be elaborated
in the next part (Part Ill).

5.

Status of WTO Rulings in Internal Law of WTO Members

In recent years, the status of WTO rulings in domestic law has called for increasing
attention from academic and practical circles. Instead of arguing about the direct
effect of WTO agreements (as a whole or in part), scholars and practitioners are
increasingly focused on individual WTO treaty provisions as specified by the WTO's
DSB decisions.

The question then arises as to whether these specified WTO

obligations can be invoked before domestic courts to challenge domestic legislation.
The issue should be separated from the one related to WTO Agreements (as
elaborated above), for, at the international level, WTO rulings do not have the force of
stare decisis to equate themselves to WTO agreements, and thus face a controversial
status ofbeing part ofWTO law (see, Chapter 3 of Part I). However, they do have the
force of res judicata towards the parties of the particular dispute, and therefore may
impose some "secondary legal obligations" upon these parties. In practice, increasing
actions have been brought before domestic courts on the grounds of WTO rulings,
either based upon their force of stare decisis or their force of res judicata. All these
424
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issues are articulated below.

A.

Res Judicata, Stare Decisis and the Interplay between WTO

Dispute Settlement Process and Judicial Proceedings of
WTOMembers

One of a series of success stories of the WTO is about its "quicker and more efficient"
dispute settlement system with compulsory jurisdiction, relatively strict timetable,
binding decisions and high rate of compliance.

426

The past decade has witnessed

frequent use of this DSU-based system. The results have been an enormous volume
of cases initiated by an increasing number of WTO members, as well as a
comprehensive body of decisions rendered by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB).

The DSB decisions consist of the reports of WTO panels or of the Appellate body as
adopted by the DSB. In the form of "recommendations" submitted to the DSB, the
reports may contain "the findings of a panel," or "the conclusions of the Appellate
Body on issues of law and legal interpretations." Unless and until being adopted,
these reports will not become binding WTO decisions on the WTO Members involved.
The ''WTO decisions" constitute "a substantial body of jurisprudence" for an
"emerging WTO legal system.'.427

According to the DSU, the WTO dispute settlement process is designed mainly "to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements." As a
result, a WTO decision would incorporate the interpretations of specific WTO treaty
obligations by the panel or Appellate Body. Given the effect of res judiciata of these
WTO decisions within the WTO legal system, the constituent interpretations by the
panel or Appellate Body would have the same binding force towards the particular
426
427
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WTO member involved. The question then arises as to whether such res judicata
force may shift to a domestic judicial proceeding of the given member. Or, more
broadly, whether this WTO decision would have any effect of stare decisis on the
internal courts of any WTO member addressing the similar or identical issue.

This in turn raises a preliminary issue regarding the linkage between WTO dispute
settlement process and the domestic judicial proceedings of WTO members, both
collectively regarded as the "two-level protection of individual rights within the WTO
framework"

428

or, "two-level approach of judicial review" in the context of

international trade relations. 429 Meinhard Hilf, after generalizing five types of links
with regard to a two-level protection of individual rights or judicial review, concludes
that none of them are presented within the WTO system.430 Specifically, Professor
Hilf observes that:
There is no recognized rule on the exhaustion of local remedies, national courts are
unable to call for a preliminary ruling or interpretation from a higher body in cases of
unclear rules under GATT [and the wro agreements], and individuals have no access
to the international dispute settlement procedure. This means there is no institutional
linkage between the two levels of judicial protection, creating a danger that divergent
interpretations of GATT [and WfO] law will occur at each level.

Accordingly, WTO dispute settlement process is not institutionally linked to internal
courts of WTO members at all. As a result, the WTO court (DSB) cannot of itself
create a res judicata for their domestic counterparts. Neither can it establish stare

decisis in the same context, none less to say "prior" WTO decisions do not of
themselves have such a status within the WTO legal system.431 These two restrictions
428
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to the domestic effect of WTO decisions are implicitly specified in the DSU, and
meanwhile reflect the long-standing practice of the World Court (ICJ). However, they
do not imply that WTO decisions would have no domestic effect at all. As required
by the DSU, in interpreting WTO treaty provisions, panels and Appellate Body would
have to adopt an "orderly approach" based upon the customary principles of
interpretation of international law.

This practice has greatly contributed to the

justiciability of these interpretations, and increased their referring or guiding value to
domestic courts. 432 In this context, the matter would appear to be that of the
discretion of internal courts ofWTO members.

B.

"Intermediate Position" Doctrine and Some Further
Reflections

During the GATT era, scholars and practitioners had already advocated the res

judicata force or even the stare decisis status of GATT panel reports in domestic
courts. With the advent of the WTO, their enthusiasm for such effect and status of
WTO decisions and rulings reached the highest, notably in an extensive literature
containing various arguments for the above position.433 One of these arguments is
developed under a doctrine of "intermediate position," according to which giving the

res judicata force of adopted WTO panel and Appellate Body reports in domestic
courts is an "intermediate approach" between the contradictory pros and cons of the
direct effect of WTO treaty obligations. The biggest proponent of this doctrine is Piet
Eeckhout, asserting that where a case is specifically settled in the WTO dispute
settlement process, "the binding character of the agreement and the principle of
legality should . . . trump any lack of direct effect. . . . The reasons for not granting
direct effect ... cease to be valid where a violation is established." This echoes the
proposition of Meihard Hilf in the EC context, who views the doctrine as "a minimum
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standard" for granting direct effect.434 As Professor Hilf submits, "[n]o flexibility
seems to be left to the discretion of the contracting parties ... The relevant GATT law
will then have been stated and satisfied. At least in such a situation the ECJ would
have safe grounds to apply the relevant GATT law directly.'"' 35

Subsequently, this doctrine was endorsed by more scholars, such as Thomas Cottier
and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer. As they observe, this intermediate approach is
appropriate in terms of the WTO dispute settlement process, which features an
increasing judicial nature with its compulsory jurisdiction, strict time frame, and more
important, binding decisions. They acknowledge the doctrine is legally "separated
from direct effect in the traditional sense" since "it is not a matter of applying general
rules, but of complying with a specific ruling arrived by quasi-judicial procedures
respecting due process of law.'' Nevertheless, they assert that the approach "goes
beyond the critics of direct effect in the USA and Europe to balance the competing
ideas of direct effect's acceptability." Accordingly, they call upon the necessity to
examine "remedies available in WTO law" and develop "nuanced judicial policies"
for ''building and exploring the interaction between courts and governments" in this
context.436

However, from the viewpoint of this author, the doctrine of "intermediate position" is
not so convincing. The present issue is about what legal effect a WTO decision or
ruling should have in the internal law ofWTO members, of which the key should still
be the WTO dispute settlement process producing these decisions. This recalls John
Jackson's "secondary legal obligations" created by WTO decisions and rulings. As
Jackson submits, "an adopted dispute settlement report establishes an international
law obligation upon the member in question to change its practice to make it

434
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437

consistent with the rules of the WTO Agreement and its annexes."

Deriving from a

WTO decision as such, this "secondary legal obligation" has the same effect of res
judicata as that of the pertinent WTO decision within the WTO, binding upon the

parties to a particular WTO dispute to the same extent that WTO treaty obligations
bind WTO Members generally. In this particular connection, the binding force of this
secondary "obligation of conformity" can be comparable to that of WTO treaty
obligations, but would never be more coercive than the latter, given its limited scope
of application.

Based upon previous discussions, the legal effect of WTO treaty obligations appears
to be different at international and domestic levels. At international level, they are

binding upon WTO members under the WTO legal system. Any violation of these
obligations would trigger state responsibility. At the domestic level, they are either
directly applicable (on rare occasions) or subject to an act of transformation (on most
occasions), depending on the actual practice of individual WTO members.

If

domestic effect WTO treaty obligations have remained an "unsettled and controversial
issue," especially, if, as noted herein, the direct effect of these treaty obligations
remains a rare case, how can we expect domestic authorities to treat WTO decisions
or rulings (of which the legal force turns out to be less coercive than WTO treaty
obligations) more preferentially by adopting a simple approach (like the above
"intermediate approach") uniformly, or, even by giving them the equivalent to direct
effect (e.g., effect of res judicata in domestic sphere) with ease?

Being "secondary" in nature, the "obligation of conformity" as deriving from WTO
decisions may somewhat - but not always - have the same domestic legal effect as
that of its pertinent WTO treaty obligations, merely in a particular applying member
state (region), but will very unlikely receive a more preferential treatment than those
treaty obligations, in terms of a potential for granting it the effect of res judicata in the

437
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domestic sphere (equivalent to direct effect of WTO treaty obligations). Therefore,
given a particular domestic legal system or internal legal order rejecting the direct
effect of WTO agreements, it would be difficult - if not impossible - to find WTO
decisions binding upon local courts.

As for stare decisis of WTO decisions, it is not even available to the WTO dispute
settlement process. As a result, "secondary legal obligations" deriving from WTO
decisions would not have the same "general application" as WTO treaty obligations
do. It is interesting to see the proponents of the "intermediate position" doctrine take
this inability as a major argument, asserting that through a WTO decision or ruling,
the specific WTO obligations will be "stated," "satisfied," and "specifically settled"
for direct application. As this author understands, what they observe as above is
rather a confirmation of the contents of the pertinent WTO obligations, than a
definition of their legal nature. Since the WTO tribunal (DSB) is not capable of
establishing stare decisis for their decisions, it would be nonsense to require its
domestic analogies to grant such status to it rulings. Absent the stare decisis status
from its origin (the WTO dispute settlement process), WTO decisions or rulings
would have nothing to shift to domestic judicial proceedings. In any event, WTO
decisions do not have the stare decisis status in the internal courts ofWTO members.

The above analysis may explain why to most WTO Members, the domestic effect of
WTO decisions has not yet been an issue on agenda, since the same effect of WTO
agreements remains controversial and unsettled. The analysis may also explain why
the "intermediate position" - to the knowledge of this author - has not yet been
embraced by any WTO Member. As a survey of state practice indicates, most WTO
Members deny the direct effect of WTO agreements, not to mention their passive
attitude towards the domestic effect of WTO decisions or rulings. Even though a
Member may be flexible in granting the direct effect of WTO agreements
(occasionally and partly), it may still, and usually does, deny the similar res judicata
force of the WTO decision concerned. As the issue comes more frequently before
157

internal courts of WTO members, it would appear to be more controversial in
academic and practical realms. This is evident in the next chapter: a case study ofU.S.
and EC experiences.
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PART III

DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO LAW: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE U.S. AND THE EC
EXPERIENCES
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INTRODUCTION: WHY THE U.S. AND THE EC?

It is almost trite to refer to the importance the United States and the European
Communities (EC) have within the WT0. 438 As two leading WTO members in the
"Quad," 439 the U.S. and the EC are among the world's most developed economic
entities and together account for some 40 percent ofboth global GDP and trade. This
may partly explain the predominant role they have played within the WTO, especially
in the dispute settlement and implementation ofWTO law at international and internal
levels.

During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the U.S. and the EC took the

dominant seats of power in this course. The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements are
observed to reflect in many respects the position of both economic giants. Especially,
the DSU has been deemed as the WTO analogy of the U.S. "Section 301" regime,
while most "implementing obligations" under WTO treaties have been seen as the
reflections of the "rule oflaw," as firmly advocated by the EC and its member states.

In this sense, the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism and implementing
requirements are almost designed by the U.S. and the EC.

The past decades have witnessed the overwhelming role the U.S. and the EC play in
the WTO dispute settlement process. These two economic elites have remained the
most frequent users of this multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, as either the
complainant or the respondent. 440 Despite a likely small percentage of global trade
'
438
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and investment affected by allegedly U.S. or EC WTO-inconsistent trade measures.
economic disputes involving both economic giants by all means smpass those
involving other nations, "by virtue of the sheer trade volume at stake or their political
dimension." Similarly, the U.S. and the EC have equally been the Members most
frequently addressing domestic effect of WTO law in their internal proceedings. 1n
recent years, the U.S and European courts have given increasing attention to WTO
panel and Appellate Body reports. Given the accelerating expansion of the outcomes
of WTO dispute settlement, it is expected that this trend will continue.

From the perspective of the global economic and trading system, the significance of
the economic disputes brought by and against the U.S. and EC at two levels can
hardly be overstated. From the perspective of the implementation and development of
WTO law, the significance of these disputes can even be greater. Often, they reflect
some of the thorniest issues arising from WTO implementation, expanding the.
horizon of such practice to create certain "new frontiers." This is equally true for the
issues arising on international and domestic planes. Moreover, these disputes have
led to ''the clarification of significant aspects, in terms of substance and volume, of
both procedural and substantive WTO law," as well as the enrichment of the
experiences for WTO members to coordinate their domestic law and practice with
WTO commitments.

Accordingly, U.S. and EC practice represents an area of study of great importance to
WTO implementation at both international and domestic levels. This chapter takes a
particular look at such practice at internal level. This may invite a question as to
whether the U.S. and the EC experiences will match those of other WTO Members,
especially the mass of developing countries vis-a-vis the "Quad." The question turns

r •

"

to be more sensitive to newcomers to the WTO, since they usually face numerous
accusations of "WTO incompliance" by a "senior" member like the U.S. and the EC.

'··

A fundamental reflection on this far-reaching issue is beyond the scope of this study.

I

However, a short commentary below may be helpful to the continuity of present

~
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discussions.

First, a relatively rule-oriented multilateral institution like the WTO (as featured in the

,.
!

DSU-based quasi-judicial process), together with a highly developed legal system like
that of the U.S. and the EC (recognized worldwide) suggest some more "fair play" for
WTO members in the WTO than their peers in the GATI. Any member comfortable
with the idea of the "rule of law" may feel less reluctant to rely on the WTO dispute
settlement process, just the same way it may rely more on legal means than on
political and diplomatic venues for WTO implementation in the domestic sphere. In
this context, the member will have to adhere to certain general standards of the "rule
oflaw," of which some valuable reference can always be taken from the U.S. and the
EC experiences.

Second, the WTO dispute settlement system is imperfect. Pleas for its reforms have
significantly increased in recent years. It would always be appropriate for WTO
members to take a cautious attitude towards WTO decisions, although the quality and
"justiciability'' of these international rulings have received respect. In this context,
any tendency of a WTO member to restrict the internal effect of WTO law (especially
WTO decisions) should have legitimacy. As for the U.S. and the EC, they have acted
consistently in a conservative manner towards the domestic effect of WTO law: the
direct effect of WTO treaties is generally excluded, even though the EC has had
something of a "spark" of flexibility on its restrictions.

Res judiciata of WTO

decisions is internally impossible, not to mention their stare decisis status in domestic
context.

These may diminish many concerns about a "radical" or "aggressive"

I

I,

advocacy of the "full WTO implementation" by the two major players (which has not
yet become the case with them at least).

Scholars and practitioners may be

enthusiastic about this, but this is definitely not true with their governments. A
distinction has already been drawn in this regard. Thus, members may follow the
same position as the U.S. and the EC, raising a "reciprocity" argument as the EC
particularly develops. Or, if their position has been the same or similar position as the
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two major players, the question becomes: what is to be learned from the U.S. and the
EC?

As most WTO Members are sovereign states, they may tum first to their peer - the
U.S., to see how this leading state copes with the enduring internal controversy over
the sovereignty issue. Given its persistent hostility to the direct effect of WTO law,
the U.S. government has set a good example for those who intend to take the same

I,

position as it does, not only in terms of the enactment of complex implementing
legislation to WTO agreements (Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or, DRAA) by the
U.S. Congress, but also of the adoption of comprehensive approaches by the U.S.
courts for avoiding direct impact of WTO law on national constitutional arrangements,
e.g., the separation of powers. In contrast, the EC experience seems unique among
WTO Member States, given its status as a highly integrated regional organization
("customs union"). At the outset, the unique constitutional structure of the EC leads
to entirely different legislative outcomes for the transformation of WTO law into the
internal EC Legal order.

Fundamentally, however, because of this special

constitutional arrangement, the European courts have developed - within their
competence- more sophisticated techniques and more nuanced policies than the U.S.
for rejecting the direct effect of WTO law. Assuming a persistent tendency of most
WTO members to resist as much internal effect of WTO law as possible, the EC
experience seemingly gives them great latitude to pursue such a purpose.

The above assessment of U.S. and EC experiences seems encouraging to an "anti-

..

WTO law" task force among WTO members. This actually depends on how one
views the direct effect of WTO law. To exclude this direct effect does not mean to
deny any domestic effect of WTO law. On the contrary, the "indirect effect" of WTO
law may still remain far-reaching and profound, especially through the efforts of
domestic legislatures and judiciaries, as evident in U.S. and EC practice.

~'
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CHAPTER I
IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO LAW UNDER THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM

1.

Legal Effect of Trade Agreements in the U.S. Law

Under U.S. jurisprudence, whether an international agreement becomes part of U.S.
domestic law depends on the doctrine of self-executing treaties. 441 In terms of their
legal effect in U.S domestic law, international agreements are either "self-executing"
or "non-self-executing." A self-executing treaty (or part of it) has "direct domestic

..

law effect" and "purports directly by its own terms to give rights to individual,
citizens" before the courts. A non-self-executing international agreement (or part of it)
does not have such direct effect. It can only be implemented domestically through
"an act of transformation" (e.g., implementing legislation) passed by the 'Q.S.
Congress or promulgated by the Executive. 442

~J
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Regardless of terminological
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difference, the "self-execution" of an international agreement actually refers to its

f~· J

i

"direct effect" or "direct application." These terms are interchangeable in the present
context.

1~11

~~iW1
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Absent the uniformed criteria for the categorization, the distinction between selfexecuting and non-self-executing international agreements has long remained
confusing in U.S. law. Under the U.S. Constitution, while Article VI makes treaties to
the "supreme law of the land," other provisions also specify certain non-selfexecuting treaties.443 Neither the Constitution nor any U.S. statute has ever provided
441

John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and

Implementation ofthe Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 168 (1997).
442

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 76, at 99. For non-self-executing treaties, of which the

implementation "requires some change in domestic law, ... some additional action by government

·''

bodies will be necessary." This raises the question as to who has the authority to implement such a
treaty. It is observed that "Congress many enact a statute" or, ''the President or other officials may
have authority to implement the agreement by issuing or changing the regulations."
443

/d. at 100.
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for an exhaustive inventory of either of the two categories, nor has any set forth a

!'

"once then forever'' standard for this purpose. According to the Comments to the

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, a treaty signed by
the U.S. will be "presumably" self-executing, in the absence of an "express request"
by Congress or the Executive for implementing legislation.444 Based upon a rather
vulnerable presumption, this seemingly convenient approach begs more questions,
e.g., how to make sure the same "request'' is not covered by the "intent'' of the treaty
makers?

When ratifying an international agreement under congressional or constitutional
authorization, the U.S. Congress or the Executive may expressly indicate the "intent"
to grant or deny the self-execution of this agreement, but does not always do so.
When the intent of these treaty makers remains vague or obscured, it will be left for
the U.S. courts to play a significant role. To determine the "self-execution" of a treaty,
the U.S. courts have developed some standards through well-established case law,
such as in People of Saipan v. U.S. Department of Interior, 445 where the key is to
"look at a series of factors, but primarily at the intent of the drafters, 446 including
intent implied or expressed in the treaty itself.'M7

This approach is particularly fit for U.S. trade agreements, where the Congress or the
Executive usually is explicit about its intent to indicate self-execution or not. In this
context, it is necessary to draw a distinction between "treaties" and "executive
agreements" in U.S. law, although both categories are collectively regarded as
"treaties" or "international agreements" in international law.
444
445

Under the U.S.

Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, at 106-107.
502 F. 2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974). ''The extent to which an international agreement establishes
affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without implementing legislation must be
determined by reference to many contextual factors: the purpose of the treaty and the objectives of
its creators, the implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods,
and the immediate and long-range social consequences of self-execution and non-self-execution."

446
447

RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch.2, §111(4) (1987).
John Jackson, Status, supra note 209, at 320.
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Constitution, the ratification of "treaties" entails the advice of the Senate and its
consent by a two-thirds vote. These "treaties" constitute the traditional category of
international agreements in U.S law. The above constitutional requirements do not
apply to the "executive agreements." The ratification of executive agreements is
under the "inherent" or constitutional authority of the Executive (President), or under
that as delegating to the Executive by Congress. This turns to be a "speedier and
easier" treaty-making process, since it "avoids the minority Senate veto ... that could
block a treaty." However, for the same reason, executive agreements have been

I'

blamed for an absence of "democratic participation," and thus regarded as

t

"unconstitutional" or "risking direct domestic legal effects of the self-executing

,.

agreements." 448

~r: : n

Although an executive agreement is not necessarily non-self-

executing in a general legal sense, this occurs in many U.S. executive agreements,
especially those in the field of trade regulation, given the above-noted concern about
their "democratic defects."

Back in the GATI era, the GATT treaty was an executive agreement in U.S. law,
accepted by the President within his authority based upon the 1945 Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act.449 Despite "a long history of recognition by the U.S. government of
the validity and binding nature of GATI," 450 the self-execution of this trade
agreement has remained ambiguous until the WTO came into being in January 1995.
The Congress never explicitly approved the GATI treaty. 451 Neither did it explicitly
exclude the self-execution of this treaty, as evident in successive Trade Agreement
Acts during the period. 452 In the context of case law, the U.S. courts never held the
GATI "not to be a binding international agreement for the United States." In fact,

448

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note

449

/d. at 95.

450

/d. at 240.

451

/d. at 238. The issue ''became moot" when the WTO entered into force on January 151, 1995, since

76, at 92.

the GAIT text was incorporated into the WTO Agreement; the latter is expressly defined as non-selfexecuting treaties in the URAA.
452
/d. at 239-240.
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"many cases have applied GATT rules,',..53 especially in terms of "the extent to which
GATf rules could be used to defend or attack an administrative agency's
interpretation of U.S. law."

Regarding the self-execution of GATT provisions, the courts seldom directly address
the issue, leaving little guidance in this regard. Some federal court decisions deny the
"treaty status" of the GATT on the ground of U.S. treaty-making authority for
entering into the GATT, and consequently avoid the issue of self-execution. Other
court decisions refer to the application of individual GATT provisions, but offer no
clear guidance on the question of self-execution. In these decisions, while the courts
assume the binding force and self-executing of the given GATT provisions, they
consistently reject the allegations that the contested U.S. legislation or administrative
acts violate these GATT obligations, and thus make it unnecessary to provide a
rationale for such an assumption. Some notable examples include a group of federal
cases involving the now-abandoned "wine gallon" method of determining the
application of U.S. excise taxes to distilled spirits. This challenged administrative act
is ruled not in violation of the "national treatment" (NT) obligations under GATT
Article ill. In United States v. Star Industries, the court relies on the "most favored
nation" (MFN) obligations under GATT Article I to defeat the plaintiff's allegation of
invalidating a U.S. federal law, simply upon the assumption of the self-executing
nature of those GATT rules. In all above context, the U.S. courts have carefully
avoided the issue "on other grounds.',..54

However, this does not imply that no federal case law "has actually analyzed the selfexecuting status of any GAIT provision in regard to an alleged violation through
federal legislation or administrative regulation.',.. 55 In a landmark case, the U.S. Court

453

/d. at 241.

454

,.

Robald A. Brand, Direct Effect ofInternational Economic Law in the United States and the
European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 556, 564-568 (Winter-Spring, 1996-1997).
455
/d. at 566.
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit or, CAFC), Suramerica de

Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 456 the Court not only explicitly denies the
self-execution of the GATT treaty, but also rejects the self-executive effect of a GAIT
panel report. For GAIT provisions, the Court rules that:
[E]ven if we were convinced that Commerce's interpretation [of the U.S. statutory
requirements for filing an antidumping investigation] conflicts with the GAlT, which
we are not, GAlT is not controlling. While we acknowledge Congress's interest in
complying with U.S responsibilities under the GAlT, we are bound not by what we

think Congress should or perhaps wanted to do, but by what Congress in fact did.
The GAIT does not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue
here are inconsistent with the GAIT, it is a matter for the Congress and not this court
to decide and remedy.

Interestingly, as for the GAIT panel report, the Court does not follow the above
rationale, but rely on some factual grounds to rule out the issue. As the Court argues:
"the GATT panel itself acknowledged and declared that its examination and decision
were limited in scope to the case before it. The panel also acknowledged that it was
not faced with the issue of whether, even in the case before it, Commerce has acted in
conformity with the U.S. domestic legislation." Obviously, the Court has taken the
panel report as a fact or the "evidence," holding it to be irrelevant to the present case.

The post-GAIT U.S. trade agreements appear to be much clearer in their selfexecuting or non-self-executing nature. Beginning with the Trade Agreement Act of
1974, a "statutory" treaty-approval procedure named "fast track" has been extensively
applied to "all major trade agreements," including various resulting agreements of
GAIT rounds of trade negotiations (e.g., Tokyo Round Agreements, Uruguay Round
Agreements, etc.), as well as Free Trade Agreements (e.g., North America Free Trade
Agreement or NAFTA). 457 Aiming to expedite the congressional approval of the "non456
457

Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 966 F. 2d 660.
Jackson, Great 1994, supra note 441, at 168.
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tariff barrier agreements and implementing statutes", 458 the "fast track" procedure
allows a statute approved by the Congress authorizes the President to accept a
proposed treaty. This statute, after being approved by both houses of the Congress
and signed by the President, constitutes "the basis for further presidential action" on
ratifying or accepting the proposed treaty. 459 Thus, with the "fast track" procedure, all
post-GAIT U.S. trade agreements have fallen within the category of "executive
agreements" under U.S. law.

Moreover, under the "fast track" process, the Congress usually adds to the required
statute (as noted above) "the measures that it wishes to enact into domestic law," so as

I

l1:{ ...
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to implement the proposed international agreement.'.460 The statute concerned then
turns into the "implementing legislation" of the given agreement. By this approach,

the Congress has been increasingly explicit about its preference regarding the nonself-execution of the post-GAIT trade agreements, notably in Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, which provides that "[n]o provision of any trade agreement approved by the
Congress ... nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance,
which is in conflict with any statute of the United States shall be given effect under
the laws of the United States.'' 461 Since then, with only certain "possible minor
exceptions," trade agreements accepted by the U.S. have been treated as non-selfexecuting. 462 A particular case in this regard appears to be the Uruguay Round
Agreements (WTO agreements) with its U.S. implementing legislation, Uruguay
!'

Round Agreements Act (URAA).

II.

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) and the U.S. WTO
Implementation

458

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 76, at 82.

459

Jackson, Great 1994, supra note 441, at 168-169. This is regarding the application of the "fast

track" procedure to the major trade agreements.
460

/d. at 168.

461

19 USCA § 2504(a).
Jackson, Great 1994, supra note 441, at 168.
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In 1994, after the Uruguay Round results were signed by the U.S. government and

other original WTO members on April15, the U.S. Congress and Executive Branch
proposed the fast track process to ratify these trade treaties. This statute, lately cited
as "1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act'' {URAA, or directly, "the Act"), did not
get approved by both houses of the Congress until December 1 of that year. Based on
the enactment of the URAA, then U.S. President Clinton ratified the Uruguay Round
Agreements (equally, "WTO agreements") a week later. 463 Since then, the WTO
agreements have been the leading U.S. trade agreements within the category of its
"executive agreements."

1.

Domestic Legal Effect ofWTO Law under the URAA

Until the creation of the WTO in January 1995, the then existing U.S. trade
agreements, GATT 1947, had remained ambiguous as to its self-executing nature,
absent the express "intent" of U.S. Congress in this regard. This ambiguity no longer
exits in the successor of the old GATT, namely, Uruguay Round Agreements (WTO
agreements), for the sake of the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA).

Serving as the implementing congressional legislation for WTO agreements, the
URAA explicitly excludes their self-execution, notably in Section 102, which governs
the relationship of WTO agreements to U.S. domestic law. 464 According to Section
102(a)(1), "no provisions of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstances, that is inconsistent
with any law of the United States, shall have effect.'.465 The provision is analogous to

463

/d. at 169.

464

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 102. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), codified as

19 USCA §3512.
465

19 USCA §102(a)(1) (US federal law prevails over conflicting WTO provisions).
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Section 3(a) of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, 466 and therefore establishes the
"continuing primacy" ofU.S. federal law over any inconsistent WTO legal obligation
deriving either from pertinent WTO provisions, or from the application of these
provisions by WTO institutions.

The latter situation particularly refers to two

categories of decisions: decisions of the Ministerial Conference and General Council
as the "authoritative interpretations by the WTO," and, "decisions of WTO dispute
settlement panels.'.467

Both categories are explicitly noted in "Subsection C" of the URAA governing
"Uruguay Round Implementation and Dispute Settlement." It should be noted that in
terms of WTO decisions, this subsection only refers to "reports" of WTO panels and
the Appellate Body, without noting the role of the DSB and its adoption process. This
has somewhat obscured the legal nature of WTO decisions as the binding source of
international law to create "secondary legal obligations.'.468 Considering the pureiy
internal perspective of the U.S. Congress, its "negligence" or "ignorance" as such
might be understandable.

After all, Congress is not dealing with this issue on

international plane. From a different perspective, this might also reflect the "overconcern" of the U.S. government about the results of the WTO dispute settlement
process, for it even brings WTO's "preliminary rulings" into domestic implementation
process. More important, the binding force of WTO decisions does not matter much
in this context, since the focus of the Congress is on the substance of such decisions
(as buried in the "reports"), other than their legal effect in international sphere.
Accordingly, instead of "WTO decisions," the following discussions of the U.S.
experience will mainly address the reports of WTO panels and the Appellate. Also,
466
461

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 76, at 87.
/d. at 244. Also, David W. Leebron, Implementation ofthe Uruguay Round Results in the United

States, p.212-214. Leebron regards "WTO agreements" as comprising "authoritative interpretation by
the WTO or decisions of dispute settlement panels." To this author, this perspective can be better
presented by the concept of "WTO law" as articulated in this study.
468
According to preceding discussions, particularly, reports ofWTO panels and the Appellate Body
will not be consided as binding upon the parties to the disputes concerned, until and unless they are
adopted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
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for putpose of these discussions only, the concept of "WTO law" is particularly
redefined in the URAA context, as comprised of WTO agreements, authoritative
intetpretations by the WTO, as well as reports ofWTO panels and the Appellate Body.

This goes back to Section 102(a)(l), whose scope does not limit it to WTO
agreements, but rather extends to a broad concept of "WTO law" in the above sense.

In the same context, this provision implies that any inconsistent "WTO law" would be

I·

invalidated by the pertinent U.S. domestic law, which consequently has excluded the
possibility of relying on any WTO legal obligations - either under WTO treaty law or
specified by WTO panels or the Appellate Body- to challenge U.S. domestic law in
~··
r ..• .

any event, not to mention the possibility of granting direct effect to WTO treaty
obligations. This is also the case with U.S. State law, except for an occasional action
brought by the U.S. government to invalidate such domestic law, for its alleged
inconsistency with WTO agreements, which is specified in Section 102(b)(2).469 The
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following discussions will focus on U.S. federal law (or, simply, U.S. law), while the
issues related to U.S. State law will be omitted.

r~
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The URAA continues to address the invocability of WTO agreements in Section
102(c), which governs the "[e]ffect of [WTO] agreements with respect to private
remedies." Section 102(c)(l) imposes two statutory restrictions on private rights of
action, 470 providing that WTO agreements "neither create privately enforceable rights,
nor provide a basis for challenging an executive action.'.471 In this regard, the "intent"
of the Congress is, as clarified in Section 102(c)(2), "to occupy the field with respect
469

In addition, with regard to the relationship between WfO agreements and the State law, section

102(b)(2)(A) the URAA excludes the possibility of relying on any WfO treaty provision to invalidate
any State law or ''the application of such a State law," "except in an action brought by the United States
for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid."
470

Section 102(c)(l) (A) & (B) of the URAA mandates that no person other than the United States

"shall have any cause of action or defense under any ofthe UR Agreements" or challenge "any
action or inaction ... of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a state on the
ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent" with one of these agreements.
471

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES,

supra note 76, at 87.
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to any cause or action or defense under or in connection with any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements" particularly in U.S. judicial proceedings. As Section 102(c)
serves to deny the "invocability" of WTO agreements entirely, it reinforces the nonself-executing nature of these trade agreements. This position was initially indicated
by the Senate during the enactment of URAA, which asserted that WTO agreements
"are not self-executing and thus their legal effect in the United States is governed by
implementing legislation. "472 Here, of course, the "implementing legislation" refers
totheURAA.

In Section 102(d), the URAA introduces a "statement of administrative action" (SAA),

.tt··. . .,

which serves "as an authoritative expression" by the U.S. concerning the application
and interpretation of WTO agreements and the URAA itself "in any judicial
proceeding.'.473 While indicating the objective of the URAA is to "bring U.S. law
fully into compliance with U.S. obligations under the [Uruguay Round]
agreements,'.474 the SAA makes it absolutely clear that WTO agreements are not selfexecuting in U.S. law, and cannot be applied by the U.S. courts so as to interpret U.S.
laws in a manner contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the Congress.475 More

~~I)

significantly, the SAA provides that reports of WTO panels and the Appellate Body

~:

"have no binding effect under the law of the U.S. and do not represent an expression
of the U.S. foreign or trade policy."

476
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In this connection, the U.S. Congress

particularly excludes the potential for WTO decisions having res judiciata force and
stare decisis status under U.S. legal system.

Undoubtedly, the above SAA sections have affirmed the non-self-execution of WTO
agreements in any respect. Nevertheless, they implicitly acknowledge the application
and interpretation of WTO treaty provisions by the U.S. courts.

In reality, this

472

S. Rep. No. 103-412, at 13 (1994), accord H.R. Rep. No. 103-812, pt I, at 25 (1994).

473

19 USCA §3512(d).

474

H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994), at 669.
Jd.

41S
476

/d. at 1032.
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situation represents not just a possibility, but also an inevitable trend. Regardless of
their non-self-executing nature, WTO agreements are capable of being applied in
domestic proceedings. This, according to John Jackson, are "indirect impacts and
effects" of non-self-executing treaties.477 Even absent a direct "statute-like" effect on
U.S. domestic law, WTO agreements "might still be applied either by a court to
resolve ambiguities in the language of a statute, or by administrative agencies in
promulgating rules and regulations," although "such applications could not lead to an
interpretive result that was contrary to any clearly expressed intent of the Congress."
In this sense, the key to the U.S. WTO implementation appears not a matter of

pursuing the self-execution ofWTO law (which would appear to unrealistic), but that
~·::

of applying or interpreting WTO law for purpose of the particular domestic law. This
"particular U.S. law" often refers to the URAA, given its status as the "implementing
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legislation for WTO agreements."
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When the issue turns to the legal application/interpretation of the WTO legal context,
concerns are raised about the consequences of such legal constructions to other
competing domestic legislation. Especially, where the rule of lex specialis derogat
/ega generalis applies, one may question how broadly a U.S. statute- e.g., the URAA

-should be interpreted "when it arguably conflicts with previous legislation." This
has become a matter of considerable concern in the implementation of WTO
agreements,

"particularly

regarding

environmental

protection

and

product

standards." 478 The URAA has fully addressed this concern in Section 102(a){2),
which governs the "interaction" of the URAA and the "pre-existing law." 479
According to this provision, the Act itself "shall not be construed to amend or modify
any law of the United States" relating to the protection of life or health, environment
or worker safety, or, "to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United
477

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES,

478

Id. at 244-245.

supra note 76, at 101-102.

479

Paul D. Clement, Brieffor the United States in Opposition, in Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. and Kovo
Corporation o(the U.S.A., Petitioners. v. United States o(the America (on petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), 2004 WL 2216343 (U.S.) at 5.
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States ... unless specifically provided for by this Act. "480

Consequently, Section 102(a)(2) has created some exceptions to the rule of lex

specialis derogat /ega generalis in the URAA context, which actually reflects the
intent of U.S Congress to restrain the "potential effects" of the URAA being
interpreted to alter U.S. laws (including administrative regulation). Notably, for other
domestic statute not specified in the URAA, their amendment for the purpose of
conforming to the WTO agreements (whether as a result of dispute settlement or a
volunteer determination of the U.S.) will entail the normal U.S. legislative process.

481

Accordingly, the WTO implementation appears to be quite restrictive under U.S.

r·: .
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jurisdiction.
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In the aggregate, the URAA not only explicitly excludes the self-execution of WTO
agreements, but also clearly denies the res judicata force and stare decisis status of
WTO decisions by excluding the "binding effect" of WTO panel and Appellate Body
reports under the U.S. legal system. This then raises concerns about legal authority
and procedure for the implementation of WTO law in U.S. domestic law. 482 The
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question is closely linked to the role of the U.S. Congress and Executive branch, as

c:u

specified in the URAA for the next discussion.

~~~

2.

Statutory Role of the U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch in
the WTO Implementation

Since WTO agreements are not self-executing treaties under U.S. law, the
implementation of WTO law calls for additional actions of U.S. government bodies,
which raises the issue of "authority" to implement, although a number of forms of

480

19 USCA §3512(a)(2).

481

JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES,

482

!d. at 90.

supra note 76, at 245.
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iinplementation are possible in this regard.

483

As noted above, WTO agreements are

"executive agreements" under U.S. law. From the perspective of treaty making, both
U.S. Congress and Executive have played a significant role, especially in the context
of the "fast track" process, under which the U.S. President had ratified these trade
agreements, while the Congress had enacted the URAA.

As for the URAA, it grants the Congress and Executive Branch an essential role in the
WTO implementation, notably in Subsection C, which governs "Uruguay Round
implementation and dispute settlement." As noted before, for the implementation
purpose, this subsection specifically refers to two categories of decisions by WTO
institutions, involving WTO decision-making and dispute settlement respectively. A
series of administrative reporting and congressional consultation requirements are
therefore established to implement the two processes and their operation under the
WTO auspices, 484 where a predominant role is given the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), the most significant agency on trade matters in U.S.
Executive Branch.

485

Thus, the URAA has provided for "much closer congressional
L

oversight of U.S. WTO/GATT participation than in the past.'t4
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In the same context, the URAA has been very specific about how the U.S. would

~~

respond to reports of WTO panels and the Appellate Body. According to the SAA,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body "will not have any power to change U.S. law or
order such a change," while "only Congress and the Administration can decide
whether to implement a WTO panel determination and, and, if so, how to implement
it.'t487 With regard to the adverse WTO reports, the Congress authorizes the USTR, in
consultation with various congressional and executive bodies and agencies, to
'·

483

/d. at 99.

484

Subtitle C -Title 1- Uruguay Round Implementation and Dispute Settlement.
SYKES, supra note 76, at 89.
486
/d. at 245.
485
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'

JACKSON, DAVEY &

''

I

H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. I, at 656, 659.
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determine whether to implement them and, the related extent of implementation.488

In case an adverse WTO report targets U.S. legislation, the SAA states that: "[i]f a

[WTO] report recommends that the US change federal law to bring it into conformity
with a Uruguay Round Agreement, it is for the Congress to decide whether any such
change will be made." In recent years, significant targeted U.S. legislation includes
the "Byrd Amendment," the Antidumping Act of 1916, as well as Section 301-310 of
the U.S. Trade Act of 1973. In all three cases the WTO tribunal has ruled in favor of
the complainants. So far, the USTR and Congress have been working to conform
with on each of these WTO decisions.

For the cases where an adverse WTO report targets U.S. administrative regulation or
practice, the URAA requires in Section 123(g) that the contested regulation or
practice "may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified" in the
implementation of such ruling "unless and until" the Congress, the USTR and
relevant administrative agency have consulted through stringent procedures specified
therein. 489 In terms of the particular WTO reports on antidumping and countervailing
duty issues, Section 129 of the URAA provides for administrative action of the
International

Trade

Commission

(ITC),

USTR

and

other

"administrative

authorities. "490

Given the essential role of the Congress and Executive Branch (especially the USTR)
in WTO implementation, it is interesting to witness the position of other U.S.

,.
I·
I
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government bodies and agencies coping with the WTO affairs in daily practice. One
example is the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). In March 2003, during a trade
law training conference held in Washington, DC, some DOC officials confessed
publicly that they would always stick to the U.S domestic law and ignore the relevant
I

488

19 USCA §3533(f)(3).

489

19 USCA §3533(g).

490

19 USCA §3538.
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WTO provisions of the WTO. This indifferent attitude towards WTO law was shared
by a number of judges of the U.S Court of International trade (CI'I) present at the
event. This fact indicates a comparatively restrictive role of the

u.s.

court in the

WTO implementation ofWTO law, which is the subject of the following discussion.

m.

Treatment of WTO Law before the U.S. Courts

1.

Role of the U.S. Courts in International Trade Regulation

Trade regulation in the U.S. refers to national governmental regulation of the
importation of goods (and services) and competition by imported goods in the
domestic economy under domestic trade law.

491

In this process, the role of the U.S

courts - as part of the U.S. government - is regarded as "corollary to the roles
allocated to the Congress and to executive and administrative agencies." Under the
U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the authority to impose duties on imported goods
and regulate commerce with foreign nations, which leads to statute-specified
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"governmental regulatory actions" or "statutory programs" to be administered and
implemented in practice.

Given the "inability" of the Congress to administer its

legislation (statutes) on a daily basis, it is necessary to delegate that responsibility to
other government institutions (basically, the Executive Branch andjudiciary). 492

Since early 1990s, it has been well recognized that statutory application and
interpretation by the administrative agencies and the courts were capable of
determining how the above "governmental actions" or "programs" of the Congress
would "work in the real world." 493 Moreover, applications and interpretations by
administrative agencies are subject to those by the courts. This actually refers to

491

PATRICK C. REED, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN U.S. CUSTOMS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

4 (1997).
492
493

!d. at 15.
!d.
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"judicial review" in the context of international trade relations, especially the review
by the courts of the "lawfulness" of the administrative interpretations.494 Under U.S.
jurisprudence, the role of the U.S. courts in international trade regulation is usually
considered in the context of judicial review of trade-related administrative
decisions, 495 the latter being nothing more the operation of a general judicial review in
the particular area of international trade.496 Accordingly, for the purpose of present
discussions, it is appropriate, and sometimes necessary to note some basic aspects of a
standard U.S. judicial review, e.g., reviewability of review, scope of review, standard
ofreview, etc.

Under the U.S. judicial system, judicial review involving international trade issues
mainly falls within the competence of the Court of International Trade (CIT, at trial
level) and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, at appellate level).
Today, most litigation involving international trade law occurs in the CIT, formerly
known as the Customs Court (given its current name by the Customs Court Act of
1980). Possessing all the powers in law and equity of a U.S. district court, the CIT
.;

enjoys extensive jurisdiction, which allows access to this court "to cover most persons
with a real interest in challenging or defending a trade-related action." Particularly,
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the CIT has "exclusive jurisdiction" over appeals or actions towards administrative

JB

decisions ofthe U.S. Customs Service, Department of Commerce, International Trade
Commission and other administrative authorities, on trade issues such as import
classification, antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD), country of origin,
tariffs, duties, fees and other taxes on imports, embargos or quantitative restrictions on
imports, etc.497

For various actions, the CIT has established a complex structure of review, featured

494
49

!d. at 16.
s /d. at 14.

496

/d. at 17.

497

JACKSON, DAVEY &

~~
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SYKES, supra note 76, at 113. See, 28 USCA §1581.

179

by the diverse "scopes of review" responding to either "factual" or "legal" issues in
respective types of actions. The trial de novo standard applies only to a few "statutespecified actions" in both factual and legal context, and thus represents a rare case.
For the majority of actions, especially those concerning antidumping (AD),

I'

countervailing duty (CVD) and trade adjustment assistance, the "substantial-evidence
standard" and "arbitrary-capricious standard" - both provided in the Administrative
Procedure Act - would apply to the review of factual issues by the Courts. 498 In
reviewing the lawfulness of administrative statutory interpretations, the Court
generally applies the two-prong "Chevron test" evolving from a U.S. Supreme Court
case, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci/. 499
i.~

: · n.

.......J·.;

Decisions of the CIT are appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC, or, Federal Circuit) and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court. 500 The CAFC
was established under Article ill of the U.S. Constitution on October 1, 1982, ·and
formed by combining the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate
division of the U.S. Court of Claims. Unique among the thirteen Circuit Courts,
CAFC has nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of subject matters, including
international trade, government contracts and patent Accordingly, appeals to this
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appellate court come not only from the CIT, but also from all federal district courts

J~

and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The Court also takes appeals of the decisions
of certain administrative agencies, such like the lTC, the Board of Patent Appeals and

l.

Interferences, the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, etc.501

I
Like the practice of the CIT, the scope of review adopted by the CAFC also depends
upon the types of actions brought, as well as on the distinction between factual issues
and legal issues. However, in terms of individual actions, especially the appeals of

498
499
500
501

/d. 113-114.
467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984).

supra note 76, at 113.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, http://www.fedcir.gov.
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the CIT decisions, the Court has applied diverging or even controversial appellate
standards of review, in absence of explicit statutory guidance. In customs cases, the
Court usually reviews the CIT's conclusion of law de novo, while accepting its factual
:findings unless they appear to be "clearly erroneous." 502 In antidumping (AD) I
countervailing duty (CVD) cases, the situation turns out to be more complicated and
controversial as observed below.

Historically, the CAFC applied the same combination of "de novo/clearly erroneous"
standard to the AD/CVD cases as it does to customs cases. In 1984, the CAFC
repealed that traditional approach by introducing the "apply anew" standard in
Atlantic Sugar case. 503 Under the new standard, in reviewing the AD/CVD decisions

:! :'"'a
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of the CIT, the CAFC would apply the same "substantial evidence/in accordance with
law" standard as the CIT does, although that standard is statutorily the privilege of the
CIT only. 504 In the following decades, the Court had consistently applied the "apply
anew" standard until it changed this position in Suramerica case in 1994.

In
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Suramerica, the Court called for more deference to the CIT and proposed a new

I

standard of review outlined by the U.S Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v.

~tl

NLRB, which only considers whether the CIT "misapprehended or grossly misapplied
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the statutory standard."505 Since then, the CAFC has increasingly cited the Surameica
rationale, although that practice does not necessarily imply a tendency for the Court to
move away from its long-standing "apply anew" standard of review. 506 From a
practical perspective, for review of legal questions, the CAFC has been observed to

502

Gregory W. Carman, A Critical Analysis of the Standard of Review Applied by the Court ofAppeals

for the Federal Circuit in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL

COMMENT. 177, 182 (Winter I Spring 2003).
503

/d. at 183. See, Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F. 2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[w]e

review the [CIT's] review of an ITC determination by applying anew the statute's express judicial
review standard." In this regard, the "express judicial review standard" refers to that only applicable to
the CIT in accordance with 19 U.S.C. §1516a.
504

19 U.S.C. §1516a.

505

Suramerica, supra note 456.

506

Carman, supra note 502, at 190-191.
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consistently apply the de novo standard, which is equally adopted by the CIT in the
same context.

Obviously, among the U.S. federal courts, the CIT and CAFC appear to encounter
WTO legal issues more frequently than others, given their particular competence and
jurisdiction noted above. Also, "[O]ther federal courts accord deference to Federal
Circuit opinions on matters within its jurisdiction or expertise." More important, "the
Supreme Court rarely accepts cases from the Federal Circuit for review." Considering
all these "institutional factors," 507 the CAFC Case law of the CIT and CAFC has
constituted the essential part of the U.S. judicial jurisprudence on WTO law.
ll
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Accordingly, the large part of the succeeding discussions will contribute to an analysis
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of some recent, distinguishing decisions of the CIT and CAFC.
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2.

The Rise of WTO Issues in the U.S. Courts and the Application of
the Charming Betsy Doctrine

!CJ~

excludes WTO agreements for their non-self-execution, as well as WTO panel and
Appellate Body reports for their lack of res judicata force and stare decisis status in
domestic sphere. Section 201 (c) of the URAA particularly bars private parties from
bringing an action against U.S. domestic legislation, or U.S. administrative regulation
or practice on the ground of WTO agreements. This restriction is equally imposed
upon the WTO's DSB decisions.

As the door is shut for the U.S. courts to directly rely on WTO law, a window opens
As noted in previous

discussions, the non-self-execution of WTO agreements does not lead to their
507
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Within the U.S., international trade is regulated under domestic trade law;508 the latter

wider and wider for the courts to address WTO issues.
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Michael F. William, Channing Betsy, Chevron, and the World Trade Organization: Thoughts on the

Interpretive Effect ofInternational Trade Law, 32 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 677, 692 (Spring 2001 ).
508
REED, supra note 491.
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irrelevance to U.S. domestic law and practice. Given their "indirect impacts and
effects" in the domestic sphere, WTO agreements and reports are often applied and
interpreted by the U.S. administrative agencies and the U.S. courts for their internal
administrative legislation and statutory interpretations. Particularly, in judicial review
of trade-related administrative actions, the courts would inevitably encounter these
issues on the domestic effect of WTO law, and therefore must determine these issues.
In this context, the rise of WTO issues is largely attributed to the Channing Betsy
doctrine, a "time-honored canon of statutory construction" under the jurisprudence of
the U.S. courts.

509

A.

1:
The Charming Betsy Doctrine and the Availability of
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Standings
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The Channing Betsy doctrine originated from an early decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Murray v. Schooner Channing Betsy, requiring "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains ... further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country."

510

Within its meanings, the doctrine would allow private parties the

standing to bring an action against U.S. domestic legislation, or related administrative
decisions based upon the non-self-executing WTO legal obligations, without irritating
the express intent of the Congress. The past decade has witnessed a frequent citation
of Channing Betsy doctrine - usually by petitioners to develop their arguments based
on WTO law - before the U.S. courts, accelerating an increase of federal cases
involving WTO issues. As a recent trend, more and more petitioners would focus on a
particular report of the WTO panel or Appellate Body, rather than just look at the
pertinent provisions of WTO agreements. They seem to assume that WTO reports are
equal to WTO agreements, especially in terms of their status such as the "law of the
nations" covered by the Channing Betsy doctrine. Interestingly, from the perspective
509

Hyundai v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1344 (Mar. 19, 1999).

510

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118; 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804).

183

=·.~
~~·I
illlllo&:>

~~

of other practitioners, usually the respondents, even the status of WTO agreements as
the "law of nations" would be doubtful, 511 which may serve as part of the argument
against the application of Charming Betsy for later discussion.

Although U.S. federal courts' position towards the above assumption and the
applicability of Charming Betsy vary from case to case (even from court to court),
they have consistently recognized the standing of private parties in this regard. In the
decision of the Federal Circuit in Tzmken, the Court observed that although "[s]ection
3512(c) bars parties from bringing claims directly against the government on the

I•

ground that Commerce acted inconsistently with the Uruguay Round Agreement Act
~ : ·r~

("URAA")," "Koyo brought this action under U.S. law under the assumption that it
would be interpreted so as to avoid a conflict with international obligations."512 The
Court reached the same conclusion in Koyo, holding that Section 3512(c) did not bar
an "action under U.S. law" urging that a domestic statute should "be interpreted so as
to avoid a conflict with international obligations." 513

In this context, private

individuals may always secure their standing under the Charming Betsy doctrine, so
as to develop an argument on the basis of non-self-executing WTO law. The CIT and
other federal courts have consistently taken the same position as that of the CAFC.
Consequently, it is not surprising to observe that WTO issues are more and more
frequently raised before the U.S. courts. Here, the question is no longer "whether
courts would even be allowed to hear arguments based on WTO rules, under the
Charming Betsy doctrine," but how the courts will hear such arguments, and,

alternatively, how the courts will treat WTO law.

B.

511

About the "WTO Issues"

Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and the Charming Betsy: Is There A Place for the

Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Determinations? 13 FED. CIRCUIT B. J. 229, 238 (2003-2004).
512
Timken v. United States, USCAFC Slip Opinion No. 03-1098, -1238 (Jan 16, 2004), at 7.
513

Clement, supra note 478, at 7.
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Before embarking on the jurisprudence ofthe U.S. courts on WTO issues, it is vital to
conceive of the circumstances under which these WTO issues may arise before the
courts, as well as their substance. For this purpose, thirteen decisions of the CIT and
the CAFC are to be cited and analyzed, as they remain the most recent and updated
status in this regard (to the best knowledge of this author). As elaborated in later
discussions, all these federal cases carry out a judicial review of U.S. administrative
decisions, of which the majority are AD/CVD determinations by the DOC or the lTC,
and the minority include one concerning the customs appraisal by the U.S. Customs
Services (Luigi case) and another concerning the import-related regulation by the U.S.
State Department (Turtle Island Case). Responding to that situation, the most-cited
WTO legal regime before the U.S. courts has been the WTO Antidumping Duty
Agreement (ADA) and the WTO Countervailing Duty Agreement (CDA), together
with the pertinent GATT primary obligations, e.g., GATT Article I (MFN) and Article
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courts

Whatever WTO legal obligations are involved; the

generally

apply

them

for

a

reVIew

of

the

"reasonableness/permissibility" of the alleged administrative interpretation or
implementation of the pertinent U.S. trade status. This becomes a pure "question of
law" under the basic concept of the U.S. judicial review.

Notably, cases considering WTO issues only account for a tiny percentage of the
caseload of the CIT and CAFC, of which the thirteen cases cited herein would never
represent an exhaustive inventory, but have already covered most WTO issues (to the
best understanding of this author). Therefore, by articulating and analyzing these
thirteen cases, the study of U.S court jurisprudence on WTO law is more likely
accomplished than the otherwise.

C.

"Chevron Test" v. Charming Betsy Doctrine

Since cases considering WTO issues involve judicial review of a trade-related
administrative action, the reviewing court (mostly, CIT and CAFC) would have to
185
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apply a specific standard of review depending on the type of the reviewed
administrative act and the particular issues for review. In this context, the reviewing
court generally deals with questions of law, while most contested administrative acts
are AD/CVD administrations decisions. This has somewhat narrowed the choices of
the courts for the standards of review, let alone the dominant application of the

"Chevron test."

The "Chevron test'' evolves from the Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. v.

Natural Resources Defense Counci/. 514 According to this approach, the court first
determines "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."
~

Then, "if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguous expressed intent of
Congress."SIS This is "prong one" of the Chevron rule. Where "the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." And, as the
court further explained, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."
This is "Prong two" of the Chevron deference rule. 516 Obviously, the "Chevron test''
is designed for the review of legal issues. In practice, the test mainly applies to
judicial review of AD/CVD administrative decisions.

For other types of

administrative decisions, such as those involving customs appraisal decisions, the
reviewing court will likely apply the trial de novo standard.

With the rise of WTO issues in the U.S. courts under the Charming Betsy doctrine,
this two-century-old canon of statutory construction is inevitably in play with in the
above standards of review, mostly under the "Chevron test." Some scholars even

514

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 67 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1984).
SIS /d. at 842-843.
516

Seastrom, supra note 511, at 230.
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view Charming Betsy as "an extension of Chevron to the international trade arena."517
However, U.S. courts do not share this simple proposition. As survey of the WTOrelated case law of the CIT and the CAFC indicates, where the Chevron test is
established, the applicability of Charming Betsy will depend on whether "prong one"
or "prong two" of this test is in actual operation.

Where the "prong one" Chevron rule is applied, the Charming Betsy doctrine will be
excluded.

This principle was originally introduced by the Supreme Court in

McCulloch, stating that the Charming Betsy "does not purport to establish an absolute

rule that the "law of nations" trumps inconsistent domestic law or governmental acts,"
~

and therefore in the fact of a "clear expression" of congressional intent, the Charming

, , ~·a
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Betsy canon is inapplicable.518
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In reviewing the cases considering WTO issues, the CIT and the CAFC have fully

adhered to this principle. In Turtle Island, the Federal Circuit found it unnecessary to
take into account the WTO report governing the same administrative regulation at
issue. As the Court found, "[t]he intent of Congress is clear and the government's
current implementation of section 609(b) carried out that intent" The Court then
concluded, "because the meaning of section 609 is clear, we need not reach the
question of how much deference we ought to accord the State Department's
intetpretation of section 609, or whether the State Department's intetpretation would
minimize potential conflicts with international trade agreement." 519

The Court

reached the same conclusion in De/verde v. United States, 520 where, by applying
"prong one" of the Chevron, the Court found "the meaning of the statute is clear," and
then decided it did not need to "give Chevron deference to Commerce's
intetpretation," but "to determine whether Commerce's methodology is in accordance
517

/d. at 229.

518

McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21-22.

519

Turtle Island v. Department of Commerce, USCAFC Slip Opinion No. 001569,-1581,-1582 (Mar

21, 2002) at 23.
520

Delverde V. United States, 202 F. 3d. 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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with the statute." The Court then concluded that it was not. Referring to a WTO
panel report that particularly addresses the contested administrative action in the
instant case, the Court determined "we do not consider the relevance of that decision
except to note it is not inconsistent with our holding. " 521

More often, the CIT and CAFC apply "Prong two" of the Chevron deference rule to
cases considering WTO issues, 522 since most of them concern the AD/CVD decisions
of the Commerce Department (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC),
which often contain administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutory or
regulatory provisions. Such ambiguity actually suggests a potential for "any other
l : >r.,

possible constructions," which may serve as the threshold for the application of the
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Charming Betsy doctrine. In this context, the two principles seemingly fit well with
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each other. 523 Nevertheless, their substance is quite different. The Chevron deference
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calls for deference to "reasonable" agency statutory interpretations, while the
Charming Betsy doctrine requires the conformity of a questioned agency

interpretation with international obligations. This raises the question of: what if the
reviewing court finds that the statutory interpretations of the DOC to be reasonable,
but also not in harmony with a WTO obligation? In such a situation, does Charming
Betsy trump the Chevron by relying on the pertinent WTO obligation to determine the

"reasonableness" of the agency interpretation concemed? 524 Or, does Charming Betsy
survive the Chevron deference? The courts' answers to these questions vary from
case to case.

During the GAIT era, the courts already intended to insulate the Charming Betsy
doctrine from the Chevron deference, particularly in reviewing the AD/CVD
521

Delverde V. United States, USCAFC Slip Opinion No. 99-1186 (Feb 2000) at 8-9.

522

Gregory Husisian, When A New Sherif! Comes to Town: the Impending Showdown between the U.S.

Trade Courts and the World Trade Organization, 17 St. John's J. Legal Comment 457, 461 (Spring
2003).
523

Seastrum, supra note 511, at 230-232.

524

/d. at 235.
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determinations. In Suramerica, the Federal Circuit held that Commerce's reasonable
interpretations of the law merited deference under Chevron, irrespective of the text of
any related international trade agreement. Since the WTO came into being in January
1995, the federal courts have reiterated this rationale in a couple of subsequent
decisions. In a recent CIT decision in SNR Roulements v. U.S.A., the Court excluded
the applicability of the Charming Betsy, holding that Commerce had showed
sufficient "reasonableness" of its statutory interpretation for purposes of Chevron
deference. Although acknowledging its "reviewing obligations" under both principles,
the Court found on factual grounds that Chevron deference was a "paramount
principle" owing to Commerce's prior decisions consistently affirming the test. The
Court held this practice was "entitled to considerable weight" and sufficient to
establish the reasonableness of the challenged agency interpretation. AI; the Court
concluded, such a consequence was more important than the application of the
Charming Betsy doctrine.

Off the bench, there are generally two contradictory positions towards the application
of the Charming Betsy in the WTO context, specifically regarding the effect of this
practice on "traditional Chevron deference-based resolution of appeals in the CIT and
CAFC."525 One position represents the advocacy of this doctrine, usually from the
perspective of the "petitioners," asserting that the Charming Betsy governs the
"permissibility" of administrative interpretations "for the purpose of Chevron" and
serves as a "threshold review for congressional intent;" the latter is at core of the
Chevron deference.

For this reason, "agency determinations that transgress the

WTO/GATT are not 'permissible' for purposes of Chevron," and therefore "merits no
judicial deference. " 526

The other position represents the restraint of the Charming Betsy, usually from the
perspective of the respondents (e.g., U.S. administrative agencies). The position takes
SlS

/d. at 236-237.

526

William, supra note 507, at 703.
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a historical perspective, viewing the Charming Betsy generally as applying to
customary international law; the latter is "already part of the U.S. law" and selfexecuting in nature. It then questions if WTO agreements - being so complex and
non-self-executing in nature - will qualify under this doctrine. It also raises the same
concern about WTO reports, particularly considering the "failure of standard of
review" in WTO dispute settlement Under this position, the Charming Betsy is rather
"a plausible and useful adjunct" to the Chevron deference rule. 527 This submission
appears to be in line with the position of the above-noted case law of the CIT and
CAFC.

So far, discussions have focused on the incompatibility and even the contradiction of
the Charming Betsy with the two-prong Chevron test, which implies little prospect for
the application of the Charming Betsy before the U.S. courts. However, this does not
represent the whole picture. Federal courts (particularly, CIT and CAFC) do apply the
Charming Betsy in the WTO context, not only with the Chevron deference, but also in
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the absence of this standard of review.

In Hyundai, the Federal Circuit fully recognized the Charming Betsy doctrine, ruling
that "Chevron must be applied in concert with" it when this doctrine is implicated. To
this end, the Court particularly noted the statutory ambiguity, Commerce's action to
"fill the void" in this regard and the pertinent WTO provisions. As the Court found,
"under the Charming Betsy doctrine, the Court must consider whether Commerce
formulated its regulation consistent with Article 11.2 of the [WTO] Antidumping
Agreement." After confirming such consistency, the Court again gave predominance
to the Charming Betsy, emphasizing that "unless the conflict between an international
obligation and Commerce's interpretation of a statute is abundantly clear, a court
should take special care before it upsets Commerce's regulatory authority under the
Charming Betsy doctrine." This actually has imposed a significant restriction upon

527

Seastrurn, supra note 511, at 235-238.
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the application of the Charming Betsy. The Court finally concluded that Commerce's
'not like' requirement is consistent with U.S. obligations under Article 11.2 of the
Antidumping Agreement 528

In Federal-Mogul, the Federal Circuit found on factual grounds that the Chevron

deference was not applicable, and instead resorted to other deference criteria set forth
in the Administrative Procedural Act (APA).

Meanwhile, the Court applied the

Charming Betsy doctrine to address defendants' allegation of GATI violation, holding

this doctrine "particularly apt in this case." Acknowledging Commerce was entitled
to broad statutory discretion of choosing between the non tax-neutral and tax-neutral
' :t<J

methodologies for antidumping purposes, the Court held the latter, which Commerce
had actually chosen, "clearly accord with" the pertinent GATI obligations. This case
represents a good example of combining the application of the Charming Betsy with
that of the non-Chevron standards of review, under an implicit condition that the
administrative statutory interpretations at issue are not in conflict, but in harmony
with the pertinent GATIIWTO legal obligations. 529
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In reviewing the above two CAFC decisions, they both involve the AD determinations

fWD

by the Commerce Department, and both entail the application of the Charming Betsy

]~

doctrine in conjunction with a deferring standard of review imposed particularly upon
the AD/CVD administrative decisions. Accordingly, it will be safe to conclude in that
type of case, the Charming Betsy may survive the Chevron deference and other
deference criteria. What about the situation in other types of trade cases, which may
adhere to other standards of review than the Chevron deference and its analogies? To
answer this one must review the CAFC decision in Luigi, where the Court reviewed
de novo the U.S. Customs' appraisal rulings "TD 85-111 ,"as promulgated "in order to

implement an April26, 1984 decision on the treatment of interest charges made by the

528

529

Hyundai, supra note 509, at 1344-1345.
Federal-Mogul v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1580-1582 (Aug. 28, 1995).
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Committee on Customs Valuation of the GAIT."530

In Luigi, the Federal Circuit declared "we need not determine whether Chevron,
Skidmore, or any deference is applicable to ID 85-111, because ... the meaning of TD

85-111 reflects a proper interpretation of 19 U.S.C.§1401a based upon our de novo
consideration of the issue."531 In conducting such a de novo review, the Court gave
full credit to the Charming Betsy doctrine, holding that "[a]lthough all the detailed
criteria of ID 85-111 cannot be found in the explicit language of the statute, ... the
statute must be interpreted to be consistent with GAIT obligations, absent contrary
indications in the statutory language or its legislative history." In this context, the
court found "no such contrary indications" because "[t]he GAIT approach is quite
consistent with the statute." Specifically, the Court observed that the GAIT not only
had defined the pertinent appraisal standard as broadly as the statute had, but also had
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been "consistent with the policy of the statute." Moreover, the "GAIT parameters"
had provided a "uniform method" of appraisal, which was absence in the statute, but
deemed by the Court as necessary for preventing the manipulation of importers. On
these grounds, the Court determined to "construe the statute to make it consistent with
GAIT," and concluded that the interpretative rulings of ID 85-111 were "consistent
with the statute" since they "set forth the same criteria" as the 1984 GAIT
decisions.

532

Ji

As this customs case indicates, the Charming Betsy may survive de novo

review as well, under similar conditions to those in Federal-Mogul, that the contested
administrative statutory interpretation is not in conflict, but in harmony with the
• 4

pertinent GAIT/WTO obligations.

D.

The Role of the Charming Betsy Doctrine: Some Reflections

As WTO issues are more frequently raised before U.S. courts, the Charming Betsy
530
531
532

Luigi v. United States, 304 F. 3d 1362, 1368-1369.
/d. at 1365.
/d. at 1368-1369.
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doctrine will be increasingly in play with various standards of review of "questions of
law" regarding trade-related administrative acts. As a survey of the CIT and the
cAFC practice indicates, the linkage between this traditional canon of statutory
interpretation and the above standards of review is "a mess." The applicability of the
Charming Betsy can be diminished by a standard of review - such as the Chevron test

- in cases like Turtle Island, Corus and SNR Roulement. It can serve as a supplement
or aid to a standard of review, as evident in cases like Hyundai, Federal-Mogul and
Luigi. Obviously, in the context of WTO law, the reviewing courts decide the fate of

the Charming Betsy on a case-by-case basis, regardless of the possible impact of the
chosen standards of review on the application of this doctrine.
: li'<J

To make it clearer, the Charming Betsy doctrine and the standards of review are
parallel legal issues. They do not necessarily work together. They arise when WTO
legal obligations come up for judicial review of trade-related administrative actions.
They interact when both share the same thresholds for application, e.g., the "statutory
ambiguity" criteria for the application of Charming Betsy and of the Chevron
deference. 533 However, at a fundamental level, each regime has its own operation
rules. To establish the applicability of the Charming Betsy in the context of WTO law,
at least two conditions should be satisfied as below, neither of them necessarily linked
to standards of review.

First, the pertinent GAIT/WID legal obligations should account as those deriving
from the "law of nations" as suggested by the Charming Betsy doctrine. Without
doubt, provisions of WTO agreement would always fall within this category (See, in
Part I, Chapter 3, "Nature of the Law of the WTO"). Take the CAFC decision in
Hyundai for example, where the Court held that since the URAA was "intended to

bring U.S. law fully in compliance with U.S. obligations under the Uruguay Round
agreements," the WTO Antidumping Agreement (ADA) was "properly construed as
533

William, supra note 507, at 702. "Charming Betsy and Chevron require courts to examine federal

statutes for ambiguity."
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an international obligation of the United States."534 Accordingly, whenever a WTO
treaty obligation is involved, it is possible to consider the application of the Charming
Betsy.

In contrast, the same case is less likely to appear in WTO panel or Appellate Body
reports, for WTO reports are hardly categorized as the above "law of nations." Even a
WTO report adopted by the DSB, and capable of creating some "secondary legal
obligations" binding upon the parties (WTO members) to a particular dispute, does
not have stare decisis status in the WTO dispute settlement, much less stare decisis
effects in the U.S. courts. This may explain why, as discussed later, arguments based
upon the WTO's EC-Bed Linnen ruling have consistently been rejected by CIT and
the CAFC in Corus, Tzmken, and Koyo, although the reviewing courts have not been
explicit about it. Also, even when such secondary legal obligations happen to bind the
U.S. as a particular party to the WTO dispute concerned, it remains unsettled that in
ruling on the same issue, U.S. courts would, as suggested by Professor Jackson, treat
those specific obligations as the same international law obligations as WTO treaty
obligations. In practice, U.S. courts usually tum away from this issue by simply
jumping into the substantial stage of ruling out the domestic effect of WTO reports.
The latter situation will be elaborated in the next discussion.

Second, the U.S. statute concerned (noted as the "act of Congress" in the Charming
Betsy doctrine) should be broadly framed - or, bluntly, ambiguous enough - to allow
at least one possible statutory construction consistent with the pertinent GATT/WTO
legal obligations concerned.

This condition usually (but not always) implies the

absence of a fundamental conflict of this statute with the relevant WTO obligations.
As evident in above-noted case law of the CIT and the CAFC, the reviewing court
would apply the Charming Betsy when the statute concerned is either silent on the
issue (Hyundai), capable of granting broad administrative discretion (Federal-Mogul),

534

Hyundai, supra note 509, at 1343-1344.
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or with "no contrary indications" for a consistency with GATT obligations (Luigi).

This condition has restricted the effectiveness of the Channing Betsy doctrine in
facilitating the WTO implementation in U.S. law, since it leads to the unlikelihood of
challenging U.S. domestic law and practice by WTO law. Where the application of
the Charming Betsy works (as evident in the above three cases), the reviewing court
will recognize, in advance, the consistency of the agency statutory interpretation at
issue with the pertinent GATT/WTO obligations. After all, the Charming Betsy is
nothing more than "judicially crafted interpretative guides," and will hardly be
applied by the court in such a manner that the overall purpose of the statute concerned
"1'1>

would be frustrated. Therefore, as the Federal Circuit observed in Koyo, "Charming

Betsy . . . does not purport to establish an absolute rule that the "law of nations"
trumps inconsistent domestic law or governmental acts." Instead, it serves as an aid
for the courts to clarify the intent of Congress through the assessment of the
"reasonableness of agency statutory interpretations."

It should be noted that the clear intent of Congress, which does not necessarily result
in its conflict with the pertinent GATT/WTO obligations, has been a sufficient ground
in itself for excluding the application of the Charming Betsy. Given the non-selfexecuting nature ofWTO agreements, and also the primacy of U.S. domestic law over
these trade agreements, when the intent of the Congress is already expressed, there
will be no need to resort to WTO law. This may explain why Prong one of the

Chevron test may work to displace the Charming Betsy, notably in Turtle Island. In
that regard, what matters is the consequence of such exercise, not the exercise itself.
This has, in tum, indicated the necessity of satisfying the second condition for the
application of the Charming Betsy.

Nevertheless, one should never underestimate the role of the Charming Betsy doctrine.
It not only allows WTO issues to be argued by private individuals before U.S. courts,
but also enables (or, obligates) the courts to address these issues. When application of

.!
the Charming Betsy is recognized, the pertinent WTO legal obligations would end up
having nearly the same effect as those of self-executing treaty norms, without
touching the same sensitive issues brought about by the latter. When the application
of this doctrine is not recognized, the court would still, and usually must, interpret the
WTO law concerned, since the parties have successfully brought WTO issues before
the courts based upon this doctrine, regardless of the merits of this application. As
discussed below, such an inevitable process of law application will have great
implications for the effectiveness ofWTO law under the U.S. legal system.

3.

The Position of the U.S. Courts towards WTO Law

The previous discussion indicates that the applicability of the Charming Betsy
doctrine is conditioned by the harmonization between U.S. domestic law and WTO
law, and the actual application of the doctrine would, in tum, enhance ·such
harmonization. In reviewing above-noted decisions of the CIT and CAFC concerning
WTO issues, only the minority of them have recognized the application of the

Charming Betsy. In the majority of these case laws, the reviewing court would have
to decide, and usually bas already decided, whether WTO treaty obligations
(including those specified by the particular WTO panel and Appellate Body reports)
would have such domestic effect under the U.S. legal system, that they may trump the
U.S. law and practice.

From the beginning, federal courts have taken a firm position of excluding the
possibility of WTO law overriding U.S. domestic law or invalidating U.S. legal
practice. The courts base such a position on the non-self-executing nature of WTO
agreements as expressly intended by the Congress through the URAA. To this end,
they customarily quote Section 102(a) of the URAA, which provides for the primacy
of U.S. domestic law over any provision of WTO agreements, as well as over "the
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application of any such provision to any person or circumstance." 535 The latter
usually refers to WID panel and Appellate Body reports ("WTO reports"). In abovenoted federal cases concerning WTO issues, the courts not only stress this position
when rejecting the application of Channing Betsy (e.g., Curos and Turtle Island), but
also insist on the same position when allowing the Channing Betsy to apply to the
assessment of U.S. law and practice in light ofWTO law (e.g., Hyundai and FederalMogul).

Regardless of the applicability of the Channing Betsy doctrine, a trend shows that
more and more WTO-related federal cases have focused not on WTO treaty
! 1t"l:l

provisions, but on the adverse reports of WTO panels and the Appellate Body. In
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most of these cases, WTO issues arise before the federal court (usually, the CIT or the

rl!U

CAFC) because a WTO panel or the Appellate Body has ruled against the U.S. on the

~
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same or similar action of the U.S administrative agency as challenged before the court
Over the past decade, cases of this kind have been growing sharply. 536 Only a few of
them refer to an adverse WTO report covering the same underlying administrative
decisions as the reviewing court does, such as Hyundai and Turtle Island. In more of
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these cases, the agency actions targeted by the WTO tribunals are just similar to those

~p

heard by the courts. Typical examples in this regard are the decisions of the CAFC in

D

Corus, Timken, and Koyo, where the Commerce Department's "zeroing" methodology

in calculation of the antidumping duty were repeatedly alleged to be inconsistent with
the interpretations of the WTO Appellate Body in its EC-Bed Linen decision.

Theoretically, the above two situations have raised two separate legal issues in the
context of WTO law. Where the court reviews the same administrative action as the
one covered by an adverse WTO report, it generally faces the issue of the res judicata
force of that WTO report in U.S. law. Where the contested agency action before the
reviewing court is similar to the one addressed by the WTO tribunal, the court
535
536

19 U.S.C.§3512(a).
Husisian, supra note 522, at 470.
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generally faces the question of the stare decisis status of the WTO report concerned in
U.S. law. In practice, however, U.S. courts rarely distinguish these two issues from
each other, except for the CIT decision in Corus case, where the Court did point out
that "the common law concept of state decisis does not expressly apply to WTO
rulings." 537 To rule on the domestic effect ofWTO reports (and equally, WTO treaty
provisions), the courts usually rely on factual findings, U.S. statutory provisions, and
their own long-standing practice (U.S. case law). Since part or all of these grounds
have been sufficient to deny the binding force of adverse WTO reports on U.S law
and practice, there seems no need to elaborate the distinction between the above
issues. In most occasions, the courts do not raise these issues at all, for in any event
1: I rQ

the courts have equally taken a firm position of denying the domestic effect of WTO
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report, and excluding their role in "striking" the challenged agency interpretations.
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Despite a firm position regarding WTO law, U.S. courts have carried out nuanced,
sophisticated policies and strategies for coping with WTO issues, especially the
domestic effect of WTO reports. To the reviewing court, the first step is always to

$
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avoid these issues on factual grounds. This approach is particularly workable in cases

I

where the challenged administrative action is not identical, but similar to the one

I

covered by the pertinent WTO report. After all, it would always be easy to find a

I

~

fill

difference from a similarity, so as to make the issue irrelevant to the instant case. This
recalls a group of decisions of the CAFC on the Commerce Department's "zeroing
methodology," as challenged simultaneously by respective parties on the ground of
the WTO Appellate Body report in EC-Bed Linen (EC-Bed Linen decision).

In

Tzmken, the Federal Circuit ruled that the EC-Bed Linen decision was "not

I

sufficiently persuasive to find Commerce's practice unreasonable" simply based upon
two factual distinctions between this WTO report and the present case, especially the
distinction that the WTO ruling "does not involve the U.S." 538 The Court reiterated
this rationale in Soyo, holding that the EC-Bed Linen decision is not applicable, for
537
538

I
I

Corus Staal Bv v. USDOC, USCIT Slip Opinion No. 03-25 (Mar. 7, 2003) at 18.
Timken, USCAFC, supra note 512, at 14.
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the WTO report neither involved the United States's specific practice, nor dealt with
an "administrative review" qf a prior "antidumping investigation."539 In Corus, the
Court not only rejected the EC-Bed Linen decision for the same reasons cited in
Tzmken, but also excluded another WTO Appellate Body report, Corrosion-Resistant
Steel decision, for its absence of "a finding regarding the challenged zeroing

methodology. " 540

This factual-finding strategy turns out to be less workable in a CIT or CAFC appeal
parallel to a WTO proceeding, since both would deal with the same agency decision.
I

y

In such situations, the courts usually base their resisting position on WTO law upon

U.S. statutory provisions and their own prior practice (U.S. case law). The basic
statutory grounds come from the URAA, together with the SAA. In Turtle Island, as
Federal Circuit Judge Newman particularly notes in his dissent, the SAA states that
decisions ofWTO panels and AB "have no binding effect under the law of the US and
do not represent an expression of US foreign or trade policy."541 Since this section of
the SAA has explicitly indicated Congress's intent to reject any controlling status of
WTO reports on U.S. law and practice, it has become one of the courts' most favorite
statutory sources in support of their position, towards not only the res judicata force
of WTO reports, but also their stare decisis status in U.S. law. Corus is a "zeroing"
decision of the CIT. In Corus, after finding that the instant case was not identical, but
"more similar to Bed Linen" than other zeroing cases, the Court, by citing this section
and its analogies in the SAA, concluded that "panel reports do not provide legal
authority for federal agencies to change their regulations or procedures."542

Another statutory ground the courts heavily rely upon concerns the "separation of
powers" among U.S. constitutional institutions, notably in Section 129 of the

s39 Clement, supra note 479, at 8.

s4°Corus Staal Bv v. USDOC, USCAFC Slip Opinion No. 04-1107 (Mar. 7, 2003) at 10.
S4l H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1032 (1994).
S4l Corus, CIT, supra note 537.
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As the cou~ observe, "Congress has enacted legislation . . . [and]

authorized the USTR .. . to determine whether or not to implement WTO reports and
determinations and, if so implemented, the extent of implementation,"544 so that "the

I

I

II

II
I
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response to an adverse WTO panel report is the province of the executive branch, and
more particularly, the Office of the USTR."545 In this regard, the courts also refer to
the SAA, such as "[i]f a [WTO] report recommends that the U.S. change federal law
to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round Agreement, it is for the Congress to
decide whether any such change will be made."

Due to Congress's constitutional concerns as above, U.S. courts have consistently
rejected granting WTO reports any controlling status over U.S. law and practice.
Notably, in Corus, the Federal Circuit made it clear that "we will not attempt to
perform duties that fall within the executive province of the political branches, and we
therefore refuse to overturn Commerce's zeroing practice based on any ruling by the
WTO or other international body unless and until such ruling has been adopted
pursuant to the specified statutory scheme." Consequently, the Court regarded the
WTO Appellate Body's Softwood Lumber decision "as nonbonding because the
finding therein was not adopted as per Congress's statutory scheme." 547 In Turtle

Island, as Judge Newman stressed in his dissent, the Court "is not authorized to
evaluate a pragmatic political accommodation" and is, "like the executive branch, ...
bound by the law as congress enacted it." Accordingly, the "salutary developments"
made by the pertinent WTO report "do not relieve the judicial obligation to implement
the statutory text as Congress intended and enacted it. " 548

Interestingly, on the same statutory ground, the courts can endorse (even indirectly)
543

19 USC § 3533(f), 3538.- See Corus.

544

Corus, CAFC, supra note 540, at 9.

545

Hyundai, supra note 509, at 1343.
Turtle Island, CAFC, supra note 519, at 36. See, "Dissenting."
547
Corus, CAFC, supra note , at 540.

546

548
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Turtle Island, CAFC, supra note 519, at 37.
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the adverse WTO report, although such cases are rare at this moment. In those
situations, the adherence of the reviewing court to the WTO report concerned is
conditioned by the intent of the Executive Branch - usually evident in its
administrative actions - to comply with it.

In George E. Warren Corp. v. U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, the D.C. Circuit recognized an agency's discretion
to take an adverse WTO report into account for its statutory interpretations, noting
that the Executive Branch already determined that compliance was appropriate. 549 In
De/verde, the reviewing court acknowledged the adverse WTO report for its
consistency with the rulings of the court itself, as the latter required the revision of the
challenged agency action in accordance with the Congress's "true" intent. 550
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It should be noted that for above the constitutional concerns, the courts generally feel
reluctant to determine what role should be accorded to WTO agreements and reports.
This reluctance may explain why the courts always give priority to the avoidance of
the issues on factual grounds. As mentioned before, the courts have adopted this
strategy for their treatment of WTO reports.

More significantly, the courts have

treated WTO agreements in the same way. In a recent CIT decision, Usinor v. United
States, the Court held the issue to be moot because U.S. law and the WTO
Antidumping Agreement were not in conflict on the issue, and therefore "avoided the
larger issue."

551

ii

In sum, concerns of the courts about the potentials for disturbing

their constitutional relations with other government bodies have become the major
policy consideration behind their firm position of rejecting the binding force ofWTO
agreements and reports on U.S. law and practice.

To support their position on WTO agreements and reports, the courts also rely on their
long-standing practice dating back to the GATT area. These cases actually have been
549

Clement, supra note 479, at 13.

550

Delverde, CAFC, supra note 520, at 9.
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Greg Husisian & Stuart Rosen, Case Comment: USA: WTO Agreements and Decisions- US CIT

Considers the Application of WTO Agreements and Decisions in the Decision-making of US Trade
Agencies ad US Courts, INT'L T. L. R. 2005, 11(2), N12-13 (2005) at 2.
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codified by most of the above-noted URAA provisions. Among the most-cited are the
decisions of the CAFC in Suramerica, Mississippi, and Footwear, all three
considering GATT panel reports. In Corus, the Federal Circuit cited Suramerica,
affinning that "neither the GATT nor any enabling international agreement outlining
compliance therewith ... trumps domestic legislation; if U.S. statutory provisions are
inconsistent with the GATT or an enabling international agreement, it is strictly a
matter for Congress." 552 In Hyundai, the Court cited the principles "espoused in
Footwear," holding that "[a]s an initial matter, the WTO report itself has no binding
effect on the court."

The Court observed particularly that Congress had clearly

codified these principles "as part of the URAA."553 In Turtle Island, Judge Newman
lr.Q

cited Suramerica and Mississippi in his dissent, asserting that "although the
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government appears to rely on the WTO ruling as requiring United States (and
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authority to rewrite the statute. " 554
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In recent years, the courts have increasingly relied on more recent cases coming up

~

judicial) support of the current Guidelines, neither we nor the Sate Department has

~

after the creation of the WTO, especially those considering WTO reports. Notably, in
the CIT decision in Corus, the Court cited both Footwear and Hyundai, holding that
"[a]s this court frequently recognized, WTO decisions are not binding upon
Commerce or the court." Therefore, from an overall perspective, by referring to their
prior practice since the GA1T era, the courts have reinforced their URAA-based
statutory grounds for excluding the binding force of WTO agreements and reports on
U.S. law and practice.

Discussions so far have indicated that, to clarify the domestic effect ofWTO law, U.S.
courts mainly rely on domestic legal sources, namely, statutory and precedential
authority, and thus adhere to the "intent" of the U.S. Congress as expressed in these
552

Suramerica, supra note 456, at 667.
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Hyundai, supra note 509, atl343.
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Turtle Island, CAFC, supra note 519, at 37.
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domestic sources. In addition, the courts also resort to the WTO reports at issue,
considering if, within the WTO legal system, the contents and legal status of these
reports, as well as the "intent" of WTO tribunals possibly expressed there, have
provided for some indications regarding their domestic legal effect.

In the CIT

decision in Corus, the Court particularly addressed the stare decisis status of WTO
rulings, holding that "it appears that WTO decisions are not binding upon the WTO
itself. The common law concept of stare decisis does not expressly apply to WTO
rulings. As a result, WTO decisions appear to have very limited precedential value
and are binding only upon the particular countries involved. They are not binding
upon other signatory countries or future panels. " 555 Here, the Court implies that since
I llQ

the effect of WTO decisions is limited to the particular countries involved, neither

;lWG

such an effect will reach the U.S. if it is not a party to the WTO dispute concerned,

l!lal

nor will it directly confer any private rights and obligations towards under U.S. legal
system. Thus, the Court has based its rejection of the pertinent WTO report on its
legal status in international law (WTO law).

•
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In another decision, the CIT has based the same position on the substance of the

r
II

issues addressed by the WTO report concerned.

In Koyo, the Court refused to

determine whether the EC's "zeroing" methodology as set forth in the WTO's EC-Bed

Linen decision, and the alleged U.S. agency decision were the same, for only the
Ministerial body of the WTO - not the courts in the U.S. - could interpret an
Appellate Body report. 556 Here, the Court seemed to realize the parallel proceedings
on both international and domestic planes, and tried to avoid the issue based upon its
understanding of the "exclusive authority" of the WTO.

In contrast, the CAFC has based a similarly resisting position regarding the pertinent
WTO report on the "limited authority" of the WTO tribunal, as specified by the WTO
itself in that report. In Hyundai, the Federal Circuit noted that the WTO panel had
sss Corus, CIT, supra note 537, at 18.
556

Clement, supra note 479, at 7.
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acknowledged its own restrictive authority to intervene into domestic sphere. 557 As
the Court observed, although the WTO panel rejected Commerce's statutory
interpretation in question, it however "declined to suggest that the U.S. should act to
revoke" the challenged agency decision. "Rather, the panel concluded that the U.S.
bas a range of possible options to implement its recommendation." Here, the Court

bas based the position on the expressed judicial restraint of its WTO counterpart.

In the aggregate, U.S. courts, especially the CIT and the CAFC, have consistently

taken a firm position of rejecting the binding force ofWTO law on U.S. domestic law
and practice. They base their position mainly upon domestic statutes and case law,
but also resort to the WTO legal regime occasionally. Although such a resisting
position is in accordance with the intent of the U.S Congress buried in the URAA, it
does not suggest that WTO law - consisting of WTO agreements - is entirely
irrelevant under the URAA. Notably, Section 102(b)(2) of the URAA grants the U.S.
the standing to challenge state law on the ground of WTO law. Under this provision,
the reviewing court may take judicial notice of a WTO decision, considering the
views of the WTO tribunal as persuasive sources. 558 More clearly, as the Federal
Circuit indicates in Hyundai, denying the binding force of WTO panel reports "is not
to imply that a panel report serves no purpose in litigation before the court. To the
contrary, a panel's reasoning, if sound, may be used to inform the court's decision."559
According to both these statutory and precedential sources, WTO reports are nothing
more than the persuasive sources in U.S. law. This means, however persuasive these
WTO decisions can be, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. courts to
change their consistently indifferent position towards them.

IV,

Prospects and Conclusions

557

Hyundai, supra note 509, at 1334.

558

H.R. Doc. No. 316, at 659.
Hyundai, supra note 509, at 1343.
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The U.S. courts' passive position towards WTO law has raised more concerns from
the academic and practical circles. Trade practitioners, particularly, call for the bench
to cease its escaping strategies and take a more positive approach to this growing
body of international trade rules. Particularly, as they observe, recent years have
witnessed "a sharp growth of U.S. case law noting or citing WTO obligations or the
decisions of WTO panels," and this trend will continue due to three circumstances as
follows.

560

First, the "relative specificity" of the WTO - versus its predecessor GATT - in
addressing the highly "technical topics" of trade, and the virtues of WTO panels versus its GATT counterparts - in efficiently specifying and enforcing WTO
obligations, have fostered the utilization of the WTO dispute settlement process and
leading to a "much higher potential" - than the otherwise - "for there being an onpoint WTO ruling" parallel to a U.S. court decision.

561

As the "free trade

inclinations" of the WTO tribunal increasingly come up in conflict with the "more
protectionist" agency determinations, more and more parties are pursuing
simultaneous appeals (i.e., direct appeals to the CIT and lobbying governments to
bring WTO challenges). Consequently, the overlap of two-level dispute settlements
would occur more directly. As simultaneous appeals are often brought before the CIT
and the WTO, there has been a growing potential "for differing outcomes in national
and WTO appeals," which calls for U.S. courts to clarify the issues of those
competing outcomes. 562

Second, given all its virtues and efficiency, WTO dispute settlement becomes more
often the "end-point of trade disputes." 563 Therefore, for practical purposes, trade
lawyers in domestic proceedings are anticipating from the beginning "the potential for
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Husisian, supra note 522, at 470.
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/d. at 465.
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!d. at 470.
/d. at 466.
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a WTO case," and trying to make "the most favorable WTO-type arguments" before
U.S. courts, in case the final results are challenged in the WTO forum. 564 With these
efforts, they have been bringing more WTO issues before the U.S. courts.

Finally, the application of the Charming Betsy doctrine by the U.S. courts - even on
an occasional basis - offers great potential "for WTO decisions influencing the
resolution of appeals in the CIT and CAFC;"565 the doctrine has itself secured the
standing of private individuals to challenge U.S. domestic law and practice on the
ground of WTO law, and thus increased their opportunities to raise WTO issues
before U.S. courts. In the latter situation, even the courts rule out these issues. They
ll'IIJ

have at least addressed them, often by applying specific WTO legal obligations. This
process of "legal application" has itself had significant implications for domestic
implementation ofWTO law.

No doubt, neither the expansion ofWTO disputes nor that of U.S. trade cases is likely
to slow down. The trend suggests an even greater potential for both WTO tribunals
and the U.S. trade courts hearing appeals of the same or similar agency
determinations and being "increasingly on a collision cause with one another." It also
imposes the "potential for the WTO arguments being heard in every appeal" brought
in U.S. forum. 566 Accordingly, it is highly expected that the U.S. courts will more
frequently encounter WTO issues, and have to take on the task of determining the
domestic effect ofWTO agreements and reports on U.S. law and practice.

So far, subject to the intent of the Congress buried in the URAA, U.S. courts have
consistently resisted the domestic effect of WTO law. Even noting the URAA is
presumed to comply with the WTO Agreements, the courts insist that they should

-

follow what Congress has done, not what it thinks or assumes. In reality, the intent of
564

!d. at 470.

565

Jd. at 469.

566

!d. at 470.
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U.S Congress, which is driven by state interests (e.g., sovereignty concerns), rather
than international commitments of the U.S. -may not guarantee U.S. law would
always reflect the will of international community, even though the latter turns to be
legitimate under WTO legal regime. The Charming Betsy doctrine may allow the
courts to hear the WTO arguments and interpret WTO rules (on limited occasions),
but will never enable the courts to make WTO law trump U.S. law or practice. The
courts may acknowledge or endorse the adverse WTO decisions, but only within the
intent of Congress or the Executive Branch as authorized.

To U.S courts, WTO

obligations can be very persuasive -but never binding upon them.

Given the courts' rigid position toward the domestic effect of WTO law, in the
foreseeable future, WTO law will still "be cast in a supporting rather than a starring
role in domestic appeals of trade decisions." 567 Here is the reality: the courts are
continuing to reject the effect of WTO law under the U.S. legal system, or are even
trickily avoiding the issue, while trade practitioners and scholars are increasingly
airing their repudiations and frustrations. Nevertheless, the courts' current position
has been both acceptable under the WTO regime, and in accordance with the intent of
the U.S. Congress. One commentary has asserted that the courts' "restrictive view of
international law expressed in Suramerica and its progeny has little support in legal
doctrine [Charming Betsy] or in constitutional history." Given the analysis of the·
URAA and the Charming Betsy in the present Chapter, that perspective appears to be
one-sided and flawed. As understandable as it should be, unless Congress changes the
issue and indicates otherwise, it is unlikely that the courts will depart from their longstanding practice in how they treat WTO law. This has been the case with Suramerica,
for Congress lately modified the agency action at issue to comply with the WTO
requirements. 568

567

!d.

568

William, supra note 507, at 691-693.
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CHAPTER 2 IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO LAW UNDER THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER

I.

European Community (EC) Law and the Internal Legal Effect of
International Trade Agreements un.der the European Community (EC)
Legal Order

The European Community (EC) remains the central element in a growing European

I

I

Union (EU). The emergence of the EC and subsequently the EU bas been premised
upon a series of founding treaties that constitute the primary sources of ECIEU law.

Ill

I

41.11

I

Today, the Community (EC) is the common label for three existing European

=
~

Communities, of which each has its own founding Treaty as follows: the Treaty of

~

Paris 1952 that created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the two

tl

Treaties of Rome in 1958 that created, respectively, the European Atomic Energy

I.

Community {EURATOOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC).

illf

p

In

November 1993, the Treaty of Rome for the EEC was officially renamed the Treaty
establishing the European Community (the "EC Treaty"), and replaced the EEC with
the EC, while the ECSC and EURATOM remains in existence.569 At the same time,
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) entered into effect, officially
creating the European Union.570

The TEU establishes a "three-pillar" structure of the Union, under which the three
European Communities (now commonly labeled the "EC") constitute the first pillar
("European Community pillar"), with the other two pillars relating to a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and

569

STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EU LAW 4 (6th ed. 2003).

570

RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN NUTSHELL 8 (2005).
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Home Affairs (JHA), respectively. Being part of the EU, the EC pillar represents an
"institutionally sophisticated and intricate model of cooperation" among the European
states, deemed a

"traditional,

developed EC

system" that is "not only

intergovernmental but also quasi-federal" in nature. 571

This feature is also reflected in the legal structure of the EU, where there is a
European Community (EC) law at the core of an evolving "European Union (EU)
law" or simply, "European law."572 There is also "non-EC EU law," emerging from
the other two pillars of the Union. 573 Given the different nature of the three pillars at

- <I
~

present, only the EC pillar amounts to a well-established legal order (EC legal order),

;n

with its origin in the EEC - "a Community of unlimited duration, having its own

jill

. gf
Ill

institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation

'I

~

-.

Ill

on the international plane, and more particularly, real powers stemming from a
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the
Community. "

J,
~

~

I

574

L

(:

B
As a result of the "institutional merges" between 1957 and 1967,

575

·-..

legislative,

,..

~

administrative and judicial processes of three European Communities are now
undertaken by a single set of European institutions, namely, the Council of the
j

I

European Union, the Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice of the
European Communities (attached by the Court of First Instance in 1989). 576 This,

S?l

WEATHERn..L, supra note 569, at 6-9.

supra note 570, at 34-35.
S73 WEATHERILL, supra note 569, at 11.

S72 FOLSOM,

74

s Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
s?s The Merger Treaty, signed in Brussels on 8 Aprill965 and in force on July 15', 1967, provided for a

Single Commission and a Single Council of the then three European Communities. See,
http://europa.eu.int/abc/print treaties en.htm.
s WEATHERILL, supra note 569, at 10. ''There is a disjoint fa~ade to the European Union. The nature
76

of each of three pillars is different. The Council seems to be the only institution which is in any
significant sense a institution ofthe whole Union. In November 1993, ... renamed itself the Council of
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inter aliar, has contributed significantly to a Community law (EC law) having grown

into "the most institutionally and constitutionally sophisticated species of law created

within the European Union." 577 In contrast, the second and third pillar of the EU
structure do not share the same "legal integrity" as the EC pillar has, especially in
terms of their "institutional deficiency" in performing the same legal functions as the
EC pillar does.

578

Accordingly, EC law is not co-terminous with EU law, since the latter represents a
legal structure evolving towards "a unified EU legal order" that is not yet
completed. 579 On the contrary, the law stemming from the traditional EC architecture
bears most of the constitutional and institutional characters of a quintessential legal
system, and therefore has become a well-developed legal order comparable to any
national legal system. Consequently, under this EC legal order, EC law is capable of
being supreme and having direct effect, to the same extent as it is within the domestic
legal system of Member States (the issue is discussed as below). It is, in a large sense,
with such supremacy and the direct effect nature that EC law has distinguished itself
from "non-EC EU law."580

Generally, EC law has four major sources oflaw:
(1)

Founding treaties, especially the EC treaty subsequently amended by the
Amsterdam Treaty 1999 and the Nice Treaty 2003;

(2)

International agreements, especially those concluded by the Community
or by it and the Member States with third countries or international

the European Union. The Commission, Parliament, and Court remain institutions whose principal role
is within the European Community pillar."
577

/d. at 33.

578

Only the Council of European Union amounts to the institution of the EU. The Commission, the
Parliament and the Courts are all institutions of the EC system.

579

WEATHERILL, supra note 569, at 11-12.

580

/d. at 99.
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organizations, e.g., association agreements, cooperation agreements,
trade agreements, etc.;
(3)

Secondary legislation, which includes, but is not limited to the binding
legal instruments (regulations, directives and decisions) and the nonbinding legal instruments (resolutions, opinions), both adopted by the EU
council, the Parliament and/or the Commission pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of the founding treaties.

(4)

Case-law, mainly referring to decisions of the Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the European Communities, since
they both undertake to "ensure that Community law is respected in the
interpretation and implementation of the founding treaties."581

Among the above sources the founding treaties are referred to as the primary law of
the EC, and the other three categories are collectively regarded as the secondary law
of the EC. In addition, EC law is also supplemented by national legislation of the
Member States as enacted ''under regional direction" of the EC institutions, as well as
by national judicial decisions based upon advisory rulings from the ECJ. 582

With the emergence of EC law, the question inevitably arises regarding its supremacy
over the national law of Member States ("hierarchical status" of EC law), and,
subsequently, its direct effect under the domestic legal system of these Member States.
Without an explicit reference in any founding treaty of the EC, the issue was merely
left to European courts to resolve. 583 Through its long-standing practice dating from
the 1960s, notably in the case of Costa v ENEL (for the supremacy of Community

581

Europa- Eur-lex- Process and players (this is rom the official website of the EU institutions,

representing the official position of the EU, including their perspectives of the legal sources ofEUIEC
law), at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/droit communautaire/droit communautaire.thm.
582

FOLSOM, supra note

583

/d. at 77.

570, at 34-35.
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lawi 84 and of Van Gend en Loos (for the direct effect of Community law),

585

the

••

European Court of Justice (Court of Justice or, ECJ) has well established the
supremacy and direct effect of EC law.

According to the Court, both these

fundamental principles are implicitly contained in the EC Treaty, particularly in the
object of this treaty, since "it would be impossible to create the structure envisaged by
the [founding] Treaties unless the law is supreme and directly effective."

586

The supremacy principle has imposed a significant duty - as reviewable by the ECJ upon the Member States to repeal or amend any conflicting national law (even the

.'

national constitution). In practice, the ECJ has invalidated numerous national laws as
in conflict with EC law. 587 The principle of direct effect, on the other hand, is
observed "in many ways" as "an application of the principle of the supremacy of

Q

If

Community law over conflicting national law," under which relevant provisions or
measures stemming from EC law "are capable of generating legal rights" for
individuals "to enforce against their government" before their national courts and
tribunals. 588 Moreover, from the perspective of the internal EC legal order, the direct
effect of these EC provisions or measures refers to their ability to generate legal rights
for individuals to enforce against the activities of European institutions, mostly before
the European courts.

This is particularly the case with international agreements

concluded by the Community with the third countries or international organizations.

In both these connections, the principle of direct effect aims at the invocability of the
EC provisions or measures at issue.

Originally, the Court of Justice applied the principle of direct effect only to provisions
of the EC founding treaties. Now, the doctrine is extended to cover various secondary
584

Costa v. ENEL, supra note 574.

585

Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Asministratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.

586

WEATIIERILL, supra note 569, at 99.
FOLSOM, supra note 570, at 78.
588
Ruttley, MacVay & George eds., supra note 274, at 132-134.
587
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laws of the EC, including directives, regulations, decisions and certain types of

II

international agreements, with certain conditions imposed that are developed by the
European Courts. 589 These criteria for direct effect concern the "legal perfect" of the
EC provisions and measures at issue, requiring them to be "clear, unconditional,
clearly intended to benefit individuals, and independent of further Member State
implementing action."

International agreements are the so-called "external relations agreements" within the
Community legal order, falling within the category of the secondary laws of the EC.
According to Article 300(7) of the EC Treaty, they "shall be binding on the
institutions of the Community and on Member states." 590 This provision actually
reflects the general principle of pacta sunt servanda, mandating both the Community

r
If

I

and Member States to be bound internationally by their commitments under these

~

agreements. However, the EC founding treaties keep silence on the "direct effect" of

I
I

these agreements within the internal legal order of the Community, leaving the issue
to be addressed either by the individual agreement itself or, by the proper European
court.s9I

Under the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, external relations agreements
generally amount to acts of the EC institutions, and therefore form "an integral part of
Community law."592 This perspective indicates a strong tendency to grant the direct
effect to any international agreement so far as it is "duly concluded" in accordance
with the relevant founding treaty of the EC. 593 In practice, however, the European
Courts decide the issue (especially its invocable dimension) on a case-by-case basis,
589

/d. at 134-135.

590

Article 300(7) (ex 228) of the EC Treaty.

591

Ruttley, MacVay & George eds., supra note 274, at 132.

592

Case 181173, Haegernan v. Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 585, at 593.
Stefan Griller, Judicial Enforceability ofWTO Law in the European Union: Annotation to Case C-
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r

I

149196, Portugal v. Council, 3 J. INT'LECON. L. 441,442 {2000). Ff 4.
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weighing the extent to which the agreement concerned may satisfy the Courts' criteria
for direct effect (as noted above). In this context, the Courts have developed a twotier test. At the first tier, the Courts particularly assess the "nature, purpose and
economy" of the given international agreement as a whole, looking at the "wording,
objectives, the role of reciprocity" of the given agreement, and "the structure and
flexibility of its system, including the dispute settlement. " 594 Only when the given
agreement meets the required standards will the Courts embark on the second tier, 595
and similarly examine the "context, object and purpose" of the specific provisions at
issue. 596 1bis approach has been widely used by the Courts to determine the internal
legal effect of international trade agreements under the EC legal order. 597
)lll

I

A particular type of the EC's external relations agreements, "international trade

~

agreements" are multilateral agreements "on customs and trade policies concluded
with non-member countries, groups of non-member countries or within the
framework of international trade agreements,"598 at the core of which are the GATI
1947 and subsequently, WTO agreements. 599 Parallel to this category are two types of
regional trade agreements, namely, "association agreements" and "cooperation
agreements," both of which involve regional economic cooperation of the Community
"with the overseas countries and territories" in general and in specific. 600 Within the

594

Naboth van den Broelc, Legal Persuasion, Political Realism, and Legitimacy: the European Court's

Recent Treatment ofthe Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L.411-413
(2001).
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Griller, supra note 593, at 444-445.
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Broek, supra note 594, at 412.

597

Ruttley, MacVay & George eds., supra note 76, at 132. For example, in an early case on the denial

of direct effect of GAIT provisions (International Fruits), the ECJ took into account the "purpose,
spirit, general themes and terms" ofthe GAIT provisions.
598

Europa- Eur-lex- Process and Players, See: htto://europa.eu.int/eur-

lex!lex/en!droit communautaire/droit communautaire.htm, at p.4.
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FOLSOM, supra note 570, at 281-285. With regard to WfO agreements, distinction has been drawn

between the GAIT as concluded exclusively by the Community, and the "mixed agreements" (GATS
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Community legal order, the legal effect of regional and international trade agreements
is mostly of the discretion of the European courts. The Courts, in a long line of their
cases, have treated these two categories of trade treaties differently, especially in
terms of the potential for granting them direct effect.

As noted before, ever since the case of van Gend en Loos, the Court of Justice has
established the "direct effect'' and "invocability" of "programmatic EC norms." In a
subsequent case, Costa v ENEL, the Court further established the predominance of EC
law "over national law" based upon the doctrine of "primaute."

In further
I

developments in this regard, the Court has consistently granted the direct effect (effet

1!11
If}

utile) to regional trade agreements (particularly, EFTA Agreement and Associated

I

II
~

Agreements). This practice has, by allowing individuals to invoke these regional

;:

trade provisions before the European courts other than any existing international

i

tribunal, greatly enhanced the market access rights of foreign exporters into the
Cornrnunity.601

"
,j.

I

As for multilateral trade agreements, the European courts nevertheless present a "stark
contrast'' to the above practice towards the effet utile of regional trade agreements. 602
,i

During the GATT era, the Court of Justice consistently denied the direct effect of

I

I

I

GATT provisions within the EC legal order. The Court originally introduced this
position in the case of International Fruit Company in early the 1970s.603 Due to this
landmark case, the GATT 1947 was "an integral part of the Community legal system"
and binding on the EC, but was incapable of conferring rights on private parties
before national courts. 604 This reasoning was reaffirmed by the Court in a number of

,·
601

Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, at102.

602

Jd.

603

EO joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruits Company v. Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit;

(1972) ECR 1219.
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Philip Ruttley, lain MacVay & Carol George eds., supra note 274, at 137.
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subsequent cases, notably in Germany v Council, 605 which developed two main
arguments for denying the direct effect of GATT 1947: (i) the GATT treaty was
considered to be "an instrument of negotiations rather than adjudication" that has
"great flexibility"; and (ii) provisions of the GATT were "not sufficiently precise for
the purpose of direct effect."606 As a result, the Court held that the GATT 1947 did
not meet the criteria for assessing the legality of EC law.

!'
I'

Meanwhile, however, the Court of Justice also developed two major exceptions to its

I

I'

general position of denying the direct effect of GATT rules. In Nakajima case, the
Court took recourse to the GATT rules on anti-dumping because the EC instrument at
issue sought to implement these GATT rules.

607

This "Nakajima exception" is also

..
Ill

termed as the "principle of implementation" for the direct effect ofGATT/WTO treaty
law. In Fediol, since the contested EC legislation- the 1984 ''New Instrument" (now

I

'It

the "Trade Barrier Regulation") for assessing the trade practice of the EC's trading
I•

partners - explicitly referred to the GATT rules for interpretation, the Court took
recourse to those rules for interpretation purposes. 608 This "Fediol exception" is also

~j

jl

I!

termed the "principle of interpretation" for the direct effect of GATT/WTO treaty
law. 609 In a subsequent case, Commission v Germany, the Court construed "in great
detail" the GATT International Dairy Arrangement for assessing the legality of the
contested national measure of a Member State, based upon the above exceptions. 610

With the advent of the WTO, the GATT 1947 is incorporated into WTO agreements.
In considering WTO treaty provisions under the EC legal order, the European courts
have continued their practice of the GATT era. This will be elaborated in succeeding
discussions.
60

s Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council, 1994 C.E.R. 1-4737.
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The Internal Legal Effect of WTO Agreements as Specified by the EC
Treaty-making Institutions

On January 1st, 1995, both the European Communities (EC) and 15 Member States

joined the WTO, and have adhered to WTO agreements ever since. 611 As noted
before, WTO agreements are at the core of"international trade agreements," the latter
of which fall into the EC's broad category of external trade law governing the EC's
external commercial relations, and particularly concerning its "common commercial
policies." 612 Since WTO agreements are essential parts of the EC's international
agreements, their internal legal effect under the EC legal order is mainly left to the

Ill

ill

~

~'

discretion of the European Courts. From the outset, however, it is vital - if not

f

•.

I!.

..,,

mandatory -to take into account the intent of the EC treaty makers in this regard.

oQI

For most international trade agreements, their treaty-making procedures are generally
set forth in Article 300 of the Treaty of Rome. According to this provision, it is the
EC Commission that undertakes to propose and then receive authorization from the
EC Council to open negotiations with third countries or international organizations; it
is in turn the Council that, based upon the "tentative agreement" reached by the
Commission, undertakes to conclude or ratify this agreement after consulting the
•t

Parliament. In this treaty-making process, the EC Council plays a determinant role
through its voting system; the latter has been further consolidated by the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) since November, 1993. 613 Also, under the TEU, the EC
Council is renamed the "Council of the European Union" (EU Council), and becomes
611

..
Today, with the growth of the European Union, Member States of the EU have reached 25, all of

I

which are WTO Members in their own rights. Given its "incomplete" legal order, the EU in itself has
not yet qualified the membership of the WTO. Still, it is the EC, as an integral legal order, that plays
the role within the WTO, especially in terms of its treaty-making authority. In this sense, when the
WTO affaires are involved, it is not the EU but the EC that should be referred to.
612
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FOLSOM, supra note 570, at 262-263.
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"the only institution which is in any significant sense an institution of the whole
Union." Nevertheless, treaty-making is by no means the domain of the EU, since

..,

,,j'

other EC institutions (especially the Commission and the Parliament) have retained
their principal role within the Community legal order. 614 lbis may be among the
major "legal reasons" for the EU to be "officially regarded as the EC" in regards to
WTO affairs, since this set of treaty-making procedures equally applied to WTO
agreements.

During the negotiation and conclusion of the WTO agreements, the EC treaty-making
institutions expressly indicated their intent to reject the direct effect of these
comprehensive trade treaties, with far-reaching impacts. In the EC Council Decision
94/800 on the Conclusion of the WTO Agreement, the EC Council, "concerning the
conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its
competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral
negotiations," asserted that "by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly
invoked in Community or Member State courts." 615 The rational behind the EC
Council's above position was revealed by the EC Commission in its Explanatory
Memorandum to draft the above Council Decision as follows:
"[I]t is important for the

wro Agreements and its annexes not to have direct effect, that

is on whereby private individuals who are natural or legal persons could invoke it under
national law. It is always known that the US and many other of our trading partners will
explicitly rule out any such direct effect.

Without an express stipulation of such

exclusion in the Community instrument of adoption, a major imbalance would arise in
the actual management of the obligations of the Community and other countries."

616

As noted before, "council decisions" are secondary legislation of EC law. In contrast,
614

WEATHERILL, supra note 569, at 10.
Official Journal, L 336/2 of23 December 1994.
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Philip Ruttley, lain MacVay & Carol George eds., supra note 274, at 145.
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WTO agreements are the "integral part of the Community legal system" due to Article
228:7 of the EC Treaty, and thus have "the higher legal ranking" than the former. As
a result, it has been widely recognized that the 941800 EC Council Decision, in terms
of its intent to control the internal effect of WTO agreements, may not bind the EC
court and national courts of Member States.617 According to the unanimous viewpoint
of academic and practical circles, the Council Decision in itself can neither "limit the
effect of an agreement, that the agreement's text is its primary source of
interpretation," nor "limit the Court's competence to apply Community agreements"
given its legal status as "secondary legislation."618 To some scholars, this Council
Decision is even just "a unilateral ad ex post facto declaration" and "can not ... alter

.•
I'' f

~·

the legal characters of its acts" which "only the ECJ is competent to decide." In other

-I~

a:.

words, it is "no more than an expression of [the Council's] potential wishes, rather

tJ
·=

......
.......
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than having any legal force." 619

_..
~
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In practice, the 94/800 EC Council Decision serves only as a persuasive source for the

·~

European courts (as well as national courts of Member States) to determine the
internal/domestic legal effect of WTO agreements, although such persuasiveness can

I•

~
...:>:-

~~~

6.-

..

be decisive in the mind of these courts. In general, the European courts are more

r,.;._
.,

...."'•

likely to take into account the Council's position, together with all factors possibly
covered, and fmally make their own decisions on a case-by-case basis. 620 This is
particularly the case with the ECJ case law in Portugal v Counci/, 621 where the Court
only refers to the 94/800 Council Decision in the sense that this decision "correspond
with" the conclusion having reached by the Court on denying Portugal "the possibility
of relying on WTO agreements to control the legality of the Community acts." 622
617

PETERSMANN,supra note 371, at 121.
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Marta Pertegas Sender & K. U. Leuven, Case Law: Paifums Christian Dior v. Tuk Consultancy,
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and Assco Geruster v. Layher, Joined Cases C-300/98 & C-392/98, 2000 E.C.R., 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
385,415 (Fall2001).
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620

/d. at 145-146.

621

Case C-280/93, Republic of Portugal v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4737.
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The position of the EC Council (and therefore, the EC Commission) of excluding the
direct effect of WTO agreements appears more to be a matter of "political
considerations" 623 than that of "legal concerns" (e.g., justiciability).

From the

perspective of the proponents of the direct effect of multilateral trade commitments,
the position of the EC treaty-making institutions is not only at odds with some WTO
treaty requirements in this regard (e.g. Article 42 of TRIPS), but also manifests the
tendency of "periodically elected politicians and government bureaucracies" to
maximize their own powers over the equal rights and welfare of domestic citizens,

,,
I

and thus confirms "the correctness of the assumption of public choice and
constitutional theories in a regretted way." 624

However, from the viewpoint of this author, the above commentary goes to the
extreme.

First, it remains unclear that the WTO treaty regime has explicitly

recognized the direct effect of WTO agreements as a whole or in part. Even some

•'I

I

WTO provisions do recognize such effect (such like Article 42 of TRIPS as noted
above), they should not bind the EC and its Member Sates internally (within the
Community legal order), considering their legal nature as nothing more than
international law obligations. Second, motives of the EC decision makers to reject
direct enforcement of WTO agreements can be diverse and interactive towards each
other, just the way in which a simple outcome may derive from a complex of factors.
In this context, we may face more questions than answers. 'If, as claimed above, the

"evil" motives of politicians and government bureaucracies are not forgivable, what if
the political concerns about "sovereignty" of Member States of the EC or, about
"reciprocity" for the Community? The issue has been open to ongoing, heated debate,

,I

towards which this author will provide some further reflections in the succeeding

l

l

discussions.

623

Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, atl06.

624

PETERSMANN,supra note 371, at 121.
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Legal Treatment of WTO Law before the European Courts

1. Role ofthe European Courts in the Context ofWTO Law

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of First Instance (CFI) are judicial
institutions of the European communities, collectively referred to as the "European
courts." It is observed that "the Community legal order grew and developed mainly at
the hands of the Community judges. " 625 The European courts play a significant role
in the growth and development of EC law, as either the legislator or the adjudicator
within the Community legal order.

I

J

J

.....

In the "earliest years" of the EC, the Court of Justice was already "a powerful law

, I_

maker'' based upon "the open-ended constitutional language of the Treaty of Rome."

l

This law-making role is evident in the Court's recognition of "general principles of

...

law," e.g., a right of legitimate expectation, a right to be heard, legal certainty, etc.626
More significantly, given the fact that Community law in its substance directly affects
individuals, the Court has developed a substantial body of "general principles of
community law" for protecting individual rights, which, including proportionality and

I

I

fundamental rights, are independent of explicit supports from the EC founding
treaties. 627 It should be noted that all above recognized or articulated principles by the
Court "are a higher source of law capable of overriding legal acts of the
Community. " 628

As the adjudicator of the EC, the European courts are, according to Article 220 of the

625

WEATiffiRILL, supra note 569, at 33.

626

FOLSOM, supra note 570, at 71.

627

WEATHERll..L, supra note 569, at 71.

628

FOLSOM, supra note 570, at 73.
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EC treaty, obligated to ensure that Community law is respected in the interpretation
and implementation of the EC founding treaties. 629 To this end, the Courts maintain
wide jurisdiction to hear various actions. Specifically, the ECJ has competence, inter

l,,

alia, to rule on:

(i)

Applications for annulment;

(ii)

Actions for failure to act brought by a Member State or an institution;

(iii)

Action against Member States for failure to fulfill obligations;

(iv)

Reference for a preliminary ruling; and

(v)

Appeals against decisions of the CFI. 630

Created in 1989, the CFI is an independent court attached to the ECJ, instituting "a
judicial system based on two levels of jurisdictions." This means all cases heard in
the first instance by the CFI may be subject to a right of appeal to the ECJ "on points
of law only."

With some exceptions, the CFI's jurisdiction mainly covers the

following "direct actions" brought by individuals and the Member States:

'·

(i)

Actions for annulment (against acts of the Community institutions);

(ii)

Actions for failure to act (against inaction by the Community institutions);

(iii)

Actions for damages (for the reparation of damage caused by unlawful
conduct on the part of a Community institution);

(iv)

Action based on an arbitration clause. 631
"r

In exercising their jurisdictions, the CFI and the ECJ generally have the task of

II
I

reviewing the legality of the contested legal acts of the Community institutions or the
Member States. This appears to be the question of law. In this context, the Courts

629

European Commission, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-

lexllex/enldroit communautaire/droit communautaire.thm.
630

European Court of Justice, at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/cje.htm.

631

Court of First Instance, at http://curia.eu.int/enlinstit/presentationfr/toi.htm.
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will perform their interpretative function, referring to various sources of EC law. 632
As a result, the Courts will inevitably face the "hierarchical status" of international
agreements, vis-a-vis the acts of the EC institutions or, national law of the Member
States under the Community legal order. The issue is more likely to arise in direct
actions before the CFI for annulment or damages against the EC institutions, or
appeals of them and the reference for preliminary rulings before the ECJ, than other
actions brought therein. As noted before, none of the founding treaties of the EC
explicitly refers to this issue, leaving it to the discretion of the European courts. 633
The Courts (especially the ECJ) in turn have developed the doctrines of "supremacy"
and "direct effect," both serving as the "twin pillars" of the Courts' "integrationist
jurisprudence" for the evolving EU System. 634

As the major part of the EC's international trade agreements, WTO agreements
inevitably encounter all of the above situations. According to some scholars, "[ s]ince
its early, originally controversial case law, the ECJ has consistently claimed the
authority to interpret GATT law and now the WTO law." And, "in theory, the ECJ has
the last word in interpreting WTO law for the purpose ofEC law."635 In this context,
the focus of the Courts is not limited to WTO treaty provisions, but extends to the
decisions of the WTO tribunal, namely, "binding" reports of WTO panels and the
Appellate Body as adopted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 636 Hence,
the succeeding discussions will elaborate the Courts' jurisprudence on internal legal
effects of WTO law, including both WTO agreements and WTO decisions, under the
EC legal order.

632

WEATHERlll.., supra note 569, at 33. This concerns the regular role of the courts as a general
jurisprudential issue.
633

FOLSOM, supra note 570, at 77.

634

/d. at 71.

635

Francis Snyder, The European Courts and WTO Law: with Special Reference to Antidumping,
unpublished manuscript on file with the author, p.4.
636
This is different from the case of the U.S., in which the U.S. authories focus on the reports ofWTO
panels and the Appellate Body, regardless of their adoption by the WTO's DSB.
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2. EC Case Law on Internal Effect of WTO Agreements

From the perspective of the Court of Justice, international agreements concluded by
the Community- e.g., the GAIT 1947 and WTO agreements- are "an integral part of
the EC legal order," and is presumably "compatible with EC law."637 This, however,
does not necessarily lead to the direct effect of GAIT/WTO law, especially for the
purpose of reviewing the legality of Community legal acts. 638 In fact, the ECJ is
probably the "most aware of the liberalizing and powerful results of direct effect" than
any court of law of other jurisdictions, as is particularly evident in its treatment of
GAIT/WTO treaty rules.

.
-·..
....

As discussed before, during the GAIT era, the Court of Justice maintained a long-

Clll

standing practice of rejecting the direct effect of GAIT provisions and panel reports.
With the advent of the WTO in January 1995, the issue of the internal legal effect of
WTO agreements has been repeatedly raised before the European courts.639 As widely
acknowledged, these newly-established multilateral trade rules brought some
"fundamental changes" to the old GAIT regime which "could reasonably "invalidate"
the major arguments in prior case law for denying the direct effect of GAIT rules. 640

637

See, Snyder, supra note 635.
Dries Van Eeckhoutte, Case Law: Biotechnological Invention Case: Case C-337/98, Kingdom ofthe
Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council ofthe European Union, 2001 E.C.R. /-7079, 8
638

COLUM. J. EUR. L. 509 (2002).
639

'

Axel Desrnedt, ECJ restricts effect of WTO agreements in the EC legal order, 3 J. INT' L ECON. L.

191 (2000).
64

°Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, at 104. These "fundamental changes" are presented as follows:

"First, the traditional argument of vagueness loses creditability in light of (a) ... (b) an increasing
number of panel reports elaborated under judicial proceedings and providing specific guidance for
interpretation. Second, the major changes in dispute settlement, in particular the introduction of the
Appellate Body, cannot remain without an impact. Third, the qualification of GATS and TRIPS as
being mixed agreements, to be ratified both by the EU and the member states, raises the issue of
independent interpretation of and qualification of these agreements by national courts in their own
rights."
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For this reason, many expected the Courts to firmly reject this position towards GATT
rules, and become more open to the flexibility of granting direct effect to WTO
agreements.

641

So far, however, the responses of the European Courts have been a big disappointment
to the above public expectations.

Before the emergence of the landmark case,

Portugal v Council, 642 the Court of Justice had on many occasions already avoided the
crucial issues relating to the internal legal effect of WTO agreements in the European
context. 643

Particularly in Hermes, 644 although the Court claimed that it had

jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPS, it avoided ruling on the direct effect
of this WTO rule. According to the Court, it was not required to rule on the issue, but
to answer the question of interpretation submitted to it by the national courts, "so as to
enable that court to interpret Netherlands procedural rules in light of that article."645

In Portugal v Council, the Court of Justice for the first time expressly addressed the

legal effect of WTO law in Community law. In denying Portugal the potential for
WTO rules "controlling" the legality of Community legislation, the Court concluded
that "WTO agreements are not in principle amongst the rules in the light of which the
Court is to review the legality of the measures adopted by the Community
institutions."

This turned out to be the continuity of the Court's long-standing

practice towards GATT law, although the Court did acknowledge prior case law on
the "Nakajima exception" and "Fediol exception" to this general position.

Notably, the reasoning of the Portugal case was based upon (if not reiterating) the
ECJ's prior case law considering GATT law.
641
642
643

Having recognized the significant

See, Desmedt, supra note 639.
Portugal v. Council, supra note 621.
See, Desmedt, supra note 639. Ff 2.

644

Case-53/96, Hermes IntemationaJ and FHT Marketing Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3603.
G. A. Desmedt, European Court Rules on TRIPS Agreement, 1 No4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 679,681 (Dec.
1998).
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distinction between WTO treaty law and the GATT 1947, the Court held that WTO
rules still "accord considerable weight to the negotiation between the parties."
Specifically, the Court emphasized the significant role of negotiations in redressing
WTO-inconsistent measures (e.g., withdrawal of inconsistent measures, compensation,
etc.). As the Court observed, "to require the judicial organs to restrain from applying
the rules of domestic law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would
have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs of the
contracting parties of the possibility afforded by Article 22 of that memorandum of
entering into negotiated agreements even on a temporary basis. " 646

Besides, the ECJ base its reasoning on the principle of "reciprocity," especially
referring to the Kupferberg case,

647

where the absence of reciprocity in the

implementation of a free trade agreement (FTA) between the EEC and Portugal did
not by itself prevent the Court from granting direct effect to the provisions of this
FTA. 648 The Court rejected applying the "Kupferberg doctrine" 649 to the present case
due to "the distinctive feature of the WTO system" from directly applicable treaties
within the EC legal order. 650 The Court observed its counterparts in most important
WTO members have refused to recognize the WTO agreements as directly applicable
and invocable, and argued that its adherence to the opposite practice may lead to a
diverging application of WTO rules, and thus "deprive the legislative and executive
organs of the Communities of the manoeuvrability enjoyed by the other WTO
members during the negotiations."651

Beginning with the Portugal case, the European courts have consistently affirmed

646

Eeckhoutte, supra note 638, at 519.

647

Case 104/81, "Kupferberg," 1982 E.C.R. 3641.

648

Eeckhoutte, supra note 638, at 514.

649

This means, "absence of reciprocity in the granting of direct effect or applicability is not in itself

enough to result in the absence of reciprocity in the performance of the treaty obligations."
6

so Sender & Leuen, supra note 618, at 414-415.

6 1

s Eeckhoutte, supra note 638, at 519.
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their position of rejecting the direct effect of WTO agreements while sustaining the
''Nakajima /Fediol exceptions." On the one hand, the Courts have repeatedly adhered
to the Portugal doctrine in subsequent cases. Particularly in the case of OGT, 652 the
Court of Justice addressed the question as to whether an individual may rely on the
provisions of the GATT 1994 to challenge an EC regulation. As the Court ruled, "the
answer to that question may be deduced from existing case-law, so that it is
appropriate for the Court ... to give its decision by reasoned order." In this context,
the "existing case-law" essentially referred to the Portugal case law. 653

From the other hand, the European courts continue to apply the "Nakajima /Fediol
exceptions."

-

In Netherlands v Parliament and Council (or, "Biotechnological

C)

invention case"), 654 the Court of Justice held WTO agreements (such like 1RIPS and

IQ

TBT) as being "in principle not invocable to review the legality of an EC act," but

~~

-

meanwhile recognized their invocability "for two considerations." First, the Dutch
plea "should be understood as being directed at the perceived obligation imposed on
Member States to breach their individual obligations under international law," and
second, the contested Community measure (Biotechnological Invention Directive)
"claims not to affect those obligations under internationallaw."655 In this particular

""".J

connection, although the Court did not explicitly refer to the "Nakajima/Fediol

··~

'0

exceptions," many have taken this case as "an example" of above exceptions
especially in sense of the "principle ofimplementation." 656

In addition to the Portugal doctrine, the European courts have developed their

r

jurisprudence on the internal effect of WTO agreements in other respects. In Dior v

1

i.
I

1
I
652

Case C-307 /99, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen
(Fruchthandelsgesellschaft), 2001 E.C.R. 1-3159.

653

I

Eeckhoutte, supra note 638, at 520.

654

Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the European
Union, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079.

655
656

Eeckhoutte, supra note 638, at 526.
/d. at 528.

227

I

Tuk, 651 the Court of Justice addressed the issue of "mixed agreements" in the context

of TRIPS, which leads to the "division of competence between the EC and its member
states," and therefore indicates a potential for individuals directly relying on Article
50 of TRIPS (procedural provision) before national courts of the Member States.658
Other than the GAIT, both TRIPS and the GATS are "mixed agreements" - as ratified
by the EC and its Member States in accordance with Advisory Opinion I/94 of the
ECJ. This type of agreement falls "partly within the competence of the European
courts and partly within that of the Member states," leading to a "division of
competence" 659 that opens the possibility for national courts to have "independent
interpretation and qualification of these agreements in their own rights." 660

Regardless of above concern, the Court in Dior v Tuk still affirmed its Portugal
doctrine, concluding that "the provisions of TRIPS, an annex to the WTO Agreement,
are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the
courts by virtue of Community law." As for the "opening for direct effect'' of WTO
agreements, some scholars assert it "will be gradually closed again, whenever the
Community extends its legislative activities to the areas covered by the mixed
agreements of the WTO, such like the TRIPS and GATS.'.6 61 However, until this is
achieved, there will always be the potential European courts to be influenced by their
counterparts in Member States of the EU.

On the contrary, it is not entirely clear to what extent the judicial policy of the

European courts will bind the Member States of the EU. The practice of Member
States appears to be diverse, but also remains "controversial and far from being
uniformly settled.'' In a British case Lenzing AG, the judge gives considerable weight
651

Joined Cases C-300/98 & C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk Consultancy BV, 2000

E.C.R. I-11307.
658

Broek, supra note 594, at 416.

659

For the definition and origin, see Sender & Leuven, supra note 618, at 416.
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°Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, at 104.
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Sender & Leuven, supra note 618, at 415-416.
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to Community law (concerning the issue of "reciprocity") in denying the direct effect
of TRIPS. 662 In contrast, the German government has "partly acknowledged direct
effect of substantive standards of the TRIPS Agreement." The result is a potential
conflict between the consistently rejecting position of the European courts, with an
increasing tendency of national judiciaries of Member States to allow direct
enforceability of WTO treaty provisions. This has raised the concerns for a potential
of "turmoil" under the EC legal order - by the "cons" of direct effect, 663 and the
concerns for the "WTO's consistency"- by the "pros" of direct effect. 664

From an overall perspective, it seems very unlikely that in the foreseeable future, the
European courts will make a breakthrough to their long line of case law on internal
effect of WTO agreements. As noted before, the Courts' negative position towards
the direct effect ofWTO agreements (and WTO law) is linked to that of the Council,
the Commission. More significantly, dual membership of the EC and its Member
States in the WTO has complicated the situation, which contributes to an increasing
acknowledgement that "WTO law, as interpreted by the European courts, has so far

....

tended to foster tighter relations between the EC and the Member States" and is

~,.

-;

beginning to "reshape the distribution of power'' between them. 665

.,.

I _;.

In discussions so far, the EC case law on internal legal effect of WTO agreements
consists of two parts: the Courts' general position of denying direct effect (and
therefore the "invocability") ofWTO agreements and, the courts' limited flexibility of
granting "other legal effects" to WTO treaty provisions, 666 the latter mainly refer to
the "Nakajima/Fediol exceptions" to the above general position, which "may be
termed as the principle of implementation."
662

In this context, it should be noted that

R v Comptroller of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks ex parte Lenzing AG v. Courtauld (Fibres)

Ltd and others, 1996 R.P.C. 245 at 31.
663

Cottier & Schefer, supra note 328, at 104-105.
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/d. at 99-100.
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Snyder, supra note 635, at 1.
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Eeckhout, supra note 311, at 91-110.
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the application of the "consistent interpretation" doctrine may also lead to "other legal
effects" of WTO agreements under the Community legal order, although the situation
is different from the Nakajima/Fediol exceptions in the sense that latter may live on in
a conflict between an act of the Community institutions and a WTO treaty provision,
while such a conflict would not be allowed for purposes of consistent
interpretation. 667 Considering the courts' rejecting position in general, "other legal
effects" become crucial to enhancing the effectiveness of WTO law, including WTO
agreements.

3. EC Case Law on Internal Effect of WTO Decisions

In recent years, the internal legal effect of the results of WTO dispute settlement
process under the EC legal order received increasing attention within and without the

.........
.:1

""

Community, which raised the particular issue of the force of res judicata of these
WTO decisions (panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by WTO Dispute
Settlement Body) in Community law. 668 The European courts' response to this issue
remains "a novelty" in EC case law, and represents the extension of the European
courts' jurisprudence on the internal legal effect ofWTO agreements. As the Court of
Justice observed in Potugal v Council, the DSU-based WTO dispute settlement
process does not in itself obligate the Community to implement WTO rulings by
granting them direct effect. Neither does the WTO regime imply a possibility of
doing so automatically. 669 The issue is therefore left to the discretion of the proper
Community institution, which, as discussed above, refers to the European courts.

In the early 1990s, the Court of Justice addressed the res judicata effects of
international judicial decisions in Community law, which decisions were rendered by
the tribunal/court of an international agreement concluded by the Community. In
667
668
669

/d. at 104-105.
Zonnekkeyn, supra note 400, at 604.
Griller, supra note 593, at 441.
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1991, the ECJ delivered an opinion (Opinion 1191) before the conclusion of the draft
agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) between the Member States of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA},

670

where it especially noted the

compatibility of the EEA's "judicial supervisions" with the EC Treaty, and specifically,
the compatibility of the role between the "EEA court" and the ECJ within the
Community legal order. At the outset, the ECJ declared the "incompatibility" in this

I

context in general terms, especially expressing the concern about a risk of inconsistent
interpretations by the EEA Court of the EEA provisions, with those by the ECJ itself

t

I

I..

in their analogies with the EC Treaty. 671

~

Meanwhile, however, the ECJ still admitted the binding force of the EEA judicial
rulings "under certain conditions." Having recalled its case law on the binding effect
of international agreements concluded by the EC, and on its own jurisdiction to
interpret these agreements, the Court held:
[W]here, however, an international agreement provides for its own system of courts, ...

(

a:
~
1:....
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the decision of that court will be binding on the Community institutions, including the
Court of Justice. These decisions will also be binding in the event the Court of Justice is
called upon to rule, by way of a preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the
interpretations of the international agreement, in so far as that agreement is an integral

I
•

part of the Community legal order. An international agreement providing for such a
system is in principle compatible with Community law. The Community's competence
in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international
agreements necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is
created or designated by such an agreement as regards interpretation and application of
its provisions." 672

670

Opinion /91, Draft agreement re1atingto the creation of the European Economic Area, [1991] ECR

1-6079.
671
Zonnekkeyn, supra note 400, at 605.
672

/d. at 605-606.
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According to the above rulings, judicial decisions of the EEA court would be binding
upon the ECJ, since the EEA appeared to be "an integral part of the Community legal
order." Moreover, the Court implied that the binding character of a judicial decision
of the above kind "does not depend on the direct effect'' of the EEA and the like, not
to mention that the EEA did not have direct effect. 673 Concerning its nature, Opinion

1191 was nothing more than a judicial policy of the ECJ, towards a draft regional trade
agreement of which the binding nature remained unsettled at the time. Even though
the binding force of this agreement is secured, it would not change the "policyoriented" nature of Opinion 1191; the latter by no means amounts to EC case law so as
to control the results of subsequent cases of the ECJ. Also, it remains unclear whether
the ECJ's position of granting direct effect to international judicial decisions - as
articulated in Opinion 1/91 - was determined upon the quality of the international
tribunal concerned. In this context, the ECJ focused its attention on the relationship
between the given international agreement (e.g., the EEA) and the EC legal order, and
further, the nature of the given international agreement (e.g., regional agreement in
the case of the EEA).

Due to the above observations, the reasoning of Opinion 1/91 appears to be
inapplicable to WTO decisions, given the legal nature of the Opinion as a non-binding,
persuasive judicial policy of the EC, as well as WTO agreements being multilateral
(other than regional) in nature.

However, other observations - especially in the

context of the "judicial nature" of the WTO tribunal and its predecessor (GATf panels)
- support the application of the Opinion 1/91 to WTO decisions.

From their

perspectives, if, being not a "court-like" but a "conciliatory" international
adjudicating body, the GATT panels could have rejected the applicability of the
Opinion, and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) should merit such application,
since the DSB "is now far more judicial in nature" and, WTO agreements are an "an
673

/d.
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integral part of the Community legal order." 674 As mentioned above, the Opinion
itself did not base its applicability upon the extent of the judicial nature of the
international adjudicating body concerned. Even if it is the case, the European courts
have consistently rejected granting WTO decisions the same effect as Opinion 1/91
proposed. This is evident in the EC case law as elaborated below.

EC case law on internal effect of WTO decisions is mainly concerned with the DSB
rulings on the "EC banana regime" and the "EC beef hormone regime," and also with
the implementation of these decisions within the WTO. The first case is the ECJ
decision in Atlanta, 675 where a private action was brought against Council Regulation
404/93 (the "old EC banana regime") on December 11, 1996,676 on the ground of the

adopted report of WTO Appellate Body of 27 September 1997. 677

The Court

dismissed Atlanta's claim for damages caused by the WTO-incompatibility of th~ EC
banana regime "on procedural grounds." According to the Court, the given Appellate
Report, taken after the appeal had been brought, was "inescapably and directly linked

to" the plea of infringement of the GATT rules." Although that plea had been raised
before the Court of First Instance (CFI), the applicant failed to repeat it on appeal.
The Court therefore refused to examine the substance of that plea. 678 Fallowing
Atlanta case, the CFI ruled on another case concerning the same cause of action. In
Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH Chemnitz v Commission, 679 the Court also rejected

the petitioners' arguments, but based on different reasoning that the EC "had already
amended its regulation, bringing it into compliance with the DSB rulings."
674

/d. at 606-607.
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Case C-104/97 P, Atlanta AG v. Commission and Council, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6983, 7024.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the
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market in bananas, OJ. L 47/1 of25 February 1993.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Incorporation, Sale and
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Distribution ofBananas, WT/DS27/ABIR (September 9, 1997).
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Geert A. Zonnekeyn, Notes, Comments and Developments- EC Liability for Non-implementation of

WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions- Are the Dice Cast? 7 J.INT'L ECON. L. 487- 488 {2004).
Case T-254/97, Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH Chemnitz v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2743,
2755.
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In 2001, the European courts successively ruled on four more "banana cases." Three
of them were handled by the CFI, respectively, Cordis v Commission (Cordis), 680
Bocchi Food Trade International v Commission ("Bocchi'')

681

and T. Port v

Commission ("T. Port''). 682 They were collectively termed "quota damage cases.'.6 83
The last one was handled by the ECJ, namely, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH
Chemnitz v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen ("OGT'). 684 Unlike the two previous
cases that targeted the EC's "old banana regime" (Council Regulation 404/93) related
to the adopted Appellate Body report of 27 September 1997, the three CFI cases
targeted the EC's subsequent legislative efforts to implement not only that Appellate
Body report, but also the adopted WTO panel report of 22 May 1997, both directed at
the "old banana regime." 685 These legislative efforts turned to be the "EC's new
banana

regime,"

686

specifically

as

Council

Regulations

No.163 7198

and

No.2362/98. 687

These three "quota damage cases" have the similar factual backgrounds to each other.
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Marc Weisberg, The Application ofPortugal v. Council: the Banana Cases, 12 DUKE J. COMP. &
lNT'L L. 153, 154 (Winter 2002).
684

Case T-254/97, supra note 679.
Marc Weisberg, The Application ofPortugal v. Council: the Banana Cases, 12 DUKE J. COMP. &
lNT'L L. 153, 154 (Winter 2002).
686
Delphine De Mey, The Effect of WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings in the EC Legal Order: Reviewing
685

Van Parys v Belgische Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (C-377/02), 6 no6 GERMAN L. J. 1026 (2005).
The EC's "old banana regime" refers to "Council Regulation (EEC)No. 404/93 of 13 February of 1993
on the common organization of the market in bananas, OJ 1993, I 4711. The "new banana regime"
refers to a series of EC Regulations promulgated to amend the "old banana regime" for the
implementation of the corresponding WTO's DSB rulings, including the "amended regime" Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1673/98 of20 July 1998 amending Council Regulation (EEC)No. 404/93, OJ
1998, L 21 0/28; also, Commission Regulations No. 2362/98 (OJ 1998 L 293/32), No. 2806/98 (OJ
1998 L 349/32), No. 102/1999 (OJ 1999 L 11/16) and No. 608/1999 (OJ 1998 L 75/18) to further
implement this "amended regime."
687

Zonnekeyn, Dice Cast, supra note 678, at 488-490.

234

· ~

ICI
,_
· ~
I~
1--

The petitioners, dissatisfied with the annual quantities of banana allocated to them in
accordance with Council Regulation 2362/98, claimed damages caused by the
"inconformity" of that "new banana regime" with WTO rules and certain general
principles of EC law.

Particularly, the petitioners asserted that since the

incompatibility of the "old banana regime" with WTO law had been specified by the
WTO decisions, the res judicata force ofthese decisions led to the EC's "obligation of
conformity," which would preclude the Community institutions from adopting a
Regulation containing infringements of WTO law, even though that legislation was

purposed to implement the above EC's "obligation of conformity." In addition, the
petitioners also claimed damages caused by the misuse of power by the Commission
on other grounds. 688

The Court of First Instance denied these claims in all respects.

In rejecting the

allegation of "misuse of power," the Court held that the petitioners failed to establish
that the Commission's adoption of Council Regulation 2362/98 was for any purpose
other than the one it had stated, which was "to bring into effect the arrangement of
importing bananas into the EC introduced by the old banana regime." Regarding the
invocability of the WTO provisions as specified by the two WTO decisions at issue,
the Court first cited the Portugal case, concluding that since the WTO agreements are
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not in principle intended to confer rights on individuals, "the EC cannot incur noncontractual liability as a result of infringement ofthem."689

The CFI then referred to the Nakajima/Fediol exceptions, according to which WTO
rules will become directly applicable and invocable only when the Community
intends to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of WTO law, or
the Community measures concerned expressly refer to the precise provisions ofWTO
treaties. In this regard, the court ruled that neither of the two WTO decisions involved
had contained any specific obligation the Commission intended to implement in
688

/d. at 598-599 (2001).

689

/d.
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accordance with the "new banana regime" (Council Regulation 2362/98), since the
latter did not explicitly refer either to a specific obligation arising from the given
WTO decisions, or to a specific provision of any WTO agreement. 690

The fourth "banana case" was the ECJ's OGT case. Its factual grounds were different
from those of three "quota damage cases," but its reasoning followed that of the latter.
Originally, the petitioner ("OGT'') applied to German courts for the suspension of an
import duty imposed upon it under the "old banana regime" (Council Regulation
404/93). 691 During the court proceeding, a WTO panel report of the "EC-Banana-

Article 21.5 Panel" was adopted by the DSB, 692 ruling that the "EC new banana
regime" continued to infringe the WTO Agreement. The Germen courts then referred
the "OGT" to the Court of Justice, on a particular question as to whether the "OGT''
may rely on Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994, to challenge the validity of the
import duty imposed upon the "old banana regime." 693

The Court of Justice denied the direct effect of the above WTO provisions by citing
the Portugal, Diorffuk and other of its cases. Besides, the Court denied the res
judicata effect of the adopted panel report of the EC-Banana-Article 21.5 Panel.

Following the reasoning of the CFI's three quota damage cases with regard to
Nakajima/Fediol exceptions, the ECJ concluded that the "new banana regime" was

"not designed to ensure the implementation in the EC legal order of a particular
obligation assumed in the context of GATT, nor does it refer expressly to a specific
provision of GATT. " 694

After their issuance in 2001, the four "banana judgments" of the European courts
690
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were widely questioned and criticized, especially for the Courts' ignorance of the
Community's expressed intent - as evident in the "EC banana regimes" - to
implement its WTO obligations as specified by the WTO decisions concerned. Some
scholars even characterized the Courts' position as the "misjudgment'' of the
Nakajima doctrine. 695 Until then, the Courts based their exclusion of the res judiciata

force of WTO decisions under the EC legal order on previous case law for rejecting
the direct effect and the invocability of WTO agreements. Neither the ECJ nor the
CFI would regard WTO decisions as having more binding force than WTO
agreements. Also, in the four banana cases, each cause of action extended only to the
adoption stage of the WTO rulings at issue, without reaching the implementation of
these rulings by the WTO.

Obviously, for those who expected "further penetration of WTO law within the EC
legal order," the above banana line of case law did not give them much inspiration.
The situation had lasted until the Court of Justice ruled on the "EC beef hormone
regime" two years later, which seemingly brought some lights to the darkness. On 30
September 2003, the ECJ rendered two judgments on the Biret cases, where the Court
dismissed the claims of the petitioners, "Biret" and its subsidiary, for damages
suffered as the result of the EC's ban on the import of hormone treated beef. 696 The
ban was embodied by Council Directive 96/22/EC (also, "old hormone directive"),697
which, long before the Biret actions, had been declared by the WTO's DSB as
breaching several provisions of the WTO's SPS Agreement. 698 In that WTO ruling
(WTO's "beef hormone" decision), the WTO tribunal had requested the Community
to bring the SPS-inconsistent measures into conformity with the EC's particular WTO
69
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obligations,699 and granted the Community a grace period of 15 months (untill3 May
1999) for such implementation. It was not until 22 September 2003 - four years after
the expiration of the above grace period - that the Community came up with new
legislation to amend the "old hormone directive," which was Directive 2003/74/EC
(also, "new hormone directive").

After the enactment of this EC legislation, its

compatibility with the requirements of the WTO's beef hormone decision was
consistently questioned by other WTO members. 700

The Biret cases were initiated before the Court of First Instance in June 2000. The
CFI dismissed the petitioners' damage claims on grounds of well-established EC case
law rejecting the direct effect of WTO agreements. The petitioners appealed to the
Court of Justice on 16 March 2002.701 In that proceeding, the Advocate General (AG)
Albert proposed a "copernican annotation," suggesting the Community might be held
liable under EC law, for non-implementation of WTO decisions "within the
prescribed reasonable time" and for damages incurred accordingly.

In such a

circumstance, as AG Albert observed, the relevant provisions of WTO agreements
may become directly applicable and invocable by private parties to "trigger the
liability of the EC." 702 In this context, the AG Albert's analysis was consistent with
the previously discussed "intermediate position," and therefore raised many hopes for
the Courts' change in their position towards WTO law.

The ECJ refused to adopt AG Albert's proposal, but did so on clever grounds. In its
judgments, the Court first pointed out the "insufficient motivation" of the CFI rulings,
observing that the key issue of the two Biret cases was whether the WTO's beef
hormone decision put into question the Court's firmly-established case law denying
699
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the direct effect of WTO agreements, and, whether this WTO decision was capable of
providing grounds for a review of the legality of the contested "EC new hormone
directive."703 This clarification actually matched AG Albert's understanding of the
problem.

In its ruling, the Court determined that the WTO's beef hormone decision could not

lead to the Community's liability for non-implementation of this decision. The Court
based this holding on the factual ground that the alleged damages had occurred not
only before that WTO decision was adopted on 13 February 1998, but also before the
expiration date (13 May 1999) of the grace period granted to the Community to
implement that decision. In looking beyond the findings, the Court implied that the
claimed damages were based upon the effectiveness of the Community's obligation to
implement the WTO's beef hormone decision. Therefore, the Court did not reject the
proposal of AG Albert on any legal ground, but merely on specific factual grounds.
As the Court concluded, absent any damage Biret might have suffered from the EC's

failure to implement the particular WTO decision, it was not necessary for the Court
to consider what such damages would really be. The Court therefore upheld the
judgments of the CFI. 704

Here, the Court in the Biret cases simply dismissed the petitioners' claims on factual
grounds, avoiding the need to rule on whether the Community should be liable for the
alleged non-implementation of the WTO's beef hormone decision. This raised many
expectations that the Court may "leave the door half door'' for granting direct effect to
WTO law under the EC legal order. Particularly, the Court's silence in the Biret cases
on several crucial issues - heavily addressed in previous EC case law - inevitably led
to a presumption of the possibilities of breaking its previous holdings, not to mention
that the AG Albert had launched an official try in this regard in the present cases. As
some scholars asserted, since the Court did not explicitly rule on the question
703
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"whether the EC could be liable for measures that have been found to be WTO

I

I

:I
I

incompatible, if the damages had arisen subsequent to the period within which the EC
should have implemented the DSB decision," the court should not exclude a
possibility for itself doing so. They also observed that unlike its previous practice, the
Court did not apply the reciprocity principle to the Biret cases.705 Considering the
significant role of this reciprocity principle in shaping the previous EC case law on
denying the direct effect of WTO agreements, its absence in the Biret case law could
suggest that the Court may depart from its long-standing practice in the future.

Two recently rendered EC judicial decisions - adding to the Courts' inventory of
banana case law - have nevertheless squashed these over-optimistic hopes. In the
case of Afrikanische, 706 the CFI dismissed the claims of two banana importers for
alleged damages resulting from the "new EC banana regime." To this end, the Court
cited previous banana cases, especially adhering to its reasoning in three "quota
damages cases" and that of the ECJ in the case of OGT in the context of the
Nakajima/Fediol exceptions. In this particular connection, the Court ruled that the
petitioners failed to demonstrate that the "new banana regime" intended to implement
any WTO obligation imposed upon the Community. Nor did they establish that this
EC legislation had explicitly referred to any WTO obligation, either specified in a
particular WTO panel report, or in a decision for the adoption of this panel report. 707

The other case, Van Parys, 708 involved a similar factual background to that of the
previous case of OGT. In Van Parys, the Court of Justice affirmed its consistent
position of rejecting the res judiciata force of WTO decisions within the EC legal
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order, and thus largely filled "loophole" left in the Briet cases. 709 The case was
initiated by "Van Parys," a Belgian banana importer being denied an import license
based upon the "EC new banana regime." The petitioner challenged the lawfulness
of this EC measure by claiming that it had been ruled by the WTO tribunal as a
violation of WTO rules. In this sense, the petitioner implicitly called for the res
judiciata effect ofWTO decision within the Community legal order.

In ruling in Van Parys, the Court of Justice strictly followed its well-established
Portugal doctrine and Nakajima/Fediol exceptions. The Court first cited the Portugal

doctrine, especially in terms of the significant role of negotiations in defining the
nature of WTO law. It then further held: "requiring the Community courts to review
the legality of Community measures in the light of the WTO rules, on the sole ground
that the time-limit for implementation of the DSB decision has expired, could
undermine the Community's position in trying to reach a mutually acceptable and
WTO conforming solution to the dispute.'mo

Besides, the ECJ explicitly referred to the reciprocity principle omitted in the Biret
cases. As the Court noted, "it is known that some important commercial partners of
the Community have not recognized the WTO rules as rules applicable before their
courts when reviewing the legality of their rules of domestic law. The lack of
reciprocity, which results from this different point of view entails the risk of
introducing an 'anomaly' in the application ofWTO rules." 711 Finally, in reviewing
the circumstances in which the contested "EC banana regime" was amended and
subject to further negotiations, the Court denied the application of the
Nakajima/Fediol exceptions to these EC measures on similar grounds to those relied

on by the Courts in the previous banana line of case law, especially the three "quota
damage cases" and the case of OGT.
109
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Interestingly, the Advocate General in the Van Parys case adopted a less restrictive
stance than his colleague did in the Biret cases. As AG Tizzano asserted, "the
Community regime in question, after the expiry of the period granted to the
Community to bring its own legislation into conformity with the WTO rules, was
invalid because of its inconsistence with WTO rules." To this end, AG Tizzano
particularly acknowledged the applicability of the Nakajima exception to the WTO
decision concerned by interpreting this case law broadly? 12 Meanwhile, he rejected
the arguments of reciprocity by citing the opinion ofhis colleague (AG Albert) in the

..

Biret case.713 The Court also declined to follow his proposal in the end.

Discussions so far have revealed that the European courts take a firm position of
denying the res judicata force of WTO decisions, the same way they consistently

--....
CIS

refuse to grant direct effect to WTO agreements. From the perspective of this author,
it is not surprising that the EC courts take such a conservative attitude towards the
internal legal effect of WTO law.

Like their counterparts in many other WTO

members, the ECJ and CFI always intend to avoid disturbing the constitutional role of
other Community institutions within the current community and the growing
European Union. Despite their essential role in defining the internal effect of WTO
law, the European courts have been cautious about their judicial activism and present
more judicial restraint than their counterparts in other WTO members. Take, for
instance, the Briet case law. The silence of the Court of Justice on crucial issues
concerning the internal effect of WTO law may suggest the Court's intent to allow a
certain possibility of granting direct effect to WTO law, but this silence may also
suggest otherwise. The presumption can go either way, since the existing factual
circumstances of that case had constituted a sufficient ground to dismiss the
petitioners' claims, not to mention the Court's tendency to use its best efforts to avoid
these sensitive issues, which turns to be a matter of judicial strategy as this author
712

ld. at 1030-1031.

713

Id. at 1028, FT18.

242

,,.1

may understand it.

In contrast to the above comprehensive EC case law on the internal effect of WTO
decisions, during the GATT era, there was only one case, Durbeck, where the Court of
Justice had explicit referred to the GATT panel reports. In that case, the ECJ rejected
the petitioner's claim based, interestingly, upon the contents of that report as informed
by the Commission. In the future, we will witness more and more EC cases coming
out in this regard. In the long run, the attentions of the EC's WTO counterparts will
not stop at bananas and hormone-treated beef.

Thus, it is foreseeable that the

jurisprudence of the EC courts will not limit itself to the banana or beef hormone
lines of case law. So far, the Courts have consistently refused to grant direct effect to
WTO law.

By contrast, European scholars and practitioners have consistently

advocated an "intermediate position" of recognizing the res judicata force of WTO

I

I

I

I
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decisions. The current situation is as a scholar has claimed: "the dice has not yet been
cast!"714

714
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COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION

In the aggregate, both U.S. and the European Community authorities have always
tended to limit the effect of WTO law to the level of international responsibility, so as
to avoid threatening the predominance of their domestic (internal) law. Behind their
similar (if not identical) position rejecting the direct enforcement of WTO law, there
are several policy considerations in the context of political economy.715

First, the political economy of denying the direct effect ofWTO obligations reflects to
a large degree the predominant interests of producers in major trading powers like the
U.S. and EC, making unilateral granting of procedural rights and domestic
enforcement of WTO obligations the equivalent of a trade concession. From a purely
economic or individual rights perspective, this situation indicates the protectionism
position, in which the illegality is nevertheless justified somehow by the
"constitutional structural issues" addressed below. 716

Second, the direct effect of WTO obligations may have profound implications for
traditional allocations of the national (internal) constitutional powers of WTO
members, and therefore may impose a number of "constitutional structural problems"
upon them. This is particularly true for the U.S. as a sovereign nation state. As WTO
law reaches more and more deeply into U.S legal systems and directly affects the life
of individuals therein, self-execution ofWTO law will inevitably alter the distribution
of powers within the U.S. domestic governance.

Specifically, making WTO

obligations self-executing can be dangerous to U.S democracy, especially as this
avoids "democratic participation" in the treaty-making process for these trade
agreements. On the other hand, the direct effect ofWTO obligations may enhance not
only the power of private actors in foreign trade and economic relations, but also the
715
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power of domestic courts vis-a-vis rule-making authorities or the executive branch,
and thus give the courts a role neither judges nor the domestic constitutional
framework have well prepared for. Had it become true in the U.S., the Congress and
its constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce - which is "arguably the most
important foreign policy prerogative of the 21st century" - would inevitably be
damaged. 717

Third, the direct effect of WTO obligations may significantly impact on the external
economic relations and foreign policies of WTO members. Today, foreign policy and
economic policy of a country (and even a region) become increasingly
indistinguishable.

Being the multilateral legal framework for international trade,

....

E
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WTO law will inevitably affect the foreign policies of each WTO member, especially

·~

the U.S. in terms of its task of constitutional shifts as noted above. Under direct effect,

;;

national or regional courts may enhance their role in external economic relations, but
may also risk hindering foreign policy goals that can no longer be pursued by other
(e.g., military) means, or risk spurring a formal, or, most likely, informal retreat from
WTO membership.

Particularly, given the global responsibilities and potentially

extensive retaliatory powers they have, the U.S. and the EC depend heavily on
effective instruments of foreign (external) policy to negotiate and fulfill these
responsibilities. Therefore, the considerations of "a fair-playing field" in external
relations tum out to be paramount to both of these economic elites, as well as to other
major trading powers (e.g., China) inside the WTO. This especially explains why the
Community institutions always have the reciprocity concern in the context of WTO
implementation/enforcement, to which direct effect would appear to be a big
detriment. 718 The question merits some elaboration as follows.

Subject to the DSU-based WTO dispute settlement system, WTO members have a
primary obligation to redress their violations ofWTO obligations, as usually specified
717

/d.

718

/d. at 111-112.
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in an adopted panel or Appellate body report by the WTO's DSB. To this end, the
member concerned may offer adequate compensation through diplomatic negotiations,
until it is finally able to remove the violating measure. The impaired or nullified
member, on the other hand, may simply withdraw their trade concessions as a means
of cross-sanctions. This intermediate stage of granting temporary compensation and
accepting sanctions represents a distinguishing feature of the WTO enforcement
system - not available to any domestic enforcement mechanism of any WTO
member.719

Should direct effect be established, domestic courts would have to immediately

..

remedy the WTO inconsistency by invalidating the domestic law and practice
concerned, while the domestic legislator would be "practically obligated to take the
court's ruling into account" or "to pass a new law overriding the WTO provision in
the national context." In this sense, for a WTO member to grant direct effect to WTO
obligations almost means the unilateral waiver of rights to temporary compensation
and options for sanctions available under the WTO. Although the availability of
international redresses (such like those offered by the WTO) do not necessarily
exclude direct effect, the latter will doubtlessly trigger a reciprocity problem by
curtailing "the options for state conduct at international level" to "assure level playing
fields in trade policy." As discussed before, EC case law has fully addressed this
concern, especially in terms of a potential for imbalanced powers among the major
Members of the WTO. Considering a fair-playing field for EC external relations,
none of the Community authorities is prepared to make WTO "have more bite at
home than abroad." 720 This is presumably the case with the U.S. and many other
WTO members as well.

Discussions so far have focused on the political economy of denying the direct effect
of WTO obligations, which may raise the question on how to find "appropriate rules
719
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coordinating political actions and judicial avenues in the WTO and/or unilaterally
within the members of the WTO."

On the other hand, considerations for such

rejection may focus on the nature and characteristics of the WTO legal order- from a
purely legal perspective. The jurisprudence of U.S. and the EC courts has contributed
greatly to this curse, especially by developing the concept of"justiciability."

For the above political economic and legal considerations, the U.S. and the EC have
been cautious towards the domestic/internal effect of WTO law; part of these
considerations has been strategic thinking to maximize the utmost effect of WTO law
abroad for fostering market access rights, while leaving the traditional constitutional
allocation of power at home as unimpaired as possible. 721

Nevertheless, this

consequence does not lead to the entire irrelevance of the WTO legal regime to the
internal law of WTO members.

The adoption of the "consistent interpretation"

doctrine by the European courts, and, the expanding application of the U.S. analogy
of this doctrine - the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation - by the U.S.
courts, has indicated the expansion of the effect of WTO law within the two
jurisdictions.

However, given the limitations imposed by the "consistent

interpretation" doctrine or the Charming Betsy canon upon the implementation of
WTO law, the effects ofWTO law under the U.S. legal system or the EC legal order
still remain primarily a matter ofU.S. domestic law or EC internal law.

It should be noted that despite their predominant roles within the WTO, neither the
U.S. nor the EC is in a position to impose its own practice on any other WTO
members. The practice of WTO members in implementing WTO law should, to a
large extent, be a matter of their internal affairs, which may differ from country to
country and region to region depending upon the particular constitutional and legal
system of each WTO member. However, since WTO law does not in itself provide
any clue for its domestic implementation, it is necessary for WTO members to

721
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develop certain unified, consistent standards or criteria for this purpose, so as to
secure the effectiveness of WTO in the domestic sphere of individual WTO Members.
In this context, the above political economic and legal considerations appear to be of
tremendous practical importance, as they would help reach a consensus among WTO
members on what to do about the direct effect ofWTO legal obligations, regardless of
their possibly diverging practice in this regard. This logic is explained in the next part
(Part IV), which concerns a study of domestic implementation of WTO law in a new
Member of this multilateral trading institution, the People's Republic of China.
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PART IV

DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO LAW: THE
CASE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CIDNA
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CHAPTER 1 CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO: HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW, SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC WTO
IMPLEMENTATION

China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is recognized as a
historical event in a broad context of world trade, multilateral trading system, as well
as today's international law and relations. 722 hnmediately after this accession became
effective on 11 December 2001, some authoritative commentaries claimed it as "the
most significant activity in the WTO's seven~year life so far." 723 The significance of
China's WTO accession stemmed first from the accession process, longest and most
arduous one on the WTO record. The significance also stemmed from the outcome of
that process, which, labeled as the "accession package," has so far been the most

-..
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complex of its kind under the WTO legal regime. Moreover, the significance lies in
the

far~reaching

impacts of China's WTO accession on China (as a new member), on

her trading partners (in terms ofbilateral trade relations), as well as on the WTO itself

A sound perception of these implications is conditioned by a

commonly shared proposition, that "the WTO cannot be truly effective without
embracing China as a member," given the country's largest population and "potential
to be the largest economy" in the world. 724 Equally, given its increasing importance
in the world trade, China's implementation of WTO obligations, mostly in domestic
sphere, represents the major aspects of these implications. Upon the WTO accession,
CHINA AND TilE WORlD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING TilE NEW MILLENNIUM 1 (Deborah Z. Cass,

Brett G. Williams & George Barker eds. 2003).
723
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To assess the implications of China's WTO accession, one can hardly go beyond the
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(as a growing multilateral trading institution).
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China has become an "insider" of the WTO and bound by various WTO disciplines.

,I

Although from the outset, the so-called "WTO implementation" or "WTO
compliance" is a matter of "adjustment problem" for both China and her trading
partners, 725 challenges are mainly imposed upon the side of China, as indicated in her
"Accession Package."

As a result, it is China's post-WTO performances (namely, WTO implementation)rather than its WTO accession- that have generated various far-reaching impacts on
every dimension of the Chinese society and international community, not to mention
that China has just celebrated the 4th anniversary of its accession to the WTO. Of
course, China's WTO implementation is indispensable to its WTO accession. Until
the accession process had been completed, China was not obligated to implement any
of its WTO obligations, the latter were in turn the outcome of the accession process.
More profoundly, factors having worked on the accession process have affected, and
will continue to affect the implementation process. 726

In this chapter, all above issues will be addressed to assess the implications of China's
WTO accession for its domestic WTO implementation. The chapter begins with a
historical overview of China's endeavors to enter the GATI/WTO system. It then
turns to China's accession process, elucidating the significance of this process to
China's WTO implementation. Finally, the chapter shifts the focus on the outcomes
of the accession process, analyzing the substance and legal nature of the "accession
package" for China's WTO implementation.

I.

From the GATT to the WTO: China's "Long March" towards the
Multilateral Trading System
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1.

Pre-GAlT Involvement in International Trade

Foreign trade in China can be traced as far back as to the Western Han Dynasty (206
B.C. - A.D. 9). Chinese exports began in the 2nd century A.D, when the Chinese
traded silk goods with Rome for species and pearls.727 Until the Imperial China (Qing
Dynasty) lost the Opium War with the British in 1839, and subsequently signed the
1842 Treaty of Nanjing, China's traditional trading relations with the outside world
had been based on a "tributary system," serving the political objective to maintain a
"Chinese world order.'' Trade concessions were mostly given to the non-Chinese
''barbarians" to reward their tribute and obsetvance. Consequently, there was little
need to trade with the Western countries in economic sense, as China had long
remained a self-sufficient, self-sustaining sovereign state. 728

In 1840s, the Western powers started to break out China's traditional trading pattern
towards the outside. After the 1839 Opium War, British forced China to open its
market to the West through the bilateral Treaty ofNanjing in 1842, of which trade had
been a predominant subject. Under this so-called the "first unequal treaty," British
required the Manchu government to: abolish the monopolistic Cohong trading system;
set forth a fixed tariff; open five ports for trade and residence by British consuls.
Soon after, other Western countries forced the Imperial China to sign a series of
treaties of the same kind. Implementation of these "unequal treaties," especially from
the Chinese viewpoint, had severely undermined the sovereign and economic interests
of the Imperial China, although the outsiders might consider it as a price China paid
for her entry to the West-dominated "civilized world." As Dr. Gerrit Gong obsetves,
"trade according to Western practices may have seemed the life-blood for the
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European countries, but it sounded the death-knell for old China."729

In 1912, the Republic of China (ROC) was established through revolution to
terminate the Qing Dynasty. Until then, China was on its way of integrating into the
international society, even in absence of an equal footing. Nevertheless, continuous
political turmoil and civil wars between the ruling Party Kuo-Ming-Tang (KMT) and
the dissenting Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frustrated the country's efforts to
restructure its relations (including the trading relations) with the world. Not until the
mid- 1940s did China win itself a new, respectable figure among the international
community, through its significant contributions to the ending of the World War II.
From then on, despite its continuous struggles in a civil war, China had devoted
efforts to pursuing a better position in the international society. 730 The ROC's
involvement in the preparation for and creation of the GATT 1947 was part of these
efforts.

2. Original Connection and Later Disassociation with the GATT

China was one of the twenty three original contracting parties of the GATT,
predecessor of the WTO. Between 1946 and 1947, the ROC government participated
in the 1st multilateral trade negotiation round and signed the Final Act of Geneva that
created the GATT 1947. One year later, the ROC government signed the Protocol of
Provisional Application (PPA) and became an original contracting party of the GATT
1947. Until then, China was still in the civil war, but it did not prevent the ROC

government to attend the 2"d round of tariff reduction negotiations held in Annecy,

I.

France. In late 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the civil war and took
over the Mainland China. As the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established
729
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730
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on 1 October 1949, the KMT shifted its regime to Taiwan. Since then, the whole
China has been split by the Taiwan Straits with two co-existing regimes. 731

These changes in China's political situation imposed significant implications for the
presence of China within the GATT. In 1950, the KMT regime in Taiwan notified the
Secretary-General of the UN of its decision to withdraw from the GAIT 1947, and,
according to the then UN Secretary General, such withdrawal took effect on May 5th
of that year. During the following forties decades, the PRC government kept silent on
that withdrawal, due mainly to its long-standing isolation from the Western world for
ideological frictions and political conflicts between the two. 732

For the same reason, the PRC government missed serial subsequent rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT.

In early 1950s, when GATT

contracting parties worked on the 4th Trade Negotiation Round, the PRC was in the
Korean War and was imposed economic sanctions by Western countries.

In late

1960s, when the Kennedy Round was in session to address the problems of
developing countries, the PRC was suffering the infamous "Big Leap Forward"
movement and falling into the early stage of the "cultural-revolution" disaster.
Between 1973 and 1979, when the Tokyo Round was held significantly to develop the
GATT system, the PRC underwent the peak of the "cultural revolution" disaster. All
in all, within four decades after the ROC's withdrawal from the GATT, the PRC did
not have any association with this growing multilateral trading system.

3. Campaigns for Resuming the Status as a Contracting Party of the GATT
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It was not until early 1980s did the PRC pay attentions to the GAIT system. In 1980,
two years after the Chinese government officially endorsed an open-door policy and
launched massive economic reforms, China began to send officials to training courses
conducted by the GAIT. A year later, China became an observer at the meeting of the
Multilateral Fabric Agreement (MFA) of the GATT. During another two years, China
further became an observer at the GAIT's ministerial sessions. 733 In 1984, China
obtained a membership of the MAF and a permanent observer status to the GAIT

I

proceedings at large. Nevertheless, the observer-status experience was of little use for

l

I•

the country fully to participate in this predominant multilateral trading system, since
the country still remained an "outsider" of the GAIT, unaffected by the latter's
privileges and obligations. For this reason, when present at above respective GAIT
events, China repeatedly expressed a willingness to resume her

~tatus

as a GAIT

contracting party, through re-negotiation of her rights and obligations under the GATT
legal regime. 734

Subsequently, China submitted a formal application on 10 July 1986, requesting the
"resumption" ofher status as a contracting party of the GAIT. It is worth noting that
this resumption application applied the same procedures as those for the accession to
the GAIT, the latter, as laid down in Article XXXIII of the GAIT 1947, provided that
"[a] government ... may access to this Agreement [the GAIT 1947] ... on terms to be
agreed between such government and the Contracting Parties." As a result, China's
resumption application was processed at both multilateral and bilateral levels. This
two-level accession process was subsequently adopted by the WTO legal regime, as
further provided in the "WT/ACC/13" of 15 March 1995, and revised in accordance
with the "Technical Note on the Accession" of 19 November 1999.735
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At multilateral level, four months after China submitted the "Memorandum on
China's Foreign Trade System" on 13 February 1987, the GATT appointed a working
party on China's resumption application, with the members reaching as many as 68 in
the GATT history for the first meeting. At bilateral level, there were thirty seven
GATT contracting parties (subsequently, WTO members) requesting bilateral
negotiations with China, focusing mainly on tariff concessions and market access on
trade in services. 736 Until May 1989, when reaching the understanding with the U.S.
at the 5th round of bilateral negotiations, China had respectively yielded some similar
fruits with other major GATT contracting parties. This "smooth advance" was largely
due to a technical factor: bilateral negotiations by then had only been limited to trade
in goods, without outreaching the complex issues put forward lately by Western
countries in the WTO era.

Moreover, China's aggressive economic reforms and

opening to the outside world convinced its Western trading partners that the country
was on the way towards a "free market," and also improve the diplomatic relations
between the two sides. Meanwhile, the GATT Working Party on China held the 7th
meeting of its kind, almost wrapping up the review of China's foreign trade system.
As a protocol on China's GATT resumption almost took shape, it was highly expected
that the negotiations at both levels would be concluded by the end of 1989.737

Nevertheless, the Chinese government's crackdown of the Tiananmen pro-democracy
movement on 4 June 1989 brought the ongoing negotiations nearly to a stand-still at
both levels. It was not until early 1992, when the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
delivered his famous speeches in South China and the 14th session of the Central
Committee of the CCP set forth the strategic goals of establishing Chinese market
economy and modem enterprise system, did China reinforced her open policy and
economic reforms.

As the Western world's faith got restored in this regard,

negotiations for China's GATT resumption were resumed as well. By late 1992, the
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GAIT Working Party on China has held eleven meetings m total, particularly
addressing tremendous inquiries of the GAIT contracting parties about the China's
Memorandum. At the 11th meeting on October 1992, the Working Party finalized the
investigations on China by two documents: the Draft Report of the Working Party on
China and the Draft Protocol on China. 738

In contrast, the progress in bilateral negotiations was far less desirable, making itself a
"bottleneck" to China's prolonged struggle for returning to the GAIT and
subsequently entering the WTO.

Right after the "Tiananmen incident," Western

countries imposed economic sanctions upon China. The subsequent revocation of
these sanctions did not wipe Western countries' growing skepticism about China's
development towards a free market and democracy within their standards of
civilization. 739 During bilateral negotiations, their demands upon China expanded
significantly, covering not only traditional field of trade in goods (particularly
agricultural products and textile), but also new areas like intellectual property and
trade in services, etc.

Moreover, some demands touched China's domestic trade

regulation and judicial affairs, such as finance and tax policies and judicial review,
which appear to fall within the scope of"domestic implementation."740

It should be noted that difficulties in above bilateral negotiations were concerned with
the then ongoing Uruguay Round. The extensive coverage of these trade negotiations
(e.g., intellectual property protection, trade in services, agriculture, etc.) expanded the
scope of China's commitments demanded as a price of its acceding to the GAIT. 741
The Uruguay Round kicked off just two months after China submitted her official
resumption application to the GAIT.

China then actively engaged in this most
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enduring event in the GAIT history. On 15 April 1994, China joined the other 125
participants to sign the final documents of the Uruguay Round in Marrakesh. 142

Nevertheless, China's participation in the Uruguay Round did not expedite her
resumption of the GAIT contracting party status. Neither did the birth of the WTO
secure an original membership for China, although the Chinese government intended
to set the end of 1994 as the "deadline for finishing substantial negotiations of China's
resumption in the GAIT."743 Due to "high prices" charged by some western countries,
their bilateral negotiations with China came to a deadlock. 744 The situation lasted
until the WTO came into being on 1 January 1995. Consequently, China lost the
opportunity to become a "founding (original) member" of the newly established
multilateral trading institution, and had to continue her endeavors to pursue a
membership of the WTO as an "acceding Member."

4. Endeavors to Join the WTO

Upon the establishment of the WTO on 1 January 1995, China, having failed to
resume the status as a GATT contracting party in time to become an original member
of this newly born multilateral trading institution, had to renewed its application for
the accession to the WTO. At this stage, the process of China's WTO accession can
be classified under three headings: (1) conclusion of bilateral market-access
negotiations; (2) conclusion of multilateral negotiations in the Working Party,
including the draft Protocol and its Annexes, as well as the Working Party Report, all
of which setting out the terms of China's accession; (3) approval and acceptance of
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these terms of accession by WTO members and by China, respectively. 745

In December 1995, the GAIT Working Party on China was transformed into a WTO

Working Party on the Accession of China, continuing with the multilateral
negotiations in this context.

At bilateral level, some forty four WTO members

(including previous thirty seven GAIT contracting parties) expressed interest in
negotiating bilateral market-access terms with China, among them the U.S., the
European Communities (EC}, Japan and Canada were major players vis-a-vis China,
given their predominant influence within the WTO. As noted below, it was not until
China reached bilateral agreement with the U.S. in November 1999 and then with the
EC in May 2000, was the country able to make rapid progress in concluding her
bilateral negotiations with most other WTO members.746

Between 1995 and 1999, China made tremendous efforts to accelerate its accession
process towards the WTO. At the end of 1995, China accepted full convertibility for
currency account transactions. In 1997, despite the negative impacts of the South
Eastern Asian financial crisis, China announced an overall restructuring of state-own
enterprises, including the elements of privatization, and also agreed to phase out
trading monopoly and extend the scope of candidates enjoying the full trading
authority. Meanwhile, China continued to make significant progresses in bilateral
negotiations with the U.S. and the EC. In April 1999, when the Chinese Prime
Minister Zhu Rongji visited the U.S., Beijing presented Washington an extremely
favorable offer in order to expedite the conclusion of the deal. When the Clinton
Administration was yet hesitating to accept the Chinese offers, NATO bombed the
Chinese embassy in Budapest in that May, arousing sever resentments in China
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towards the American. The Sino-US accession negotiation was then interrupted until
November 1999, when China finally reached the deal with the U.S.

747

Tiris was

followed shortly thereafter by a spate of other bilateral deals in the first half of 2000,
including that with the EC in May of that year. 748

Another element contributing to China's expenditure for her bilateral accords with
WTO members was the U.S. administration's agreement with China in September
2000- as a quid pro quo for China's market-access- that the U.S. would provide
China with permanent MFN status, thus eliminating the annually renewed conditional

MFN provided under the Jackson- Vanik amendment to the US Trade Act. During that
period, the Working Party on China resumed its work on drafting the Accession
Protocol and the Working Party report. It was then highly expected that China would
join the WTO by the end of2000. 749

Nevertheless, hindered by certain major controversies on market access to Chinese
agriculture and insurance market, the accession process was dragged until late March
2001, when the Sino-US aircraft collision occurred over the South China Sea,
worsening the whole situation.

After three-month efforts to overcome these

difficulties, China reached a new bilateral accession deals with the U.S. and the EC in
June 2001. By then, China already ironed out all substantive issues raised out of its
long-standing bilateral negotiations with WTO Members. On 13 September 2001,
when signing the accession agreement with Mexico, China concluded the last bilateral
negotiation for her accession. 750
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Four days later, at its final (18th) meeting, the Working Party on China reached
agreement with China on all "outstanding issues" and then finalized the full
"accession package" for her, including the Accession Protocol and the Working Party
Report. On 10 November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar
approved the Decision on Accession and the above "accession package." On the next
day, the Chinese government notified the Director-General of the WTO that the
Standing Committee of the People's Congress of China had ratified the terms of
accession. Thus, due to accession procedures of the WTO, China officially became
the 143rd Member of the WTO one month later on 11 December 2001. 751

D. Process of China's WTO Accession: Significance and Implications for
Domestic WTO Implementation

1. Significance ofthe Accession Process: Why So Long?

From the above historical overview, China's experience in pursuing a GATT/WTO
membership has portrayed the "longest and most arduous" accession process for a
single Member in the GATT/WTO history. With feature, China is distinguished from
any other acceding WTO Member, even though "each accession to the WTO is a
unique event." Some observers take this feature for granted, deeming it as an "easily
making" fact according to China's status as an original GATT contracting party back
to 1948, as well as its subsequent resumption application to the GATT as early as

1986. To this author, however, "timing" matters only in the sense that it may mark
I

whatever is brought to the surface, but not the factors underneath. Others refer to "the

l

many ups and downs China experienced along its accession trail," especially those
historical "incidents" occurring one after another. 752 These individual events, as any
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acknowledgeable observer will agree, would hardly be counted as the key obstacle to
the accession process. As this author believes, the significance of China's accession
process is determined by the factors in two dimensions at least:

technical and

practical.

A.

Technical Dimension

In technical dimension, difficulties standing in the way of China's "long and torturous
fifteen-year accession path" come from the GAIT/WTO accession procedures. For
the GAIT, accession procedures were mainly set out in Article XXXIII of the GAIT
1947, entailing bilateral market-access negotiations by an "acceding member" with
each interested GAIT contracting party, before the outcomes of these negotiations
became "mulilateralized" - on the MFN basis - through review of a Working Party
appointed by the "Contracting Parties" as a whole. 753 The WTO adheres to a similar
practice, notably in Article XII: 1 of the WTO Agreement, providing that "[a]ny state
or separate customs territory ... may accede to this Agreement on terms to be agreed
between it and the WTO." Under this accession provision, an "acceding member" is
particularly required to reach bilateral market-access accord with each interested
WTO member, before its accession is finally endorsed by the WTO Working Party at
the multilateral level.

Consequently, an acceding member of the WTO is bound not only by the wellestablished WTO agreements, but also by the specific "terms" it has reached with all
other WTO members for the accession. In this particular connection, one may hardly
find any limitation to such "terms." Legally, the existing WTO members are free to

m General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art: XXXIII. " ... may
access to this Agreement [the GATT 1947) ... on terms to be agreed between such government and the
Contracting Parties."
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negotiate any term for the accession of an acceding country, including whatever
imposing the more stringent, restrictive commitments than the WTO agreement would
do in a general sense. 754 This opens the door for the possible abuse of above
accession procedures by the existing WTO members.

At this point, it seems necessary to post a "common-sense" notice that the GAIT's
accession procedures did not apply to its "original contracting parties," in just the
same way that the WTO analogies do not apply to its "original members." For the
founding members of the GATTIWTO system, their membership was secured right
after the GATT 1947 entered into force (through the PPA) or the WTO was
established.

This appears to be a far simpler process than the accession process

undertaken by an "acceding member." Unfortunately, for the historical reasons noted
earlier, China, once an original contracting party of the GATT, failed to take
advantage of either of these privileges. Instead, the country underwent the rather
complex and complicated accession procedures of the GATT and then of the WTO,
part of which were the bilateral market-access negotiations with GATT contracting
parties, and subsequently, WTO members.

As mentioned above, The GATTIWTO accession procedures are at both bilateral and
multilateral levels. In this context, the bilateral accession negotiations appear more
complex and time-consuming, for the acceding Member would have to deal
respectively with each individual GATT or WTO Member. In the case of China, thirty
seven GATT contracting parties and later on forty four WTO members had been
engaged in such bilateral accession negotiations with China before the accords were
sealed.

This remarkable number inevitably brought complexity to the accesston

process, making it potentially long process.
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More fundamentally, the mandatory requirement for the bilateral accession
negotiations opens the door for the engaged Members (especially led by the U.S. and
EC) to request maximization of market access from China, while blocking any
possible "leeway" for China to avoid their demands. 755 In this particular connection,
it would be hard to see engaged members bargaining for the so-called "commercially
viable" terms, but rather for whatever in their best interests, since the settings of the
GATIIWTO accession procedures may arouse their temptation to do so. This "onesided" tendency increased the "imbalance" of positions between China and her
trading partners in the accession negotiations, and thus increased the difficulties in
processing a smooth accession. In addition, the extension of the substantive coverage
of the Uruguay Round broadened the scope of the commitments demanded as a price
of admission, 756 placing additional burdens on the part of China.

B.

Practical Dimension

The technical dimension merely presents the possibility, and may never tum into a
reality without counting all practical factors.

In the course of China's long and

arduous accession process towards the GATIIWTO system, difficulties in practical
dimension matter more, which mainly originated from China's "unique" situation,
based on her historical, political, economic and legal status vis-a-vis the fundamentals
essential to the GATIIWTO system. This contrast has invited enormous concerns and
skeptics of the GATIIWTO Members, especially those from the West.

The

consequence was the increase of a "Sino-West confrontation," especially evident in
the bilateral accession negotiations between both sides.

(1)

Unique Situation of China
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Within the international community, China has been unique in many respects. From
the outset, the country's historical experience in integrating into the global community
is definitely in a class of its own, and has profound implications for China's
continuous adventure in this regard, including her accession to the GAITIWTO
system and implementation ofWTO obligations.

Over the past two hundred years, China's long-standing struggle with the Western
world has portrayed a long and painful process of adjusting herself from the centre of
a "Chinese world order" to the bearer and enforcer of a West-dominated "standard of
civilization.''757 From the beginning of this enduring course, trade and trade relations
had played a pivotal role, originally evident in initial British attempts back to the
eighteenth century to open trade for China. 758 The subsequent "unequal treaties" and
the "treaty port system" erected therein - as forcibly imposed by the Western powers
upon China "under the threat of naval bombardment and overland siege" - allowed
them to dictate the conditions of its relations with China for almost a century (1840s1930s). Concerning trade relations, such conditions include: opening of treaty ports,
fixing of tariffs, limits on internal duties for imports, trading on Western terms, etc.759
Having resented the "unequal treaties" and "treaty port system" as a "national
humiliation," the Chinese had consistently sought to remove them until the 1930s,
when such efforts finally bore fruits with the gradual abrogation of the
extraterritoriality in China.

r
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there. Neither did she stop the process of integrating into the world community. With
the two tasks being merged, a main issue is raised: how can the country accommodate
itself to a modem world apparently dominated by the West (economically at any rate),
without having China's identity overshadowed by the latter?761 In search of answers
to this question, the Chinese would inevitably turn to their past experience, with
highly emotional outburst of Chinese humiliation and naturally emerging nationalism.
This may entail significant implications for China's interactions with the Western
world, particularly at the negotiating table.

Therefore, it was not surprising to see China's harsh responses to the expanding
demands of the Western countries for her GAIT!WTO commitments, particularly in
the bilateral accession negotiations. As noted earlier, it is for technical reasons that
Chinese had to face the challenges posed by each GAIT/WTO Member in the already
complex accession process, and China's firm position (even if not always consistent)
towards the increased pressures from the West which further prolonged the process.
Without taking into account theses historical perspectives, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain a sound perception of the difficulties inherent in China's
accession process. Moreover, this historically sentimental factor did not detract from
China's determining accession to the WTO. As discussed below, it continues to affect
China's post-WTO performance, particularly in the implementation of WTO legal
obligations in the domestic sphere. On many occasions, this factor of uniqueness
even determines how far China can reach out to satisfy the requirements of the WTO.

History may display the roots, but can rarely reflect the living reality of the current
situation.

China is also unique in terms of her fascinating trade and economic

developments vis-a-vis today's fairly conservative political structure. According to
the recently released WTO statistics, China now has been among the World's top ten
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trading partners, and also the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment
(FDI). 762 The country has grown into a major player in the world economy. By the
time China joined the WTO in December 2001, it already ranked as the seventh
largest exporter and eighth-largest importer of trade in goods, and also the twelfthleading exporter and tenth-leading importer of trade in services. Given its largest
population in the world, China can be easily counted as the largest potential market of
all WTO Member. 763 Therefore, as a growing economic giant, China's accession to

I

j

I

the WTO has inevitably invited numerous concerns of her trading partners, either
about a threat to their interests in the GATTIWTO system, or about the impacts on the
WTO institution itself.

However, China's remarkable performances in the world economy do not in
themselves make the country unique, for the impact of the Chinese economy on the
world economy as a whole still remains relatively small, and is unlikely to increase
substantially as a consequence of its WTO accession. 764 China's uniqueness lies in
the fact that the preceding economic achievements have been made during its
"transitional period," featured by China's consistent implementation of aggressive
economic reforms and rigorous open-door policy, under a fairly conservative political
structure still based upon a communist ideology. 765 China adopted the open-door
policy and launched economic reforms in early 1980s, aiming at transforming a
centrally-planned economy into a "socialist market economy." The last two decades
have witnessed considerable fruits bore by this process: not just the above-noted
remarkable economic achievements, but also China's increasingly pivotal role in
international community, as partly mirrored in the lengthy accession effort towards
'•

the GATTIWTO system. 766 Specifically, China has gradually brought prices and
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market mechanism into play as the key determinants of her future trade relations with
the rest of the world. 767

II

Nevertheless, it remains controversial to what extent China can really be regarded as a
"market economy," especially in terms of the GATTIWTO criteria.

Despite its

economic achievements, China's nationwide dominance of a communist apparatus,
problematic restructure of numerous state-owned enterprises and other related
circumstances still reflect the "planned nature" of the Chinese economy, which has
affected WTO members' confidence in the pace and depth of China's reform and open
process with regard to "sufficient market orientation" as a condition of the WTO
membership. 768

Another dilemma posed by China's remarkable economic achievements concerns her
position as a "developing country," as consistently claimed by the Chinese side. This
claim has much merit in the context of the traditional definition of a developing
country, given China's relatively low annual per capita income of less than $800, with
up to 9 million peasant farmers engaged in traditional agriculture and with much of
the country still experiencing the poor world-type economic conditions. However,
China's "developing country" position has been complicated by her remarkable
performances in the world economy, with a number of Chinese coastal provinces
reaching the level of newly industrialized economies. In this regard, China can hardly
be treated as a standard developing economy.

l:.
·I

769

These controversial issues arise from China's unique situation, and they both entail
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significant implications for China's WTO accession. As noted above, the "market
economy" status generally serves as a prerequisite for the GATI/WTO membership.
The "developing country" position, on the other hand, suggests the acceding member
concerned would be entitled to a series of "special and preferential treatments" under
the GATI/WTO regime.

Both issues were crucial to the setting-up of China's

GATIIWTO commitments and obligations. As discussed below, they formed part of
major focuses of GATI/WTO members' concerns and skepticism about China's

II

accession, as consistently penetrating throughout China's bilateral and multilateral
accession negotiations with her GATI/WTO rivals.

Until they were ironed out,

together with others, the accession process would have no steam to move forward.

(2)

Concerns and Skepticism of Other WTO Members

It was China's unique situation that caused the concerns and skepticism for other
WTO Members about its accession to the WTO. However, it would not be possible to
understand these concerns and skepticism without referring back to the nature of this
multilateral trading institution, as well as its underling principles. Being a principal
international organization for the promotion of multilateral global trade, the WTO is
charged with laying down the rules governing international trade, 770 which are based
upon five fundamental principles: (1) Non-discrimination, including the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) and national treatment; (2) Market opening; (3) Transparency and
predictability; (4) Undistorted trade; and, (5) Preferential treatment for developing
countries. 771 As these principles are underlined by most substantive legal obligations
of the GATI/WTO system, the WTO is seen to have embodied the so-called the
"spirit of classicalliberalism."772
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To be sure, the WTO has not always completely adhered to these principles, while its
members have not only complained about their application to themselves, but some
have even sought to side step them. Nevertheless, as supported by major OCED
countries, the WTO has registered considerable successes in applying these principles
across the board. 773 At this point, it is worth noting that the OECD countries,
particularly represented by four largest WTO members called "Quad" (Canada,
European Union, Japan and United States), are leading founders of the WTO and
major advocates of above fundamental principles.

Generally, most difficult

negotiations would need an initial break through among the "Quad." As this case
applied to China's WTO accession, most concerns and skepticism about China's WTO
accession had been raised by these developed countries.

Reviewing China's unique situation in the context of the above five fundamental
principles, one may easily understand why other WTO Members, especially those
Western countries, raised tremendous concerns and skepticism about China's WTO
accession, and also, why the coverage of these concerns and skepticism had been so

iJP

extensive, far beyond the above-discussed controversies on China's "market

3

economy" status and "developing country" position. Particularly, under the principle
of transparency and predictability, the WTO regime "necessarily intrudes into
domestic affairs of its members," especially concerning their national legal
infrastructures

and

judicial

systems

for

"WTO

compliance"

or

"WTO

implementation" purpose. 774

Having traveled the whole accession trail, concerns and skepticism of China's WTO
counterparts were fully addressed in the accession negotiations, bilaterally and
multilaterally. Their complexity and sensitiveness contributed largely to a sluggish
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accession process, as undesirable to either side. 775 In addition, China's resisting
position towards most of these concerns and skepticism also increased the length of
this process.
'I
I

In general, these concerns and skepticisim bear four facets. The first facet concerns
the market access, relating to the principles of "non-discrimination" and "market
opening." As mentioned earilier, the WTO members intended to take advantage of
bilateral accession negotiations with China, requesting the maximization of market
access from her. It is thus hard to say their concerns and skepticism in this context are
for their own sake or, in support of the above general principles of the WTO.

II

>-

Extensive and enormous as their demands could be, the motive behind appeared to be
more "interest-driven" than "fair bargaining," and inevitably received numerous
complaints and criticism from the Chinese side, although the accession negotiations in
this regard ended up in China's massive concessions, notably, the commitments to
eliminate dual-pricing practices, phase out (within three years) most of the restrictions
on importing, exporting and trading faced then by foreign enterprises, progressively
and substantially open up the service sectors to foreign competitors, etc.776

The second facet concerns China's status as a "market economy," relating to the
principle of "undistorted trade" that underlines the WTO disciplines on the imposition
of trade remedies (antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguard measures) by
respective WTO members. 777 A "market economy" (ME) used to be the "prototype"
model of a WTO member whose industries and sectors "operate under market
conditions," with all the privileges and rights deriving from above disciplines. 778 A
775

Gertler, supra note 745, at 66. "In the final few months, there was little doubt that WTO members
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I

and China were very eager to see the negotiation brought to a rapid and successful conclusion. This

I

desire to achieve closure of China's accession was also shared by the WTO Secretariat."
776
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"non-market economy" (NME) - on the other hand - would have to undergo certain

I

I

particular adjustments before it may reach that position. These advance adjustments,
which allow a WTO member to "walk away" from above regular disciplines on its
imposition of trade remedies towards another member, and thus put the latter in a very
unfavorable position, mainly cover the NME treatment for antidumping purpose,
rigorous

restriction

mechanism.

779

on

subsidies,

and

special

product-specific

safeguard

In this sense, the status of an ME or NME is crucial to the

'

I,

establishment of the rights/obligations of an acceding member, with regard to its
capacity to challenge any trade remedy outside the WTO disciplines.

China has long argued that over the past two decades of the open-door policy and
economic reforms, the country has transformed from a centrally-planned economy
into a market economy, and should qualify for the regular treatments granted to a ME
under the WTO with regard to trade remedies. 780 This position, however, has not yet
been fully shared by the Western countries, particularly during China's WTO
accession process. Among the West's major concerns were China's state trading and
government-owned, or state-owned or operated enterprises, both inevitably resulting
in their enormous skepticism about China's rampant subsidies, irregular market and
distorted pricing system. 781 As a consequent, the controversy over China's MEINME

''

status lasted over fifteen years, until China finally sealed the accession deal with the
Western countries by accepting the NME treatment for antidumping purpose (for
fifteen years), a special product-specific safeguard mechanism with a separate textile
safeguard, as well as the abolition of all export subsidies on either industrial or
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agricultural goods.782

The third facet relates to China's trade regime and legal system, notably the principle
of "transparency and predictability" that are "key element of the multilateral trading
system." According to the transparency principle (mainly contained in Article X of
the GAIT), the member governments should promptly publish all trade-related laws,

I

i

regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of generally application,

'
II
III.

administer all such measures in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, and

1.
I

meanwhile furnish efficient, independent procedures of judicial review for all traderelated administrative actions. The predictability principle calls for "a legal hierarchy
giving preference to tariffs over less transparent and less secure non-tariff measures
such as quotas and licenses, and therefore "encouraging members to 'bind' their
market-opening commitments in goods and services."783 Evidently, this principle is
more procedural than substantive in nature, and has intruded into domestic sphere of a
WTO members, particularly focusing on its internal legal infrastructures in legislative
and judicial context. This goes back to the subject of the present study, domestic
implementation of WTO law, as mainly undertaken by national legislature and
judiciary.

The West's concerns and skepticism about China's trade regune and legal
development long preceded the country's WTO accession. Back to late 1980 when
China just introduced the open-door policy and launched economic reforms, Western
business circles held many expectations for enormous market potentials in that
country. Their expectations were soon frustrated (partially, at least) by the fact that
until early 1990s, there had not yet been any actual Chinese market to them. To make
it worse, their "pioneers" doing business in China had experienced a broad range of
market-disorder problems, e.g., arbitrary administrative interferences, unfair trade
782
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practices, discriminatory regulatory process, lack of transparency, etc.

All these

problems appeared to be in conflict with the principles of transparency and
predictability of the WTO, and in effect limited the participation of the Western
traders in the Chinese market or "unfairly" affected their trade. When China began
her efforts to join the GAIT and then the WTO, Western countries had a chance to
address these problems. 784 They added extensive requirements for China's trade
regimes and legal system, with many of them even more stringent than those imposed
upon an existing WTO Member.

Interestingly, no records indicated that China had ever held a harsh position towards
the above concerns and demands. A positive response in this regard constituted a big
contrast to China's paradoxical attitude towards the West's demands for substantial
trade concessions, e.g., market access and discriminatory imposition of trade remedies.
Despite her immature legal system and problematic trade regulation, China has
committed to adhere herself to the WTO 's transparency obligations in greater depth
and width than many WTO members (including some most developed countries) have
been able to do (details in this regard are elaborated in China's Accession Protocols
for later discussions). In compliance with the principle of predictability, China, after
having all her import tariffs bound, has committed to the phased reduction and
removal of tariff barriers, mostly by 2004, but in no case later than 2010. 785 In this
context, the West's concerns and skepticism consequently focused more on China's
difficulties and the capacity in developing the WTO-compatible trade regime and
legal system, than on her willingness and determination to fulfill the obligations in
this regard.

Even so, the complexity and comprehensiveness of these WTO

obligations already contributed to slow accession process by China.
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The final facet concerns China's position as a "developing country," in relation to the
principle of "preferential treatment for developing countries" that provides "transition
periods" to developing countries and countries in transition to market economies, "to
adjust their system to many of the new obligations resulting from the Uruguay
Round."786 For over five decades since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese
government has claimed that the country is a developing country. 787 During the
fifteen years of WTO accession negotiations, China's negotiators had consistently
claimed China's entitlement to join the status of a developing country, until at the very
end they accepted implicitly the U.S. and EU argument that China could not be
treated as a "typical" developing country "by virtue of size and the magnitude of its
part in international trade." Taking such acceptance as part of the "concessions,"
China has agreed to a special cap on its ability to provide domestic production
subsidies in agriculture, abolition of export subsidies, as well as immediate
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement.788

At this stage, it is interesting to recall the Western world's insistence on China's status
as a "non-market economy" (NME) for the purpose of trade sanctions. Since China from their perspectives - is neither a "market economy" (ME) nor a "developing
country," a question may arise as to what category it should fall into. True, it is not
uncommon that a ME may stay at its developing stage, and there is not necessarily a
linkage between a NME and a developing country. However, it will be very rare, if
not possible, to see a NME like China (still under a "transitional period" as
recognized by the Western countries) being part of the developed world already.
Otherwise, where can one find the advantages of the ME - as widely recognized in the
Western world- over the NME?

This irony reveals the fact that the West is more apprehensive about the potentials of
786

/d. at 64.
Yahuda, supra note 757, at 311.
788
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China's increasing economic strength and competitive power if granted preferential
treatment of a developing country. Notably, these concerns have also been widely
shared by the developing WTO Members.

During the accession negotiations,

although the EU and U.S. took the lead in resisting China's accession simply as a
designated 'developing country', it was the developing world that had most to fear
from it.789 Being a predominant receipt of foreign direct investment and an active role
in world trade, China has emerged as "a damaging competitor'' to many developing
countries, with her WTO accession possibly putting them in a position at increasingly
competitive disadvantages to existing developing WTO Member countries.790 Since
the resistances to China's claim for the status of a developing country also came from
the developing countries of the WTO as well, the controversy turned out to be
significant, contributing in part to the already slow accession process.

2.

Implications of the Accession Process for China's Implementation
of WTO Obligations

China's official entry into the WTO in December 2001 ended the slowest and most
sluggish accession process she had experienced in the GATT/WTO history. Since
then, China has embarked on the new stage of WTO implementation, devoting to
honoring its comprehensive and complex WTO commitments.

Despite China's

completion of her accession process, circumstances contributive to this protracted
process have not yet disappeared. The unique situation of China can not change
overnight. Neither will the concerns and skepticism of other WTO Members diminish,
with their focus shifting to China's post-WTO performance. In response, China will
likely maintain her rather incredulous position towards these concerns and skepticism,
regardless of the significant concessions made in the Accession Protocol. All these
impressions will continue to affect China's WTO implementation.
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Take, for instance, China's obligations in regard to market access. Although WTO

I,

I

Members have successfully maximized their rights and privileges vis-a-vis China,

i
I

they may also make themselves a "self-interests seeker'' - rather than a "fair-play
advocate" - to the Chinese people.

Given China's historical experience in the

"unequal treaties" with the Western world, the country's reluctance to fulfill these
obligations will inevitably emerge wherever and whenever possible, in just the same
way as its long-standing resistance persists, to the corresponding demands of other
WTO Members during the accession negotiations.

This can equally be the case for China's status as a None Market Economy (NME),
the latter has been confirmed by the China Accession Protocol and therefore
"internationally legalized."

The Chinese may continue to regard this term as a

"concession" of much unfairness, while the Western perspectives have firmly taken it
as "constructive" and "part of the trade off in trying to assimilate a society and a
market structure that is really quite different from, and could abuse, an equal
partnership, or a totally harmonized partnership role in the WT0."791 With these two
conflicting perspectives underneath, just as they were during China's accession
process, it would be hard to imagine a smooth process of WTO implementation for
China, especially with regard to her NME-related substantive obligations.

'·

On the surface, these two situations represent nothing more than a bargaining contest
that is normal in any negotiation of an international agreement. In deed, however,
they reflect a conflict of values between the Western world and China, particularly in
terms of the role of the market. Unlike the WTO, which was built on the basis of free
trade and has represented the "spirit of classical liberalism," the Chinese regime
viewed the role of market primarily in terms of a mechanism to increase efficiency
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and productivity, rather than as the governing principle of the national economy.

792

Even though they realize the inevitability of the market opening, the Chinese would
rather maximize the period of adjustment, so as to ease any tension brought about by
the overture. Such considerations are not unique to China, since other acceding WTO
Members will follow the same practice in effect. No doubt, they will invariably
prolong China's WTO implementation process depending on each specific obligation
involved.

In the same context, concerns may also arise - from both sides, from China and other
WTO Members - about China's capacity to fulfill her WTO obligations. The only
difference is that China took them into account earlier on during the accession process,
while other WTO Members, especially those from the West, have _ to pay more
attention to them in their assessment of China's performance after WTO accession. In
either case, these concerns are always there, whether before or after China joined the
WTO. Having served as a feet-dragging factor in China's accession process, these
concerns continue to play a significant role in China's WTO implementation.
Therefore, it will be sensible for China's counterparts within the WTO to be patient
and prepared for a protracted process of China's WTO compliance. After all, many of
China's WTO obligations appear to exceed its current implementing capacity, even
though the country is not lacking in its good faith to fulfill them. This is particularly
the case with China's TRIPs-related commitments, as well as those concerning the
transparency and predictability of the Chinese domestic trade regime.

As noted above, during the accession process, China committed to bring her trade
regime and legal system - in greater depth and width than most other WTO members
have done - into compliance with the WTO's transparency and predictability
principles. In this regard, China's attitude is more positive towards other demands of
WTO members for substantive trade concessions (e.g., market access and the NME

792

Yahuda, supra note 757, at 307.

278

§
..-5
5
I I"

J

'

status). Nevertheless, given China's relatively recent legal system, problematic trade
regulation and "novel" legal culture in the Western sense, it remains questionable
whether the country has the capability to fulfill these obligations, and how to achieve
that in practice. This concern was shared by China and her WTO counterparts during
the accession process, and will continue unabated in the process of China's WTO
implementation.

Notably, the transparency and predictability obligations are

procedural in nature, and have intruded into China's domestic sphere, especially her
legal infrastructures in the legislative and judicial process. This goes back to the
subject of the present part, which focuses on China's domestic implementation of
WTO law, as mainly undertaken by the Chinese legislature and judiciary for later
discussions.

Finally, China's bid for a "developing country" represents a more complicated task
than any negotiation in the three preceding occasions. On the one hand, China failed
to obtain an "across-the-board preferential treatment as a developing country" for her
WTO accession, and had to accept a special cap on her ability to provide for
agricultural subsidies, the abolition of export subsidies, as well as the immediate
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement.793 Accepting these terms as "concessions,"
however, the Chinese will be likely to return to the matter on a case-by-case basis?94
On the other hand, China was able to reach agreement on specific transitional
arrangements in certain areas of Chinese internal trade regime, e.g., the phasing out of
quotas and import licenses, the phased liberalization of the right for foreign entities to
trade in China. 795 This will give her some leverage as a developing country within the
WTO.

Consequently, the status of China as a developing country, which already served as
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one of the feet-dragging obstacles in the Chinese accession process, has not yet been
finally settled "on a once and for all" upon the completion of the package deal,796 but
will continue to affect China's WTO implementation process.

China will likely

continue to claim the various exemptions and entitlements available to those classified
as "developing countries,"797 or, assert the lack of sufficient recognition for China's
position as a developing country.798 Either of these circumstances may serve China's
purpose to have her WTO obligations legitimately waived.

Besides, given the

developing world's worries and concerns about China's potential of being a
"damaging competitor" upon her WTO accession, China has made, and will continue
to make special concessions to these developing countries, particularly through the
regional trade arrangements (RTA). This may reshape her WTO obligations vis-a-vis
the developing countries concerned. Thus far, the ongoing ASEAN-China Free Trade
Area (ACFTA) has been the first case of this kind.799

For all these, the process of China's accession to the WTO was actually not sluggish
in itself, but the reasons for this significant feature have imposed enormous
hindrances for the country's implementation of WTO obligations. These include the
various concerns and skepticism of WTO members about China's unique situation,
focusing on China's willingness and capacity to fulfill her WTO obligations. They
also include various conflicts of the Chinese values (based upon their historical
experience and ideological heritage) with Western values, especially in terms of the
role of market and rule of law. It is the process of China's WTO accession that has
brought these concerns and conflicts to the surface.

Given China's growing

significance as a world trader, it will be the process of China's WTO implementation
that may widen or deepen these concerns and conflicts, or otherwise address and abate
796
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or settle them, depending on how China is going to react. This will be treated in the
part titled: "China's domestic implementation ofWTO law."

ill.

Outcome of China's WTO Accession: Significance and Implications for
Domestic WTO Implementation

China's accession to the GATT!WTO trading system has been the longest and most
arduous process compared to those of other acceding WTO Members. By the time
China acceded to WTO in December 2001, there were 16 other acceding Members,
among

which

11

were

transitional

economtes

(former

centrally-planned

economies). 800 None of these acceding Members had ever experienced the same
hardship as China. Subsequently, the outcomes of China's accession process, socalled "accession package" for China, became the most comprehensive of its kind in
the WTO history.

"'"'

.
An "accession package" refers to the protocol of accession for an acceding Member,

with any necessary reference to the particular paragraphs of the relevant Working
Party Report. This "accession package" contains all "terms" reached by the acceding
Member with the WTO at both bilateral and multilateral levels. 801 The protocol of
accession, together with the incorporated provisions of the Working Party Report,
becomes "an integral part of the WTO Agreement'' hinging upon the acceding
Member, in the same way as other WTO agreements upon an original Member. This
suggests that an acceding Member will have to shoulder a "double burden" of
implementing WTO law, not only with reference to the existing WTO agreements in
general, but also the specific accession protocol for the acceding Member. How to
assess such a "double burden" will depends on the relation of this protocol to the

800

Qin, supra note 193, at 487.

801

/d. at 488.

281

·'I

existing WTO treaty system, especially in relation to the length and substance.

Take the above-noted 16 acceding Members. The main text of each of their protocols
of accession consists of no more than two pages of "standardized provisions," and

I
I·

addresses nothing more than necessary procedural and technical matters of the
accession. In these circumstances, the protocol has little impact on the substance and
structure of the existing WTO treaty, and then the acceding Member concerned are
still bound mainly by the "pure" WTO agreements, exactly in the same measure as the
.. 1Memb ers. so2
ongma

.....

The accession of China has fundamentally changed this long-standing practice. As
elaborated below, the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China
("China Protocol") is distinguishable from any of its kind to date, both textually and
substantively. The China Protocol, together with its incorporation of a comprehensive
part of the Working Party Report on China ("China Working Party Report"), is the
outcome of her WTO accession process, namely, "accession package" that embodies
China's obligations and commitments vis-a-vis her WTO counterparts. China's WTO
implementation is a process of implementing these obligations and commitments.
Thus, it is these outcomes of China's accession process - so-called "accession
package" for China - that determine what the country should implement. Given the
complexity and comprehensiveness of this accession package, China's WTO
implementation will inevitably undergo many hardships, depending largely upon the
substances and legal nature of each individual obligation set forth in the accession
package. All these issues are elaborated below.

1.

Significance of the "Accession Package" for China: Why So
Comprehensive?

802

ld. at 487-488.
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The "accession package" for China refers to the Accession Protocol of China (China
Protocol), with a number of paragraphs of the China Working Party Report
incorporated therein. This outcome of China's accession process to the WTO are

I'

comprehensive and complex, and appear to be the most lengthy accession documents
of their kind, among other WTO's acceding Members. This significance stems from
the complexity of the accession formalities, reflecting extensive concerns and
skepticism of WTO members about the unique situation of China, and also
demonstrates China's remarkable resolutions and efforts to integrate herself into the
international community for national economic development and prosperity.

A.

Formation of the "Accession Package" for China

At the core of the "accession package" for China, the China Protocol is not a
standardized document as in the case of many other WTO acceding members. As
noted above, for each of the 16 acceding members prior to China, the main text of
their accession protocol takes no more than 2 pages of "standardized provisions" on
necessary procedural and technical matters of the accession. In contrast, the China
Protocol consists of 11 pages of main text, 9 annexes (including China's Goods and
Services Schedules), as well as 143 paragraphs incorporated by reference from the
China Working Party Report. The main text of the China Protocol covers 17 sections
of substantive provisions, which include 56 paragraphs and many additional
subparagraphs. 803 As for the incorporation of 143 paragraphs of the Working Party
Report into the Protocol, it is expressly provided in Section 2.1 of the Protocol: "[t]his
Protocol, which shall include the commitments referred to in paragraph 342 of the
Working Party Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement." In tum,
Paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report specifically refers to those 134 paragraphs
803
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that have respectively prescribed China's accession commitments. 804

From a technical perspective, comprehensiveness of China's "accession package"
depends on the complexity of its WTO accession process, as featured by its bilateral
market-access negotiations with each interested Member, as well as the multilateral
negotiations in the Working Party. 805 At the bilateral level, with the deals struck and
notified to the WTO, China's consolidated Schedule of Concessions and
Commitments on Goods ("Goods Schedule") and consolidated Schedule of Specific
Commitments on Services ("Service Schedule") were prepared with the assistance of
the WTO Secretariat and thereafter reviewed by the Working Party. In that process,
these schedules were "multilateralized" - namely, extended on a MFN basis to all
WTO members - as they were annexed to the Protocol of Accession. In other words,
these bilaterally agreed commitments became part of the multilateral treaty terms of
China's membership in the WTO. 806
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As the bilateral market-access negotiations neared completion, WTO members and
China embarked on multilateral negotiations in the Working Party, "wrapping up the
many outstanding multilateral elements of the accession package." To finalize the
negotiated package that consists of the Accession Protocol and the Working Party
Report, both sides faced the challenges of "identifying the trouble spot and agreeing

I

I

I'

on the timing - including possible transition period - for China to bring any WTOinconsistent policy measures into compliance with WTO obligations." To meet this
challenge, China provided the Working Party with the updated information

(
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(notifications of laws, regulations and other policy measures) on all key aspects of
China's trade regime, which became indispensable to finalizing negotiations on
various key provisions of the Protocol and the Report. Lately, at the final meeting of
the Working Party in 2001, the technical 'clean-up' and verification of the Goods and
Services Schedules was completed, followed by an overall review of the documents to
ensure consistency among various elements of the whole accession package.

807

With

the agreement reached between China and Working Party members on all "outstanding issues," China's accession package fmally came into being for the approval
and acceptance by WTO members and by China, respectively.

B.

808

Substances of the "Accession Package" for China

Given its lengthy text, the "accession package" for China covers a wide range of
subjects and prescribes numerous specific rules binding upon both China and other
WTO Members. 809 As noted above, at the core of this accession package is China's
Accession Protocol, with numerous Goods and Services Schedules annexed and
incorporating a large body of paragraphs drawn from the China Working Party Report.
By virtue of its substances, the China Protocol addresses extensive concerns and
skepticism of WTO members about China's trade regime and practice, which
significantly contributed to its comprehensiveness.

Under the China Accession Protocol, China and WTO members have agreed on: (1)
preambular and general provisions; (2) commitments relating to the administration of
the trade regime, including uniform administration, special economic areas,
transparency and judicial review; (3) commitments on non-discrimination, special

Bo7 /d. at 58.
BOB

/d. at 56.
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Qin, supra note 193, at 489.
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trade arrangements, state trading, non-tariff measures, tariff-rate quota administration,
import and export licensing, price controls, taxes and charges levied on imports and
exports, export subsidies and domestic support in agriculture, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures; (4) trading rights; and, (5) standards and technical
regulation. 810

Besides, the China Protocol has imposed some obligations upon China, which are
widely regarded as her "massive concessions" for the WTO accession, including: a
special transitional provision on price comparability for determining dumping and
subsidies, lasting fifteen years; the establishment of both a separate transitional
product-specific safeguard mechanism and a separate textile safeguard; immediate
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, a host of technical, sectoral issues in trade
in services; a transitional review mechanism to oversee compliance with the terms of
the Protocol, etc. 811

In addition, the China Protocol contains many "transitional Annexes of the Protocol"

which, other than Goods and Services Schedules, include the Annexes on: Products
subject to State-trading; Products subject to designed Trading; Non-tariff Measures
subject to Phased Elimination; Products and Services subject to Price Controls;
j,

Notification and Phase-out of Subsidies; Export Taxes and Charges; Restrictions

·;

Maintained Against China, Issues to be Addressed in the Transitional Review. 812

In sum, in terms of its substances, the "accession package" for China contains mostly
China's obligations and commitments vis-a-vis other WTO Members. Of course,
some "soft commitments" are still available from these WTO Members, e.g., non-

I
I
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Gertler, supra note 745, at 58.
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/d. at 59.
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/d. at 60.
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abuse of domestic products in antidumping actions, restraint in the use of special
safeguard, etc. 813 Compared to the overwhelming obligations imposed upon China,
these "soft commitments" appear too minor to attract any attention.

C.

China's Motive Behind the "Accession Package"

As a procedural matter, the accession package" for China (China Protocol) would
never have come into effect and become legally meaningful without the approval and
acceptance ofboth China and WTO members. 814 Given the "one-sided" nature of the
accession package in regard to China's overwhelming obligations, it does not seem to

<

~

present a problem for WTO members to endorse this package, for the latter comes
fully within their expectations. As for China, the situation turns out to be interesting.
One may wonder why the country, with a particular sensitivity towards foreign
interference in domestic affairs and an emphasis on reciprocity and mutual benefit in
trade relations with the West, which can be attributed to her historical experience in
humiliating and discriminatory treatment, would agree to such comprehensive WTO
terms. 815 After all, "no country has endured as lengthy an accession process to the
GATTIWTO as China, nor has any country acceding to the WTO been asked to take
on as many concessions as the price for admission," the latter has led to the
comprehensiveness of China's accession package. 816

The answer is simple: China sees the WTO membership as beneficial, or, more
precisely, the Chinese believe "the costs of remaining outside the WTO may well
exceed the costs of joining."817 According to some Chinese top trade officials, the
WTO accession will help China expand foreign trade, deepen the ongoing economic
813

/d.

814

/d. at 60-61.

815

Halverson, supra note 741, at 331.

816

/d. at 323.

817

!d. at 332.
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reforms in domestic sphere, and engage actively in international economic affairs (e.g.,
decision making) and resisting trade protectionism. 818

In a word, the WTO

membership may allow the country to accelerate the pace of integrating into the world
economy, and signal her status as a global economic power. 819

Among these strategic considerations, to deepen China's ongoing domestic economic
reforms takes a lead. Although the Chinese leaders may differ about the pace and
depth of economic reforms, they nevertheless agree there can never be a turning back
towards the command economy. 820 Particularly, the 1997 Asian financial crisis
convinced the Chinese leadership of the need to complete their economic reforms.
Considering the worsening impact of the state-owned sector as a drag on economic
growth, together with the growing debt crisis in the state-own financial sector, they
might have viewed WTO accession as "generating necessary momentum" to complete
the most politically difficult stage of China's move to a market economy. Over the
past two decades, China has made incredible strides at reforms, and, as the Chinese
leaders believe, committing China to abide by international treaty rules and the rule of
law in the conduct of trade and in domestic policy reform is likely to take this process
forward at an even more impressive pace. 821

l·
I
I

The Chinese leaders would not recognize a reversal of the open-door policy within the
international economy. 822 In this regard, China's lack of the GATT/WTO membership
did not preclude it from becoming an active member of the international trading
community. Since the introduction of an open-door policy in the late 1970s, and the
appointment of Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader in 1986, China has pursued a
vigorous trade policy. In the last twenty years it has undertaken economic reforms
aimed at freeing up its imports and exports and encouraging foreign investment.
818

YANG & CHENG, supra note 731, at 302-304.

819

Halverson, supra note 741, at 332.
Yahuda, supra note 757, at 307.
821
Gertler, supra note 745, at 65.
820
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Meanwhile, China has undergone extensive political changes, and conducted major
reform of its legal system, both of which contributed to an increase of Chinese slice of
the international trade pie. 823

Nevertheless, until it entered the WTO in 2001, China was excluded from the
international trading system.

Not only was the country limited in its ability to

participate on the same terms as WTO Members in the negotiation of new standards
relevant to trade, it was also precluded from the WTO's dispute settlement process.
Moreover, unlike most other states, China was subject to the annual ritual of scrutiny
by the US Congress in order to gain the MFN status in the U.S. 824 China's accession
to the WTO is expected to overcome, to a greater or lesser degree, all of the above
disadvantages. With the recognition and prestige of the WTO, China may gain much
leverage to enable her to play an active role in the international trading community.
Directly, the accession will provide the 1.3 billion Chinese people with secure,
predictable and non-discriminatory access to the markets of 143 trading partners, as
well as their various goods and services. 825 More significantly, with the WTO
membership, China will be entitled to the privileges of the GATTIWTO system,
including the MFN treatments, utilization of the WTO dispute settlement process, as
well as the participation in decision making.

J

I,

'
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Of course, the cost of China's WTO accession can hardly be overstated, especially in
terms of the difficulties facing many Chinese sectors upon the accession. The impact
on loss-making state industries, less-developed agricultural communities and myriad
government-financed projects across the country will be dramatic. Moreover, the socalled 'adjustment' to new, more competitive market conditions, will, for millions of
individuals and families, mean unemployment and significant "displacement" 826 No
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Cass, Williams & Barker eels., supra note 722, at 2.
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Gertler, supra note 745, at 65.
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doubt, it will take many years for large segments of China to establish a new
equilibrium, during which time many citizens will be facing considerable hardship.827

Nevertheless, such an "adjustment" has occurred long before China's accession to the
WTO, while the Chinese people are hardly strangers to this process. Back to the early
1990s, China already introduced a bankruptcy law and other legislation making state
industries in principle responsible for their own profits and losses. Over at least a
decade now, China has radically reduced state subsidies and encouraged development
of private enterprises in many sectors. 828 Since the mid-1990s in particular, and as a
member of the IMF, China has rationalized and liberalized handling of its foreignexchange market. Besides, China has progressively, yet dramatically, reduced its
import tariffs and other non-tariff restrictions on foreign participation in the Chinese
market. 829 Whether or not China acceded to the WTO, she will continue with this
process of self-adjustment, so as to build up a market economy and be further
integrated into the international community for her own development and prosperity.

~

."'
~·
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Accordingly, it is hard to say that the "cost" of China's WTO accession is exclusively
attributed to this historic event, although the latter may have rendered the cost more
"tangible" than otherwise.

If one views China's economic reforms and her new

opening to the outside world as an inevitable course, the WTO accession would be a
significant link in this course, while the pursuit of this course, or specifically, the

I
I
I
'

existence of this link, is just a matter of time. In this sense, in terms of China's WTO
accession, there is little to lose but much to win, even for the Chinese people. From
this perspective, it will be easy to understand why China finally decided to accept the
comprehensive WTO bid.

In effect, it is mainly the collective political will of

Chinese leaders that make China's WTO accession possible, and make the accession
package what it has been.
I

i
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2.

Implications

of

the

"Accession

Package"

for

China's

Implementation of WTO obligations

Upon the WTO accession, China has taken on a major but somehow "imponderable"
task of fulfilling its various WTO commitments. In this process, questions may arise
,_

as to "whether and how" China will be able to ensure "uniform and impartial
implementation" of its WTO obligations.

830

However, a prerequisite is to clarify

1.

I

"what" to implement, which in tum depends on the contents of China's accession
process, namely, its "accession package" as mentioned above. The implications of
this "accession package" for China's WTO implementation are "tangible."

The

"package" is the "objective" of such implementation. In another word, legal nature

r"
)

I*'

..

!..•
!

and functioning of this process depends on the formation, substances and

•

enforceability of this "accession package."

I
,,

~
t

i

First, the formation of China's "accession package" through the bilateral and finally,
multilateral negotiations indicates a process of essentially "multilateralizing" China's
obligations vis-a-vis other WTO members, allowing China to "replace the many risky
and uncertain bilateral relationships" it used to rely on to conduct its trade relation
with major trading partners, ''by a single, multilateral trade relationship with the rest

'1

ofthe world." This represents a crucial change in the legal nature of China's external
trade relations, and has inevitably increased the complexity of the implementation
process.

Meanwhile, upon the WTO accession, China could avail herself of the

privileges and rights under the multilateral GATTIWTO regime, especially the access

I·••
I

to the WTO dispute settlement process.

This has created the interplay between

international and domestic enforcement mechanism, leaving room for the results of
the WTO dispute settlement process to be implemented in the domestic system. The

ji

process ofWTO implementation will accordingly be complicated.

I
830

/d. at 66.
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Secondly, the contents of China's "accession package" are essentially about "a one,:

way set of commitments (from China's side only)."831 As noted earlier, the "package"
consists of two major treaty texts, Accession Protocol and Working Party Report, with
a number of annexes. It contains essentially China's obligations and commitments
vis-a-vis other WTO Members, the latter are indispensable to China's WTO
implementation. As a result, China's WTO implementation will be nothing more than
a process of fulfilling these comprehensive obligations.

Therefore, from an

international law perspective, China's "accession package" deserves a thorough

. ':

articulation for the purpose of its WTO implementation. This will be discussed in the
next chapter.

Finally, the Chinese political will - which has already made the accession package
legally meaningful - will be equally essential to China's WTO implementation.
Given China's strategic considerations for the WTO accession, her willingness to
fulfill the WTO commitments is not in doubt, although there has been little query that
the country "will be a difficult member to integrate fully into the organization." The
issue is rather a matter of the "capacity" than that of the "willingness." This is not
I

•

unique to China. In practice, it has been "far from easy for the WTO to demand
effective implementation," and, much will depend on the standards imposed on the
WTO member concerned, like China. 832

Since the WTO has tolerated a wide range of performance by its over one hundred
and forty members, why not China? As some observations indicate, the OECD
countries have varied greatly in their compliance with the ostensible rules of the WTO,

I

"as may be seen from considering such different cases as Japan, the U.S., EU

il

countries and say South Korea." 833 Therefore, it is not really surprising that China
II'

831

/d. at 60.
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Yahuda, supra note 757, at 310.
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may undertake the WTO implementation by her own approaches, even though it may
tum out to be at odd with others' practice. As an old Chinese saying describes, this is
a process of "reaching the same goal from every path."

r·

In this context, some

perspectives represented by a senior WTO official should be highly appreciated,
claiming that "at this stage, we can do little more than wish China and its people 'bon
courage' as they venture down the extremely challenging and tortuous path that
stretches before them."834

I.

834

Gertler, supra note 745, at 67.
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CHAPTER 2 STATIJS OF WTO LAW IN CHINESE DOMESTIC LAW

I.

Status of Treaties in Chinese Domestic law

Theoretically, the status of treaties in domestic law may be conceived from five major
perspectives: (1) validity of treaties in domestic law; (2) domestic legislation of
treaty-making process; (3) power to implement treaties in domestic legal system; (4)
choice between direct application of treaties and an act of transformation under the
domestic legal system; and, (5) "hierarchical status" of treaties in domestic law. They
are primarily governed by the national constitution, and may also be addressed by
other internal legal authority.

Pragmatically, the status of treaties within a national legal system is shaped
collectively by various national legal instruments, including constitutional
arrangements, legislation, judiciary decisions, as well as administrative rulings
(Prospective (3)). As noted above, the status of treaties in a national legal system
represents one primary dimension of the relationship between treaty obligations and
consistency with domestic law. The health of such relationship will then depend
largely on the maintenance of a "proper'' balance with all applicable national legal
instruments, in a dynamic process of "domestic implementation," which in tum is
conditioned upon the "legal effect'' (Perspective (4)) and the "hierarchical status"
(Perspective (5)) of these treaties. Accordingly, to obtain a sound perception of
domestic legal status of treaties, one should take into account all above five
perspectives, with a particular focus on "domestic implementation" of these treaties.
As previously discussed, both the U.S. and the EC have adhered to this proposition in
their practice. The present chapter is devoted to a similar exercise taken by the
People's Republic of China.

.,.
1.

Relationship between Treaties and Chinese Domestic Law under

"I
I

I

I
294

-

International Law

I

(

In the eyes of international law, relations between treaties and domestic law are
governed by a well-established set of principle, Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties ("Vienna Convention"). Article 26 and 27 of this Convention codify and
complement a fundamental general principle of pacta sunt servanda, requiring
domestic law to adhere to international treaty obligations, especially in case of a clash
between the two, the latter may incur "state responsibility" for the nation state
concerned. 835 The Vienna Convention entered into force on January 27, 1980, binding

I·

upon all parties to it in terms of treating all treaties they have entered into at
international level. For the non-parties to this Convention, it is still binding upon
them as customary international law.

China officially became a party to the Vienna Convention on October 3, 1997. Back
to May 9 of that year, the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National
People's Congress approved China's accession to this Convention. Four months latter,
the representatives of the Chinese government deposited the instrument of Accession
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, just a month before this Convention
took effect for China. 836 Since then, the Vienna Convention has - in particular regard
to its codification of the principle of pacta sunt servanda - played a leading role in
defining, at international level, the status of each treaty to which China is a party in
Chinese domestic law. As a matter of fact, the Chinese government has consistently

,,

maintained its adherence to this Convention and the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

I"

Moreover, the Chinese government has codified this principle in a number of Chinese

1,·

statutory provisions, which, as will be seen later, prescribe the direct effect of treaty

I

provisions in certain circumstances. 837

i·
835

See supra note 244 and 245.

836

NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE LEIGH 15 8

I

(Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington eds. 2005).
837

LI Zhaojie, Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law: Practice ofthe People's Republic of China, 16 no 1
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2.

Status of Treaties in Chinese Constitutional Arrangements

A.

Common Guideline of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (Tentative Constitution of the
PRC)

II

'

The constitutional history of the People's Republic of China can be traced back to the
eve of the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC). On September 29, 1949,
the Common Guideline of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (the
"Common Guideline") was adopted by the

1st

plenary session of this conference,

I
,,

I
!"'

.
~

ri

which is the so-called "tentative Constitution" of the PRC. Under Article 55 of the

1
,..

Common Guideline, "[f]or the treaties and agreements concluded by the Kuomintang

I

government with foreign governments, the Central People's Government of the
People's Republic of China should examine them, according to their contents, to
recognize, abolish, revise, or re-conclude them respectively." 838

This article was regarded as the PRC government's general guiding principle for
handling treaties concluded by the past government, which especially addressed the
validity of treaties in Chinese domestic law. Particularly, "recognition" represents a
special concept in China's treaty practice, meaning the recognition of the validity of
any legal action taken on a treaty that was previously signed, ratified or acceded to by
the predecessor Chinese government. Upon such recognition, the treaty concerned
would still be subject to ratification for its validity in Chinese internal law, as in the
case of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 1956. Furthermore, by stipulating
that the power to conclude treaties belonged to the Central People's Government, the
article addressed the issue of treaty-making process under Chinese internal law,
although it did not provide any specific procedures in this context. 839

..
'

I
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Hollis, Blakeslee & Ederington eds., supra note 836, at 155.
/d. at 155-156.
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B.

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China

I

,I
•I

(Constitution of the PRC)

.I

I

:

On September 20, 1954, the first Constitution of the PRC was adopted at the 1st
meeting of the 1st National People's Congress of the PRC, and was thus titled as the
"1954 Constitution." Under Article 31 of this Constitution, the Standing Committee

of the National People's Congress decided on the ratification and abrogation of
treaties concluded with foreign states. Article 41 further provided that the President
of the PRC shall, in accordance with decisions of the Standing Committee of the
National People•s Congress, ratify and abrogate treaties with foreign states. One

.
~

month later, to implement these constitutional provisions, the 1st National People's

I

Congress adopted a decision of its Standing Committee on the Procedure of

I I

Rectifying a Treaty Concluded with Foreign States at its 1st meeting. 840 Both the 1954
Constitution and the above related legislative decision merely focused on domestic
treaty-making process, especially the allocation of treaty-making power, without
referring to other issues crucial to the status of treaties in Chinese domestic law.

The current PRC Constitution, which is the forth Constitution adopted at the 5th
meeting of the 5th PRC National People's Congress on December 4, 1982 (thereinafter
as the "1982 Constitution•'), restates above provisions of the 1954 Constitution
concerning the power of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to
decide "on the ratification and abrogation of treaties and important agreements"
(Paragraph 14, Article 67), as well as that of the President of the PRC to ratify or
abrogate them (Article 81). Moreover, Paragraph 9 of Article 89 provides that the
state council has responsibility to "conduct foreign affairs and conclude treaties and
agreements with foreign states." 841 Equally, the current Constitution of the PRC
merely addresses the allocation of the treaty-making process without touching other
840

/d. at 156. FT2.

841

/d. at 157.
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issues crucial to the status of treaties in Chinese domestic law.

Notably, the current PRC Constitution does codify China's general principles of
foreign policy, providing that "China consistently carries out an independent foreign
policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect, for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing
diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries."842 It
is based upon this constitutional stipulation that China has concluded a large number
of treaties with foreign states. 843 Being policy-oriented in nature, this stipulation does

oi

not explicitly address the status of treaties in Chinese legal system, but does lay a
foundation for China to fulfill its international obligations in good faith, especially its
. I

treaty obligations.

3.

I

Status of Treaties under China's Law ofTreaties

On December 28, 1990, the Law ofthe People's Republic of China on the Procedures

for the Conclusion of Treaties (hereinafter as the "Treaty Procedures Law") was
adopted at the 17th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th National People's
Congress, marking a new era for Chinese treaty practice. With a higher "hierarchical
status" than that of the decisions of the National People's Congress and regulations of

I

r:

the State Council, this law of treaties of the PRC for the first time laid down
procedural rules for the conclusion of treaties, based on China's 45 years of treaty
practice since 1949. 844

In stead of giving a definition of a treaty, the Treaty Procedures Law defines its

govermng scope in Article 2 as covering "bilateral or multilateral treaties and
842

/d. at 156.

843

!d. at 163.
!d. at 157.
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agreements and other instruments in the nature of a treaty or an agreement concluded

;'

between the People's Republic of China and foreign states." Article 4 of this law
categorizes these "treaties and agreements" by the respective names in which the PRC
has concluded them, ranging from the PRC, the Government of the PRC to the

.\
1:

governmental departments of the PRC. Article 5 then lays down detailed rules and

,I

procedures for negotiation and signature of these different types of treaties. Notably,
the Treaty Procedures Law does not specify the title of a treaty. Although contracting
forms or procedures for the entry into force of a treaty may depend on its title, the
effect of it may not. For China, the commonly used treaty titles include: treaty,
convention, protocol, agreement, exchange of notes, exchange of letters, minutes,

~

memorandum of understanding, joint communique, joint statement, etc. 845

'r'
I

r

Article 3 of the Treaty Procedures Law incorporates the provisions of the 1982
Constitution on the allocation of treaty-making power, 846 specifying respectively the
role of the State Council, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
and the President of the PRC in domestic treaty-making process. 847 Specifically, the

·'·

I

power to conclude treaties belongs to the State Council, through the procedures on
treaty drafting, approval of treaty proposal, negotiation, signature, entry into force,
amendment, termination and the issuance of full powers to its representatives. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of the State Council, administers the
specific affairs concerning the conclusion of the treaties and agreements with foreign

I'

I

affairs. 848 In this regard, Article 5 sets out the procedure for initiating the conclusion
of a treaty, and Article 6 does that for the appointment of representatives with full
845

!d. at 159.

846

See, Articles 67, 81 and 89 of the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

847

Hollis, Blakeslee & Ederington eds., supra note 836, at 157. Under Article 3, the State Council

shall conclude treaties and agreements with foreign states. The Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress of the PRC shall decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties and important
agreements concluded with foreign states. The President of the PRC shall, in accordance with such
decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC, ratify and abrogate
treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states.
848
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powers. 849

With regard to the formalities to be processed upon the signature of a treaty, the
Treaty Procedure Law sets out "internal legal procedure" for treaty ratification
(Article 7), approval (Article 8) and recording and registration (Article 8). 850 Also,
this Law particularly refers to the accession and acceptance of multilateral treaties.
Under Article 11, accession to a multilateral treaty shall be decided by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress or by the State Council. Under Article
12, the State Council shall decide upon the acceptance of a multilateral treaty.
Meanwhile, the Law provides for the publication, registration and amendment of a
treaty in Article 16, 17, and 19, respectively.851 In addition, the Treaty Procedure Law
addresses the compilation of the collection of treaties in Article 16. 852

From all above, the Treaty Procedure Law has achieved the most elaborate and
operational rules for the conclusion of treaties by China. More significantly, since the
Law was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and
promulgated under the decree of the PRC President, it has the higher "hierarchical
status" than any decision of the National People's Congress or administrative
regulation, - before or after its enactment - in the same context, and therefore makes
itself a uniform, major treaty law of China.853 However, the Treaty Procedures Law,
as its title suggests, focuses on Chinese domestic treaty-making process, and thus
reflects only part of the status of treaties in Chinese internal law. Silent on other
crucial issues in this context, e.g., the legal effect and "hierarchical status" of treaties,
the Law has not yet rendered a clearer legal status for treaties in the Chinese legal
system.

849

!d. at 159-160.
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!d. at 162-163.
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Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that domestic treaty-making process still has
significant implications for other respects of the status of treaties in domestic law. In
general, domestic validity of treaties may derive from their acceptance into domestic
law through domestic treaty-making process. This is equally true for China, where
the validity of treaties under the Chinese law may derive immediately from their
validity under international law. In the latter circumstances, the Treaty Procedures
Law mandates that China and other contracting parties fulfill their domestic
procedural requirements and notify each other through diplomatic channel.

854

Thus,

.
l·

the issue of domestic validity of treaties is closely linked to that of their domestic
treaty-making process.

Besides, parallel with that of domestic legislative power, the structure of domestic
treaty-making power may provide for a sensible reference to the "hierarchical status"

I

I

of a treaty in domestic law, assuming that treaty is both directly applicable and
invocable. Under the Constitution and the Law on Legislation of the PRC, national
legislative power is allocated among the National People's Congress, its Standing
Committee and the State Council, similar to the allocation of treaty-making power as
noted above.

More importantly, in terms of their law-making power these three

II
l

legislative bodies rank hierarchically towards each other in the Chinese domestic legal
order. This suggests that treaties and laws made by the same legislative body may
stand equal to each other, and further, the legal status of treaties made by one
legislative body, likely depends on the hierarchy of the national legal system where
this body ranks. 855

·II
Admittedly, these two submissions are rather practical and pragmatic in nature,
without being explicitly addressed either by the current Constitution or by the major
PRC law of treaties. Together with other crucial issues absent in the same context,
they are more reflected or even confirmed in the practice of respective Chinese
as 4 LI, supra note 837, at 74. Ff 115.
ass /d. at 89-90.

301

authorities on "treaty implementation" as discussed below.

4.

Status of Treaties in China's "Treaty Implementation" Practice

The proceeding discussions reveal the fact that neither the current PRC Constitution
nor any major Chinese law of treaties has been explicit in all crucial respects of the
status of treaties in Chinese domestic law. In particular, they are both silent on the
issue of "treaty implementation," the latter mainly involves the "domestic legal
effect" of a treaty and its "hierarchical status" in Chinese legislation, as collectively
determined by the Chinese legislature, judiciary and administrative bodies. Thus, in
the absence of constitutional and legislative references, the domestic legal status of a
particular treaty can only be identified through the practice of the above Chinese
government authorities in treaty implementation.

This will be the focus of the

ensuing discussions.

A.

Granting "Trumping effect" to Treaties: China's Past
Practice in Treaty Implementation

China's treaty implementation practice has long been inconsistent and even selfcontradictory. For a time, there was a frequently-followed principle: if a treaty to
which China is a party contains provisions inconsistent with the Chinese law, treaty
provisions should prevail, unless China has made reservations to them. This principle
has been adopted in a number of Chinese statutes. An earliest example was Article
189 of the Civil Procedural Law ofthe P RC of 1982, which reads "if a provision of an
international treaty which China has concluded or acceded to is different from that of
the present law, the treaty provision shall apply, unless China has made reservations to
the provision." Since then, the principle has been consistently incorporated into the
relevant provision of subsequent Chinese statutes, e.g., Article 142 of the General
Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC of 1986, Article 72 of the Administrative
Procedural Law of the PRC OF 1989, Article 238 of the Civil Procedural Law of the
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PRC of 1991, Article 17 of the Criminal Procedural Law ofthe PRC as revised in
1996, and Article 9 of the Criminal Law of the PRC as revised in 1997. The same

provision can also be found in the Customs Law of the PRC of 1987, the Patent Law
of the PRC of 1992, the Maritime Law of the PRC of 1992, the Trademark Law of the
PRC of 1993 and the Civil Aviation Law of the PRC of 1995. 856

The application of this principle entails certain interesting bearings for China's
practice in treaty implementation. First, the principle is adopted for the purpose of a
particular Chinese statute, without specifying any particular treaty or (its provisions),
suggesting that any treaty (or its provision) relevant to that domestic statute (by virtue
of subject matter) would be taken into account.

Furthermore, for individual

provisions of a treaty, rather than that treaty as a whole, the principle implies that it
may only give the priority to the treaty concerned on a provision-by-provision basis.
Nevertheless, this principle has established a broad scope of application towards the
"hierarchical status" of treaties in Chinese domestic law, despite the linging
ambiguities as to how to identify these treaties.
t'

Secondly, by granting the trumping effect to treaty provisions, this principle implies
that a given treaty provision is not only valid in Chinese law, but also directly
applicable and invocable within the Chinese legal order.

After all the domestic

validity of a treaty is an essential prerequisite for an inquiry into other respects of its
status in domestic law, and therefore, clarification of those "other respects" - e.g.,
"hierarchical status" of the treaty - will in tum presupposes such validity. Also, the
higher "hierarchical status" of a treaty (or part of it) usually comes up wherever its
direct applicability and invocability have been secured, as evident in the case of this
principle.

In addition, by granting the trumping effects to treaty provisions, the

hierarchy of Chinese domestic legal order may apply to the relationship between
treaty provisions and domestic norms, especially at a "horizontal level," where treaty
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provisions may come in to a conflict with domestic norms. 857

Thirdly, in explicitly granting the trumping effect to treaty provisions over domestic
norms, this principle is silent on whether the conflicting norms under reference are
previously or subsequently enacted.

Thus, it implicitly excludes, under the Chinese

legal system, the application of lex posteriori derogate priori to a conflict between a
prior treaty and a subsequent domestic statute, while there is not necessarily a conflict
between a prior treaty and a subsequent treaty of the same rank. Consequently, under
this principle, treaty provisions will always prevail over domestic statutory norms,
even though the latter is enacted subsequently to the former. 858
•'

Finally, as mentioned above, this principle has been incorporated by a number of
Chinese laws (statutes).

Given a large number of those statutory provisions

.;.

concerned, as well as their extensive subject matters, it is doubtless that the
application of this principle constitutes a major part of China's "treaty
implementation" practice. Actually, the adherence of this principle used to be China's
leading practice in treaty implementation, manifesting "the firm resolution of the PRC
to carry out in good faith the principle of pacta sunt servanda."859 Notably, none of
these statutory provisions is constitutional in nature, even though some have fallen
into the category of ''basic laws" within the scope of Article 62 of the Constitution. 860
Besides, given the substance of each individual domestic statute concerned, the
principle provides not a general, but a case-by-case approach of treating treaties
preferentially to Chinese domestic law, which is merely part of China's practice in
treaty implementation, 861 or, more precisely, represents a special case of "direct
application" and higher "hierarchical status" of treaties as defined by the Chinese
legislature.
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B.

Direct Application or Transformation: Trends of China's
Practice in Treaty Implementation

As a practical matter, the "hierarchical status" of treaties or treaty provisions seldom
comes up as the primary concern with regard to their domestic implementation.
Instead, the Chinese authorities pay more attention to the "formality" of treaty
implementation, the latter refers to either the "direct application" or the
"transformation" of treaties and their provisions.

How to choose between these two

formalities is crucial to the status of treaties in Chinese domestic law. As indicated
before, this issue is explicitly addressed neither by the PRC Constitution nor by the
major Chinese treaty law, while the answers to it are more likely to be formed in the
practice of Chinese authorities, namely, the legislature, the administrative body and
the judiciary. 862

As noted above, statutory-based provisions which allow direct application of treaties
are not a scarcity in China's domestic legal system, as they used to be the leading part
of China's practice on domestic treaty implementation, featuring a primary role of the
Chinese legislature, especially the National People's Congress and its Standing
Committee. 863 However, given the wide scope of treaties as defined under Chinese
legal system, as well as their rapid expansion in recent year involving extensive
subjects in international economic and trade relations, more and more treaties to
which China is a party require further domestic legislative or administrative actions
for their enforcement, the so-called process of"transformation." 864 This has been the
current trend in China's domestic treaty implementation.

In China, "transformation" of treaties is mainly undertaken by the legislative and
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administrative bodies through many administrative laws and regulations. Take, for
instance, the subject of foreign and diplomatic relations. China acceded to the Vienna

Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961in 1975 and the Vienna Convention on
Consular relations of 1963 in 1979. To implement these two Conventions, China
enacted the Regulations of the PRC Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and

Immunities and the Regulations of the PRC Concerning Consular Privileges and
Immunities in 1986 and 1990 respectively. Consequently, it is these regulations rather
than the two Conventions that will be directly applied under Chinese legal system. 865

With regard to international economic and trade relations, many treaties acceded to by
China call for their transformation for domestic implementation purpose. For instance,
on September 25, 1992, the State Council issued Decree No.1 05 of the State Council

of the PRCfor the implementation of the International Copyright Treaty. In order to

,,

implement the Patent Cooperation Treaty, China's Patent Bureau enacted the

Regulation on the Implementation of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1995. In 1997,
the State Council published the Notice on Chinas Nuclear Export Policy, which laid
down specific rules and regulations in strict line with the provisions of the Treaty on

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In a more indirect way, Article 12 of the
Regulation of Maritime Transportation of Containers enacted by the State Council in

..
I,
I

1990 stipulates that the transport of containers by sea should accord with international
container standards, fixed technical standards, as well as regulations of relevant
international container transport conventions. 866

Besides, judicial interpretations by the Supreme People's Court of China (SPC) may
also concern treaty implementation. Despite the unclear legal nature of such ·~udicial
legislation," the SPC judicial interpretations are by all means binding upon the lower
People's courts. In terms of their role in domestic treaty implementation, here are two
earlier examples. The first is the enforcement of the Convention on the Recognition
865
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and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention"). Upon
China's accession to this convention, the SPC issued a notice to the lower courts
concerning the application of the Convention. Another example is about service of
legal documents to foreign nationals or permanent residents of foreign countries.

j.

867

On February 1, 1988, the SPC issued the notice on the implementation of Chinese-

Foreign Judicial Assistance Agreement, 868 mandating the lower courts to adopt the
means of services in accordance with the terms of the treaties to which both China
and the national state of the person concerned are parties. 869

As both these judicial notices mandate the PRC courts conscientiously to handle the
matter strictly in conformity with the treaty provisions concerned, questions may arise
as to whether they fall within the definition of "direct application" (as a substantive

•'1

matter), or that of "transformation" (as a procedural matter). From the viewpoint of
this author, they should be considered as "transformation" by implementation of the
convention concerned within the Chinese jurisdiction. In these circumstances, even
though the court may end up applying the provisions contained in the conventions,
such treaty application is actually based upon the two judicial notices with legislative
effect.

Discussions so far have focused on the legislative activities of Chinese authorities in
domestic treaty implementation, which is half way to the whole implementation
process. After the direct application or transformation of a treaty (or part of it) is
recognized or processed by the Chinese legislation, it is incumbent upon Chinese
courts to apply the treaty provisions concerned, or their transformation as embodied in

(
I·
r.

the specific domestic legislation in a particular trial, a stage of enormous practical
significance in China's domestic treaty implementation where Chinese courts play a

r.

predominant role.
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According to some earlier observations, there used to be "very few cases" corning up
with the question of direct application of treaties in the PRC judicial practice, with
one having been singled out regarding an international carriage dispute between a
Belgium-based diamond company, and a Beijing-registered agency of a Chinese air
carrier. 870

The presiding court lately applied Article 22(2(d)) of the Warsaw

Convention of 1929.871 In recent years, China's judicial practice in this context has
been rapidly expanded, despite the absence of public attention in this area.
Particularly, after China acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
December 2001, the Chinese courts have made remarkable progress in the
implementation of WTO treaty norms (mostly with the provisions of the TRIPs
Agreement), even in an indirect way. This will be elaborated as follows.

ll.

The Law of the WTO in the Chinese Context

From the outset, the law of the WTO refers to a comprehensive treaty system under
the WTO auspices. At the core of this "fundamental source of WTO law" are the
Uruguay Round Agreements of 1994, consisting mainly of the "Multilateral Trade
Agreements" (MTAs) which cover the WTO Agreement and its first three annexes, as
well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements (PTAs) which refer to the fourth annex
therein. Despite a difference in the scope of their binding force (as being either
multilateral or plurilateral in nature), both the MTAs and PTAs bind their respective
Members in a rather uniformed than "member-specific" manner.

This "legal

uniformity" has been seen as a significant achievement on the WTO rule of law.

Nevertheless, the accession procedures of the WTO create a "loophole" in the above
treaty system. Under Article XII of the WTO Agreement, an acceding Member must
negotiate its "ticket of entry" - in the form of "terms of accession" - with each
870

U, supra note 837, at 82.

871

!d. at 82-83.
t'

308

interested Members at bilateral and multilateral levels, with these terms of accession
without limitation.872 This result is a series of"post-1994 protocols of accession" for
the acceding Members of the WTO.

These accession protocols appear to be

"member-specific" in nature, with their substance varying abruptly due to the
outcomes of the accession negotiations for each acceding Member.

Meanwhile, the post-1994 protocols of accession have invariably made by their own
provisions formed "an integral part of the WTO Agreement" and thereby incorporated
into the well-unified WTO treaty structure.

Thus, in the context of an acceding

Member, the "WTO law" includes not only the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1994
(as the "standard" WTO treaty regime), but also the particular protocol of accession
for this Member (as the "member-specific" WTO treaty law), regardless of any
possible inconsistency between the two. This seems to suggest that an acceding
Member will have to shoulder a "double burden" of its WTO implementation by
virtue of two convergent sources of WTO law. In fact, the issue depends on the
·t

relationship between the "standard" WTO treaty regulation and the Member-specific

'·

law-generating treaties, especially in terms of their length and substance. In any event,
implementing WTO law for an individual acceding Member must be examined in the
context of that particular Member, especially having regard to its accession protocol,
which is exactly the case of China as will be discussed below.

1.

China's Accession Protocol: A Unique Part of the WTO Treaty
System

['
~

On the surface, "member-specific" protocols of accession are at odd with the unified
structure of the existing WTO treaty system, which mainly refers to the Uruguay
Round Agreements of 1994. However, depending on their length and substance, these
post-1994 accession protocols may have little or no impact on the overall uniformity

I'

,.

872

,.

Qin, supra note 193, at 487.

309

of the existing WTO treaty structure. This has been the case with the 16 acceding
Members prior to the accession of China. To them, the main text of each of their
accession protocols consists of no more than 2 pages of "standardized provisions,"
which covers nothing more than the necessary procedural and technical matters
relating to the accession process. 873 In that regard, those accession protocols can
hardly be "unique" to the well-established WTO treaty system.

By contrast, China's accession protocol is in every way a unique part of the existing
WTO treaty system, both in length and in substance. With 11 pages of the main text,

.I

9 annexes, as well as 143 paragraphs incorporated by referral from the China Working
Party Report, 874 the China Accession Protocol sets out numerous "special provisions"

'

t,

that have elaborated, expanded, modified or deviated from the existing WTO
agreements. 875 As observed, these special provisions can be categorized as including
three groups that contain, respectively:

{1) Commitments within the scope of the Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs),
which either affirm that China shall comply with existing WTO rules on specific
subjects, or agree that China shall not have recourse to certain WTO provisions
that provide transitional periods for the developing country Members under the
MTAs. They account for a large part of the Protocol provisions (including many
incorporated from the Working Party Report).

(2) Commitments on "WTO-plus" obligations, which usually impose more
stringent disciplines on China than those required by the MTAs. These so-called
"WTO-plus" provisions cover a variety of subjects ranging from transparency,
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judicial review, sub-national government, to foreign investment, national
treatment for foreign investors, economic reform, government procurement, and
compliance review. They inevitably increase the difficulties in China's WTO
implementation.

(3) Commitments that result in "WTO-minus" disciplines and rights, which,
focusing on trade remedy regimes, immediately weaken the existing WTO
disciplines and reduce the rights of China as a WTO Member. 876
1

j

Apparently, the provisions in the first category have little impact on the substance of
the existing WTO treaty norms, although some of them may have the effect of
elaborating and interpreting specific WTO rules.877 On the other hand, many of the
"WTO-plus" provisions in the second category, as well as all of the "WTO-minus"
provisions in the third category, tum out to be "unique" to the China Accession
Protocol. These so-called "ad hoc member-specific rules" in the China Accession
Protocol have created "a new set of rules of conduct" within the WTO treaty system,
"to govern a WTO trade with the 6th largest trading partner in the world. " 878

In terms of quantities, "WTO-plus" and "WTO-minus" provisions are incomparable
to those in the first category. However, their impacts on the well-established WTO
treaty regimes can never be overestimated. There have been increasing concerns
about their potentials for impairing the uniformity of the WTO rules of conduct, as
well as the WTO rule of law, or for imposing "undesirable constraints on the WTO
dispute settlement system." 879

From a more thoughtful perspective, one may be

concerned more as to how these discrepancies between the Protocol and the existing
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WTO agreements will affect China's implementation of her WTO obligations.
Particularly, the subjects covered by most "WTO-plus" provisions directly involve the
key respects of China's domestic implementation of WTO law.

This related back to the question of the relationship between the China Accession
Protocol and the existing WTO agreements. After all, it is of the utmost importance to
clarify each of the "WTO obligations" that China must discharge. The Accession
Protocol has in part answered this question.

Under Part I, paragraph 1.3 of the

Accession Protocol, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, those
obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement ...
should be implemented by China as if it had accepted that [WTO] Agreement on the
date of its entry into force." Although concentrating on the date of effectiveness of
the WTO treaty obligations binding upon China, this provision in-deed suggests
priority of the Accession Protocol to the MTAs. This understanding is in accordance
with some Chinese perspectives which, by applying the rule of lex specialis derogat

generalis to the above relationship, contend that the Accession Protocol should prevail
over the existing WTO agreement concerned in case of a discrepancy between the
two.sso

Although this issue remains controversial, this author sees no practical difference
between above the proposition and the one holding that both the Accession Protocol
and the existing WTO agreements should be of equal legal status since they both form
integral parts of the WTO treaty system. Giving priority to the Accession Protocol
(which has been the current reality) can hardly affect China's "alternative obligations"
under the existing WTO agreements, for most China's obligations under the
Accession Protocol fall within the "first category" reflecting the obligations under the
existing WTO agreements. As for the "WTO-plus" and "WTO-minus" obligations,
88
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which are more stringent than the standard WTO obligations, China's implementation
of them can only enhance the qualification of her WTO counterparts. In either case,
other WTO Members will unlikely challenge the discrepancies between the China
Accession Protocol and the existing WTO agreements in the WTO dispute settlement
process. Hardly can China herself challenge such discrepancies, given the binding
force of the Accession Protocol in international law. Accordingly, China's WTO
implementation is mainly a task of implementing the Accession Protocol, both in
international and domestic settings.

In other words, so far as China's WTO

implementation is concerned, the process is more a matter of the China Accession

l.

Protocol than that of the existing WTO agreements.

2.

Nature and Enforceability of "China-specific" WTO Obligations

China Accession Protocol, which contains the commitments "referred to in paragraph
342 of the Working Party Report," is "an integral part of the WTO Agreement" Like
the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1994, the Accession Protocol represents a
common agreement among all WTO Members, under which most legal obligations
are "one-way" or "one-sided" on the part of China. 881 Being part of the WTO treaty
system, the Accession Protocol (a complete treaty in itself) shares the same legal force
with other existing WTO agreements under international law, regardless of any
discrepancy between the two. This means, the Accession Protocol binds China and
WTO members in regard to the modified terms of China's WTO accession, 882 to the

'I

same extent as other existing WTO agreements, even though the Protocol might in
many respects appear to be inconsistent with the latter.
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As noted previously, the China Accession Protocol has established three categories of
"China-specific" legal obligations. They either confirm or expand the commitments
that China should undertake under the existing WTO treaties, or else they could
operate to decrease the privileges and rights China would have been accorded in the
same context. The last two categories refer to "WTO-Plus" obligations and "WTOminus" obligations, inherently containing significant discrepancies with the standard
WTO obligations. 883 Since the Accession Protocol is an integral part of the WTO
treaty system, these three categories belong to a broad category of "WTO treaty
obligations" emanating from the standard WTO treaty system, and sharing the same
legal nature with it.

h

I

This goes back to the previous discussions (see, Part I) on the nature of WTO treaty
obligations. Depending on the multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral nature of each
respective WTO agreement, legal obligations flowing therefrom vary accordingly.
Those emanating from the MTAs and the PTAs are multilateral and plurilateral in
nature, and are technically termed "regulatory obligations." Those arising from the
"Goods and Services Schedules" are purely bilateral in nature, usually termed "market
access obligations." Since the China Accession Protocol contains both the MTAs and
the Schedules portions, the China-specific obligations flowing therefrom are equally
categorized as either "regulatory obligations" (multilateral in nature) or "specific
market access obligations" (bilateral in nature).

The preceding discussions also introduce some "secondary legal obligations," as the
result of the WTO dispute settlement process to enforce the pertinent WTO treaty
obligations. 884 In this context, the pertinent WTO treaty obligations are deemed to be
"enforceable." China-specific obligations share the same enforceability as a general
WTO treaty obligation to generate the above "secondary legal obligations." Being an
883
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integral part of the WTO Agreement, the Accession Protocol is part of the "covered
agreements" for the purpose of the DSU, with its provisions being fully enforceable
through the WTO dispute settlement procedure. 885

Under the DSU, the failure on the part of a Member to carry out its obligations under
a "cover agreement" is considered a prima facie case of nullification and impairment,
meaning the establishment of a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse
impact on other Members, and that it is up to the Member accused of the breach to
refute the charge. Equally, should China fail to carry out any specific obligations

"'

under the Accession Protocol, other WTO Members may seek redress by resorting to
the WTO dispute settlement process. It will then be incumbent upon China to prove
that such failure did not have an adverse impact on that Member. Therefore, the
consequence of a failure to comply with a China-specific obligation would be no
different from that of a failure to comply with a standard WTO obligation. 886
Likewise, such consequences turn out to be "secondary obligations" as noted above.

For all these, China-specific obligations share the same features and the same legal
status with standard WTO obligations, of which a significant consequence to China's
WTO implementation is that, China should equally honor the Accession Protocol and
the existing WTO agreements, and also equally fulfill the specific WTO obligations
and standard WTO obligations, at both international and domestic levels.

ill.

Status of WTO law in Chinese Domestic Law

The law of the WTO generally refers to a treaty system which, based upon the "WTO
Agreement" and its comprehensive annexes, will also include the Protocol of
'·I•
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Accession for China, so far as that country is concerned. Thus, to examine the status

I

·r

of WTO law in Chinese domestic law turns essentially on a matter of all those WTO
treaties, especially the Accession Protocol.

The status of treaties in Chinese domestic law is a complex issue from various
perspectives, e.g., domestic validity and treaty-making process of treaties, their legal
effect in the Chinese legal system (depending on a choice between direct application
and an act of transformation), as well as the power to implement them in domestic
forum. Under the Chinese legal system, neither the Constitution nor the general law
of treaties has uniformly and thoroughly clarified this issue. The practice of various
Chinese authorities in this regard appears inconsistent and at times even contradictory,
as different treaties are treated somewhat differently.

Occasionally, a treaty in

question may in itself clarify the issue, especially through particular provisions
mandating China to honor the treaty as a whole.

In terms of WTO law, its status in

I

•

Chinese domestic law has been addressed at both international and domestic levels.

,.
1.

Within the Scope of the WTO Agreement

Unlike the case of many other treaties to which China has acceded, the status ofWTO
treaty-based law in Chinese domestic law is, first of all, well established within the
scope of WTO treaties, particularly in paragraph 66, 67 and 68 of the China Working

.1.

Party Report. 887

Paragraph 67 begins with the "validity" and "treaty-making process" of the WTO
Agreement in Chinese legal order, stating that the WTO Agreement "fell within the
category of 'important international agreements' subject to the ratification by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress." In fact, such ratification
was notified by the Chinese government to the Direct-General of the WTO Secretariat
887
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on 11 December 2001, a month before China officially became a member of the WTO.
1brough this domestic law-making process, the WTO Agreement has obtained its
validity within Chinese domestic legal order.

Paragraph 67 addresses the "formalities" to be followed by China for domestic
implementation of the WTO Agreement, stating that "the WTO Agreement would be
implemented by China in an effective and uniform manner through revising its
existing domestic law and enacting new ones fully in compliance with the WTO
Agreement." This actually refers to the acts of "transformation," which may tend to
suggest that China denies the "direct application" of WTO law under domestic legal
order. At this point, the "legal effect" of WTO law under Chinese domestic legal
system is absolutely clear: in the absence of any "direct effect" in Chinese domestic
law, the WTO Agreement is not a part of the Chinese domestic law; nor is it
comparable to any source of Chinese law for the purpose of its "hierarchical status"
within China.

To the extent that domestic implementation of WTO law is primarily a matter of
transformation, the "power to implement WTO law" belongs to the legislative body,
as classified in paragraph 66 of the Working Party Report.

From the reports of

various Chinese legislative bodies and their corresponding legislative enactments,
paragraph 66 cited China's position that "[t]hese features of the Chinese legal system
would ensure an effective and uniform implementation of the obligations after
China's accession [to the WTO]."

Notably, paragraph 66 and 67 reiterate the "statements" of China in the Working Party.
Without being incorporated into the China Accession Protocol, they do not constitute
the "commitments" by China vis-a-vis her WTO counterparts, but merely serve as an
essential indication of those commitments, unlike other paragraphs of the Working

317

,:

•i'
Party Report that are incorporated into the Accession Protocol.888 However, without
the binding force of international law, the two paragraphs are not unuseful for
defining the issue at this point. After all, the status of the WTO Agreement in Chinese
domestic law is basically a matter of domestic law that does not necessarily fall within
the scope of the WTO regimes. So long as the two paragraphs accurately reflect the
intent and practice of China in this regard, they should be taken as a reliable source
for the clarification of the present issue.

However, the above submission does not imply that the commitments by China vis-a-

I•

vis other WTO members, as embodied in the WTO Agreement, are irrelevant to the
status of WTO law in Chinese domestic law.

On the contrary, where the WTO

provisions have expressly addressed one or more aspects of this issue, they actually
"confinn" - to a varying degree - the legal status of WTO law. This is evident in
paragraph 68 of the Working Party Report, which imposes a single obligation upon
China to take an "act of transformation" for domestic WTO implementation.
According to this paragraph, "administrative regulations, departmental rules and other
government measures would be promulgated in a timely manner so that China's
commitments would be fully implemented within the relevant timeframes." Moreover,
"the central government would undertake in a timely manner to revise or annual
administrative regulations or department rules if they were inconsistent with China's
obligations under the WTO Agreement and the Draft Protocol."

Since paragraph 68 has been related by the "Draft Protocol" to constitute an integral
part of the WTO Agreement, it has the force of international law both for China and
her WTO counterparts. But this paragraph actually contains a patent ambiguity. On
the one hand, the requirement for an act of transformation represents a single
"commitment'' of China to fulfill WTO legal obligations in such matter as are
specified therein. On the other, the adoption of an act of "transformation" means that
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China is given a "privilege" to exclude the "direct application" of the WTO
Agreement, a less desirable formality of WTO implementation for most WTO
Members (including China). Whether or not paragraph 68 is treated as China's "legal
obligation" or, instead, her "legal right," by explicitly referring to an act of
"transformation," this paragraph has confirmed the "legal effect" of the WTO
Agreement under the Chinese legal system, one crucial aspect of its status in Chinese

.I

1

I·

domestic law.

The forgoing discussions appear to suggest that, paragraph 66, 67 and 68 of the

··'
I

Working Party Report have been explicit in regard to the status of the WTO
Agreement in Chinese domestic law. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that such

I

li

textual and contextual parts of the WTO Agreement related to this issue are intended
to achieve the purpose of incorporating the general principle of pacta sunt servanda
into the WTO legal regime. As paragraph 67 states, "China would ensure that its laws

• I

and regulations pertaining to or affecting trade were in conformity with the WTO
Agreement and with its commitments so as to fully perform its international
obligations." This appears to be an echo of the principle ofpacta sunt servanda under
international law.

Paragraph 68 confirms where "administrative regulations,

departmental rules or other measures were not in place" timely, "authorities would
still honor China's obligations under the WTO Agreement and Draft Protocol." In
this context, although the principle of pacta sunt servanda is confirmed, it remains
ambiguous how the Chinese authorities will, in the absence of an act of
"transformation," "honor" WTO legal obligations, which appears to be a matter of

I.

Chinese domestic law.

,.

I

In sum, within the scope of the WTO Agreement, the status of WTO law in Chinese

domestic law is well "stated" and "confirmed," especially in some textual and
contextual parts of the China Accession Protocol, namely, paragraphs 66, 67 and 68 of
the China Working Party Report.

As international instruments creating legal

obligations in international law, these WTO agreements are not supposed to mandate
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China's choice of methodology for giving effect to her international obligations under
Chinese internal law. In reality, however, they have been widely and frequently relied
up by various Chinese authorities, wherever there is an issue within the Chinese
domestic legal system.

This is attributable largely to a shortcoming inherent in

Chinese domestic legal system and the difficulty involved in clarifying the entire issue,
which is the focus of the ensuing discussions.

..
2.

Within the Scope of Chinese Domestic law

Under the Chinese legal system, the status of treaties in Chinese domestic law has
been unclear and controversial. The PRC Constitution and the Chinese law of treaties
are silent on the issue. China's practice in this regard has been inconsistent or even
contradictory, since different treaties have been treated differently. In the context of
the WTO Agreement (WTO law), this situation is not much improved, given the

~ '

absence of any Chinese legislation capable of clarifying the issue in a systematic and
consistent manner.

Specifically, upon the WTO accessiOn, China has not enacted any statutory law
comparable to the "Uruguay Round Agreement Act" (URAA) of the U.S., which may
systematically and comprehensively clarify the status of WTO law in Chinese
domestic law. Nor has the competent Chinese treaty-making authority, e.g., Standing
Committee of the NPC, adopted any decision or resolution comparable to the
"Council Decision 94/800 on the Conclusion of the WTO Agreement, the EC
Council" of the EC, which may explicitly and thoroughly clarify this issue. This
significant legislative deficiency, as observed by some Chinese jurists, is attributable
largely to China's inexperience in treaty-making practice. Little attention has been
paid to the status of treaties in domestic law, in regard to their domestic
implementation. 889
I'
889

KONG XIANGJUN, supra note 880, at 145-146.
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Notably, the Supreme People's Court of China (SPC) has practically filled the above
legislative "gap."

As mentioned above, judicial interpretation by the SPC may

concern specifically the question of treaty implementation.

In terms of domestic

implementation of WTO law, the SPC has gone further during its efforts to develop a
WTO-compatible system of judicial review. On 27 August 2002, the SPC issued the

Provisions of the SPC on Certain Issues Related to Hearings of International Trade
Administrative Cases (hereinafter as the "2002 Trade J!'), where it endeavors to
clarify the domestic legal effect ofWTO law in a general sense.

t
t

[.
l

In Article 3, 7 and 8 of the 2002 Trade JI, the SPC implicitly limits the legal grounds
for the People's Court to hear international trade administrative cases to Chinese laws,
regulations and rules at national and local levels. For its silence on the applicability
of WTO law, the SPC made a particular explanation in the press conference for the
enactment of the 2002 Trade Jl. As Hon. LI Guoguang, the-then Vice President of the
SPC, pointed out in this press conference:
The hearings of international trade administrative cases directly concern the
application of international treaties and domestic law, especially domestic
implementation of WTO rules. Given the comprehensiveness and enormous
impacts of wro rules, how to make rules for their domestic implementation

..
l

has invited widespread concerns and become one of the major issues
addressed in the present Provisions. According to Article 67 of the Working
Party Report on the Accession of China, . . . This indicates that WTO rules
cannot be directly applied within the jurisdiction of our country, but instead
should be implemented by means of revising and promulgating domestic
law. . . . Articles 7 and 8 of the Provisions incorporate the spirit of such a
principle, by explicitly providing that in the hearings of administrative cases,
the People's Court shall rely on domestic law( ... omitted). 890
890

LI Guoguang, Zai Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbu 'Guanyu Shenli Guoji Maoyi Xingzheng Anjian
Ruogan Wenti de Guiding' Xinwen Fabuhui Shane De Jianghua (Speech at the Press Conference of the
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Due to the practice of the SPC, the above speech delivered in the press conference for
the issuance of the 2002 Trade

n is actually the

official "annotation" of this set of

judicial interpretations, expressing the position of the SPC towards the status of WTO
law in Chinese domestic law. So far, there has never been any Chinese legal authority
that elaborates the issue to such an extent.

Interestingly, to support its position

towards the issue, the SPC particularly referred to the pertinent context of the WTO
Agreement.

....1

This is actually the approach commonly adopted by other Chinese

authorities (legislative or administrative in nature) as well, wherever they face the
same task of clarifying the issue.

In other words, although well-specified by the WTO legal regime, the domestic status
ofWTO law remains unclear within the scope of Chinese domestic law. In this regard,

•·

given the huge "loophole" in Chinese legislation, Chinese authorities will basically
resort directly to the well-settled WTO legal text and context, especially, paragraph 67
and 68 of the Working Party Report.

It remains interesting to see that if this

"adoption" of WTO legal sources should be considered as "direct application,"
contrary to China's firm and consistent position, embracing the doctrine of

',J

"transformation." By this pragmatic approach, the above issue can always be clarified
in domestic legal system. At this stage, for instance, it has been settled by the Chinese
authorities along the line espoused by the WTO legal regime.

..
As noted above, "treaty implementation" reflects an essential aspect of their domestic
status. It would be impossible to obtain an accurate perception of the status of WTO
law in Chinese domestic law, without looking into its actual implementation in
Chinese domestic legal order. To this end, the next chapter will focus on the domestic
implementation of WTO law in China, based particularly on an empirical study of the
Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China for the Publishing of ' Rules on Certain
Issues Related to Hearings oflnternational Trade Administrative Cases'), 1 REFERENCE TO
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 11 at 12 (Beijing: Law Press, 2002).
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role of the Chinese legislature and the Chinese judiciary in this regard.
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CHAPTER 3 THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE LEGISLATURE AND THE

I

'
JUDICIARY IN THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO LAW:

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Introduction

It has now been more than four years since China officially joined the WTO on

December 11, 2001. Over this period, international trading community -led by major
WTO Members like the U.S. and the EC- has cast numerous concerns about China's
capacity and ability to honor her WTO commitments. In this connection, much
attention has been given to the performance of various Chinese administrative
agencies, as evident in some WTO Members' assessment of China's WTO
compliance. 891 No doubt, like their counterparts in other WTO Member States,
Chinese administrative bodies play a predominant role in fulfilling China's WTO
obligations, especially those concerning market access and other substantive traderelated commitments. Nevertheless, the task of "WTO implementation" does not fall
within the exclusive province of any domestic executive body, in particular.

Conceptually, "treaty implementation" covers both "direct application" and
"transformation," suggesting a crucial role of the national legislature and the judiciary
in the implementing process of WTO law. More importantly, WTO legal regime is
explicit in the role of domestic legislative bodies and courts, imposing upon the
Members a series of obligations that particularly fall within the jurisdiction of the
legislature and the courts. In the case of China, the role of the Chinese legislature and
the judiciary in China's WTO implementation has become even more significant, not
only as specified by the mandate of the China Accession Protocol, but also as
891

United States Trade Representatives, 2005 Report to the Congress on China's WTO Compliance, at

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/Reports Publications/2005/asset uoload file293 8580.
pgf (Dec. 11, 2005).
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confirmed by the currently escalating confrontation between China and a few of its

t,

WTO counterparts (e.g., U.S. and Japan) over China's enforcement of intellectual
property rights. 892 With China's problematic IPR enforcement in the spotlight of the
world, the Chinese legislature and the judiciary are being pushed into the frontier of
China's WTO implementation, and will likely constitute an interesting case study on
their role in the WTO implementation.

Nevertheless, an empirical study in the same context will have to go beyond the above
instances. This is the purpose of this chapter. China's WTO accession has long been
a popular topic for scholarly debates, as well as a focus of political and diplomatic

r
I

attention. Unfortunately, little has been mentioned about the role of the Chinese
legislature and the judiciary in this historically remarkable process, especially as it
related to China's WTO compliance. Take, for instance, the annual report of the
United States Trade Representatives (USTR) on China's WTO compliance, which by
now has been released for the fourth time. In total four reports of this kind, the USTR
repeatedly addressed the situation on China's WTO-compatible judicial review, which

t.
}.

r
II

is supposed to be afforded by the Chinese courts that "have handled cases involving
administrative agency decisions relating to international trade in goods or services or
intellectual property rights." As the USTR consistently echoed in these reports, "so
far, however, there continues to be very little known statistics, as few foreign
companies have had that experience with these courts."893

This chapter reflects the efforts of this author to fill up such a "gap." The chapter
begins with the role of the Chinese legislature in the "transformation" of WTO law.
After an elaboration of China's position towards this "transformation" process, the
chapter will analyze China's legislative practice in this regard, and will also add some
892

United States Trade Representatives, The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade

(JCCT) Outcomes on U.S. Requests, at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/Fact Sheets/2006/asset upload ftle91 9286.pdf(April
11, 2006).
893

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 92.
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reflections and policy recommendations. The following section will discuss the role
of the Chinese judiciary in the "application of WTO law." It first elucidates the role
of Chinese courts in the context of WTO legal regime, and then shifts the focus to the
judicial practice of China's court system in this regard, addressing, respectively, the
role of the Supreme People's Court of China (SPC) and the lower People's Court. A
conclusion will then be drawn accordingly.

I.

The Role of Chinese Legislative Bodies in the "Transformation" of WTO
Law

1.

China's Position towards the "Transformation" ofWTO law

It has been well-recognized that China embraces the doctrine of "transformation" in
her domestic implementation of WTO law.

This position is best illustrated in

paragraph 67 of the China Working Party Report, where the Chinese government
stated that "the WTO Agreement would be implemented by China in an effective and
uniform manner through revising its existing domestic law and enacting new
legislation in fully compliance with the WTO Agreement" This appears to be the
process of "transformation," with the task mainly taken on by the Chinese legislature,
ending up with the new enactment or amendment of the existing Chinese legislation
I.

on the matter at issue.

I'

•'

This goes back to paragraph 66 of the Working Party Report, which particularly
specifies the allocation of the legislative power and the hierarchy of domestic
legislation under the Chinese constitutional and legal system, and therefore
"classifies" the role of respective Chinese legislative bodies to carry out the
"transformation" process of WTO law. Under this paragraph, by virtue of the PRC
Constitution and the Law on Legislation, the National People's Congress {NPC,
highest organ of state power) and its Standing Committee (as its permanent body)
"exercise the legislative power of the State." They "had the power to formulate the
326
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Constitution and laws." The State Council (Central People's Government of China,
executive body of the highest organ of state power) "was entrusted with the power to
formulate administrative regulations."

The ministries, commissions and other

competent departments (collectively "departments") of the State Council may
"issue departmental rules within the jurisdiction of their respective departments and in
accordance with the laws and administrative regulations."

Furthermore, the

"provincial people's congress and their standing committees could adopt local

'·

regulations," and the "provincial governments had the power to make government
rules."

As such, China's legislative power is rather "de-centralized" both "horizontally" and

,r

"vertically." Horizontally, the legislative power is divided into the "state legislative
power," exercised by the NPC (highest organ of the state power) and its Standing
Committee, as well as the "administrative legislative power," exercised by the State

'I

Council (executive body of the highest organ of state power) and its various
departments. Thus, the NPC and its Standing Committee are doubtless the legislative
bodies of the state. The State Council and its various departments, which are actually

.

r·

the administrative bodies at all levels, also serve as the legislative bodies with their
administrative character.

At this stage, the legislative power is allocated at the

national level. 894

In a vertical manner, the legislative power is also shared by the local people's

'

I

I

congress and its standing committee, as well as the local government, mostly at the
provincial level. They therefore serve as a "local legislative body." The diversity of
legislative bodies has long been a significant feature of China's legislative system,
leading to the equally diverse sources of Chinese law, ranging from the Constitution,
laws, administrative regulations and local regulations to the departmental rules and
894

ZHU Liyu, Lun Zhongguo Lifa Tixi De Yange: Jinan 1982 Nian "Xianfa" Banbu Shengxiao 20

Zhounian (Issues on the Evolution of the New China's Legislative System: In Memory of the 201h

Anniversary of the Enactment of the 1982 Constitution), NATIONAL JUDGES COllEGE L. J. 23 (2002).
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local government rules. 895 These features are crucial to the enactment of a new law in
China, one primary formality of "transformation" of WTO law into Chinese domestic
law.

To administer the above diverse legislative bodies and their legislative enactments in
an effective and uniform manner, the PRC constitution and the Law on Legislation
explicitly specify their "hierarchy." As Paragraph 66 of the Working Party Report
further stated, the NPC and its Standing Committee has the power "to annul the
administrative regulations that contradict the Constitution and laws," "as well as the
local regulations that contradict the Constitution, laws and administrative
regulations." And, the State Council has the power "to annul departmental rules and
local government rules inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and administrative
regulations."

This establishes the mechanisms and criteria for the revision and

amendment of the current Chinese law, another primary formality of "transformation"
of WTO law into Chinese domestic law.

By contrast, the WTO legal regime in itself remains unclear as to the hierarchical
status of a source of Chinese law involved in the process of "transformation" of WTO
law. According to paragraph 68 of the Working Party Report, which is integrated into
the China Accession Protocol and becomes part of China's WTO commitments,
"administrative regulations, departmental rules and other central government
measures would be promulgated in a timely manner so that China's regulations,
departmental rules and other central government measures would be fully
implemented within the relevant time frames." Furthermore, ''the central government
would undertake in a timely manner to revise or annul administrative regulations or
departmental rules if they were inconsistent with China's obligations under the WTO
Agreement and Draft Protocol."

Within the meaning of this provision, China's

"transformation" of WTO law into domestic law involves only administrative

a9s Id.
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legislation (in a lower hierarchical status than that of the "laws"), as well as the role of
administrative bodies at various levels (lower-ranking legislative bodies than the NPC
and its Standing Committee).

It is true that some WTO provisions do refer to other sources of Chinese law which, as
promulgated by a higher-ranking legislature than the administrative bodies, are
recognized as having a higher hierarchical status than administrative legislation.
Nevertheless, they are silent on the issue of domestic WTO implementation. Under
Section 2(A)(2) of the China Accession Protocol, "China shall apply and administer in
a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other
measures of the central government as well as local regulations, rules and other
measures issued or applied at the sub-national level (collectively referred to as "laws,
regulations and other measures") pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services,
trade-related aspects if intellectual property rights (TRIPs) or the control of foreign
exchange." This provision, although focusing on those sources of Chinese law that
share the subject matters of the WTO legal regime, does not even refer to the WTO.
Of course, to the extent that it has imposed certain requirements for the management
of such sources of law, the provision will likely affect the process of "transformation"
of WTO law into Chinese domestic law, but do not necessarily lead to the
involvement of any such sources of law, at a higher hierarchical status, and as
promulgated by a higher-ranking legislature, in that process.

In another example, Section 2(A)(3) of the China Accession Protocol particularly

mandates that "China's local regulations, rules and other measures of local
governments at the sub-national level" "conform to the obligations undertaken in the
WTO Agreement and this Protocol." Focusing merely on China's local legislation,
this provision does impose a liberal obligation upon China to comply with WTO legal
regime, but never specify any specific formality of doing so, such as the process of
"transformation." Accordingly, under the current WTO legal regime, China seems
only committed to transform WTO law into domestic law by means of administrative
329
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legislation, with the administrative bodies playing a leading role of the legislative
enactment. It then remains unclear whether those in the higher hierarchical status,
e.g., the Constitution and laws, shall be involved to serve this process of
transformation.

In addition, the above WTO provisions repeatedly refer to the "measures" of the

governments at the central and local level, which in fact do not count as a source of
Chinese law, but are "administrative acts" performed by the administrative bodies at
various levels.

Rule-making in nature, these measures are generally termed

"normative documents," falling within the categories of the "abstractive
administrative acts" under the Chinese administrative law regime.

Actually, it is also questionable whether the "departmental rules and local government
rules" should be viewed as a source of Chinese law. In this connection, the key can
be found in the criteria for defining a source of law. As many have maintained, such
criteria lie in Article 72 and 73 of the Chinese Administrative Procedural Law,
according to which the People's Court shall, for the purpose of hearing an
administrative case, "rely on" laws, administrative regulations and local regulations
but will "take as reference" departmental rules and local government rules. Since the
last two legal authorities are not capable of providing legal grounds for the courts,
they will not have the force of general application, and therefore should not qualify as
a source of law. With such criteria, there would be little difference in the legal force
between departmental/local governmental rules and normative documents, although
the latter is deemed to be in a lower hierarchical status for this purpose.

Unlike the case of departmental rules and local government rules, however, the issue
as to which governmental authority has the power to annul normative documents is
still unsettled.

Under the Chinese administrative law regime, these abstractive

administrative acts are excluded from judicial review, although the court may
"indirectly" annul any normative document by applying its analogy in a higher
330
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hierarchical status. 896 As is a customary practice in China, a normative document can
either be annulled by the administrative agency that makes it, or by another
administrative body ranking higher than that norm-issuing administrative agency.
This actually has little inconsistency with the constitutional and statutory allocation of
the power to annual administrative legislation. 897 Therefore, within the

wro

legal

regime, it should be the administrative bodies and administrative legislation (or the
alike) at various levels, that play a leading role in China's "transformation" ofWTO
law into domestic law, although what China has achieved is far beyond such
"legitimate expectation." This will be examined immediately below.

2.

China's Actual Practice in the "Transformation" ofWTO law

China's efforts to bring its trade-related laws, regulations and other measures into
compliance with the WTO legal regime can be traced back to 1999, long before the
country acceded to the WTO in December 2001.

By the eve of China's WTO

accession, 40 laws and administrative regulations had been enacted or amended, with
another set of 12 administrative regulations annulled; over 2000 departmental rules
had been reviewed, followed by their respective annulment or amendment, as well as
the issuance of the new ones. The Legal Affairs Office and other various departments
of the State Council played a leading role in this "initial transformation" of WI'O
law.898

During the first year of WTO membership, China attached a principal focus on its
framework of laws and regulations governing trade in goods, trade in services, and
Intellectual Property Rights. With an initial review of 2500 of these trade-related
896
897

KONG XIANGJUN, supra note 880.
It appears to be interesting whether this practice, in which a "rule maker" plays at the same time as

the "rule corrector" would be in conflict with the spiritual of the "rule oflaw."
898

Zbenjie Hu, Rushi Dui Woguo Sifa Zhidu De Yingxiang (The impact of China's WTO Accession on
the Chinese Judicial System}, LEGALDAll.Y (Nov. 28, 2001}, at
www .legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-11128/content 28058.htm.
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legal authorities for their WTO consistency, 30 departments of the State Council
reportedly repealed 830 regulations and rules, and issued almost 450 new or revised
rules.

At local level, nearly 190,000 local regulations and rules were reportedly

amended, annulled or terminated. 899 This work continued in 2003, when the central
government issuing more than 100 new or revised laws and regulations in an effort to
meet China's WTO commitments, and 31 provinces and autonomous regions and 49
major cities reportedly repealed over 500 trade-related measures and amended almost
200 more. 900 By these massive transforming activities, China has established a basic
WTO-consistent legal framework for each major trade or trade-related area. The
country continued these efforts in 2004 and 2005, with a pace slowing down to focus
not on the "quantity" but on the "quality" of the desirable legislative products. Below
is a review of some progress achieved in the past four years.

A.

I

Achievements and Progresses

I'

In the area of trade in goods, China has particularly developed a comprehensive legal

framework for trade remedies. Shortly before China's WTO accession, the State
Council revised its regulations on antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD)
and issued a new one on safeguards, in order to make them consistent with the WTO's
AD Agreement, CVD Agreement and Safeguards Agreement.

These three

administrative regulations became effective on January 1, 2002, followed by a series
of ministerial rules issued respectively by the MOFCOM and the SETC, on the
initiation of investigations, questionnaires, hearings or other procedural matters
related to these trade remedy proceedings. In 2003, upon a general reorganization of
the State Council ministries and commissions, the functions of the MOFCOM and the
SETC concerning trade remedies are consolidated into the MOFCOM. The above

899

Xinhua Press, Woguo Chubu Jianqi Fuhe Shi Mao Zuzhi Guize De Shewai Jingji Falv Fagui Tixi (A

legal framework for foreign-related laws and regulations has been initially established to comply with
the WTP rules in our country), at www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/244649.htm (Dec. 10, 2002).
900

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 89.
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regulations and rules were then updated and revised to reflect such changes. 901 In
July 2004, China promulgated the long-awaited revised Foreign Trade Law, which
particularly provides for the full liberalization of trading rights as required by the
China Accession Protocol.902 To implement this statutory amendment, the MOFCOM
issued the "implementing rules" setting out the procedures for a new registration
process in this regard. 903

In the area of trade-related investment, by the time China became a WTO member, it
had finished the review of its laws and administrative regulations governing the
foreign-related enterprises for their compliance with the WTO requirements. 904 As a
result, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress amended the Law
on Chinese-foreign Contractual Joint Ventures and the Law on Foreign-capital
Enterprises in 2002, and the Law on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures in 2003;

the State Council, in the meantime, had amended the regulations for the
implementation of these laws. This part of the "transformation" process is mainly
concerned with export performance, local content, foreign exchange balancing, and
technology transfer.

They represent a "fundamental restructure" of China's legal

framework for foreign investment, a significant progress in the area. 905

It is to be observed that China's most remarkable achievement on her
"transformation" of WTO law is in the area of trade-related intellectual property
rights (IPR).

By the time of her WTO accession, China had completed the

amendments to Chinese patent law, trademark law and copyright law for a WTO
901

/d. at 28-31.

902

/d. at 12.

903

/d. at 13.

904

/d. at 47.
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Chunian Lifa Gongzong Huimou (New Millennium, New Tasks, New Steps- Retrospect of Legislative
Works ofthe 9th People's Congress and its Standing Committee on the First Year of the Millennium,
LmERATION ARMY DAn.Y, March 6th, 2002, at
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consistency. Within several months after accession, China issued "regulations" for
the trademark law and the copyright law.

It also promulgated various sets of

"implementing regulations and rules" covering specific subject matters addressed by
the WTO's TRIPs Agreement, e.g., integrated circuits, computer software and
pharmaceuticals.

In 2003, China adopted several new "measures" in the patent,

trademark and copyright areas for the same purpose. These transformation measures
moved China generally in line with the WTO law on most key substantive areas of the
IPR.9o6

Further progress was made in 2004 and 2005, particularly in the IPR enforcement
regime.

In March 2004, the Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual

Property Customs Administration took effect.

907

Subsequently, the Customs

Administration enacted the implementing rules for these regulations, effective July
2004. 908 In June 2005, the Trademark Administration circulated draft amendments to
its Regulations on the Tzmely Transfer of Suspected Criminal Cases in the

Enforcement of Administrative Law, designed to strengthen Chinese regional
industrial and commercial administrations with the view to ensuring effective
trademark enforcement and protection.

Earlier, in April 2005, the Copyright

Administration of China and the Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) adopted the

Measures for administrative Protection of Copyright on the Internet.

Five months

later, in search for a more important Internet-related measure for public comments,
China circulated the draft Regulations on the Protection of Copyright over

Information Networks. 909 Currently, China is preparing for the "Third Amendment''
to its patent law and to the implementing regulation for this law, and also preparing a

906

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 66.
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/d. at 68.
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/d. at 67.

909

/d. at 68.

334

1'

I
II

draft of an "anti-monopoly law."910

However, China's legal framework to fulfill her WTO commitments in the area of
trade in services turns to be more fragmental and less consistent. Most of these
commitments involve the market access to various service sectors covered in China's
Service Schedules, at the core of which are "acquired rights" and "licensing process."
For the latter, the Administrative Licensing Law took effect in July 2004. For a
specific service sector, financial service is a good example. The Chinese financial
regulators have issued a series of rules and measures to respond to China's WTO's
requirements. In the banking sector, to keep pace with China's WTO obligations,
shortly after China's accession to the WTO, People's Bank of China (PBOC) adopted
"regulations" governing foreign-funded banks, with "implementing rules" effective
February 1, 2002. The PBOC also undertook several other related measures. To open
the banking sector further, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
enacted the Implementing Rules for the Administrative Regulations on Foreign-

invested Financial Institutions in July 2004, which removed the restriction that
limited foreign-funded banks to open only one new branch every 12 month. 911

In the insurance sector, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC)
promulgated several new "insurance regulations" shortly after China's accession to
the WTO, including one directed at the regulation of foreign insurance companies.
Although implementing many of China's commitments, these regulations created
problems in three capital areas: capitalization requirements, transparency and
branching.

To address these problems, CIRC issued the Detailed Rules on the

Regulations for the Administration of Foreign-invested Insurance Companies in May,
2004.912 Besides, to fulfill its commitment to open up the motor vehicle financing
910
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sector to foreign non-bank financial institutions, the CBRC adopted the long-awaited
"regulations" permitting foreign financial institutions to offer auto loans in October
2003.

..
•·

One month later, CBRC enacted implementing rules setting forth the

procedures for foreign financial institutions to apply for licenses to begin operation.
In August 2004, the PBOC and CBRC jointly issued the Administrative Rules on Auto
Financing which became effective in October 2004.

913

By setting forth administrative

requirements and risk management rules for extending auto loans in China, these rules
enable the licensed companies to actually begin operations. 914 In addition, in October
27, 2005, the 18th session of the Standing Committee of the lOth NPC adopted the
amended Security Law, effective on January 1, 2006.915

The preceding survey tends to show that China has made remarkable achievements in
her endeavor to transform WTO law into the domestic legal system. Substantially,
this process has covered almost every area of trade or trade-related matter addressed
by the WTO legal regime, so as to fully respond to China's comprehensive WTO
commitments. Hierarchically, the process has involved a variety of legislative bodies
with their legislative activities at all levels. In this connection, the administrative
bodies apparently play a key role, with regard to administrative regulations,
departmental rules and measures in the form of Chinese internal law. All is actually
within the "legitimate expectation" of the WTO.

However, China has gone further in the sense that the higher-ranking state legislature
(Standing Committee of the NPC) has also played a major role in this process,
followed by the amendments to or promulgation of the "laws" at a higher hierarchical
level. Typical cases include the amendments to the Foreign Trade Law, Patent Law,
Trademark Law, Copyright Law and Security law, as well as the drafting of an anti913

ld. at 80.

914

ld. at 80-81.
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Guangxi Liu & Taifeng Chen, Zhongguo Rui Shi Si Zhounian Huishou Yu Zhanwang (Retrospect
and Prospect of the Four Anniversaries of China's Accession to the WTO), WENHUI DAILY, at
http://theorv.people.com.cn/GB/49154/4915 5/3895568.html.
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monopoly law. This reflects China's good faith to honor the WTO law: despite its
higher hierarchical status, the "laws" are subject to the WTO disciplines to the same
extent as administrative regulations and rules, and will be deemed to be revised or
annulled for its WTO inconsistency, even though the WTO legal regime does not can
not explicitly so require.

B.

Problems and Challenges

While China has made significant and steady progress in bringing its laws, regulations
and measures into compliance with its WTO commitments, questions and problems
emerge at the same pace.

First, not all China's WTO commitments have been

transformed into the Chinese domestic law, with numerous "blank areas" left behind.
For example, China has not yet implemented its trading rights commitments insofar as
they relate to the importation of books, newspapers and magazines. Under the terms
of China's Accession Protocol, trading rights for these publications should have been
automatically available to foreign-related enterprises and foreign individuals as of
December 11, 2004. Nevertheless, China continues to reserve the right to import
these publications exclusively for state trading enterprises, based on the general
exception for the public morals in Article XX of GATT 1994. The same situation
arises in regard to the trading rights commitments concerning the importation of
pharmaceuticals. Although under China's Accession Protocol, these rights should
have been automatically available to foreign pharmaceutical companies as of
December 11, 2004, China still requires foreign pharmaceutical companies to hire
Chinese importers to bring their finished products into the country, and also requires
them to sell their finished products through Chinese wholesalers.916

Secondly, for those commitments that have been translated into Chinese domestic law,
the extent to which they are fully addressed by domestic enactments (e.g., laws,

916

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 13.
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regulations, rules or measures) can be problematic in a substantive or technical sense.
Take the sector of legal services. In December 2001, the State Council issued the
Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Law Firm Representative Ojjices. Ten

months later, the Ministry of Justice issued implementing rules. While these measures
removed some market access barriers, their ambiguities in many substantive areas
also led to new obstacles (contrary to China's GATS commitments) to China's legal
service market, such as the "economic needs test" and the "restrictions on the types of
legal services." To date, these obstacles have continued to prevent foreign law firms
from participating more fully in China's legal market.917
I'

Particular techniques adopted in the transformation of China's WTO commitments
may also significantly affect the extent to which these commitments are addressed by
domestic legislative measures. For example, China's countervailing duty (CVD)
regime is still a mystery. To conform to the requirements of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement and China's WTO commitments, China has its CVD regulations and rules
to "track" those found in the Subsidies Agreement. However, there are still certain
areas where key provisions are omitted or vaguely worded, leaving much to be
desired for greater transparency and clarification. 918 This "technical defect'' has
increased the difficulties for China to enforce its CVD regime for the WTO
consistency purpose.

Thirdly, in many instances, China still maintains some regulations, rules or measures
that are inconsistent with its WTO commitments.

A typical case relates to the

consumption tax regulations, which first went into effect in 1993 and was applicable
to a range of consumer products, including spirits and alcoholic beverages, tobacco,

cosmetics, jewelry, etc.

The regulations provide different tax bases to compute

consumption taxes for domestic and imported products, resulting in a substantially
higher effective consumption tax rate for imported products than for domestic
917

Id. at 82.

918

Id. at 31.
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products. This appears to be in conflict with the "national treatment'' principle, a
cornerstone of the GAIT legal regime. Despite the concerns consistently raised by
the U.S. and other WTO members, China has not yet revised these regulations. 919

To make the matter worse, China even creates inconsistencies with her WTO
commitments by issuing new rules and measures for WTO implementation purpose.
For instance, to implement its post-WTO automobile policy that in itself has not yet
fully adhered to China's WTO commitments, the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) issued the Measures on the importation of Parts for Entire

Automobile in February 2005. Since they became effective two months later, these
rules have been strongly criticized by WTO members like the US, EC and Japan, for

I

I

they not only result in the imposition of a tariff on auto parts in excess of China's
bound rate, but also improperly condition tariff treatment on local content, contrary to
Article III of the GAIT 1994 and the commitment in China's Accession Protocol to
eliminate all local content requirements relating to importation. By now, even though
China has been slow to implement these rules, the uncertainty that they create distorts
the auto parts trade. 920 In short, to maintain those WTO-incompatible regulations,
rules and measures and issue the new ones, China places herself in more difficult
position in performing her task of transforming WTO law into Chinese domestic law.

3.

Some Reflections and Policy Recommendations

Notwithstanding the remarkable achievements made in the transformation of WTO
law into Chinese domestic law, China is still facing enormous problems and
challenges ahead. Comparing these two sides, achievements or challenges, one may
lead to an unrealistic view or an unfounded forgone conclusion.

An objective

assessment calls for a better understanding of the reasons behind all these "ups and
downs," which should blend China's economic capacity, legislative techniques and
919

ld. at 37-38.
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Id. at 50-51.

339

I
I

'

collective political will with her WTO counterparts' perception of the situation and
their reactions accordingly.

Here is a typical case reflecting all the above factors, starting with the observations of
an American trade association on China's transformation of its services commitments
into domestic law: "[i]n many instances, PRC regulators are using a two-pronged
approach to implement China's services commitments. . .. China often enacts basic
laws that 'allow' or 'permit' new investment in previously restricted sectors as
required by WTO commitments, but sets the bar for entry prohibitively high.
American investors in China's service sectors say these restrictions and the lack of
transparency in the regulatory system prevent complete market openings."921 From
the U.S. perspectives, because of the above "two-pronged" approach, China has not
succeeded in putting in place the transformation of its WTO commitments into
domestic law, even though such process had been undertaken at a higher hierarchical
level by taking the form of legislative enactment.

From a Chinese perspective, however, the "two-pronged" approach represents its
customary practice: in legislating a new subject, a source of law in a higher
hierarchical level (e.g., basic law and law) will be taken to address the primary issues
and prescribe general principles, while those in a lower hierarchical status (e.g.,
regulations, rules and measures) will be taken to set forth the procedures and rules for
their implementation.

This approach particularly applies to a case where the

legislative process is still in progress, and the legislative techniques for this purpose
remain unperfected.

Being flexible and tentative in nature, a lower hierarchical

source of law is more suitable to address the changing or developing conditions.
Once the situation is ripe and fully ready, it will be appropriate to expect a more stable
and consolidated source of law at a higher hierarchical level, to govern the matter
based upon the experience and techniques accumulated by the lower hierarchical

921

Id. at 74.
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source of law.

China is a new member of the WTO, with little experience in the implementation of
her WTO commitments, both internationally and domestically.

Due to her

''uniqueness" in various respects, China has subjected herself to the most
J

comprehensive and far-reaching WTO obligations among the WTO Members. In tum,
by the time China acceded to the WTO, many of these obligations had far exceeded
China's implementing capacity. Fulfilling these obligations has become a challenge
not only in respect to China's economic capacity, but also for her legislative
techniques. To face this "dual" challenge, especially in the Chinese internal system, it
is necessary to develop some strategies that could accommodate the tentative and
effective measures to the long-term fundamental goal of the WTO.

The "two-

pronged" approach represents part of China's efforts' in this regard, particularly in the
context of Chinese domestic legislative activities.

In the circumstances, the U.S. business community complained that China, while
enacting ''basic law" to allow foreign investors to operate in the previously restricted
sectors, also "sets the bar for entry prohibitively high." It should be noted that such a
bar is generally in the form of a lower hierarchical source of law, being tentative and
adjustable in nature.

The revised Sectoral Guidelines Catalogue for Foreign

Investment, enacted by the State Council in January 2005 (2005 Catalogue), is a clear
illustration of this point. Like its previous version adopted in March 2002, the 2005

Catalogue continued to reflect China's decision to adhere to her WTO commitments
to open up certain sectors to foreign investment, including travel agencies, human
resources companies, cinemas, etc. Nevertheless, it still excludes books, magazines
and newspapers from the above category, even though they have been equally covered
by China's WTO commitments. 922 Thus, the 2005 Catalogue implemented China's
WTO commitments on a selective basis. However, it is subject to further review in

922

ld. at 52.
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the near future, since a nonnative document as such is always adjustable in the
Chinese legal order. Sooner or later, the inconsistency of the 2005 Catalogue with the
WTO legal regime will be corrected by its successive version, in accordance with the
spirit and requirements set forth in the established "basic law." It is a matter of the
time. Thus, for present purpose, it is premature to determine that China has failed to
fulfill her WTO commitments in any particular area.

Certainly, time is of essence not only for China's WTO counterparts, as they are
anxiously coxing China to complete her WTO compliance, but also for China, since
the "transformation" process constitutes the essential part of her domestic WTO
implementation. It is understandable that China's trading partners would always like
to see the completed transformation of China's WTO obligations in a timely fashion.
However, it is also clear that both sides have acknowledged that it may not always be
the case in practice. Under paragraph 68 of the China Working Party Report, "[i]f
administrative regulations, departmental rules or measures were not in place within
such time frames, [Chinese] authorities would still honor China's obligations under
the WTO Agreement and Draft Protocol." In this connection, to "honor" China's
WTO obligations is truly a matter of international law that involves international
responsibility, rather than a matter of domestic law that involves domestic legal
remedies. 923 As noted above, paragraph 68 constitutes part of China's accession terms
binding upon both sides.

Thus, this provision does indicate the recognition by

China's WTO counterparts of any possible "untimely" situation with regard to China's
"transformation" process.

Since China's "transformation" of WTO law into domestic law is mainly a matter of
domestic administration, falling within the discretion of Chinese legislative bodies,
the task has become a test of China's political will, economic capacity and legislative
techniques in this regard. Generally, the Chinese government has consistently acted
923

Interestingly, the issue of the ''time frames" is more outstanding in China's services commitments,

since they are mainly involved in China's Service Schedules for market opening.
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in a good faith in honoring its WTO commitments, as evident in its steady progresses
and continuous efforts in the transformation process. Problems and challenges mainly
stemmed from China's insufficient economic capacity to carry out certain WTO
commitments, as well as Chinese untested legislative techniques to treat the
complexity and comprehensiveness of the more burdensome WTO commitments. In
these situations, a delay in transformation is inevitable.

To resolve this problem, China should first establish the "legitimacy" of such a delay,
by resorting to a particular WTO legal source that may justify the above insufficiency
and inexperience. Then, China should make sure that any WTO inconsistency caused
by this delay (particularly, the existing domestic legislation and the like) remain at a
lower hierarchical level, flexible and legally adjustable enough for future correction.
In this context, the above-noted "two-pronged" approach appears to be a good choice.

To incorporate the WTO commitments into a "basic law," or to take advantage of the
experience of the lower hierarchical legal sources for this purpose, China should
develop its legislative techniques on a larger scale.

Technically, the Chinese

legislature may "reword" the WTO provisions to match domestic circumstances,
incorporate part of the language of the WTO treaty into a new domestic legislation, or,
indirectly, give effect to the WTO treaty obligations by enacting a separate act or
statute, without reenacting the text itself.

Each of these tasks calls for a good

understanding ofWTO law, which constitutes a real challenge to a new WTO member
like China. But China will learn from her experience in this connection.

China's task of transforming WTO law into domestic law has also become a test of
patience of its trading partners within the WTO, depending on their perception of the
whole situation. For this purpose, it is essential to enhancing the transparency of
China's "transformation" process, as promised by the Chinese government in her
accession negotiations with other WTO members. The first commitment is to provide
an opportunity for "pubic comment" before new or modified laws and regulations
could be implemented. So far, China's compliance with this commitment has been
343
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uneven, since only a small portion of new and revised laws and regulations have gone
through this "notice-and-comment" procedure. The second commitment is to make
new and revised laws and regulations available to the pubic, on which China always
maintains a better record. Via official journals or the internet, almost all new or
revised laws and regulations (in Chinese) have been available soon after issuance and
prior to their effective date. None the less, China continues to lag behind in another
commitment to translate them into one or more of the WTO languages (English,
French and Spanish).924

The above "transparency" obligations are designed to facilitate the efficient
communication between China and other WTO members. Apparently, much is still
I

left to be desired in this context. Communication is the beginning of understanding.
Without a sound perception of the situation in China, China's trading partners within
the WTO are not likely to reach any objective assessment of the country's
performance on the WTO compliance. For China, the country should continue to
improve the "transparency" of its transformation process. To other members of the
WTO, they need to be more patient than ever. After all, China does not lack in
political will and good faith in honoring her WTO commitments, especially in regard
to the transformation process.
criticism.

At this point, assistance is more productive than

Particularly, Western countries should continue to assist China in this

regard, since a timely and proper "transformation" of WTO law into Chinese domestic
law is in the best interest ofboth sides.

In sum, China's transformation ofWTO law into domestic law has never been an easy
task.

With enormous challenges and problems ahead, both China and her WTO

counterparts should maintain an optimistic and cooperative position, working
diligently towards the same goal of getting China on the right track to achieve her
goal ofWTO compliance.

924

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 88-89.
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D.

The Role of Chinese Courts in the "Application" of WTO Law

1.

The Role of National Courts in the Enforcement ofWTO Law

Under public international law, how to implement a treaty under the domestic legal
system of its party members is generally a matter for the latter's discretion, while the
treaty in itself does not elaborate the issue. In this regard, the WTO treaty regime has
gone further by producing enormous legal effect on the internal legal order of its
Member States.925 Particularly, the WTO Agreement imposes an obligation upon the
Member States to ensure a legal conformity of their domestic laws with the WTO
obligations,926 a task to be taken up by the domestic legislature in the first place, but
also significantly affects the domestic "judicial structure." 927

A number of WTO-administered agreements contain express provisions to obligate
Member States to provide for "an effective system of legal remedies" against any
violation of WTO obligations by Member States. 928 This actually refers to a domestic
enforcement mechanism, generally linked to the judicial process undertaken by the
domestic courts. Although the courts may grant various legal remedies, the WTO
legal regime directs mainly at the 'judicial review," incorporating this requirement
into a number of WTO agreements, e.g., GAIT 1994 (Article X of the GAIT}, WTO
Antidumping Agreement (Article 13}, WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation
(Article 11 ), Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection (Article 4}, WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 23), GATS (Article VI}, TRIPs
Agreement (Article 41-50 and 59) and, Agreement on Government Procurement
925

Ruttley, MacVay & George eds., supra note 274, at 130.

926

Marrakesh Agreement Establsihing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 331.L.M. 1125

(1994). Art. XVI:4 provides: "Each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements."
927

Ruttley, MacVay & George eds., supra note 274, at 140-141.

928

/d. at 41.
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(Article :X:X).929

Notably, the above provisions do not impose a uniformed standard upon Member
States for the availability of judicial review, especially in terms of the role of national
courts. Some provisions are explicit in this regard, such as Article 11 of the WTO
Agreement on Customs Valuation, requiring Member States to make available a
"distinct" judicial review to be undertaken by national courts.

Others are more

implicit, such as Article 41 :4 of the TRIPS Agreement, providing that "[p]arties to a
proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial review authority of final
administrative decisions and .. . of at least the legal aspect of initial judicial decisions
on the merits of a case."930

However, more provisions adopt a rather flexible standard, allowing Member States to
choose between "judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures" for the
purpose of "prompt review" of the relevant administrative actions. These include

~.

Article 6(2) of the GATS, Article X:3(2) of the GATT, Article 23 of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as well as Article 13 of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement. Although under the heading 'judicial review," the
possibility is open for an alternative review by the less stringent arbitral or
administrative procedures. Specifically, Article X:3(2) of the GAIT and Article 6(2)
of the GATS are deemed to have put forward the minimum standard for such review.
Thus, under these very provisions, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to single
out the role of national courts.

Accordingly, within the WTO treaty system, regarding the requirement for domestic
judicial review, the significance of the role of national courts varies from one
agreement to another. However, this does not suggest the denial of their role in this

.,
929

PETERSMANN,supra note 371, at 72.
930
Ruttley, MacVay & George eds., supra note 274, at 131.
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process at all. 931 On the contrary, the trend of today's rule of law calls for the

l'

enhancement of the courts' role as such, so as to secure a "distinct'' judicial review for
protecting private interests and rights against abuses of administrative power. Within
a modem concept of the rule of law, judicial review falls within the exclusive
province of the judicial authority, namely, courts of law. 932 Obviously, the existing
WTO treaty system does not adhere to this trend in a uniformed manner, given the
imbalance in the level of legal development among different Member States.
Nevertheless, to single out the role of national courts in act effort to satisfy the WTO
requirement for judicial review will definitely count as a move to "keep pace with the
time," as evident in the case of China now under discussion.

:
Besides the major requirements for judicial reVIew, the WTO treaty system,
particularly the TRIPs Agreement, has also specified the role of domestic courts in

.j

providing for other legal remedies for the enforcement of WTO law. Under the TRIPs

r
r·

Agreement, Article 42-50 (Part ill: Section 2) specifically address the civil procedures

I

.~[
1

and remedies for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, while Article 61 (Part
ill: Section 5) specifies the criminal procedures for the purpose. So far as these civil

and criminal proceedings are concerned, the exclusive role of national courts in
granting a civil remedy or criminal sanction for the WTO implementation is taken for
granted

For all these, the role of national courts has been explicitly or implicitly addressed by
the WTO treaty regime, so as to establish the "legitimacy" of their involvement in the
implementation of WTO law. As a result, the courts will face the task of hearing the
cases related to the particular WTO legal rules (so-called "WTO-related cases").
More specifically, the courts will inevitably encounter the issue of interpreting a rule
ofWTO law, and, on many occasions, will have to "apply'' this rule.
931

Some scholars obtain that national courts have no connection to the WTO legal regime. See, Hilf,

supra note 377, at 321.
932

KONG XIANGJUN, supra note 880.
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2.

The Role of the Chinese Courts under the WTO Legal Regime

China is not only subject to the WTO's general requirements for the role of national
courts in domestic implementation of WTO law, but also to any special requirement
set forth in the Accession Protocol on her WTO accession.

With regard to the requirement for judicial review, Article 2(D) of the Accession

.

,

Protocol provides that:
1. China shall establish, or designate, and maintain tribunals, contact points and
procedures for the prompt review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation
of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application
referred to in Article X: 1 of the GATI 1994, Article VI of the GATS and the relevant
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Such tribunals shall be impartial and independent of the
~'I

agency entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial interests
in the outcome of the matter.
2. Review procedures shall include the opportunity for appeal, without penalty, by
individuals or enterprises affected by any administrative action subject to review. If the initial
right of appeal is to an administrative body, there shall in all cases be the opportunity to
choose tQ_appeal the decision to a judicial body. Notice of the decision on appeal shall be
given to the appellant and the reasons for such decision shall be provided in writing. The
appellant shall also be informed of any right to further appeal.

Besides, this provision is supplemented by paragraphs 76-79 of the China Working
Party Report, as they have been incorporated into the Accession Protocol, and, as such,
are legally binding upon China and her WTO counterparts. Section 1 of Article 2(D)

,.

stipulates certain institutional standards for the "review" of trade-related
administrative actions, emphasizing the independence of the "tribunals" to undertake
this review (as confirmed by paragraph 78 of the Working Party Report). This section
also defines the coverage of the "reviewable" administrative actions to the extent
348
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provided by the GAIT, GATS and TRIPs Agreement, which has been further
confirmed by paragraph 79 of the Working Party Report. Section 2 of Article 2(D)
stipulates a series of procedural requirements for a "review" covered by the previous
section, focusing on "due process" - fundamental element of modem rule of law.
Also, this section confirms the "judicial nature" of the required review procedures by
exclusively assigning the task of "appeal" to a '1udicial body," leading to a "distinct"
judicial review operated by the Chinese courts.

These stipulations have been

confirmed by paragraph 79 of the Working Party Report.

Therefore, compared with the general requirements of the WTO for judicial review,
those specifically set forth in Article 2(D) of the Accession Protocol have become
more uniform and rigorous, resembling the essential elements of a modem rule of law.
They give the Chinese courts an exclusive role in the WTO-compatible judicial
review process, so as to fulfill China's obligations in this regard. This mandate is in

,.
'

I,

fact consistent with China's existing system of judicial review featuring the exclusive
role of the People's Court.

To meet with these China-specific institutional and

procedural requirements, the People's Court will be able to guarantee a minimum

,.

level of justice.

As noted above, so far as a single treaty instrument of the WTO is concerned, the
TRIPs Agreement has been most relevant to the role of the judiciary. Besides the
judicial review requirements, the Accession Protocol mandates China to make
available civil and criminal procedures and remedies for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights to a greater extent than that required by the TRIPs
Agreement.

These China-specific TRIPs obligations are stipulated in several

paragraphs of the Working Part Report, as they have been integrated into the

I'

Accession Protocol.

Regarding "civil judicial procedures and remedies," China is committed in paragraph
291 to effectively implement Article 42 and 43 of the TRIPs Agreement "under the
349
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judicial rules of civil procedure." In paragraph 292, China is further committed to
amend the relevant implementing rules "to ensure full compliance with Article 45 and

.
I

46 of TRIPs Agreement, to the effect that damages paid by the infringer to the rightholder would be adequate to compensate for the injury knowingly, or, with reasonable
grounds to know, engaging in the infringing activity."

Regarding "criminal

procedures," China particularly addressed in paragraph 303 the concerns of some
WTO Members about the "monetary thresholds for bringing a criminal action," to
have its administrative authority recommend that "judicial authority make necessary
adjustments to lower the thresholds." In paragraph 305, China is committed to "fully
apply the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement" upon its accession to the WTO, given
"the advanced state of protection for intellectual property rights in China."

As a matter of civil and criminal judicial process, all these TRIPs-based commitments
are within the province and function of the Chinese courts. In other words, China's
implementation of these obligations falls within the exclusive authority of the
People's Court.

3.

Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People' Court of China

Generally speaking, the role of the Chinese courts in treaty implementation is
primarily concerned with the role of the Supreme People's Court (SPC), especially in
terms of its "judicial interpretation." Under the Chinese constitutional and legal
system, the power to interpret law is vested first and foremost in the legislative bodies,
namely, the National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. Their
legal interpretation forms part of the legislation, should the appropriate procedures be
followed. Besides, the NPC delegates the power of "statutory interpretation" to the
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP), making the
latter competent in interpreting any particular issue arising from the daily adjudication
of the People's Court and public prosecution of the People's Procuratorate on the

I

I

j
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application oflaw. 933

Varying in forms, judicial interpretations of the SPC and SPP only bind the lower
courts and the procuracy. Given such limited scope of application, they do not count

"

as a source of Chinese law, with their hierarchical status not comparable to that of the
legislature. However, the People's Court does rely on the SPC judicial interpretation
in the routine adjudicative work.

Particularly, wherever judicial interpretation is

applicable, the People's Court is mandated to rely on it n the judgment. In this sense,
the SPC judicial interpretation serves as a de facto source of law, with a "quasilegislative" function. Despite its uncertain status in the hierarchy of Chinese law, the
SPC judicial interpretation is credited with a strong authority oflaw, since most issues
oflegal interpretation will come before the People's Court.

Given this "quasi-legislative" character, judicial interpretation by the SPC serves the
purpose of "treaty implementation" in the same way as any other source of Chinese
law. This refers particularly to the "transformation" process, where, as discussed
before, the role of the SPC has been active with regard to a number of treaties. In
terms of the WTO agreements, the role of the SPC in implementing these treaty norms
in the domestic setting has special significance. Since China joined the WTO in
December 2001, the SPC has reviewed all of its approximately 2,600 instances of
judicial interpretation and related documents, so as to ensure that they comply with
WTO legal regime. 934 More remarkably, the SPC has issued a series of new decrees
of judicial interpretation to consolidate China's WTO obligations on judicial review,
as well as on civil and criminal judicial proceedings for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Most of these judicial decrees of interpretation will be
discussed below.
933

The issue as to ''which governmental body has the authority to interpret law" is not only prescribed

in the current PRC Constitution, but also, more specifically, clarified in the Resolution ofthe NPC
Standing Committee on Strengthening the Legal Interpretation ofLaws of 1954 ("1954 Resolution").
934

United States Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005 Annual Report, at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/CECCannRpt2005.pdf, at 98.
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A.

Judicial

Interpretation for WTO-compatible Judicial

Review

On 28 August 2002, just before the one-year anniversary of China's accession to the
WTO, the SPC published its first set of decree of judicial interpretation aimed at
honoring China's commitments to bring its judicial system in line with the
requirements of the WTO. This set of decree of judicial interpretation, known as the
"Rules on Certain Issues Related to Hearings of International Trade Administrative
Cases" ("ITAC Rules"), became effective on October 1, 2002. They represented the
first attempt by the Chinese judiciary to strengthen its role in creating a favorable
legal environment for China's post-WTO performance within this global trading club.

Under the Chinese judicial system, judicial review of administrative acts constitutes a
major part of the administrative trail services afforded by the People's Court.935 The
Administrative Procedural Law (ALL/ 36 allows access to the courts for the purpose of
challenging administrative interference with legitimate interests of individuals and
organizations. For administrative acts involving international trade, as China recently
entered into the WTO, judicial review in this regard would play an increasingly
crucial role in ensuring the compliance of China's trade regulation with the WTO
regime, as provided in Article 2(D) of the China Accession Protocol. Apparently, the
ITAC Rules were promulgated in good time to provide the People's Court with some
guidance in this connection.

This set of judicial interpretative pronouncements

consist of 12 Articles, addressing a series of issues on the scope of reviewability,
standing, original jurisdiction, standard of review, application of law, etc.

These

issues will be further examined below.

935

LI Guoguang, supra note 890.

936

Administrative Procedural Law ofthe People's Republic of China, promulgated on April 4, 1989,

effective October 1, 1990.
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(1)

Scope of reviewability

Article 1 of the ITAC rules establishes a category of "international trade
administrative cases" to be tried by the People's Court, which actually defines the
scope of reviewability for a WTO-compatible judicial review. Parallel to the structure
of the WTO treaties, Article 1 defines the governing scope of the ITAC Rules as
covering "administrative cases in relation to international trade in goods, international
trade in services, international trade-related intellectual property rights and other areas
of international trade."

Evidently, these Rules are mainly but not exclusively

,,

,,

II

applicable to international administrative cases involving the WTO legal regime.
Other similar cases, which involve the bilateral and multilateral treaties China has
signed or ratified in the area of trade, investment and intellectual property rights, also
fall into the governing scope of the Rules.931 However, Article 11 of the ITAC Rules
provides for an exception in this regard. According to this Article, "[f]or the pmpose

r'

I I

of hearing an international trade administrative case where one or more parties are
from Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, Macao, or the Taiwan Area,
People's Court shall take as reference these rules."

By introducing a new category of "international trade administrative case" to China's
existing administrative trial services, Article 1 has significantly expanded the scope of
reviewability under China's system of judicial review, and therefore will facilitate the

l•

I

development of China's WTO-compatible judicial review.

(2)

Standing

To make judicial review as available as possible to the individuals and enterprises
intending to challenge the adverse administrative actions in relation to international

I

.I

trade, Articles 3 and Article 10 of the ITAC Rules serve as the applicable standing

I

l
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LI Guoguang, supra note 890, at 13.
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clauses. As Article 3 provides, "[w]here a natural person, legal person or any other
organization believes that a particular international trade-related administrative act conducted by the agencies or institutions under their statutory authority - infringes his
legitimate rights and interests, he may commence an action in People's court." The
provision reflects the legacy of ALL concerning its broad and vague criteria for
obtaining standing, since the meaning of "legitimate rights and interests" can be
divergent.

As for Article 10, on the appearance, it fits the requirements of the WTO for the
"widespread" protection of the rights and interests of private parties. In effect, it does
make a breakthrough to ALL by specifying the standing of foreign parties by
incorporating the principles of "national treatment" and "reciprocity." According to
this article:
Foreigners, natural persons with no nationality, or foreign organizations shall be
entitled to the same standing as that of the citizens and organizations of the People's
Republic of China in an international trade administrative case.

Under the

circumstances listed in Article 71(2) of the Administrative Procedural Law, the
principle of reciprocity shall be applied instead. 938

It is worth noting that Article 4 of the ITAC Rules prescribes a particular legal ground
on which the standing of the parties may be established. As this article provides,
"[ s]hould a new law enter into force before a particular administrative determination
is made, parties involved may commence an action in People's Court against that
determination based on the new law, regardless of the fact that the acts of the parties
attributed to that determination occur before the new law enters into force."
Accordingly, these three provisions may efficiently safeguard the right of individuals
and enterprises to take actions against adverse administrative actions in relation to
international trade, the exercise of which would offer them a better chance to seek

938

!d. at 16-17.
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suitable judicial remedies.

(3)

Original Jurisdiction

Within the hierarchy of the Chinese Court System, the Administrative Chamber of
People's Court is charged with the administrative cases which, based on Article 2 of
the Rules, unquestionably include international trade administrative cases. However,
given that international trade administrative cases contain highly technical and
strongly policy-oriented features, it is expected that the judges handling this type of
case would be expert in administrative law and international economic law generally,
as well as knowledgeable about the WTO rules. Only thus, it is important to note, can
the appropriately high quality of hearings of this type of case be guaranteed, and the
consistent operation of the legal system be maintained. For this purpose, Article 5 of
the Rules properly raises the rank of the original jurisdiction of People's Court over
such cases. 939 As Article 2 provides, "A competent Interim People's Court or one at
the level above shall have jurisdiction as the court of first instance over an
international trade administrative case."

(4)

Standard of review

Article 6 of the ITAC Rules sets forth the standard of review to be adopted by People's
Court for international trade administrative cases. According to this rule, People's
Court shall, on a case-by case basis and in accordance with the Administrative
Procedural Law, review the legality of a particular administrative act in dispute from
the angles of a seven-prong test:

939

(1)

Substantiality and sufficiency of major evidence;

(2)

Accuracy of the application of law and regulations;

(3)

Violation of legal procedures;

/d.
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(4)

Absence of authority;

(5)

Abuse of executive power;

(6)

Obvious prejudice in administrative sanctions; and

(7)

Failure to carry out statutory duties or delay therein.

i'

From all of the above, it is understood that at the hearing of this type of cases, the
People's Court is to review factual findings (the question of fact) and legal
conclusions (the question of law) as well, with regard to the contested international
trade administrative act. 940

At this stage, it is interesting to look at the standard of review from a comparative law
perspective. The People's Court standard of review resembles that of the WTO panels
in that it calls for examination and consideration of the factual evidence presented as

'j

well as applicable legal rules. This approach contrasts with the standard of review
employed by the WTO Appellate Body, which, according to article 17.6 ofthe DSU,
reviews only "issues of law covered in the panel report and the legal interpretation
developed by the panel." The seven-step balancing act in the People's Court sets
','

forth more specific legal criteria, and may occasion more penetrating evidentiary
review than the WTO panels' "objective assessment" test. The legal view envisioned
in the People's Court standard likewise appears much closer to a de novo review than
I

to the "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary, capricious" tests followed by the U.S.
courts, which are highly deferential to administrative agency decision-making in
international trade cases.

(5)

Applicable law

As mentioned earlier, the issuance of the ITA C Rules aims at providing effective
judicial remedies, assuring compliance of Chinese trade regulation with the WTO

940

ld.
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regime. However, the WTO treaties have no direct effect in China, and may only be

·t

implemented in China through the amendment or promulgation of Chinese domestic
laws. 941 In the circumstances, Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Rules specifically address the
issue of applicable law in the context of hearings of international trade administrative
cases; this lays down the legal basis on which People's Court may conduct judicial
review in the international trade administration area.

As Article 7 provides, "[a]ccording to Article 52(1) of the Administrative Procedural
(

Law and Article 63 of the Legislation Law, People's court shall base the hearings of
international trade administrative cases on the law, administrative rules and
regulations and local regulations pertaining to or affecting international trade. Local
regulations in this regard shall be promulgated by the corresponding local legislatures
under their statutory authority."

Furthermore, Article 8 provides, "[a]ccording to Article 53(1) of the Administrative
Procedural Law and Article 71, 72 and 73 of the Legislation Law, for the purpose of
hearing an international trade administrative case, People's court shall take as
reference the regulations pertaining to or affecting international trade, which are
issued by the administering authorities under the State Council within their discretion,
with the formulation of these regulations based on the law and administrative rules
and regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council. People's Court shall also
take as reference local regulations pertaining to or affecting international trade, which
are issued by the People's government of provinces, autonomic regions and
municipalities subject to the Central Government, by that of the cities where the
People's governments of provinces, autonomic regions and municipalities are located,
of the cities where the Special Economic Zones are located, and of the larger cities

941

World Trade Organization, Working Party Report on the Accession of China, WTIMIN(01)/3 (Nov

11, 2001), para. 67. 'The WTO Agreement would be implemented by China in an effective and
uniform manner through revising its existing domestic law and enacting new ones fully compliance
with the WTO Agreement."
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approved as such by the State Council. Formulation of these local regulations shall be
based on the law, administrative rules and regulations and local regulations."

Both Articles indicate that in the hearing of an international trade administrative case,
People's Court would mostly rely on the law and administrative regulations while
merely taking as reference the regulations and rules issued by the State Council. This
approach is very different from the one adopted by People's Court in the hearing of an
ordinary administrative case. The reason is clear: It is the law and administrative
rules and regulations pertaining to or affecting international trade, that constitute the
primary grounds on which People's Court may conduct judicial review in
international trade administration cases.

'·'

Also, "sub-national governments had no

autonomous authority over issues of trade policy to the extent that they were related to
the WTO Agreement and the Draft Protocol."942 As for local regulations pertaining to
or affecting international trade, the competent People's Court is to take them as legal
grounds in the hearing of any international trade administrative case falling into its
territorial jurisdiction, so long as these local regulations are promulgated by local
legislatures under their statutory authority, and have no conflict with the law and
administrative rules and regulations of the nation. 943

A comparative law note may be of interest here.

The mandate that sub-national

legislation should conform to WTO norms consistent with the laws of China is
parallel to U.S. practice requiring state law to be in conformance with U.S. treaty
obligations consistent with federal law, a precept inherent in the supremacy clause of
the U.S. constitution.944

942

Under Article 8 and 9 of the Law on Legislation ofthe PRC, legislation for "the fundamental

economic systems and those concerning fiscal policies, taxation, customs, finance and foreign trade"
shall solely be in the form of law. With such laws unavailable, the State Council many be delegated
effectively to legislate for those systems in the form of administrative regulation.
943

"
l

!
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LI Guoguang, supra note 890, at 15-16.

944

US Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2. "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
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Considering the international feature of an international trade administrative case,
Article 9 of the Rules incorporates China's principle of"complying with international

treaties" and that of"interpreting in consistency with international treaties."945 As this
article provides, "[w]here there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a
particular provision of the applicable law and administrative regulations available to
People's Court to hear an international trade administrative case, the Court shall
choose the one consistent with the corresponding provision of the relevant
international treaty, except for those provisions that the People's Republic of China
have claimed for reservation."
I
I

""

This Article is interesting. On the one hand, the ITAC Rules as a whole aim to fulfill
China's obligation on a WTO-compatible judicial review, the Article in itself does not
refer to the WTO legal regime at all. What may be relevant instead is the modest

l'

I

phrase of "international treaty." Such prescription is actually consistent with China's
position towards the domestic status of WTO law, which embraces the
"transformation" of WTO law, and accordingly excludes its direct effect. From the
other, Article 9 has apparently incorporated the doctrine of"consistent interpretation,"
reflecting the efforts of the Chinese judiciary to learn from the experience of its

I•

II

counterparts in other WTO Members. As a result, the Article opens the room for the
People's court to apply WTO law in a more direct way. After all, to transform WTO
law into Chinese domestic law is rather a complex process, while the outcome of such
process (domestic legislation) may not always be in place in a timely manner. Thus,
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
945

In international judicial practice, it is customary for a domestic court to embrace the principle of

"consistent interpretation" and render its interpretation of a domestic law as consistent as possible with
the relevant international treaty. A comparative law review shows that this principle is recognized
around the world. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has put it in this way: "There is, first,
a firm and obviously sound cannon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in
ambiguous congressional action." Trans World Airlines, Inc v Franklin Mint Corp, 466 US 243 at 252
(1984).
I,
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the role of the Chinese courts in filling up any "gap" left over by the legislative bodies
is essential, as it is strongly supported by the doctrine of "consistent interpretation."

In summary, the ITAC Rules have significantly extended the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the People's Court in the field of administrative law, and strengthened
the function of judicial review in the context of international trade administration.
Moreover, the Rules for the first time have clarified a positive and cautious position of
the People's Court to carry out its duty to assure feasible and substantial fulfillment of

1,

China's WTO commitments. Undoubtedly, the issuance of the Rules symbolizes a
huge turning point in China's judicial practice in administrative law.946

Notably, the ITAC Rules merely address certain primary issues concemmg the
hearings of international trade administrative cases. For the purpose of hearing a
specific case of this type (e.g., antidumping administrative cases, anti-subsidies
administrative cases, intellectual property administrative cases), the Supreme People's
Court has also issued other decrees of judicial interpretation to provide for more
detailed procedural guidance. These include the Rules on Certain issues Related to

the Application of Law in Hearings of Antidumping Administrative Cases
("Antidumping JI"), and also, the Rules on Certain Issues Related to the Application

,L

of Law in Hearings of Anti-subsidies Administrative Cases (Anti-subsidies Jl), both
effective on January 1, 2002. On July 25, 2003, the SPC issued the Rules ofEvidence

for the Administrative Litigation ("Administrative Evidence JI'}. All these judicial
interpretations have paved the way for the Chinese courts to conduct a WTOcompatible judicial review in practice.

B.

Judicial Interpretation for TRIPs-friendly Trial Services

Within the WTO treaty system, the TRIPs Agreement is most relevant to the role of

946

LI Guoguang, supra note 890, at 17.
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the national judiciary, with its extensive coverage reaching not only judicial review,
but also civil and criminal proceedings. Upon WTO accession, it is not surprising that
the most active role of the People's Court in China's WTO compliance has been
evident in the intellectual property-concerned trail services, regardless of their legal
nature concerning the field of civil law, administrative law or, criminal law. To secure
TRIPs-friendly trial services, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) has made enormous
efforts to review the existing related judicial decrees of interpretation and issue new
ones. In fact, a campaign for this purpose had been kicked off long before China

'.:'

acceded to the WTO, and the achievements so far have been remarkable.

Many of these achievements are first dedicated to China's particular commitments
under the Accession Protocol to afford sound civil and criminal procedures and
remedies. For instance, to fulfill China's obligations to effectively implement Article

I

43 of the TRIPs Agreement (regarding "evidence"), the SPC issued Several

r

Provisions on Evidence for Civil Litigations on January 5, 2002 (as the 2002 Jis on
Civil Evidence), a month after China acceded to the WTO. To fully address the
concerns of other WTO members about China's criminal law enforcement of IP rights,

I,

and honor China's commitments to adjust the "money thresholds for bringing a
criminal action" in this regard, the SPC issued the Interpretation of Several Issues

Concerning the Particular Application of Law in the Hearings of Criminal Cases on

l

l'
I
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Intellectual Property Infringements on November 2, 2004 (as the 2004 Jis on IP
Criminal Cases, effective November 22, 2004).

Apparently, judicial interpretation of the above kind is based upon, but not limited to
the particular mandate in China's WTO accord, since it serves to provide concrete
judicial guidelines and operational rules for the overall IP-concemed trial services. It
is formulated in a broader context, covering comprehensive related issues in a more
thorough manner. The 2004 Jis on IP Criminal Cases can be cited for this purpose.
Although mainly aimed at lowering the thresholds for bringing a criminal action
against the IP-related crime, this set of judicial interpretative pronouncements does
361
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not stop there. Instead, it systematically clarifies a nwnber of other fundamental
issues concerning the criminal trial services for the IP enforcement, including:
coverage of criminalization on "online piracy," definition of the "identical trademark"
and the "usage" concerned, identification of the status of being "internationally
acknowledging," calculation of "illegal business volwne," definition of accomplice,
as well as the principles of penalization for simultaneously crimes. 947 Given this
extensive coverage, the purpose of the 2004 Jls on IP Criminal Cases has gone

,,

beyond the "transformation" of China's "criminal thresholds" obligations into
domestic law. They are more purposed to optimize China's IP-concerned criminal
trial services as a whole.

I

I.
I.
'

In issuing the formulation of judicial interpretation concerning the IP-related civil trial
services, the SPC adopts a strategic approach similar to the above.

Under the

Accession Protocol, China is committed to effectively implement or fully comply with
Article 42, 42, 45 and 46 of the TRIPs Agreement, as they set forth respectively the
standards for the "fair and equitable" civil procedures and related legal remedies.
Being procedural in nature, these obligations have been elaborated by the SPC in
many of its newly issued or revised judicial interpretation, but in an interestingly
indirect way. For most ofsuchjudicial interpretation, it does not serve to "transform"
the above procedural obligations directly, but to implement particular provisions of a
Chinese law that have served to transform China's substantive TRIPs obligations on
particular intellectual property rights.

The 2"d Amendment to the Patent Law of the PRC, effective July 1, 2001, which
constituted part of China's efforts to get ready for her WTO accession may now be
examined. Aimed to develop a TRIPs-compatible patent regime, the Amendment has
incorporated a nwnber of TRIPs provisions into the existing Patent Law. In particular,
947

LI Xiao, Understanding and Applying the "Interpretations by the SPC and SPP of Certain Issues on
the Particular Application of Law in the Hearings of Criminal Cases Related to Intellectual Property
Infringement, "4 REFERENCE TO CRIMINAL TRIAL200 {2004).
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Article 61 of the amended Patent Law provides that, any patentee or any party whose
interests are affected may bring a motion to the People's Court for the patent

•!'

infringement prevention and property preservation, should he or she prove the
existence of such patent infringement, or the potential for such infringement, as well
as the irreparable damages that would incur accordingly to his or her legitimate rights
and interests otherwise. To implement this provision and make such "provisional
measures" available, the SPC issued Several Provisions on the Application of Law in

.

the Pre-trial Prevention of Patent Infringements on June 24, 2001. To address other
amended provisions of the Patent Law, the SPC issued a more comprehensive set of
judicial interpretation, namely, Several Provisions on the Application of Law in the

Hearings of Cases Concerning Patent Disputes, effective July 2, 2001. According to
the SPC, the issuance of these decrees of judicial interpretation has marked a mile in
the establishment of China's TRIPs-friendly judicial mechanism for patent trials. 948

This is also the case with the Amended to the Trademark Law of the PRC, effective
December 1, 2001 when China officially became a WTO member. The Amendment
has incorporated a number of TRIPs obligations into the existing Trademark Law, of
which some specifically address the trial services provided by the People's Court.
The SPC has since then actively responded to these statutory changes. For instance,
Article 57 and 58 of the amended Trademark Law has incorporated the standards set

I

•

forth in Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement, providing certain "provisional measures"
for pre-trial trademark infringement prevention and evidence preservation.

To

implement these two provisions, the SPC issued the Interpretations of the Issues on

II
• I

the Application of Law in Pre-trial Prevention of the Infringements of Exclusive
Rights of Registered Trademarks and Preservation of Evidence on January 22, 2002.

I'

I

On the same day, the SPC also issued the Interpretations ofIssues on the Jurisdiction

948

Renzhen Guanche Shishi Xin Zhuanli Fa, Gongzheng Shenli Zhuanli Jiufen Anjian (Strictly

implementing and enforcing new patent law, justly hearing cases on patent disputes), at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.cn/file/2001 0702699.html. This was the SPC statement at the News
Conference for the enactment of that judicial decree of interpretation.
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and Leal Application with Regard to the Hearings of Trademark Cases, so as to
implement Article 32, 33, 43 and 49 of the amended Trademark Law. These four
statutory provisions serve to meet the TRIPs requirements for domestic judicial
review, and therefore have brought four more types of trademark administrative acts
into the scope of reviewability. Apparently, this set ofjudicial interpretation is ofboth
civil and administrative law in nature. On October 16, 2002, the SPC issued a more
thorough, comprehensive set of judicial interpretative rulings, Interpretations of
Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Hearings of Trademark-related Civil
Case, which further improved the judicial mechanism for China's trademark trial
services.

Besides, the SPC also issued some TRIPs-compatible judicial interpretations
concerning other particular intellectual property rights.

For copyrights, the SPC

issued the Interpretations of Several Issues on the Application ofLaw in the Hearings
of Civil Cases concerning Copyright Disputes, effective October 15, 2002.

On

January 8, 2004, the SPC issued the revised Interpretations of Several Issues on the
Application of Law in the Hearings of Copyright Cases Concerning Computer
Network. With these consistent, enormous efforts, the SPC has paved the way of
developing China's TRIPs-friendly trail services for all kinds of intellectual property
disputes, with their various legal nature engaged in civil law, administrative law or,
criminal law.

Discussions so far have revealed that by reviewing its existing judicial interpretations
and issuing the new ones in accordance with China's WTO commitments, the SPC
has made remarkable progress in developing a WTO-consistent judicial mechanism,
to pave the way for the people's Court to implement WTO law in daily judicial
practice.

Of course, all these available judicial interpretative rulings are not yet

exhaustive. They are either silent on certain crucial issues with regard to particular
trial services, or fail to respond to the new ones emerging from judicial developments.
Where the issues as such are already covered by the SPC, it may still remain
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questionable to what extent the judicial interpretation concerned has fully addressed
the pertinent WTO obligations.

This undesirable situation can attribute to the

incapacity of the SPC to accommodate its judicial policies to WTO requirements in a
timely manner. On many occasions, however, the problem inherent in the particular
domestic legislation designed to "transform" those WTO obligations requires the
judicial interpretation concerned merely to serve the consistent application of this
internal legislation.

China's criminal law enforcement against copyright infringements is currently the
most concern of major WTO Members about China's WTO compliance. Although
the 2004 J/s on Criminal Cases significantly lower the "monetary thresholds" and
"copy thresholds" for criminalizing copyright infringements, from the perspective of
some WTO Members (especially the U.S.), they are still too high or even should be
eliminated entirely, according to the mandate of Article 61 of the TRIPs Agreement.949
Since the requirement for such thresholds are set forth in the Criminal Law of the
PRC, the SPC can do little or nothing to remove unless and until the Criminal Law
itself is amended accordingly by the Chinese legislature (by the Standing Committee

;I
·i
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I

I

ofthe NPC).

Therefore, in most cases, the role of the SPC in implementing WTO law is restrained
by the Chinese legislature. After all, in this particular connection, the SPC serves as a
"quasi-legislative" body (not comparable to a domestic legislature), attempting to
transform WTO rules from its judicial interpretation into domestic law. Thus, the role
of the Chinese courts in the WTO implementation must be assessed not only by the
performance of the SPC, but more importantly, through the normal practice of the
People's Court.

4.

949

Judicial Practice ofthe People's Court

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 68.
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It is well established that in the context of WTO law, the role of national judiciary is

mainly confined to judicial review and judicial enforcement of intellectual property
rights.

In the case of China, such judicial practice refers to administrative trial

services involving China's WTO obligations, as well as civil and criminal trial
services relating to China's TRIPs obligations. As a result, there is a new category of
caseload for the People's Court, known as "WTO-related cases," which include both
WTO-related international trade administrative cases and TRIPs-related civil and
criminal cases.

A.

Development of the WTO-related Cases in China

Ever since China acceded to the WTO, there has not yet been a significant increase of
international trade administrative cases. According to the official statistics of the SPC,
compared to the year 2002, the first-instance administrative cases in 2003 decreased
significantly. 950 However, the situation varies with regard to cases involving foreign
trade regime.

On the one hand, customs administrative cases and import-export

inspection administrative cases dropped from 202 to 63; cases involving foreign
exchange control dropped from 9 to 3. On the other hand, patent administrative cases
increased from 138 to 243, and taxation administrative cases increased from 1150 to

,.
'•

1495. 951 Subsequently, the issuance of the ITAC Rules did not bring about any
dramatic change. As the U.S. Trade Representative recently observed, until the end of
2005, "there continues to be little data" on the cases handled by the Chinese courts
"involving administrative agency decisions relating to international trade in goods or
services or intellectual property rights," for "few foreign companies have experienced
with these courts."952
'I

950

2 REFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL REviEW 64-67 (Beijing: Law Press,

2003). Of cause, various factors contributed to this decrease, as pointed out by the SPC accordingly.
951

Id. at 64-65.

952

USTR 2005 Report, supra note 891, at 92.
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Admittedly, the USTR has exaggerated the case, since the sources relied up were so
limited. In 2001, as the official statistics of the SPC indicated, compared to the
situation in 1997, customs administrative cases increased by 3.57 times; patent
administrative cases by 3.06 times; other cases involving administrative areas like

,,
;

trademark, foreign exchange control, industrial & commercial administration,
financial administration, etc., all increased by more than double. 953 During the oneyear gap between China's WTO accession and the issuance of the ITAC Rules,
administrative actions were continuously brought before the local courts in Beijing,

J

J

Shanghai, Guangdong and other jurisdictions in China, to challenge international
administrative acts covered by the WTO legal regime. 954 This means in effort that,
even before the issuance of the ITAC Rules, China's WTO-related administrative trial

li

services had been more or less settled in practice. The past four years have witnessed
a continuous increase in international trade administrative cases. Invariably, most of

,.

them have occurred in China's developed regions, especially Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangdong Province. Among these cases, the IPR-related administrative cases have
continuously taken a lead.

II·
The IRP-related administrative cases are categorized as patent administrative cases,
trademark administrative cases and copyright administrative cases. In practice, the
I I

first two categories are more commonly seen than the third one. Prior to the

I

2nd

Amendment of the Patent Law, patent administrative cases only involved the
decisions of the Patent Re-examination Board on patents. After this Amendment took
effect on July 1, 2001, this category extends to such decisions on utility models and
design applications.955 Also, the 2001 Amendment to the Trademark Law has brought
953

I

1 REFERENCE TO ADMlNISTRATNE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (Beijing: Law Press,

~

2003).
954

LI Guoguang, supra note 890, at 12.

955

The Amendment to the Patent Law of the PRC took effective on July 151, 2001. According to
Article 41 and 46 of this amended Patent Law, "for utility models and design applications or patents,
the final decisions on re-examination and invalidation would be made by the People's court other than
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four more types of decisions of the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board under
judicial review,

956

and thus significantly expanded the category of trademark

administrative cases.

Since the Patent Re-examination Board will always be the defendant in a patent
administrative case, while the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board will always
be the defendant of a trademark administrative case, given the location of both these
central government agencies in Beijing, the No.1 Beijing Interim People's Court has
been granted the exclusive jurisdiction over these two categories of cases, which
means, patent and trademark administrative cases will be exclusively tried by the
local courts in Beijing.957 The development on these cases will be detailed in later
discussion regarding the WTO-related judicial practice of the local court system of
Beijing Municipality.

As for the IPR-related civil and criminal cases, the past years have witnessed an even
greater leap in their growth. Between 1998 and 2004, the Chinese courts decided

'I

38,228 IPR-related civil cases of first instance nationwide. Also, the courts decided
2,057 criminal cases involving IPR infringement under Section?, Chapter ill of the
"Specific Provisions" ofthe Criminal Law of the PRC, with 2,375 adjudged offenders
sentenced. Among these cases, 8,332 IPR-related civil cases and 385 criminal cases
l I

for inventions that were patented prior to the amendment." Consequently, the following patent
administrative actions may be challenged before the People's Court:
(1)

A final decision of the Patent Re-examination Board on the request for reexamination of a utility model or design applications, as the latter has been raised
by the applicant(s), patentee(s), or those who request to revoke the patent at issue;

(2)
956

A final decision of the Patent Re-examination Board on the request for a
declaration of the invalidity of a utility model or design application at issue.

This specifically refers to Article 32, 33, 43 and 49 of the amended Trademark Law. To implement

these statutory provisions, the SPC issued the Interpretations ofIssues on the Jurisdiction and Leal
Application with Regard to the Hearings of Trademark Cases on January 22, 2002.
957
WANG Zhenqing, Vice-President of Beijing High People's Court, Status ofJudicial Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights with the Beijing Court System, Speech at the News Conference for the 3nl
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were decided in 2004, with 528 adjudged offenders sentenced. 958 In 2005, the number
for civil cases continuously rose to 13,393, and criminal cases to 505, with 741
offenders sentenced.959 Sharing the same geographic feature as that of international
administrative cases, these IPR-related civil and criminal cases mainly occurred in
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and other developed regions of China.

B.

Definition of the WTO-related Cases: Implications for the
"Application" ofWTO Law by the People's Court

Emergency and growth of the "WTO-related cases" in China have enabled Chinese
courts to address WTO law in their regular practice. Whether or not this process can
be counted as the "application" of WTO law will depend on how a "WTO-related
case" is defined. According to its plain wording, the "WTO-related" qualification
suggests a connection between the case concerned and a particular WTO legal rule,
and the extent to which they may connect each other depends on the status of WTO
law under the Chinese domestic legal system.

As noted above, China is among most WTO members that reject the "direct
application" of WTO law in their domestic legal system. The Chinese government
has held a firm position of embracing the doctrine of"transformation," which in effect
excludes the possibility for the People's court directly applying WTO law.

It is

unlikely that the aggrieved parties may be allowed to bring an action on the basis of
WTO law or, the People's Court may decide a case on the basis of WTO law. Often,
what makes a WTO legal rule relevant to a case is a specific source of Chinese law
recognized as such by the People's Court, which serves to transform the related WTO
rule into Chinese law. The more Chinese law transformed the WTO rule concerned,
958
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the more the case will be determined by reference to the WTO legal order.
Nevertheless, given the availability of the domestic implementing legislation, the
People's court should always rely on it, not directly on the WTO legal regime
eonomine for even a single time.

There is another situation. If a case brought before the People's Court involves the
issues that are also covered by the WTO legal regime, there will likely be an overlap
of the governing scope between a possibly applicable Chinese law to this case, and
the pertinent WTO legal rule. This will equally lead to a connection between the case
and the WTO rule. Typical examples in this regard include antidumping and antisubsidy administrative cases, of which the subject matters (antidumping and
countervailing duties) are governed by the WTO AD Agreement and CVD Agreement
Intellectual property administrative cases are also included, since they apparently fall
within the coverage of the TRIPs Agreement.

For these WTO-related cases, the

applicable Chinese law may not be available or yet in place, which may leave room
for the People's Court to "take as reference" (not even "rely on") the pertinent WTO
rule, with the same legal effect as if it is in actual fact applying these WTO rules. The
doctrine of "consistent interpretation" represents a specific case in this regard, where
the applicable domestic law is available, but too vague to provide for any meaningful,
practical guidance.

Since the term "WTO-related" bears different meanings, the WTO-related cases can
be differently defined. If it refers to a case where the People's Court expressly relies
on WTO law, there has not yet been one, and there will unlikely be one in the future.
It may also refer to a case where the People's Court could address the WTO legal
regime, or interpret WTO law using its own reasoning, or even take WTO law as
reference in the absence of a comparable domestic legal basis. The preceding study of
international trade administrative cases and IPR-related civil and criminal cases will
fall within this category, with an increasing number. At this stage, it is necessary to
clarify the meaning of the "application" ofWTO law by the People's Court. For the
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pwpose of the present chapter, to "apply'' WTO law means the People's Court will
"interpret" the particular WTO legal rule for various pwposes, e.g., for clarifying any
issue raised by parties with reference to a particular WTO legal rule, for interpreting
the applicable domestic legal rule to implement this WTO rule, or, for developing the
Court's reasoning in the absence of any available domestic legal basis. None of these
instances falls within the category of "direct application" of WTO law, while each of
them calls for the ordinary function of the courts to apply law.

No doubt, the

expansion of such "application" will enhance China's domestic implementation of
WTOlaw.

C.

Hearings of WTO-related Cases: Case-study of the
Application of WTO Law by the People's Court

Discussions so far have indicated that only in the hearing of a WTO-related case will
the People's Court be likely to encounter the issue of applying WTO law. In fact, the
availability of such an occasion depends on the subject matter of the case involved,
the compatibility of the applicable domestic law (if is any) with the pertinent WTO
rule, or, the substance (''judicialibility") of any WTO rule that may be relevant to the
case.

(1)

IPR-related Criminal and Civil cases

Applying the above criteria, the IPR-related criminal cases will be the most unlikely
occasion where the People's Court could even address China's TRIPs obligations
(specifically, Article 61 of the TRIPs Agreement). The subject matter of this type of
WTO-related cases involves criminal law, most sensitive legal field to any nation state,
which exclusively falls within national competence of the state. There is no reason
for the People's Court to disregard the current Chinese Criminal legislation, even
though the latter is allegedly inconsistent with the requirements of the Article 61 of
the TRIPs Agreement. Besides, the procedural nature of those TRIPs obligations
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makes it unfeasible for the People's Court to apply them to any particular case.

Nor will the IPR-related civil cases leave much room for the People's Court to apply
the TRIPs legal regime, even though it is in substance judicatable under Chinese law.
As noted above, in terms of transforming WTO law into Chinese domestic law,
China's legislative framework for civil law enforcement of IPR has been the most
convincing example, given its great compatibility with the TRIPs Agreement.
Consequently, in the hearing of an IPR-related civil case, the People's Court has no
need to address the TRIPs obligations at all, since the domestic IPR legal regime has
full coverage of the situation. What is left for the Court to figure out is how to apply
the relevant Chinese IPR law properly. Should this task be achieved, the People's
Court will fully satisfy its role in implementing WTO law, specifically, the TRIPs
Agreement.

At this point, it is necessary to recall China's specific commitments towards the
TRIPs Agreement.

Especially, according to paragraph 305 of the Working Party

Report, China is committed to "fully apply the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement"

upon its accession to the WTO, given "the advanced state of protection for intellectual
property rights in China." Frankly speaking, whether the IPR protection in China has
reached an "advanced" status remains controversial. However, that is no dispute that
the Chinese IPR legislation has been well-established, and highly-compatible with the
TRIPs Agreement. Thus, to "fully apply the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement" is
clearly a task of the responsible and competent Chinese administrative and judicial
bodies. This inevitably puts a heavy burden upon the People's Court to provide
TRIPs-consistent civil and criminal trial services, an issue that can never be resolved
simply by applying the TRIPs Agreement.

(2)

WTO-related International 'fiade Administrative
Case

372

International trade administrative cases, as categorized by Article 1 of the ITAC Rules
of the SPC, include, but are not limited to, those involving the WTO legal regime. In
a

"WTO-related"

international

trade

administrative

case,

the

challenged

administrative act is covered by the particular WTO rule, regardless of the availability
of a comparable domestic legislation. If such domestic legislation is not available, the
People's Court may resort to the pertinent WTO rule for its decision.

If that

legislation is not available, given the overlap between its governing scope and that of
the WTO rule concerned, the People's Court may still interpret WTO rules in aid of
domestic legislation.

Accordingly, compared with IPR-related civil and criminal

cases (which merely involve a single WTO legal regime, TRIPs Agreement), WTOrelated international administrative cases have left more room for the People's Court
to apply WTO law. Thus, for a case-study of the application of WTO law by the
People Court, it would be much more plausible to take the Court's judicial practice on
WTO-related international trade administrative cases, than IPR-related civil and
criminal cases.

As noted above, ever since China joined the WTO in December 2001, the growth of
WTO-related international trade administrative cases has been modest, with
intellectual property administrative cases consistently taking a lead. Most of these
cases occurred in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong Province, given their political
essence or economic significance throughout the whole country.

The following

section will focus on the judicial practice of the local court system in each of these
three regions. In this context, it should be noted that for the cases released to the
public, it is difficult to discuss whether the related WTO legal rules were applied by
the presiding courts, since the available information on them seldom mentioned such
details. As an alternative approach, this author will resort to both the position of the
above local court systems towards the domestic status of WTO law, as well as the
particular cases determined by them.
J
{,

(a)

li

Local court system of Beijing Municipality

I
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Beijing Municipality High People's Court (as "Beijing High Court") oversees two
interim courts and district courts all over the administrative territory of Beijing
Municipality. According to Beijing High Court, as the Capital of China, Beijing
Municipality accommodates all central government agencies, including those playing
a leading role in the implementation of China's comprehensive WTO obligations, e.g.,
Ministry of Commerce, General Customs Administration, State Council Tariff
Commission, State Intellectual Property Office, etc. 960 Under the Administrative
Litigation Law (ALL), a competent court may assert jurisdiction over an
administrative case, so long as the location of the defendant(s) fall within its
jurisdiction. As the ITAC Rules of the SPC further provide, for the purpose of an
"international trade administrative cases," the competent interim courts, or those at
the above level must serve as the court of the first instance. Consequently, any action
against an administrative act of the above administrative agencies may only be
brought before either of the two interim courts in Beijing, or brought directly to the
Beijing Municipality High People's Court as directed. These specially refer to such
WTO-related administrative

~ases

as antidumping and anti-subsidies administrative

cases, patent and trademark administrative cases, and other administrative cases
concerning import-export inspection, quarantine procedures and non-tariff barrier
measures. 961

As the Beijing High Court forecast in 2003, upon China's WTO accession, WTOrelated international trade administrative cases would continue to increase, with more
and more new issues and environments. According to the survey of the High Court, a
few antidumping and anti-subsidy cases, custom valuation cases, or those cases
involving import-export inspection, quarantine procedures and non-tariff barrier
measures might emerge in its lower courts, with their number remaining modest.
960
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Given the recent amendments to the Patent Law and Trademark Law, cases involving
administrative review of legal status of patent and trademark would increase
significantly for a short run. As the High Court fully acknowledged, upon the WTO
accession, the Beijing Court System was likely to shoulder most of the caseload for
WTO-related international administrative cases.962

Considering these challenges, the Beijing High Court contended that China's WTO
accession already put an enormous pressure on the Beijing Court System in the
context of a WTO-compatible judicial review. Tiris suggested a great opportunity for
the local courts to optimize their administrative trial services, but also posed
tremendous challenges to these courts. To meet these challenges, the Beijing High
Court proposed two principles to guide the hearings of WTO-related administrative
cases. One was to maintain the consistency of judicial practice, especially in terms of
the "WTO-related" administrative trial services. The other is to safeguard the national
economy by properly balancing the government policy goals and the mandates of
law.963

In 2002, a Shenzhen-based trading company brought an action before the No.2
Beijing Interim People's Court against the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC, which is now replaced by the Ministry of Commerce,
MOFCOM).

In this case, the plaintiff, Haohe Automobile trading company of

Shenzhen City, requested the Court to grant a motion for the defendant to issue a
license for import of electronic machinery products.

Subsequently, the plaintiff

withdrew the case upon its own initiative. 964 The case was quite unique, for the
defendant was a leading central government agency responsible for the
implementation of China's WTO commitments. Also, as the High Court contended, a
case as such involved both China's state policies and the WTO legal rules for a
962

963
964

!d. at 21-22.
/d.
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specific importation, which in deed complicated the whole situation, by making it
very difficult for the court to identify the issue in question. 965

Another similar case occurred in the same year. The plaintiff was a Shanghai-based
metal manufacturer limited company, suing the State General Administration for
Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) for administrative
compensation.

The case was remarkable in that the defendant was the central

government agency in charge of the state policies and procedures for the compliance
with the WTO's TBT Agreement. Moreover, the plaintiff raised issues concerning
certain WTO legal rules, e.g., transparency, market access and fair competition, which
mandated the law enforcement authorities like the AQSIQ to maintain uniformity of
their administrative acts. 966 Unfortunately, the court decisions on both these cases are
not available to this author.

It is said that in 2003, a Taiwanese importer filed an antidumping administrative

action before the No.2 Beijing Intermediate Court, which was supposed to be China's
first antidumping administrative case. Due to some political sensitivity, the case was
dismissed quickly. The presiding court failed to give any reasoning for this dismissal.
This is a big frustration, not only to the Chinese trade law practitioners, but also to the
Chinese judges devoting themselves to the administrative trial services. 967

However, the development in the IPR-related administrative cases may bring in some
hopes in the future. As noted above, due to the geographic features of the challenged
administrative agencies, patent and trademark administrative cases fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the No.1 Beijing Intermediate People's Court. During the
first eight months after the Amendment to the Patent Law took effect, 60 patent
administrative cases were filed before this Court, three times the number in the
965
966
967
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previous year. Among these 60 cases, 17 involved utility models, and 1 involved
design applications, both subject matters are brought under judicial review in
accordance with the new Patent Law. 968 By the end of 2002, the Beijing Court
System had commenced 194 patent administrative cases, accounting for 20% of its
caseload as a whole. By April 2003, this number jumped to more than 200, with most
cases involving utility models and design applications. 969 As the Beijing High Court
predicted, this category will continue to expand significantly in the near future.

Notably, to the knowledge of this author, there have been few patent administrative
cases involving foreign elements. One "high-profile" exception was initiated by a
Japanese company Honda Motor in 2002. In this case, Honda Motor challenged the
adverse final decision of the Patent Re-examination Board to invalidate its design
application (KCW) for the motorcycle products. After the No.1 Beijing Intermediate
People's Court ruled the case, the plaintiff appealed to the Beijing High Court. 970
Regardless of the final court decision (which has not yet been available to this author),
·the case itself has been significant enough, since its came out immediately after
China's WTO membership had been officially endorsed.

Subsequently, both the

judgment of the trial court and that of the appellate court were translated into Japanese,
and distributed among the intellectual property industries in Japan. 971

Ever since the Amendment of the Trademark Law, the No.1 Beijing Intermediate
People's Court has tried a number of trademark administrative cases. Right after the
promulgation of the amended Trademark Law, that Court commenced the first case of
this kind, where the plaintiff, Beijing Hengsheng Far-eastern Computer Group
challenged the decision of the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board to reject its
968
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request for a review of a registered trademark "Hengsheng" owned by the third party,

Bejing Hengsheng Technology & Development Company. The defendant based its
decision on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to file its request within the statutory
time limit. After the trial court rendered the verdict, the plaintiff appealed to the
Beijing High Court.

In December 2002, the appellate court ruled to uphold the

challenged administrative measure of the defendant. 972

Beginning from the "Hengsheng" case, there have been more and more trademark
administrative cases before the Beijing Court System. Quite a few of them involved
significant foreign elements. In December 2003, the No.1 Interim People's Court of
Beijing decided two high-profile cases of this kind. The plaintiffs in both cases were
famous transnational companies: one was the US-based "Johnson & Johnson," the
other was the Japan-based "Shiseido."973

In the "Johnson & Johnson" case, the plaintiff challenged the decision of the
Trademark Review and Adjudication Board to support a registered trademark
"CAREFUL," which was owned by a Chinese company, Zhejiang Kang Fu Ya
Company.

As the plaintiff alleged, "CAREFUL" had been in conflict with its

trademark "CAREFREE." The Court upheld the decision of defendant, ruling that the
two registered trademarks were not similar enough to confuse the consumers. 974

In the "Sheseido" case, the plaintiff challenged the decision of the Trademark Review
and Adjudication Board to reject its request for a review of a decision of the local
trademark office, the latter had denied its original application for the registration of its
trademark "BENEFIQUE." The Court supported the position of the plaintiff, vacated

972
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the challenged decision of the defendant. 975 The appellate and final court decisions
for both cases are not available to this author.

It is highly expected that for a time being, patent and trademark administrative cases

will continue to take a prominence among various categories of "WTO-related"
administrative cases, in terms of both quantities and qualities. This trend will enhance
the predominant role of the Beijing Court System in the implementation ofWTO law.
Also, it may more or less wipe off much skepticism about the functioning of China's
WTO-compatible judicial review, especially by those who claimed China's absence
and dearth of "WTO-related" administrative cases.

(b)

Local court system of Shanghai Municipality

Like its Beijing counterpart, the Shanghai Court System equally holds an optimistic
and enthusiastic attitude towards the application of WTO law.

Although

acknowledging that the Beijing Court System is in the "forefront" of the "WTOrelated" administrative trial services, the Shanghai Municipality High People's Court
(as "Shanghai High Court") still stresses its "territorial advantages" that may
significantly contribute to the development of China's WTO-compatible judicial
review. 976

According to the Shanghai High Court, Shanghai Municipality - serving as the
"frontier" of China's "open-door" movements and economic reforms- has become
the centre of the Chinese economy, especially in the field of finance and international
trade. The municipality possesses some "absolute advantages," especially in terms of
its abundant resources for settling administrative law disputes involving import &
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management of capital, market adjustment & monitor, and other measures for the
protection of legitimate rights of private parties. As the High Court forecast, upon
China's WTO accession, local administrative authorities in Shanghai would be
expected to re-adjust their trade-related measures significantly. Inevitably, the WTOconcemed administrative law disputes would increase, and therefore constituted a
new landscape of administrative trial services provided by the Shanghai Court
System. 977

As the Shanghai High Court acknowledged, for the "WTO-related" administrative
cases handled by the Shanghai Court System, most of them were rather "indirectly"
connected to the WTO legal regime, in contrast to those handled by the Beijing Court
System.

Nevertheless, the High Court asserted that, given the far-reaching and

profound impact of the WTO accession on China's overall system of judicial review,
local administrative trial services furnished by the Shanghai Court System would still
be "directly" linked to WTO law. The High Court particularly referred to China's
market access commitments concerning finance, insurance, telecommunication,
transportation, tourism and other sectors of trade in services, predicting that many
"WTO-related" administrative cases brought before the Shanghai Court System
would involve the above substantive areas, although the absolute number of these
cases might not be so remarkable in a short run. 978

In practice, the Shanghai Court System has ruled on several "high-profile" WTOrelated administrative cases.

As early as in 2001, a local court in Shanghai

commenced an administrative case that would possibly involve China's market access
obligations under the WTO.

In this case, the plaintiff was a foreign financial

enterprise, who challenged the decision of local administration to reject its application
for a permit to open local banking business. Although the court decision for this case
is not available to the public, the case itself has been significant enough, since it was
977
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possibly related to China's market access commitments on banking services.979

Another WTO-related administrative case was concerned with customs valuation,
heard by the No.2 Shanghai Interim People's Court in September 2001. In this case,
the plaintiff, Jiangxi Ke Jia Li Technology & Development Limited Company,
challenged an adverse decision of Shanghai Customs Services on the customs
evaluation of its imported electronic products. According to the defendant's decision,
the plaintiff's importation had been valued at USD$200 per unit, leading to a tariff at
15% tariff rate and a value-added taxation (VAT) at 17% VAT rate levied on the
plaintiff. The Court upheld the position of the defendant, ruling that the challenged
customs determination was based upon substantial evidences and in accordance with
the relevant law and regulations. 980

(c)

Local court system of Guangdong Province

Compared with their counterparts in Beijing and Shanghai, the Guangdong Court
System takes a more modest and pragmatic position towards the application of WTO

I I•

'I

law, also the released official statistics shows that its role in operating the WTOcompatible judicial review has been much significant and active.

As the Guangdong Provincial High People's Court (as "Guangdong High Court'')
reported in 2003, that long before China's accession to the WTO, some of its lower
courts had decided a number of WTO-related administrative cases.

After China

acceded to the WTO, local courts within the province already ruled eight such cases,
six in Shenzhen and two in Guangzhou. All of them were customs valuation cases,
where the plaintiffs (importers) challenged the determinations of the local customs
services on the value of their imported goods.

From the perspective of the

Guangdong High Court, these were typical "WTO-related" administrative cases. The
919

/d.
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High Court then expected a continuous increase of such cases within its
jurisdiction.981

Besides, the Guangdong High Court also reported some other WTO-related
administrative cases handled by its lower courts, which mainly involved foreign
investment activities. Although these cases were decided differently on their merits,
the responses of the affected foreign investors to those court decisions were quite
positive.

Some even increased their investment in Guangdong afterwards. On this

basis, the High Court concluded that in the field of foreign investment, the WTOcompatible administrative trial services would significantly contribute to a favorable
legal environment, and therefore attract more foreign investors for local economy. 982

Conclusion

Due to above empirical study, both Chinese legislature and the judiciary have played
an important role in China's implementation of WTO obligations. The more crucial
their role in this regard, the closer China will move towards the "commercial rule of
law" that is essential to a favorable legal environment for trading and investing
activities within and from without China.

Nevertheless, the significance and

enhancement of such a role largely depend on the extent to which the Chinese
government (mainly represented by the executive body) may engage in the operation
of the WTO institution, especially in regard to the WTO's dispute settlement
mechanism, which will lead to the interplay between international and domestic
enforcement mechanisms. After all, both Chinese legislature and the judiciary serve
to "smooth out" China's "WTO inconsistency" as originally alleged by foreign traders
and investors, and later developed into a confrontation between China and other WTO
Members. When more and more trade disputes are brought to the surface, or even
before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, the issue of domestic
981
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implementation will emerge, and sooner or later, the role of the Chinese legislature
and the Chinese judiciary will stand out.

By now, China has not yet been advanced very far. The past four years witnessed a
rather "peaceful" transition of China from a new comer into a fully-engaged
Membership, where, as acknowledged by other WTO Members,

China's

"commitments that were easiest fulfilled have largely been fulfilled." 983 For many
commitments that are still outstanding, they have been "tenderly" treated by China

. I;

I'
'

and its counterparts in the WTO through bilateral or multilateral negotiations, without
being referred to the WTO's DSB.

Consequently, "transformation" of WTO

obligations was basically on China's own accord, with enormous technical difficulties
and inefficient practice ahead. "Application" of WTO rules was a rare case, given a
comparatively light caseload involving WTO legal regime, an inexperienced judicial
practice in this regard, as well as a developing court system subject to numerous
criticisms.

Nevertheless, China cannot stay in the stage of "peaceful transition" for good. Today,
other WTO Members are pushing this transition to a close. Their position was fully
addressed by Ambassador Karan K. Bhatia, Deputy USTR in his recent testimony
before the Commission of Finance of the U.S. Senate, where he proclaimed that
"China's transition period as a new participant in the international trading systemand, in particular, the WTO - must now come to a close, and China must act and be
treated as a fully accountable participant in and beneficiary of the international trading
system." As he continued, "[l]ike any stakeholder, China must find a way to pursue
its own self-interest while also adhering to, and helping to shape, the policies and
institutions that undergird its own growing prosperity and the prosperity of its trading
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partners." 984

This may explain a recent WTO case against China's regulations on imported auto
parts, which was jointly filed by the U.S. and the EC on March 30, 2006, "sweeping
aside diplomatic niceties weeks before a visit of the Chinese president to

'I

Washington."985 It may also explain the consistently tough position of the U.S. and
Japan towards China's IPR enforcement, which may lead to another WTO case
against China soon, despite the latter's successive, substantive concessions already
made. Over the past four years, China's role in the WTO dispute settlement process
has been inactive. Until the latest "auto parts" dispute, China played the part of the
complainant (third party) before the WTO's DSB for only once, as well as a
respondent for only twice. Since early this year, however, China has encountered two
WTO challenges, which will likely be followed by future complaints. Obviously, as
China embarks on its fifth year of the WTO accession, other WTO Members become
more aggressive in using the WTO enforcement mechanism to open China's market.
This inevitably imposes enormous challenges to China's capacity to implement its
WTO obligations.

These challenges will affect the Chinese legislature and judiciary significantly. At
least, directed at China's legislative and judicial system, the dispute over China's IPR
enforcement has placed the Chinese legislative bodies and courts in the spotlight of
the international trading community. With their IPR practice tested by the WTO,
Chinese legislative bodies and courts will play a leading role in China's WTO
implementation, particularly in terms of the TRIPs Agreement.
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actions against China, their merits can be administrative m nature, with little
relevance to Chinese legislative activities or judicial practice.

However,

implementation of a WTO decision on any of these disputes may still depend on the
domestic transformation process, or, domestic judicial proceedings. As noted above,
the U.S. and the EC has developed certain legislative and judicial practice in this
regard. To China, this moment has yet to come, which, nevertheless, does not suggest
that the Chinese legislative bodies and courts can do nothing but wait with hands
folded. Particular, the Chinese courts may start with each single "WTO-related" case.
This reminds us a famous saying ofMao Zedong, founder of the People's Republic of
China, that "a spark may bum the whole grass."
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